McClain v. Thornell

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 2, 2026
• Docket: 24-797
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 2 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KRIS RAYMON MCCLAIN, No. 24-797 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 3:23-cv-08056-SPL v.

RYAN THORNELL, Director of the MEMORANDUM* Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation; KRIS MAYES; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Respondents - Appellees, ----------------------------------------

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 24, 2025 Submission Withdrawn October 27, 2025 Resubmitted June 2, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Before: GRABER and BADE, Circuit Judges, and NAVARRO, District Judge. **

Kris McClain appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and

we affirm.

1. McClain first argues that, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper

Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), federal courts cannot apply

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) highly deferential

standard when reviewing state court decisions. This argument is foreclosed by

Bradford v. Vang, No. 23-99005, 2026 WL 1340217 (9th Cir. May 14, 2026),

which was decided after briefing. See id. at *17 (“AEDPA’s requirement that a

federal habeas court must apply a ‘highly deferential standard’ in reviewing a state

court’s resolution of a federal constitutional claim raises no constitutional concerns

under Loper Bright or otherwise.”).

We review de novo the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Ybarra v.

McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2011). Under AEDPA, we may grant relief

only if the state court’s adjudication on the merits was (1) “contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

** The Honorable Gloria M. Navarro, United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

2 No. 24-797 the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

2. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that McClain was not in

custody for the purposes of Miranda before he was placed under arrest at the

hospital. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966). The state court’s

determination that McClain was not in custody was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Contrary to

McClain’s argument that the state court took a piecemeal approach, the Arizona

Court of Appeals identified the correct totality-of-the-circumstances test, see

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam), and reasonably

applied it to McClain’s case, see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520–21 (2003)

(explaining that overcoming AEDPA deference requires the application of

precedent be “objectively unreasonable,” not just “erroneous” (citation omitted)).

3. McClain next asserts that the state court’s conclusion that his statements

were voluntary is contrary to clearly established federal law because the facts here

are materially indistinguishable from those in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385

(1987). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). In Mincey, the

defendant had been wounded in a gun battle with the police and was found “lying

on the floor, wounded[,] and semiconscious.” 437 U.S. at 387. The Court

3 No. 24-797 concluded that Mincey’s statements made to the police from a hospital bed were

not voluntary, explaining that “Mincey was weakened by pain and shock, isolated

from family, friends, and legal counsel, and barely conscious, and his will was

simply overborne.” Id. at 401–02.

This case is distinguishable. Although there is evidence that McClain

appeared disoriented and confused at the scene of the accident, there is no evidence

to suggest that his confusion persisted while he was being questioned at the

hospital. Further, given his lack of disorientation at the hospital, McClain’s

requests for a lawyer at the hospital could support, rather than undermine, the state

court’s finding that McClain’s free will was not overborne as Mincey’s was. See

id. at 399.

4. We decline to expand the certificate of appealability to address

McClain’s uncertified claims. McClain has not made a substantial showing that

his constitutional sentencing error claims were not procedurally defaulted or that

his double jeopardy claim was not barred under Arizona’s waiver bar. He also has

not met his burden of showing that the introduction of his DUI conviction violated

his due process rights because he fails to point to United States Supreme Court

precedent to support his argument. In sum, McClain has not made a “substantial

showing of the denial of [his] constitutional right” as to any of the uncertified

issues. Catlin v. Broomfield, 124 F.4th 702, 721 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting

4 No. 24-797 Robertson v. Pichon, 849 F.3d 1173, 1187 (9th Cir. 2017)), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct.

333 (2025).

AFFIRMED.

5 No. 24-797