McGill Financial Ltd. v. Kristin McGill

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 14, 2025
Docket01-24-00101-CV
StatusPublished

This text of McGill Financial Ltd. v. Kristin McGill (McGill Financial Ltd. v. Kristin McGill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGill Financial Ltd. v. Kristin McGill, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Opinion issued January 14, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00101-CV ——————————— MCGILL FINANCIAL LTD., Appellant V. KRISTIN MCGILL, Appellee

On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 4 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 515,128

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McGill Financial Ltd. filed this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s

order granting a temporary injunction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 51.014(a)(4) (authorizing appeal from grant or refusal of temporary injunction). Because the temporary injunction has expired, we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to

hear this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Background

McGill Financial appeals from the trial court’s temporary injunction order

signed on February 2, 2024. The order stated that “unless terminated earlier, [the

order] shall remain in full force and effect until March 26, 2024 at 2:30 p.m.” Thus,

the order expired on March 26, 2024.

On October 31, 2024, the Clerk of this Court issued a notice of intent to

dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a) (authorizing

court to dismiss appeal for lack of jurisdiction after giving ten days’ notice to

parties). The notice requested supplemental briefing from the parties concerning the

jurisdictional issue. The deadline to respond has passed, and neither party has filed

a response.

Appellate Jurisdiction

A suit becomes moot when there is no longer a justiciable controversy

between the parties or when the parties no longer have a legally cognizable stake in

the outcome. State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018); Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). Mootness occurs

when events make it impossible to grant the relief requested or otherwise affect the

parties’ rights or interests. Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 6. Mootness can occur at any time,

2 including on appeal. Id. When a case becomes moot, the court loses subject-matter

jurisdiction. Id.; Jones, 1 S.W.3d at 86 (“Appellate courts are prohibited from

deciding moot controversies.”).

When a temporary injunction expires and thus no longer exists, an appeal

challenging the validity of the order becomes moot. Jones, 1 S.W.3d at 86; Parr v.

Stockwell, 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. 1959) (per curiam); Jordan v. Landry’s

Seafood Rest., Inc., 89 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.

denied) (op. on reh’g). In this circumstance, we must dismiss the appeal. Jordan, 89

S.W.3d at 741; see Ellington Indus. Park 25A v. Denenburg, 642 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ) (dismissing appeal from temporary

injunction as moot because temporary injunction had already expired by its own

terms). Texas appellate courts routinely apply this well-established law. E.g., Saroj

Haddington, LLC v. Puckett, No. 01-22-00066-CV, 2022 WL 2976227, at *1–2

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 28, 2022, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.)

(dismissing appeal from temporary injunction order that became moot by expiration

of order during pendency of appeal); Roswell v. Cleaver-Brooks Sales & Serv., Inc.,

No. 14-19-00673-CV, 2020 WL 897101, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

Feb. 25, 2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (same); Stone v. Glazier Foods Co.,

No. 01-09-00042-CV, 2009 WL 3152187, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Oct. 1, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (same).

3 The temporary injunction at issue in this appeal expired by its own terms in

March 2024. Consequently, there no longer exists a justiciable controversy between

the parties with respect to the temporary injunction. Any ruling from this Court

would not affect the parties’ rights or interests. See Jones, 1 S.W.3d at 86 (“When a

temporary injunction becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties or

the passage of time, the issue of its validity is also moot.”). This appeal is therefore

moot, and we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal.

Conclusion

We dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Guiney.

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Related

Jordan v. Landry's Seafood Restaurant, Inc.
89 S.W.3d 737 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Parr v. Stockwell
322 S.W.2d 615 (Texas Supreme Court, 1959)
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones
1 S.W.3d 83 (Texas Supreme Court, 1999)
State v. Paul Reed Harper
562 S.W.3d 1 (Texas Supreme Court, 2018)
Ellington Industrial Park 25A v. Denenburg
642 S.W.2d 8 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1982)

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McGill Financial Ltd. v. Kristin McGill, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgill-financial-ltd-v-kristin-mcgill-texapp-2025.