McCraner v. Wells Fargo & Company

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedMarch 30, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-01246
StatusUnknown

This text of McCraner v. Wells Fargo & Company (McCraner v. Wells Fargo & Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McCraner v. Wells Fargo & Company, (S.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

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7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 JOHN MCCRANER, SHARON CASE NO. 21cv1246-LAB-LL 11 STIANSEN, JANET POLLARD, 12 MICHAEL DARLINGTON, SUSAN ORDER: R. LANDREAU, JOHN N. 13 TUFFIELD, individually and on 1) GRANTING MOTION TO 14 behalf of all others similarly situated, DISMISS [Dkt. 12]; and

15 Plaintiffs, 2) DENYING MOTION TO 16 vs. STRIKE AS MOOT [Dkt. 13]

17 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, a corporation, WELLS FARGO 18 BANK, N.A., a national banking 19 association, 20 Defendants.

21 Phillip Peikos, David Barnett, Brian Phillips, Richard Fowler, Ryan 22 Fowler, and Nathan Martinez (collectively, the “Principals”) operated three 23 separate online subscription scams through their companies Apex Capital 24 Group, LLC (“Apex”), controlled by Peikos and Barnett, Triangle Media 25 Corporation (“Triangle”), controlled by Phillips, and Tarr Inc. (“Tarr,” and 26 collectively with Apex and Triangle, the “Enterprises”), controlled by the 27 Fowlers and Martinez. Each of the Enterprises relied on banking services from 1 “Wells Fargo” or the “Bank”) to effect their fraudulent schemes. 2 The Enterprises allegedly defrauded plaintiffs John McCraner, Sharon 3 Stiansen, Janet Pollard, Michael Darlington, Susan R. Landreau, and John N. 4 Tuffield (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs filed this putative class action 5 against Wells Fargo asserting four claims: aiding and abetting fraud; 6 conspiracy to commit fraud; violation of Cal. Penal Code § 496; and violation 7 of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Wells Fargo moves to dismiss each claim. 8 Each of Plaintiffs’ claims requires that they allege facts sufficient to 9 support the inference that Wells Fargo had actual knowledge of the 10 Enterprises’ fraud against the Plaintiffs. Because Plaintiffs don’t meet this 11 requirement, Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and each claim 12 is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. And because Wells Fargo’s separate 13 Motion to Strike is directed to allegations in the now-dismissed complaint, that 14 Motion is DENIED AS MOOT. 15 BACKGROUND 16 Wells Fargo provided banking services to the Enterprises between 17 2009 and 2018 (the “Relevant Period”).1 (Dkt. 1, “Compl.,” ¶¶ 8, 153, 165, 170, 18 201). Each set of principals operated “free trial” scams online through their 19 respective Enterprises, promising customers risk-free trials but signing them 20 up for expensive subscriptions that would automatically charge their accounts 21 at regular intervals unless affirmatively cancelled. (Id. ¶ 2). To run these 22 businesses, the Enterprises needed access to merchant processing services 23 that allowed them to charge customers’ credit cards. But the nature of their 24 fraudulent schemes made continued access difficult: customers challenged 25 the Enterprises’ charges at rates that would make merchant processors 26 1 For the purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court 27 accepts the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint as true. South Ferry LP, 1 unwilling to work with them. (Id. ¶¶ 69–72). 2 The Enterprises started shell companies for the purpose of setting up 3 accounts to route the Enterprises’ transactions through without having the 4 Enterprises as a whole cut off from merchant processing services, a scheme 5 known as “credit card laundering.”2 (See, e.g., id. ¶¶71–73). It wouldn’t be 6 enough to simply start new companies—the principals needed to hide their 7 personal involvement with those companies to ensure that they would be able 8 to get merchant processing services. Triangle and Apex accomplished this by 9 recruiting straw owners. (Id. ¶¶ 77, 84, 106, 121–22, 157). Those Enterprises’ 10 principals made clear to the Bank that they should retain control over the 11 accounts, and Wells Fargo complied. (Id. ¶¶ 125, 159). 