W. H. “Dub” Arnold, Chief Justice.
This is the second appeal of this case. Appellant seeks to overturn his second conviction for attempted first-degree murder. Finding no error, we affirm.
Appellant was previously convicted of attempted murder in the first degree and residential burglary and was sentenced to a total of thirty-five years’ imprisonment. Appellant appealed that conviction to the Arkansas Court of Appeals on the basis that the trial court erred in denying a motion he had made to instruct the jury on the crime of attempted second-degree murder. The court of appeals agreed with appellant and reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. See McCoy v. State, 74 Ark. App. 414, 49 S.W.3d 154 (2001). After review was granted by this Court, the case was reversed and remanded, thereby affirming the court of appeals’ decision. See McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002). A supplemental opinion on the denial of rehearing was issued on April 18, 2002. See McCoy v. State, 348 Ark. 239, 74 S.W.3d 599 (2002).
When retried for the attempted murder in the first degree charge, appellant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment to run consecutive to the five-year sentence imposed for residential burglary at the first trial. At trial, during cross-examination of the appellant by the State, the prosecutor requested a ruling from the trial court regarding the admission of appellant’s prior misdemeanor conviction for third-degree domestic battery. Appellant objected to the admission of the evidence on the basis of Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, but the trial court overruled the objection and allowed the evidence in.
Appellant now argues on appeal that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of his prior conviction because it had no probative value and was unfairly prejudicial to him in that it could have led the jury to conclude that he had the character trait of engaging in violence directed toward the victim and that on the night in question, in this case, he acted in conformity with his violent character. The State argues that this Court should affirm because the evidence of the prior conviction was properly admitted as evidence of lack of mistake or accident and motive under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b); and, further, the probative value outweighed any prejudice under Ark. R. Evid. 403. We agree with the State and affirm.
I. Standard of Review
This Court has held that trial courts are afforded wide discretion in evidentiary rulings. See Hawkins v. State, 348 Ark. 384, 72 S.W.3d 493 (2002). Specifically, in issues relating to the admission of evidence under Ark. R. Evid. 401, 403, and 404(b), we have held that a trial court’s ruling is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 345 Ark. 264, 45 S.W.3d 820 (2001). This Court will, likewise, not reverse absent a showing of prejudice. Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000).
II. Merits
Just prior to trial in this case, defense counsel moved in limine to prevent the State from introducing proof that appellant had a prior conviction for the domestic battering of Sarah Battung, the victim in this case, if the appellant did not testfy. In response, the prosecutor specifically stated that he did not intend to introduce proof that appellant had a prior conviction for the domestic battering of Ms. Battung but did intend to prove that Ms. Battung had obtained a “no contact” court order in connection with appellant’s domestic battering conviction. The trial court stated, “You may introduce the no-contact order but leave the assault or whatever it is out.”
Appellant did, in fact, testify in his own defense. With regard to the gunshot wounds suffered by Battung, appellant stated that, although he did shoot her twice, he did not intend to shoot her and did not intend to cause her death. His defense was that the shooting was an accident. In the course of cross-examination by the State, appellant stated that he had forgotten that the Jacksonville Municipal Court had issued an order directing him to have no contact with Ms. Battung. Because this was his testimony, and over defense counsel’s objection, the court permitted the State to cross-examine appellant about a conviction he received in Jacksonville Municipal Court in August of 1999 that arose out of his conduct in June 1999. The prosecutor asked “You got convicted of domestic battery in the third degree for beating Sarah Battung, is that correct?” The appellant replied, “If you want to word it like that.” After appellant’s testimony, the State introduced into evidence, as State’s Exhibit No. 6, a certified copy of a judgment for third-degree domestic battering that was entered against appellant in municipal court. Appellant claims that this was error, as the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed the probative value. We disagree.
Under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b), evidence of other crimes may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 351 Ark. 468, 95 S.W.3d 801 (2003). If the evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is relevant to show that the offense of which the appellant is accused actually occurred and is not introduced merely to prove bad character, it will not be excluded. Id. The test for establishing motive, intent, or plan as an Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) exception is whether the evidence of the other act has independent relevance. Id. To be probative under Rule 403, the prior criminal act must be similar to the crime charged. See Sasser v. State, 321 Ark. 438, 902 S.W.2d 773 (1995).
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Sarah Battung, the victim in this case, and appellant had dated for about two and one-half years before their relationship ended on June 30, 1999. Appellant had previously been convicted of domestic battery in the third degree against Ms. Battung and was ordered on June 30, 1999, to have no further contact with her. At trial, Battung testified that, after the two of them stopped dating, appellant would frequently call or try to visit her, attempting to continue their relationship. Battung invariably balked at appellant’s attempts to continue seeing her. Battung went on to testify that on the night of August 11, 1999, appellant had phoned her several times at the apartment of Rodney Wilson and that she repeatedly hung up on appellant until she got so frustrated with the frequency of his calls that, during one of his last calls, she cursed him and then kissed another man. After becoming aware of the kiss from the apparent loud reaction of the other people present in Mr. Wilson’s apartment, appellant threatened to kill Ms. Battung. After Battung told him that she would call the police, appellant called back and apologized.
That same night, another encounter occurred between appellant and Ms.
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W. H. “Dub” Arnold, Chief Justice.
This is the second appeal of this case. Appellant seeks to overturn his second conviction for attempted first-degree murder. Finding no error, we affirm.
Appellant was previously convicted of attempted murder in the first degree and residential burglary and was sentenced to a total of thirty-five years’ imprisonment. Appellant appealed that conviction to the Arkansas Court of Appeals on the basis that the trial court erred in denying a motion he had made to instruct the jury on the crime of attempted second-degree murder. The court of appeals agreed with appellant and reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. See McCoy v. State, 74 Ark. App. 414, 49 S.W.3d 154 (2001). After review was granted by this Court, the case was reversed and remanded, thereby affirming the court of appeals’ decision. See McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002). A supplemental opinion on the denial of rehearing was issued on April 18, 2002. See McCoy v. State, 348 Ark. 239, 74 S.W.3d 599 (2002).
When retried for the attempted murder in the first degree charge, appellant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment to run consecutive to the five-year sentence imposed for residential burglary at the first trial. At trial, during cross-examination of the appellant by the State, the prosecutor requested a ruling from the trial court regarding the admission of appellant’s prior misdemeanor conviction for third-degree domestic battery. Appellant objected to the admission of the evidence on the basis of Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, but the trial court overruled the objection and allowed the evidence in.
Appellant now argues on appeal that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of his prior conviction because it had no probative value and was unfairly prejudicial to him in that it could have led the jury to conclude that he had the character trait of engaging in violence directed toward the victim and that on the night in question, in this case, he acted in conformity with his violent character. The State argues that this Court should affirm because the evidence of the prior conviction was properly admitted as evidence of lack of mistake or accident and motive under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b); and, further, the probative value outweighed any prejudice under Ark. R. Evid. 403. We agree with the State and affirm.
I. Standard of Review
This Court has held that trial courts are afforded wide discretion in evidentiary rulings. See Hawkins v. State, 348 Ark. 384, 72 S.W.3d 493 (2002). Specifically, in issues relating to the admission of evidence under Ark. R. Evid. 401, 403, and 404(b), we have held that a trial court’s ruling is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 345 Ark. 264, 45 S.W.3d 820 (2001). This Court will, likewise, not reverse absent a showing of prejudice. Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000).
II. Merits
Just prior to trial in this case, defense counsel moved in limine to prevent the State from introducing proof that appellant had a prior conviction for the domestic battering of Sarah Battung, the victim in this case, if the appellant did not testfy. In response, the prosecutor specifically stated that he did not intend to introduce proof that appellant had a prior conviction for the domestic battering of Ms. Battung but did intend to prove that Ms. Battung had obtained a “no contact” court order in connection with appellant’s domestic battering conviction. The trial court stated, “You may introduce the no-contact order but leave the assault or whatever it is out.”
Appellant did, in fact, testify in his own defense. With regard to the gunshot wounds suffered by Battung, appellant stated that, although he did shoot her twice, he did not intend to shoot her and did not intend to cause her death. His defense was that the shooting was an accident. In the course of cross-examination by the State, appellant stated that he had forgotten that the Jacksonville Municipal Court had issued an order directing him to have no contact with Ms. Battung. Because this was his testimony, and over defense counsel’s objection, the court permitted the State to cross-examine appellant about a conviction he received in Jacksonville Municipal Court in August of 1999 that arose out of his conduct in June 1999. The prosecutor asked “You got convicted of domestic battery in the third degree for beating Sarah Battung, is that correct?” The appellant replied, “If you want to word it like that.” After appellant’s testimony, the State introduced into evidence, as State’s Exhibit No. 6, a certified copy of a judgment for third-degree domestic battering that was entered against appellant in municipal court. Appellant claims that this was error, as the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed the probative value. We disagree.
