RAKER, Judge.
In this appeal, we must decide whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search and seizure warrant. Appellant maintains that the warrant was a defective anticipatory warrant, and was not supported by probable cause. Even if Appellant is correct that the warrant was flawed, or that it lacked probable cause, suppression of the evidence would not be an appropriate remedy in light of the principles set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). We further conclude that the verdict was supported with sufficient evidence to convince a trier of fact of the Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we shall affirm.
I.
Appellant David McDonald was convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.) Article 27, § 286(a)(1),1 and of possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of § 287(a). His conviction arose out of the following facts. During a random parcel [457]*457check in San Diego, California, on March 8, 1994, James Davis, a United Parcel Service (UPS) prevention loss representative opened a package and found a large quantity of marijuana. The address on the package was 4403 Jupiter Street, Rockville, Maryland, and the addressee was James Master. The affidavit in support of the search warrant indicated that the return address on the package label was Phil Waters, 1222 Reed Street, San Diego, California 92109. UPS officials contacted Detective Ron Featherly of the San Diego Police Department, who arranged to have the package sent to the Maryland State Police. Upon receipt of the package, Trooper Christopher Tideberg of the Maryland State Police inspected the contents and found eight separate bundles of marijuana. The packaging and contents weighed approximately eighteen pounds.
After he inspected the contents of the package, Trooper Tideberg confirmed from the United States Postal Inspection Service in San Diego that the return address on the package was an actual address in San Diego, California. He then initiated a subscriber check with Bell Atlantic and the Potomac Electric Power Company, and identified the service subscribers for 4403 Jupiter Street as Joe Lopez and Philip D. Porter. A further check of the names Joe Lopez, Phillip D. Porter, and James. Master through the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) and Maryland Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) databases failed to reveal any information about these individuals.
The next day, Trooper Tideberg applied to a judge of the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Harford County, for a warrant to search 4403 Jupiter Street, Rockville, Montgomery County, Maryland. See Birchead v. State, 317 Md. 691, 699, 566 A.2d 488, 491-92 (1989) (holding that a District Court judge has “territorial jurisdiction” to issue a search warrant for execution in any county of the State). As the basis for probable cause to search the premises, Trooper Tideberg represented in the affidavit: 1) his experience in drug enforcement; 2) the facts relating to the discovery of the package and its transportation from the State of California to Maryland; [458]*458and 3) the substance of his investigation of 4403 Jupiter Street.2 He further stated in the affidavit:
The San Diego Police Department was advised by Corporal Welkner that the Maryland State Police Support Services Division Drug Interdiction Unit would attempt to conduct a controlled delivery of the package [to 4403 Jupiter Street].
The District Court judge issued the search and seizure warrant on March 11, 1994. The warrant authorized the police to search 4403 Jupiter Street and to seize items listed in [459]*459Exhibit A attached to the warrant.3 Neither the warrant nor the application for the warrant conditioned the execution of the warrant on a controlled delivery, nor does the record reflect that the police were directed to condition the execution of the warrant on a controlled delivery of the package.
Nonetheless, the police prepared to deliver the package to the residence at 4403 Jupiter Street before they executed the warrant. Troopers Tideberg and Hurley installed an electronic monitoring device into the package, designed to emit a signal when the package was opened.4 The police conducted a [460]*460fifteen- to twenty-minute surveillance of the residence before they attempted to deliver the package.
At 5:00 p.m. on March 11, 1994, Maryland State Police Trooper Roger W. Snyder, dressed as a UPS delivery person, attempted to deliver the package to 4403 Jupiter Street. No one answered the door. At 6:00 p.m., Trooper Snyder tried again. Appellant opened the door and accepted the package. He signed for the package, using the name Mickey Michaels,5 and carried it inside the house.
Approximately one-half hour after the delivery, the police entered the house. In the hallway of the second floor, they discovered McDonald and Lopez in the process of opening the package. The police searched the residence. The warrant return stated that, among other things, the police seized documents, $780 in cash from a pair of trousers in a bedroom, rolling papers, a marijuana pipe, and the package containing the marijuana.
McDonald was indicted by the Grand Jury for Montgomery County for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance and possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of §§ 286(a)(1) and 287(a) respectively. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized under the warrant. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County held a hearing on September 16,1994.
At the hearing, McDonald argued that a single package bearing the address of his residence was not alone sufficient to provide probable cause to issue the search warrant. He argued:
[The warrant] is overly broad. There is nothing else, there is no surveillance—or surveillance that indicates any drug trafficking. There is no prior history of any of the people. [461]*461They can’t even determine who the people are who are living there.
