McDonald v. Citibank N.A.

• Court: District Court, D. Colorado
• Decided: May 5, 2021
• Docket: 1:21-cv-00427
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No.: 21-cv-00427-PAB-NRN

REED K. MCDONALD,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITIBANK N.A. and SHANA KLOEK, in her individual and professional capacity as Clerk of Court for Arapahoe County, Colorado,

Defendants.

ORDER

N. REID NEUREITER United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Restrict Duties of Magistrate or Alternatively Voluntary Recusal (Dkt. #42). Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer denied Plaintiff’s invitation to “restrict” my duties, but referred the portion of the motion which requests that I recuse myself (Dkt. #53). Title 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The goal of this provision is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988). Pursuant to § 455, the Court is not required to accept all factual allegations as true “and the test is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality.” Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1268 (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard is completely objective, and the inquiry is limited to outward manifestations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993). Recusal must not be mandated “upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.” Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.1986).

As grounds for his motion for recusal, Plaintiff states that I have “shown [myself] to be prejudice [sic] against pro se parties; more specifically, this pro se party.” This accusation stems from an earlier case, McDonald v. Eagle County, et al., Case No. 18- cv-00105-CMA-NRN (D. Colo.), in which I recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Eagle County, Colorado and Bellco Credit Union. Plaintiff claims that this was “an untidy and incomplete [sic] researched decision” that was reached “with intent to harm this pro se party.” Notwithstanding the fact that Judge Christine M. Arguello adopted the recommendation, see id. at Dkt. #81, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, see McDonald v. Eagle Cty., 807 F. App’x 786, 791 (10th Cir. 2020)

(unpublished), and the United States Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition for writ of certiorari, see McDonald v. Eagle Cty., Colo., 141 S. Ct. 1127 (2021), the mere fact that I ruled against Plaintiff in past is not evidence of bias. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”); Smith v. Figa & Burns, 69 F. App’x 922, 924 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (“[Plaintiff’s] characterization of adverse rulings as evidence of the judge’s impartiality is insufficient to establish bias.”); Winslow v. Lehr, 641 F. Supp. 1237, 1241 (D. Colo. 1986) (“[T]he fact that a judge has previously rendered a decision against a party is not sufficient to show bias or prejudice.”). The same is true regarding Plaintiff’s contention that | have granted Defendants “unwarranted and unneeded” extensions of time. Moreover, “baseless personal attacks on. . . the judge by a party do not mandate recusal in a case in which the judge is not a party.” Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Finally, | note, as Chief Judge Brimmer did, that if Plaintiff disagrees with any of my rulings, he may object pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the portion of Plaintiff's Motion to Restrict Duties of Magistrate or Alternatively Voluntary Recusal (Dkt. #42) that requests | voluntarily recuse is DENIED.

Date: May 5, 2021 N. Reid Neureiter United States Magistrate Judge