McElvane v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

McElvane v. State

553 So. 2d 321, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2776, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 6822, 1989 WL 145754

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedDecember 4, 1989

DocketNo. 89-1827

StatusPublished

This text of 553 So. 2d 321 (McElvane v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McElvane v. State, 553 So. 2d 321, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2776, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 6822, 1989 WL 145754 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989).

Pincite

Opinion

SHIVERS, Chief Judge.

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for post conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.

Appellant pled guilty to theft and burglary charges and signed a form entitled “plea of guilty and negotiated sentence” indicating, inter alia, (1) that he freely and voluntarily negotiated a sentence of 6½ years, (2) that he gave up his right to trial by pleading guilty, and (3) that he and his attorney further discussed the case and he fully understands the case and is satisfied with the services of his attorney.

Appellant filed a motion for post conviction relief which the court denied for the reason that he signed this form. The court attached this form to its order. We affirm on the authority of Oatsvall v. State, 444 So.2d 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) where this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a 3.850 motion and attached to its order a waiver and consent form showing that the appellant “was informed of his rights, knew the maximum penalty, knowingly waived the jury trial, and pled freely and voluntarily.” Id. at 561.

We note a different result may have been reached by the Second District in light of its opinion in Davis v. State, 468 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) in which it reversed and remanded the trial court’s denial of a 3.850 motion where the trial court had denied the motion stating that all the grounds in the motion were moot due to the attached, written plea agreement. The Second District held that “[t]he written plea agreement, if voluntarily entered, would support the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion. However, we cannot determine from the written plea agreement alone whether defendant voluntarily pled guilty.” Id. at 443.

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

SHIVERS, Chief Judge.

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for post conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.

Appellant pled guilty to theft and burglary charges and signed a form entitled “plea of guilty and negotiated sentence” indicating, inter alia, (1) that he freely and voluntarily negotiated a sentence of 6½ years, (2) that he gave up his right to trial by pleading guilty, and (3) that he and his attorney further discussed the case and he fully understands the case and is satisfied with the services of his attorney.

Appellant filed a motion for post conviction relief which the court denied for the reason that he signed this form. The court attached this form to its order. We affirm on the authority of Oatsvall v. State, 444 So.2d 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) where this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a 3.850 motion and attached to its order a waiver and consent form showing that the appellant “was informed of his rights, knew the maximum penalty, knowingly waived the jury trial, and pled freely and voluntarily.” Id. at 561.

We note a different result may have been reached by the Second District in light of its opinion in Davis v. State, 468 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) in which it reversed and remanded the trial court’s denial of a 3.850 motion where the trial court had denied the motion stating that all the grounds in the motion were moot due to the attached, written plea agreement. The Second District held that “[t]he written plea agreement, if voluntarily entered, would support the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion. However, we cannot determine from the written plea agreement alone whether defendant voluntarily pled guilty.” Id. at 443.

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

553 So. 2d 321, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2776, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 6822, 1989 WL 145754, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcelvane-v-state-fladistctapp-1989.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack