McCoy v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons

776 F. Supp. 521, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15310, 1991 WL 217987
CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedOctober 11, 1991
DocketCV-N-89-94-ECR
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 776 F. Supp. 521 (McCoy v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McCoy v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons, 776 F. Supp. 521, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15310, 1991 WL 217987 (D. Nev. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

EDWARD C. REED, Jr., Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs, female inmates incarcerated at the Nevada Women’s Correctional Center (NWCC), filed a civil rights complaint (# 17), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therein, they allege that Defendants discriminate against them because of their gender, thereby violating their right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. According to Plaintiffs, this disparity in treatment is evidenced by the better educational, vocational, and occupational training programs offered by the Nevada prisons housing male inmates as compared to the programs offered at NWCC. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Nevada prisons housing male inmates provide those inmates with greater privileges than NWCC provides to Plaintiffs, to wit, male inmates are allowed blood banks, pets, prison industries jobs, the opportunity to earn good-time credits and money, inmate action committees, honor camps, restitution centers, photographs of other inmates in their cells, and more free time. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the conditions at NWCC are much worse than at any other Nevada prison, namely, an inadequate law library, law clerks, maintenance of the facilities, clothing, cleaning supplies, fresh food, and mail service. In addition, Plaintiffs contend that inmates at NWCC do not receive proper medical screening, that inmates testing positive for the HIV virus are not segregated from general population, and that NWCC has not received its allocation of money from the Inmate Welfare Funds unlike other prisons within the Nevada Department of Prisons.

Now before the court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (# 37).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi *523 tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Rule 56 also provides that when a properly-supported motion is filed, the nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e).

The Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to mean that “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To determine what constitutes a material fact to a case, a court must look to the controlling substantive law. Id.

GENDER DISCRIMINATION

The substantive law at issue is whether Defendants have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution with respect to their treatment of female inmates at NWCC as compared to male inmates within the Nevada Department of Prisons. The Equal Protection Clause directs that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982), reh’g denied, 458 U.S. 1131,103 S.Ct. 14, 73 L.Ed.2d 1401 (1982). The Supreme Court has interpreted this directive to mean that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (Cleburne).

Generally, a classification that results in disparate treatment of like individuals will not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the classification drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 1 Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1074,1080, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981). A classification drawn on the basis of gender, however, calls for a “heightened standard of review.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254. Thus, a party seeking to uphold dissimilar treatment based upon gender must show an “exceedingly persuasive justification.” Kirchberg v. Feens-tra, 450 U.S. 455, 461, 101 S.Ct. 1195, 1199, 67 L.Ed.2d 428 (1981). Such justification exists only if the gender disparate treatment “serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Steiger v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 761 F.2d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir.1985).

In applying this heightened standard of review to prisoner cases, courts have required that female prisoners be treated “in parity” with male prisoners. See Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F.Supp. 1252 (S.D.W.Va.1981); Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F.Supp. 1162 (E.D.Va.1980). To determine whether the female inmates at NWCC are being treated “in parity” with male inmates within the Nevada Department of Prisons, this court shall consider each prison condition which is claimed to violate the Equal Protection Clause as it affects the male inmates on the one hand and the female inmates on the other. 2 Here, where no legislation authorizing any gender dispar *524 ate treatment exists, the court must ask “whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination.” Personnel Adm V of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2293, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979), affd, 445 U.S. 901, 100 S.Ct. 1075, 63 L.Ed.2d 317 (1980). Given the controlling substantive law of the case and the standard Defendants must meet in order for the court to grant summary judgment, the court finds that Defendants’ motion shall be granted in part and denied in part, as follows.

I. EDUCATIONAL, RECREATIONAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS

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Bluebook (online)
776 F. Supp. 521, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15310, 1991 WL 217987, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mccoy-v-nevada-dept-of-prisons-nvd-1991.