McCuen v. BMW Manufacturing Corp.

677 S.E.2d 28, 383 S.C. 19, 2009 S.C. App. LEXIS 110
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
DecidedApril 15, 2009
Docket4531
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 677 S.E.2d 28 (McCuen v. BMW Manufacturing Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McCuen v. BMW Manufacturing Corp., 677 S.E.2d 28, 383 S.C. 19, 2009 S.C. App. LEXIS 110 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

SHORT, J.

BMW Manufacturing Corporation (BMW) appeals the circuit court’s order upholding the Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s (Appellate Panel) finding that Robert McCuen sustained a compensable neck injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with BMW and awarding him benefits for his injury. We reverse.

FACTS

McCuen began working for BMW as a dent repair technician in April of 2000. McCuen inspected and repaired minor dents and other imperfections on vehicles as they neared completion on the assembly line. As a dent technician, he utilized stationary fluorescent lights to detect imperfections. Once he detected an imperfection, McCuen used various tools to correct the dent. McCuen stated it was BMW’s preference to correct the dents on the assembly line 1 and, as a result, he assumed awkward positions in an attempt to “push the dents out.” According to McCuen, as a dent technician, he used both of his hands and applied a continuous force.

McCuen testified that prior to working for BMW, he had never experienced any problems with his neck, hands, arms, or wrists. However, on October 26, 2001, he began to develop pain in his right -wrist while still employed with BMW. McCuen testified he reported the pain to BMW’s infirmary. Consequently, BMW transferred McCuen to another area on the assembly line. He began complaining of pain in his right forearm and he was transferred to a computer data entry position. Shortly thereafter, on November 13, 2001, McCuen left BMW for medical leave and did not return to work. 2 After leaving BMW, McCuen began to complain of pain in his left wrist.

*22 McCuen’s problems with both of his wrists continued, and he sought additional medical treatment. According to McCuen, several doctors were unable to diagnose the problem with his wrists. Ultimately, McCuen was referred to Dr. Joseph Kutz, a hand specialist in Kentucky. Eventually, Dr. Kutz diagnosed McCuen with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. During the summer of 2002, Dr. Stephen Gardner, a Greenville neurosurgeon, performed carpal tunnel surgery on both of McCuen’s wrists. Dr. Gardener released McCuen from his care in September 2002. However, in December 2002, McCuen made an appointment with Dr. Gardner for problems with his neck, and underwent surgery on January 13, 2003. McCuen admitted his neck problems did not develop until months after he left BMW and he was unable to explain how he hurt his neck.

Before, during, and after McCuen’s employment with BMW, McCuen owned and operated a landscaping business. McCuen testified at the hearing that he “had two guys that did most of the work,” and sometimes he helped. However, at his deposition, he stated he did not have any employees, but he had “a friend that helped [him] some.” Diana German, a former co-worker, testified McCuen worked in her yard on two separate occasions after he left BMW. Another former coworker, Heather Lazo, also testified McCuen told her he was doing most of the landscaping himself. Additionally, McCuen assisted in the organization of a dent removal business after he left BMW.

McCuen filed a claim for benefits under the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 42-1-10 to 42-19-40 (1976 & Supp.2008). This case originally came before the single commissioner, who found McCuen sustained compensable injuries to his neck, upper extremities, and hands by accident under South Carolina Code Section 42-1-160. Specifically, the single commissioner found McCuen had no pain or other difficulties with his neck, upper extremities, and hands prior to his employment with BMW. The commissioner specifically noted McCuen’s job as a dent technician “involved forcing his neck, arms, and entire body into very awkward positions.... ” Further, the single commissioner stated McCuen’s “neck and entire upper extremity symptoms are associated manifestations of his condition.”

*23 BMW appealed the single commissioner’s decision to the Appellate Panel, and the Appellate Panel affirmed the single commissioner’s decision, sustaining the order in its entirety. Subsequently, BMW appealed the Appellate Panel’s decision to the circuit court, challenging only the portion pertaining to a sustained injury to the neck. The circuit court affirmed the Appellate Panel’s order, finding substantial evidence existed supporting the “finding that [McCuen] sustained a compensable injury to his neck as a result of the injury by accident.” This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA) establishes the standard for judicial review of decisions by the Appellate Panel. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 134-35, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Under the scope of review established in the APA, this court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Appellate Panel as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, but may reverse where the decision is affected by an error of law. Stone v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 360 S.C. 271, 274, 600 S.E.2d 551, 552 (Ct.App.2004).

The substantial evidence rule governs the standard of review in a workers’ compensation decision. Frame v. Resort Servs. Inc., 357 S.C. 520, 527, 593 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ct.App.2004). The Appellate Panel’s decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Shuler v. Gregory Elec., 366 S.C. 435, 440, 622 S.E.2d 569, 571 (Ct.App.2005). However, an appellate court can reverse or modify the Appellate Panel’s decision if the appellant’s substantial rights have been prejudiced because the decision is affected by an error of law or is “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.” S.C.Code Ann. § l-23-380(A)(6) (2005); Bursey v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 360 S.C. 135, 141, 600 S.E.2d 80, 84 (Ct.App.2004).

“Substantial evidence” is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the *24 administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.

Lark, 276 S.C. at 135, 276 S.E.2d at 306.

“[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984).

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Bluebook (online)
677 S.E.2d 28, 383 S.C. 19, 2009 S.C. App. LEXIS 110, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mccuen-v-bmw-manufacturing-corp-scctapp-2009.