He also argued that the warrant was defective as an anticipatory warrant6 because its execution was not conditioned upon the completion of a controlled delivery. Because of this flaw in the warrant, McDonald argued, there was no probable cause to believe that contraband would be at the house at the time the police executed the warrant.
The State argued that the search warrant was not an anticipatory warrant, and that the police had probable cause to search 4403 Jupiter Street without a controlled delivery of the package. The State argued that police experience, the interception of the package, the large quantity of drugs contained in the package, and the fact that the package was sent to a fictitious addressee all provided a basis for probable cause. In the alternative, based on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the State argued that the police relied on the warrant in “objective good faith,” and under those circumstances, suppression of the evidence is inappropriate.
The circuit court denied the motion to suppress. The court found that the warrant was not an anticipatory warrant because probable cause “exist[ed] regardless of the delivery of the package.” The court stated:
[I]t ... is apparent to the Court that the reliability and the expectation that the contingent event, that is the delivery of the package, was very high with the reviewing Judge.
[W]hat was required here was the delivery by an appropriate delivery person to the address in question to which the package had been addressed. This is contrasted to anticipatory events such as a controlled buy of a controlled [462]*462dangerous substance, which may or may not take place, and there are many reasons why they may or may not be successful.
That is much different than simply what I consider the ministerial duty of delivering the package and thereafter executing the warrant.
The reviewing court also found that the warrant was not overbroad, reasoning that the application requested permission to seize only those items related to the drug trade. The court continued:
Here, by candid admission by the State, the State is in reliance only upon the training and experience of the police officer and not upon any objective indicia received by that officer or that trooper ... in advance of the application for the warrant.
[This application] is a request for that kind of item [or] material which is commonly found in the drug milieu and particularly the milieu surrounding the use of marijuana, the Court finds that the Schedule A in connection with the application and affidavit is not overly broad.
That the items that are indicated there are legitimate items that relate to, or could relate to the exercise of drug trade which would be consistent with the delivery of and receipt of, by someone at the address, [of] a large quantity of marijuana.
Appellant was convicted by a jury on both counts in the indictment. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals, and we granted a writ of certiorari on our own motion prior to consideration by that court.
II.
Appellant contends before this Court that the search warrant in this case was an anticipatory warrant and was per se unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He also asserts that [463]*463anticipatory warrants are impermissible under § 551,7 the statutory provision governing the issuance and content of search warrants. Alternatively, Appellant contends that even if anticipatory warrants are permissible, this anticipatory warrant was invalid because its execution was not conditioned upon a controlled delivery, and because the package was not on a sure course for delivery to James Master. Finally, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction.
The State maintains that this warrant was not an anticipatory warrant, but was instead a search warrant supported by probable cause that could have been executed properly before the delivery of the package.8 The State further contends that even if the warrant were invalid, the evidence was admissible because, under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this case.
We agree with the State that the warrant at issue in this case was not an anticipatory warrant. We also agree the Leon good faith exception applies in this case, and accordingly, that the evidence was properly admitted.
III.
Although the Appellant argues that anticipatory warrants are per se unconstitutional because they are not supported by probable cause at the time they are issued, we need [464]*464not decide this issue because this warrant was not an anticipatory warrant. The warrant states:
I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that there is now being concealed certain property, namely books, ledgers, records, receipts, bank statements, and other traceable proceeds relating to illegal drug activities on the above-described and that the foregoing grounds for application for issuance of the Search Warrant exist and is attached hereto and made a part hereof.
A fair, nontechnical reading of the warrant leads to the conclusion that the issuing judge found probable cause that a drug trafficking operation was ongoing based on a single box containing eighteen pounds of marijuana and addressed to a fictitious addressee. Knowledge of the fact that the delivery of the package had not yet occurred, in conjunction with the statement, “I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that there is now being concealed,” strongly suggests that the issuing judge found that there was probable cause to search 4403 Jupiter at the time of issuance without regard to the delivery of the package.