12 Over the course of Wells Fargo’s relationship with the Enterprises, the 13 Bank received numerous signals that the Enterprises were engaging in 14 misconduct. Wells Fargo’s monthly account statements for the Enterprises’ 15 accounts reflected very high chargeback rates relative to industry standards. 16 (Id. ¶ 98, 111–13, 192, 228). When Apex accounts lost merchant processing 17 services due to high chargeback rates, Apex closed them and opened new 18 ones through new shell companies and new straw owners. (Id. ¶¶ 97– 99). 19 Wells Fargo knew that the shell companies and nominal owners weren’t 20 the true owners of these accounts. When Apex applied for merchant 21 processing services with Wells Fargo for two shell companies, Wells Fargo 22 noticed that one company’s accounts listed Barnett as owner, but its 23 2 The Complaint’s non-c onclusory allegations specific to Tarr are very limited 24 and include broad assertions that Tarr was engaged in conduct similar to that of the other Enterprises and that Wells Fargo provided Tarr with similar 25 services. (See Compl. ¶¶ 207–14). Because these allegations, if taken as true, 26 wouldn’t affect the Court’s conclusion that the Complaint fails to state any claims, the question of whether these allegations are well-pleaded isn’t 27 relevant. For the purposes of this order only, the Court will credit those 1 application listed different owners. (Id. ¶¶ 126, 128). Apex addressed this 2 issue not by fixing the application, but by directing Wells Fargo to change the 3 ownership of the account without Barnett’s involvement. (Id. ¶ 127). When that 4 couldn’t be done easily, Apex instead applied on behalf of another pair of shell 5 companies with the same address, purportedly owned by Apex’s CFO. (Id. 6 ¶¶ 128, 133). Apex had told Wells Fargo only days before that such accounts 7 should remain under Peikos’s control. (Id. ¶ 122). Wells Fargo ultimately 8 rejected the application for merchant processing services, explaining that its 9 decision was a result of Apex’s “high-risk,” “unqualified business model” 10 selling supplements. (Id. ¶¶ 140–41). 11 Wells Fargo instead assisted Apex in securing those services elsewhere 12 by providing reference letters. A year before Wells Fargo declined to offer its 13 own merchant processing services, Barnett requested that the Bank remove 14 his name from a set of ten reference letters for various shell companies, hiding 15 Barnett’s association with those companies. (Id. ¶ 101). Wells Fargo complied. 16 (Id.) And Wells Fargo continued supplying these anonymized letters even after 17 determining that the Apex shell companies weren’t qualified for merchant 18 processing services. (See id. ¶¶ 149, 152). 19 Wells Fargo knew that Triangle was using straw owners, too. Phillips 20 requested that Wells Fargo list other individuals as “100% owners” of the 21 accounts he opened. (Id. ¶ 159). But Phillips also asked that Wells Fargo give 22 him immediate access to and full control of those accounts. (Id.). Wells Fargo 23 complied. (Id.) And when Wells Fargo needed to collect information on 24 account-owners, it sent Phillips pre-filled paperwork identifying Phillips as the 25 owner of Triangle’s shell companies’ accounts, not those companies’ 26 purported owners. (Id. ¶ 182). 27 The Complaint’s factual allegations regarding Tarr are much more 1 business was of a sort that “generally create[s] an unusually high volume of 2 chargebacks,” and that the FTC alleges that Tarr was “concern[ed]” about high 3 chargeback levels. (Id. ¶ 208). The FTC alleges in a separate action that Tarr 4 diverted funds from shell companies to other Tarr entities. (Id. ¶ 209). Online 5 reviews and “television personality Dr. Oz” claimed that Tarr was a scam. (Id. 6 ¶¶ 210–11). 7 Over the Relevant Period, Wells Fargo opened more than 150 accounts 8 for shell companies and straw owners within the Apex and Triangle 9 enterprises. (Id. ¶ 6).

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Bluebook (online)
McCraner v. Wells Fargo & Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mccraner-v-wells-fargo-company-casd-2022.