Under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b), evidence of other crimes may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 351 Ark. 468, 95 S.W.3d 801 (2003). If the evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is relevant to show that the offense of which the appellant is accused actually occurred and is not introduced merely to prove bad character, it will not be excluded. Id. The test for establishing motive, intent, or plan as an Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) exception is whether the evidence of the other act has independent relevance. Id. To be probative under Rule 403, the prior criminal act must be similar to the crime charged. See Sasser v. State, 321 Ark. 438, 902 S.W.2d 773 (1995).
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Sarah Battung, the victim in this case, and appellant had dated for about two and one-half years before their relationship ended on June 30, 1999. Appellant had previously been convicted of domestic battery in the third degree against Ms. Battung and was ordered on June 30, 1999, to have no further contact with her. At trial, Battung testified that, after the two of them stopped dating, appellant would frequently call or try to visit her, attempting to continue their relationship. Battung invariably balked at appellant’s attempts to continue seeing her. Battung went on to testify that on the night of August 11, 1999, appellant had phoned her several times at the apartment of Rodney Wilson and that she repeatedly hung up on appellant until she got so frustrated with the frequency of his calls that, during one of his last calls, she cursed him and then kissed another man. After becoming aware of the kiss from the apparent loud reaction of the other people present in Mr. Wilson’s apartment, appellant threatened to kill Ms. Battung. After Battung told him that she would call the police, appellant called back and apologized.
That same night, another encounter occurred between appellant and Ms. Battung at Wilson’s apartment. Trineka McCoy, appellant’s sister, was with Ms. Battung in Wilson’s apartment on August 11, 1999. Her testimony was introduced via the reading of a transcript from the first trial. Ms. McCoy apparently opened the door to the balcony of Mr. Wilson’s apartment and saw appellant sitting in one of the chairs on the balcony. Appellant was'not allowed to be at the apartment due to the no-contact order against him in reference to Ms. Battung and the third-degree domestic battery conviction. All the same, appellant forced his way in through the balcony door and, once inside, pulled out a gun. Ms. McCoy testified that once she saw the gun, she ran into another room and soon afterward heard “three or four” loud gunshots.
According to testimony, Ms. Battung was walking from the kitchen to the couch, where she had been sitting, when she saw appellant come into the apartment from the third-floor balcony. She sat back down on the couch and saw the appellant arguing with two other men who had approached him. She then picked up the phone and began dialing 911. At that point, appellant stood and fired shots at her. Two bullets struck her chest and her abdomen, and a third bullet struck a book that was next to her on the couch.
When appellant took the stand to testify in his own defense, he claimed that he “forgot” he had a gun with him that day. He testified that he went over to the apartment because he was angry at the other people present and wanted to talk with Ms. Battung. He averred that he did not intend to kill her at the time he entered the apartment. He testified that he just aimed for the same corner where he fired the first shot. He insisted that he had learned a valuable lesson and inferred that this incident was a mistake. Because appellant indicated that the incident was a mistake or accident, the admitted evidence of the prior conviction for domestic battering was properly introduced to show absence of mistake or accident, which is allowable under Rule 404(b).
Appellant further claimed, as was stated above, that he was not aware of the no-contact order in effect at the time. In response to the question from the State as to the reason for the no-contact order, appellant replied that it was for “domestic abuse B dispute.” He repeated that he and Ms. Battung had a “domestic dispute” and, when asked if he was convicted of domestic battery in the third degree against the victim, he replied, “If you want to word it like that.” Appellant himself opened the door to the introduction of his prior conviction by claiming that he did not remember the no-contact order from the Jacksonville Municipal Court. Appellant was aware of the trial court’s ruling limiting the admissibility of his previous conviction; he, therefore, should have limited his responses accordingly. We have held that, under the doctrine of invited error, one who is responsible for error cannot be heard to complain of that for which he was responsible. McGhee v. State, 330 Ark. 38, 41, 954 S.W.2d 206, 208 (1997). Under this doctrine, appellant cannot now claim error.
Lastly, regarding credibility, the evidence showed that appellant wrote the victim a lengthy letter even after a second court order to have no contact with her. He asserted that the shooting was an accident and that killing her was not on his mind. After the appellant testified, the State introduced the prior conviction for domestic battery against the victim, the second no-contact order, and the letter. The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Burns v. State, 323 Ark. 206, 913 S.W.2d 789 (1996).
As substantial evidence clearly existed in this case to support the jury’s verdict, with or without the introduction of the prior conviction, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Hannah, J., concurs. Thornton, J., not participating.