McCracken v. Bryan

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 1, 2021
• Docket: 3:21-cv-05222
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE

9 10 STEVEN ALLEN McCRACKEN, CASE NO. C21-5222JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 12 WILLIAM MANNESS BRYAN, 13 Defendant. 14

15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court are: (1) Magistrate Judge Michelle L. Peterson’s report and 17 recommendation (“R&R”) (R&R (Dkt. # 12)) and pro se Plaintiff Steven Allen 18 McCracken’s objections thereto (Obj. (Dkt. # 14)); (2) Mr. McCracken’s notice on the 19 timeliness of his objections to Magistrate Judge Peterson’s R&R, which the court will 20 construe as a motion for an extension of time in accordance with its duty to liberally 21 construe pro se filings (Notice (Dkt. # 13)); (3) Mr. McCracken’s objection to the 22 Magistrate Judge’s order requiring him to serve his objections on Defendant William 1 Manness Bryan and a motion for a continuance of that service deadline (Mot. for Cont. 2 (Dkt. # 15)); and (4) Mr. McCracken’s motion to amend his complaint (Mot. to Amend

3 (Dkt. # 9)). Magistrate Judge Peterson recommends that the court dismiss Mr. 4 McCracken’s complaint and deny his motion to amend as moot pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. (R&R at 1, 12.) Having 6 carefully reviewed all of the foregoing, all other relevant documents, and the governing 7 law, the court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Peterson’s R&R, DENIES Mr. McCracken’s 8 pending motions for an extension of time, continuance of the service deadline, and to

9 amend his complaint as moot, and DISMISSES this action with prejudice. 10 II. BACKGROUND 11 Mr. McCracken brings claims against Mr. Bryan under 18 U.S.C. § 1595, the civil 12 remedy provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA” or “the Act”). (See 13 generally Compl. (Dkt. # 5).) His claims relate to the drug offenses for which he is

14 currently confined. (See id.) He asserts that his longtime acquaintance, Mr. Bryan, 15 coerced him into participating in the drug transaction which led to his conviction and 16 confinement. (See id. at 1, 15-19.) Mr. McCracken alleges that Mr. Bryan’s conduct 17 violated various provisions of the TVPA, including those which criminalize forced labor 18 (§ 1589), involuntary servitude (§ 1584), and peonage (§ 1581), thus entitling Plaintiff to

19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 1 an award of damages under § 1595. (See id.)1 During the interaction that serves as the 2 basis for Mr. McCracken’s claims, Mr. Bryan accused Mr. McCracken of “starving out”

3 and “cutting the throat” of both Mr. Bryan and another individual. (Id. at 3.) Mr. 4 McCracken alleges that, “[a]fter some back and forth,” Mr. Bryan told him: “You think 5 I’m gonna sit here out of dope while you are the only one that has [or can get] product?” 6 and “I’m not going to take that!” (Id. at 2.) Mr. McCracken asserts that he interpreted 7 these statements as a threat, ultimately leading him to engage in the drug transaction. (Id. 8 at 2-3.)

9 After reviewing the complaint, Magistrate Judge Peterson concluded that Mr. 10 McCracken had not identified therein any plausible claim for relief, and she issued an 11 order directing Mr. McCracken to show cause why this action should not be dismissed. 12 (OSC (Dkt. # 6).) Mr. McCracken filed a response to Magistrate Judge Peterson’s order 13 to show cause (Resp. (Dkt. # 8)) as well as a motion for leave to amend his complaint.

14 (See Mot. to Amend); see also R&R (noting that Mr. McCracken’s motion for leave to 15 amend “is actually a request to supplement his original complaint with additional details 16 and facts apparently intended to demonstrate the plausibility of his claims”).) Magistrate 17 Judge Peterson then filed her R&R recommending that the court dismiss Mr. 18 McCracken’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a

19 cognizable claim for relief and deny his motion to amend as moot. (See R&R at 12.) Mr. 20 //

21 1 Mr. McCracken also alleges that Mr. Bryan violated the Act by benefitting financially from peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons, as well as by conspiring and attempting to 22 violate various provisions of Chapter 77 of Title 18. (See Compl. at 1, 15-19.) 1 McCracken timely filed his objections to Magistrate Judge Peterson’s R&R. (See Obj.; 2 Notice.) The court now considers Mr. McCracken’s objections.

3 III. ANALYSIS 4 A district court has jurisdiction to review a Magistrate Judge’s report and 5 recommendation on dispositive matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). “The district judge must 6 determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly 7 objected to.” Id. “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, 8 the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

9 The court reviews de novo those portions of the report and recommendation to which 10 specific written objection is made. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 11 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). “The statute makes it clear that the district judge must review 12 the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but 13 not otherwise.” Id.

14 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) authorizes a district court to dismiss a claim filed 15 in forma pauperis “at any time” if it determines: (1) the action is frivolous or malicious; 16 (2) the action fails to state a claim; or (3) the action seeks relief from a defendant who is 17 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The complaint must allege 18 facts that plausibly establish the defendant’s liability and contain “a short and plain

19 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 8(1)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Lopez v. Smith, 203 21 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that Section 1915(e)(2) parallels the language 22 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 1 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (noting that Federal Rule of Civil 2 Procedure 8’s pleading standard demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-

3 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). Because Mr. McCracken is proceeding pro se, the 4 court must interpret his complaint and objections liberally. See Bernhardt v. Los Angeles 5 County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). But even liberally construed, Mr. 6 McCracken’s complaint fails to plausibly establish Mr. Bryan’s liability or raise his 7 “right to relief above the speculative level.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also In re 8 Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that in reviewing the

9 plausibility of a complaint courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely 10 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences”). 11 Mr. McCracken raises numerous objections to the R&R. (See generally Obj.) His 12 objections are directed at (1) Magistrate Judge Peterson’s overall conclusion that Mr. 13 McCracken failed to plausibly allege that Mr. Bryan’s conduct rose to the level of the

14 type of conduct criminalized in § 1589 (forced labor), § 1584 (involuntary servitude), and 15 § 1581 (peonage) and (2) the way Magistrate Judge Peterson considered certain facts in 16 reaching her conclusion. (Id. at 2-3.) The court has reviewed Mr. McCracken’s 17 objections, and has considered Magistrate Judge Peterson’s recommendations de novo in 18 light of those objections. Mr. McCracken’s objections essentially reiterate his arguments

19 from previous filings and do not raise any novel issues that were not addressed by 20 Magistrate Judge Peterson’s R&R. 21 “Congress’s express purpose in enacting the TVPA in 2000 was ‘to combat 22 trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are 1 predominantly women and children, and to ensure just and effective punishment of 2 traffickers, and to protect their victims.’” Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(a), 114 Stat. 1464

3 (2000); (see also R&R at 5).2 However, as Mr. McCracken addressed in his objections, 4 courts have noted that Congress broadly defined the types of harm and conduct that 5 qualify under the Act because “the means used by modern-day traffickers are 6 ‘increasingly subtle.’” United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) 7 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 106–939, at 101 (Conf. Rep.)); (see also Obj. at 18-20). While 8 the court acknowledges the TVPA’s broad scope, the facts in this case do not rise to the

9 level of the types of harm and conduct covered by the Act. Dann, 652 F.3d at 1170 (“To 10 be sure, not all bad employer-employee relationships or even bad employer-immigrant 11 nanny relationships will constitute forced labor.”). 12 The facts in this case do not demonstrate that Mr. McCracken was a servant or 13 slave to Mr. Bryan, but instead showed that Mr. McCracken and Mr. Bryan were

14 longtime acquaintances and that Mr. McCracken was enlisted on one occasion to arrange 15 and execute a drug transaction allegedly against his will. (R&R at 8; Compl. at 2-4, 16 15-19.) Moreover, Mr. McCracken acknowledges that Mr. Bryan made random, explicit 17 threats to him in the past that did “not to force him into buying and/or selling drugs,” but 18 instead “focused on forcing Plaintiff to do or not do other stuff, such as not stealing

19 customers, money, or drugs . . . .” (R&R at 7; Compl. at 13.) Mr. McCracken does not 20

2 Mr. McCracken relies on § 1589, which was enacted as part of the TVPA, as a basis for 21 his forced labor claim. The other statutes that Mr. McCracken relies on, §§ 1581 and 1584, were enacted by Congress to implement the Thirteenth Amendment. (R&R at 5); United States v. 22 Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 945-52 (1988); United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 528 (1944). 1 allege that any of Mr. Bryan’s prior threats transformed his relationship with Mr. Bryan 2 into one of involuntary servitude or forced labor. Instead, Mr. McCracken insists that the

3 relationship changed when Mr. Bryan said, “You think I’m gonna sit here out of dope 4 while you are the only one that has [or can get] product?” and “I’m not going to take 5 that!” in a “godfather type tone.” (Compl. at 2.) Mr. McCracken fails to plausibly 6 explain why these later purported threats transformed the relationship into one of 7 servitude or forced labor, while the prior threats did not. Considering the totality of the 8 circumstances, the court finds Mr. McCracken’s allegation that Mr. Bryan’s purported

9 threats coerced him into participating in a drug transaction against his will insufficient to 10 elevate Mr. Bryan’s conduct to the type of conduct criminalized in §§ 1589, 1584, and 11 1581. 12 Accordingly, Mr. McCracken’s complaint falls short of plausibly alleging any 13 entitlement to relief under the TVPA. The court has thoroughly examined the record

14 before it and finds Magistrate Judge Peterson’s reasoning persuasive in light of that 15 record. The court independently finds that Mr. McCracken’s complaint (Dkt. # 5) fails to 16 state a claim for the same reasons set forth by Magistrate Judge Peterson in her R&R. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 For the reasons stated above, the court:

19 (1) ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Peterson’s R&R (Dkt. # 12) in its entirety; 20 // 21 // 22 // 1 (2) DISMISSES with prejudice Mr. McCracken’s complaint (Dkt. # 5) and this 2 action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a cognizable claim for

3 relief; 4 (3) DENIES as moot Mr. McCracken’s motion to amend his complaint (Dkt. # 9), 5 his motion for an extension of time (Dkt. # 13), and his motion for a continuance (Dkt. 6 # 15); and 7 (4) DIRECTS the Clerk to send copies of this order to the parties and to 8 Magistrate Judge Peterson.

9 10 Dated this 1st day of October, 2021. 11 A 12 13 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22