An anticipatory warrant is a search warrant “ ‘that has been issued before the necessary events have occurred which will allow a constitutional search of the premises.’ ” State v. Lee, 330 Md. 320, 328, 624 A.2d 492, 496 (1993) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Grant v. United States, 493 U.S. 943, 110 S.Ct. 348, 107 L.Ed.2d 336 (1989)); see also United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir.) (Breyer, C.J.) (describing an anticipatory warrant as one that “takes effect, not upon issuance, but at a specified future time”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1051, 115 S.Ct. 654, 130 L.Ed.2d 558 (1994). Most courts have required that the record indicate that the warrant was conditioned upon the delivery of the package or upon the occurrence of a future event. See United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding the issuance of an anticipatory warrant as valid when clear and narrowly stated conditions are contained in the affidavit supporting the warrant, even if those conditions are not stated on the face of the warrant); United States [465]*465v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir.1996) (Wood, J., concurring) (“In order for an anticipatory warrant to satisfy the probable cause requirement, it must demonstrate that the contraband in question will be at the designated place at [a] time set for the search.”), cert. denied. - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1434, 137 L.Ed.2d 542 (1997); United States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225, 229 (2nd Cir.1995) (acknowledging that “clear, explicit, and narrowly drawn” conditions must be satisfied before the execution of an anticipatory warrant); Gendron, 18 F.3d at 965 (recognizing a valid anticipatory warrant must clearly and narrowly state when and under what conditions it becomes effective); United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir.1993) (reasoning that suppression of evidence follows if the execution of an anticipatory warrant precedes the controlled delivery); Com. v. Gauthier, 425 Mass. 37, 679 N.E.2d 211, 215-16 (1997) (concluding an anticipatory warrant is valid when clear and narrowly stated conditions are contained in the affidavit supporting the warrant even if not stated on face of warrant); State v. Engel, 465 N.W.2d 787, 791 (S.D.1991) (holding that anticipatory warrant may be valid when oral limitations by issuing magistrate restrict scope of warrant, and are coupled with clear references in affidavit to a contingent event, even if express limitations are not stated on face of the warrant). “Such warrants typically issue when the police have orchestrated a controlled delivery of contraband which ‘is on a sure course to its destination’ through the mails or parcel post.” Lee, 330 Md. at 328, 624 A.2d at 496.
There is no indication in this case that the warrant was issued in reliance on the occurrence of a future delivery of the package in question, or any other future event. The mere mention of a controlled delivery in the affidavit does not make a warrant anticipatory.9 Although the affidavit refers to a [466]*466statement made by a Maryland State Trooper to a San Diego, California police officer that the Maryland officers “would attempt to conduct a controlled delivery,” nowhere does the affidavit indicate that the execution of the warrant was contingent upon the delivery of the package or any other event. Furthermore, the affiant does not aver that he or anyone else intended to deliver the package. The absence of any indication that the police intended to deliver the package further supports the conclusion that in issuing the warrant, the judge was satisfied that probable cause existed independent of any delivery. See United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 222 (2nd Cir.) (holding that a warrant was not “anticipatory” because an actual delivery of the packages to the residence was not an element in issuing judge’s determination of probable cause), cert. denied sub nom. Donahue v. United States, 506 U.S. 980, 113 S.Ct. 480, 121 L.Ed.2d 385 (1992).
Furthermore, if the warrant was premised on the belief that there was an ongoing drug operation at the residence, and the police were authorized to search and seize evidence relating to the ongoing drug operation, including “books, ledgers, records, receipts, bank statements, and other traceable proceeds,” the probable cause must not have been based upon this particular shipment of marijuana. If there was probable cause to believe that a drug trafficking operation existed at 4403 Jupiter Street, the operation existed independent of the delivery of this particular package. Under this reasoning, there is nothing for the warrant to “anticipate” since “ ‘the necessary events ha[d] occurred which will allow a constitutional search of the premises’ ” at the time the warrant was issued. Lee, 330 Md. at 328, 624 A.2d at 496 (quoting Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702). For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the instant warrant was not an anticipatory warrant. Accordingly, in our review of this warrant, we shall consider the warrant to be a traditional search warrant rather than an anticipatory warrant.
rv.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or [467]*467affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend IY. The probable cause standard is a “practical, nontechnical conception.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Probable cause means a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 716, 641 A.2d 214, 218 (1994).
We review the judge or magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant to determine whether there was “a substantial basis for concluding that the evidence sought would be discovered in the place described in the application and its affidavit.” State v. Lee, 330 Md. 320, 326, 624 A.2d 492, 495 (1993); see Birchead v. State, 317 Md. 691, 701, 566 A.2d 488, 492-93 (1989); see also Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 572, 479 A.2d 1335, 1338 (1984). In this regard, we observed in Birchead:
The judge’s task is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether probable cause exists; however, his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.
317 Md. at 701, 566 A.2d at 492 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), reiterated this standard of review, explaining “that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review.” The judge’s determination that probable cause exists is entitled to great deference. Id. at 237, 103 S.Ct. at 2331; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Lee, 330 Md. at 326, 624 A.2d at 495.
The United States Supreme Court in Leon modified the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule to provide that evidence seized under a warrant subsequently determined to be invalid may be admissible if the executing officers acted in objective good faith with reasonable reliance on the warrant. [468]*468Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20,104 S.Ct. at 3419; Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 729, 589 A.2d 958, 963 (1991). In Leon, the Court first announced and then applied the “good faith” exception to admit evidence seized by the police pursuant to a search warrant later found to lack probable cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-25, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-22.
The Supreme Court in Leon did not suggest that evidence obtained under an invalid warrant is always admissible, but cautioned that “suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 918, 104 S.Ct. at 3418 (footnote omitted). The Court held that “[i]n the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.” Id. at 926, 104 S.Ct. at 3422.
Leon sets out four circumstances in which the exclusionary rule remains the appropriate remedy:
(1) if the magistrate, in issuing a warrant, “was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for a reckless disregard of the truth,” [see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978);] or (2) “in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role ... [so that] no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant,” [see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979);] or (3) in cases in which an officer would not “manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” [see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975);] or (4) in cases where “a warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably [469]*469presume [the warrant] to be valid.” [Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984)].
Connelly, 322 Md. at 729, 589 A.2d at 963 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421) (some alterations in the original). “The test under Leon,” as we stated in Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 641 A.2d 214 (1994), “is not whether there was probable cause, but whether ‘a reasonably well trained officer would have known the search was illegal’ despite the authorization from the judge.” Id. at 717, 641 A.2d at 218 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420 n. 23).
In Leon, the Supreme Court suggested that reviewing courts have the discretion to decide the question of the officer’s good faith, and the applicability of the objective good faith exception, without deciding whether probable cause is lacking under the Fourth Amendment. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 924-25, 104 S.Ct. at 3421. Justice White first proposed this approach in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (White, J., concurring):
When a Fourth Amendment case presents a novel question of law whose resolution is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates, there is sufficient reason for the Court to decide the violation issue before turning to the good-faith question. Indeed, it may be difficult to determine whether the officers acted reasonably until the Fourth Amendment issue is resolved. In other circumstances, however, a suppression motion poses no Fourth Amendment question of broad import—the issue is simply whether the facts in a given case amounted to probable cause—in these cases, it would be prudent for the reviewing court to immediately turn to the question of whether the officers acted in good faith. Upon finding that they had, there would generally be no need to consider the probable-cause question. I doubt that our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would suffer thereby.
Id. at 264-65, 103 S.Ct. at 2346-47 (footnote omitted).
[470]*470Many courts have adopted this approach,10 concluding that “[a] determination that probable cause is lacking is not always necessary before reaching the issue of the objective good faith exception of Leon.” United States v. Maggitt, 778 F.2d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184, 106 S.Ct. 2920, 91 L.Ed.2d 548 (1986); see United States v. Clutchette, 24 F.3d 577, 580 (4th Cir.1994) (admitting evidence without determining validity of telephone warrants where officers acted in good faith); United States v. Livesay, 983 F.2d 135, 137 (8th Cir.1993) (applying Leon and concluding that “it is unnecessary to reach the question of whether probable cause existed for the issuance of the two search warrants”); United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 222 (2nd Cir.) (concluding it unnecessary to determine whether the issuing judge had “actual probable cause” when the good faith exception applies), cert. denied sub nom. Donahue v. United States, 506 U.S. 980, 113 S.Ct. 480, 121 L.Ed.2d 385 (1992); United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 931-32 (10th Cir.1990) (assuming invalidity of warrant and applying Leon); United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1468 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding it is unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the warrant was based on probable cause when Leon applies).
In United States v. Maggitt, 778 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184, 106 S.Ct. 2920, 91 L.Ed.2d 548 (1986), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that in cases involving relatively well settled Fourth Amendment principles, such as those which question whether the attributed facts set forth in the affidavit rise to [471]*471the level of probable cause, it is unnecessary to determine whether the warrant was issued on a showing of probable cause. Id. at 1033. As Justice White noted in his concurring opinion in Gates, in certain cases the issue is simply whether the facts in a given case amounted to probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 265, 103 S.Ct. at 2347 (White, J., concurring). Similarly, this is a case in which the issue is whether these particular facts rise to the level of probable cause. Thus, for purposes of our analysis, we shall assume arguendo that this search warrant lacked probable cause to believe that the residence contained contraband or evidence of an ongoing drug operation. We must now consider whether the Leon good faith exception applies and permits the evidence to be admitted.
