McCauley v. State

405 So. 2d 1350
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedNovember 18, 1981
Docket80-1200, 80-1332
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 405 So. 2d 1350 (McCauley v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McCauley v. State, 405 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinion

405 So.2d 1350 (1981)

Johnny Tyrone McCauley, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 80-1200, 80-1332.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

November 18, 1981.

*1351 James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Thomas R. Mott, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and C. Michael Barnette, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant McCauley was charged and convicted of second degree murder. The only issue requiring discussion is whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case. We have carefully considered the record and find that the evidence at the close of the State's case was reasonably susceptible of two different views: that the appellant's action in shooting the deceased was justifiable self-defense or that such action evinced a depraved mind without proper regard for the life of the deceased. Therefore the trial judge properly submitted the case to the jury who determined the disputed question of fact against the appellant.

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER and COWART, JJ., concur.

COWART, J., concurs specially with opinion.

COBB, J., dissents with opinion.

COWART, Judge, concurring specially:

"In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt but, being seasoned with a gracious voice, Obscures the show of evil?"

Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act. III, Scene II, Line 74.

McCauley was charged with second degree murder, defined as killing another "by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life." § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1979). The dissent would hold that the State did not establish "Johnny Boy" McCauley's "depraved mind" at the time of the shooting beyond a reasonable doubt or, alternatively, that self-defense as a matter of law was established in the State's case.

For all the frills the basic facts are an old story: Two men and one woman; Skit had her first and Johnny Boy beat his time with her. Trouble and threats. Johnny Boy carried his pistol to a party. Skit wanted to talk to Debbie, but Debbie didn't want to talk to Skit anymore. Johnny Boy "walked around the car to where Skit was."[1] They had "words" and, suddenly and without warning, Johnny Boy shot Skit dead in the head. Of course, Debbie and her girl friend Josa view the facts favorable to Johnny Boy. They all now believe Skit was "reaching," but Skit was not reaching — he had nothing to reach for — he was unarmed. He cannot testify, but the facts themselves speak.

The jury's task was to determine whether Johnny Boy's act in killing Skit evinced an evil and morally debased (corrupt), hence depraved, mind. In doing so, as with any question of fact, the jury had a right to, and apparently did, disbelieve and disregard McCauley's testimony that he thought Skit was "reaching." There was sufficient other evidence, including evidence of McCauley's *1352 ill feelings toward Skit and his preparation for the encounter, from which the jury could properly find McCauley guilty of second degree murder.[2]

McCauley's self-defense claim was likewise properly submitted to the jury. Self-defense is an affirmative defense[3] and the State has no burden to anticipate and negative it in its case in chief. Involving as it does intricate finding of facts and numerous conclusions,[4] the question of self-defense, with its inherent problems involving judgment and credibility decisions based on common sense and experience and the weighing of evidence, is peculiarly a function of the jury. The dissent cites no Florida case,[5] and research reveals none, where an appellate court has analyzed and weighed the facts and circumstances, overruled a jury determination to the contrary, and held that the facts constituted self-defense as a matter of law. To put Johnny Boy back on the street would require a deviation from well established law and would create a most remarkable and dangerous precedent. In criminal cases trial courts routinely acquit for insufficiency of evidence but it is quite another thing to acquit for a sufficiency of evidence as to an affirmative defense because under such a practice when the trial court errs in favor of the accused the State has no appeal and an anxious citizenry is deprived of its right, as a jury, to express a community attitude toward the reckless, irresponsible and lawless use of a handgun when it is urged as a defense to a criminal act.

The real issue was the state of mind of Johnny Boy when he pulled the trigger. Under all the circumstances did his act which killed Skit evince an evil and morally debased (depraved) mind, or did he truly act out of an innocent, unavoidable and forced necessity and, therefore, in self-defense? The jury, as is their duty and function, answered that question. The dissent is so engrossed and enthralled with the colorful details and life styles that it would overrule the jury and hold, as a matter of law, that the jury erred in determining the ultimate facts, including the state of mind of the accused. There was sufficient evidence on all issues to justify their submission to the jury and this appellate court should not now hold, as a matter of law, that the jury erred in its determination or that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to weigh the facts and circumstances in the case and answer this question.

COBB, Judge, dissenting.

I dissent.

The defendant, Johnny Tyrone McCauley, was arrested on October 22, 1979, as the result of shooting and killing one William "Skit" Johnson shortly after midnight on that date. The state filed an information charging that McCauley "did, in violation of Florida Statute 782.04, by an act imminently dangerous to another, and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, ... murder William Johnson by shooting (him) with a handgun."

*1353 McCauley was convicted as charged after jury trial and appeals that judgment and sentence. The question we consider is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the state's case.

In his opening statement, the prosecutor said:

I believe there will be testimony in this courtroom to the effect that just prior to the shooting of Skit Johnson that he reached behind his back, and I believe in the statement that Johnny McCauley made to the police, you're going to hear it was Johnny McCauley's belief that Skit had a gun or weapon of some sort, and that he was acting in self defense when he killed Skit Johnson.

The prosecutor knew this in advance because, as it turned out, that was the uncontroverted testimony of the state's witnesses to the shooting. As the prosecutor told the jury, "Josa Sanchez and Debbie Donaldson are the only ones (other than the defendant) that really had an opportunity up close to see what occurred."

The state then called these two eyewitnesses, together with ten other witnesses, to establish various elements of proof, and read McCauley's statement. The state then rested, and the defense moved for acquittal. As it weighed that motion, the trial court had before it the following evidence:

I. THE TESTIMONY OF DEBBIE DONALDSON

Debbie Donaldson testified that she had met Johnson and had a sexual relationship with him in the Fall of 1978. Soon after Debbie first met Skit, he shot at her then boyfriend, whose name was Victor, at her father's house.

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Related

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532 So. 2d 16 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1988)
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474 So. 2d 1237 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1985)
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405 So. 2d 1350, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mccauley-v-state-fladistctapp-1981.