As Leon indicates, the “good faith” exception to the general rule of exclusion does not apply universally. Hence, the question is whether the warrant falls within any one of the four situations outlined by the Supreme Court in which reliance on the warrant would not be reasonable. Because none of the four circumstances set out in Leon apply, the application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate.
Neither the first nor second exception of Leon has any application to the instant case. There is no suggestion or argument from McDonald or the State that the issuing judge was misled by information in the affidavit that the officer knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth. Nor is there anything in this record to suggest that the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role in issuing the warrant.11
[472]*472Addressing Leon’s third exception, the affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that it was unreasonable for the officers to rely upon it. The warrant application contained several objective facts from which the officers could have reasonably concluded that there was probable cause to search 4403 Jupiter Street. The troopers were aware of the contents of the package, the package’s weight, the delivery address, and the use of what appears to be a fictitious name. Armed with this information, a well-trained officer could have reasonably concluded that the warrant was legal.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached a like conclusion in the case of United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Donahue v. United States, 506 U.S. 980, 113 S.Ct. 480, 121 L.Ed.2d 385 (1992). In Moore, the search warrant was based solely on the interception of two large UPS packages. Inside one of the packages the police had found a large cooler containing marijuana. Id. at 219. A subsequent warrant authorized the officers to search an apartment for records or documents relating to a drug scheme after the two packages were delivered to that apartment. The Second Circuit held that knowledge of “the contents of one of the packages, the packages’ weight and the delivery address” provided sufficient indicia of [473]*473probable cause to justify the officers’ reliance on the warrant. Id. at 222. The court continued:
As the district court noted, the search will survive the Leon test if the UPS shipment reasonably permitted the officers to rely upon [the issuing judge’s] finding of probable cause that documents or records of drug trafficking were in the apartment. We believe that it did. The size of the shipment alone compellingly indicated that the intended recipient was a drug dealer. Dealers need to keep records. The address of the shipment and the need for a signature by the recipient strongly suggested that the apartment was used at the very least as a collection and redistribution point. It was, therefore, a likely repository of drug records.
Id. at 223. In the instant case, there were sufficient indicia of probable cause to justify reliance by the troopers upon the warrant.
We turn next to Leon’s fourth exception, which provides that suppression remains appropriate when a warrant is “ ‘so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume [the warrant] to be valid.’ ” Connelly v. State, 322 Md. at 729, 589 A.2d at 963 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421) (alterations in the original). The warrant identifies the place to be searched, the items to be seized, and the statute allegedly violated. We conclude that the warrant was not so facially deficient that a police officer could not reasonably conclude that it was valid. See Brown v. District of Columbia, 638 F.Supp. 1479, 1488 (D.D.C.1986).
In sum, the officers who executed the search warrant at 4403 Jupiter Street were entitled to rely on the District Court judge’s determination of probable cause, and this reliance was objectively reasonable.
V.
Finally, we turn to Appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We begin [474]*474our analysis by observing that “it is not the function or duty of the appellate court to undertake a review of the record that would amount to, in essence, a retrial of the case.” State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478, 649 A.2d 336, 337 (1994). Rather, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)), giving due regard to the trial court’s finding of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly, its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses. Id. We do not measure the weight of the evidence; rather we concern ourselves only with whether the verdict was supported with sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 478-79, 649 A.2d at 337.
Appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, and of possession of marijuana. Possession is defined in § 277(s) as “the exercise of actual or constructive dominion or control over a thing by one or more persons.” To prove control, the “ ‘evidence must show directly or support a rational inference that the accused did in fact exercise some dominion or control over the prohibited ... drug in the sense contemplated by the statute, i.e., that [the accused] exercised some restraining or directing influence over it.’ ” State v. Leach, 296 Md. 591, 596, 463 A.2d 872, 874 (1983) (quoting Garrison v. State, 272 Md. 123, 142, 321 A.2d 767, 777 (1974)); see Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 457-58, 697 A.2d 462, 465 (1997). The accused must have knowledge of both the presence and the general character or illicit nature of the substance. Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 651, 547 A.2d 1041, 1047 (1988). “[S]uch knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence and by inferences drawn therefrom.” Id.
We conclude that the facts presented at trial could fairly convince the trier of fact of McDonald’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. McDonald personally signed for and took delivery of the package containing the marijuana. When the search [475]*475warrant was executed, nearly thirty minutes after the delivery, McDonald was found standing above the package with the marijuana exposed. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
ELDRIDGE, CHASANOW and BELL, JJ., dissent.