McCauley v. Logan

25 A. 499, 152 Pa. 202, 1893 Pa. LEXIS 959
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 3, 1893
DocketAppeal, No. 86
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 25 A. 499 (McCauley v. Logan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McCauley v. Logan, 25 A. 499, 152 Pa. 202, 1893 Pa. LEXIS 959 (Pa. 1893).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Green,

The plaintiffs in this case were bridge builders who had erected a false works in the Allegheny river at Pittsburgh, in [204]*204the building of a bridge across the river at that place. The defendant was engaged in the lumber business on the river, and had a lumber yard at Tarentum, a place on the river about twenty miles above Pittsburgh. On the night of May 20, 1890, two boats loaded with lumber and belonging to the defendant were tied up a short distance above his yard at Tarentum, and one of them, the outside one, became detached from the other, in some way not explained by the testimony, and floated down the river. When it reached the bridge which the plaintiffs were building at Pittsburgh it ran against their false works erected in the river and carried away a portion of them, and this action is brought to recover damages for the loss thus occasioned.

As a matter of course there can be no recovery in such a case, unless the defendant was guilty of a breach of some legal duty which he owed to the plaintiffs. The foundation of the action is negligence, and the accusation of negligence is only made out by showing a breach of a legal duty owing by the defendant to the plaintiffs. In considering this question it must be borne in mind that the defendant, in occupying a portion of the river’s surface with his lumber boats, was in the exercise of a perfect legal right. He was engaged in a lawful calling and had an absolute right to float his lumber on the river and to tie it up along the shore. His right in these respects was in every sense fully equal to any right of the plaintiffs to erect their false works in the river. In one sense the defendant’s right was superior, as he was simply occupying the river for its regular and legitimate uses, and the plaintiffs were using it for an exceptional purpose, lawful it is true, but temporary in its nature and only continuing as long as the necessities of the occasion required the maintenance of the false works. It was an obstruction in the river which could only be justified by the bridge construction. It must also be remembered that these false works were twenty miles distant from the place where the defendant’s lumber was moored, and there is no evidence in the case to show that the defendant had any knowledge of their existence, or that he had ever received any notice of their erection. He was therefore subject to no duty to take any special or unusual precautions against injury to the plaintiffs’ false works by the floating away of [205]*205his boat. He was subject only to the duty of taking the ordinary precautions against such injuries to others as .might arise from the -ordinary uses of the river and which could or ought to have been foreseen. In order to convict one of negligence the consequences of his act or omission must be the natural and probable results of his fault which, for that reason, might be foreseen by ordinary forecast. But persons are not bound to take precautions against occurrences of an extraordinary or unusual character, and therefore are not likely to be foreseen.

We have many times announced these principles and applied them in various circumstances and in various relations among men. Thus in McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. 436, we said: “ The general rule is that a man is answerable for the consequences of a fault which are natural and probable, and might therefore be foreseen by ordinary forecast, while it is true that if his fault happen to concur with something extraordinary, and therefore not likely to be foreseen, he will not be answerable for the unexpected result. ... We are not to link together, as cause and effect, events having no probable connection in the mind, and which could not, by prudent circumspection and ordinary thoughtfulness, be foreseen as likely to happen in consequence of the act in which we are engaged. It may be true that the injury would not have occurred without concurrence of our act with the event which immediately caused the injury, but we are not justly called to suffer for it unless the other event was the effect of our act, or were within the probable range of ordinary circumspection when engaged in the act.”

We have applied the same principles in actions to recover damages for injuries occurring on public roads. Thus in Schaeffer v. Jackson Township, 150 Pa. 145, our Brother Heydrick, delivering the opinion of this court, said: “ It is a general rule, as well settled as anything in the law of negligence, that a man is responsible for such consequences of his fault as are natural and probable, and might therefore be foreseen by ordinary forecast, but if his fault happen to concur with something extraordinary, and therefore not likely to be foreseen, he will not be liable for the extraordinary result.’’’ To the same effect are Worrilow v. Chichester Township, 1 Adv. Rep. 622, and Kiefer v. Hummelstown, 151 Pa. 304, and [206]*206Jackson Township v. Wagner, 127 Pa. 184. In the last case we said: “ Township officers are bound to anticipate and provide against the ordinary needs of travel conducted in the ordinary manner, and to remove obstructions and defects which would naturally or probably cause injury to the traveler along the highways; but the township is not an insurer against all possible accidents, nor is it bound to anticipate the danger to which a broken wagon or a frightened horse may expose the driver. Such a burden would be too heavy for any township to bear, and the law does not impose it. The general rule is well stated in Hey v. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. 44, to be, that “ roads and bridges are made for ordinary travel; if they fulfill such purpose they are sufficient, and those in charge of them are not responsible for extraordinary accidents occurring on them.”

In the further consideration of the question of the defendant’s culpable negligence, the special occasion of the escape of the defendant’s boat must be regarded.

The testimony in the case on both sides showed that there was only an ordinary stage of water in the river during the day preceding the night on which the boat floated off. An ordinary stage of water was about five to six feet in depth. During the day and evening the river had risen slightly and slowly about two feet. The great bulk of the testimony was that it was not raining in the vicinity of Tarentum during the day, and the weather was fair as evening approached. All the witnesses who testified in regard to the rise during the night said that the river began to rise rapidly between nine and ten o’clock, and from that time till about five o’clock the next morning it had risen from eight to twelve feet, and there was a very considerable run of driftwood. Whether this was an extraordinary and unusual rise in so short a time was a subject of considerable testimony, and it was, practically, unanimously stated by the witnesses on both sides that it was of that character. Thus H. F. McCassley, a witness for the plaintiffs, said : “ Q. Was the river very high that night? A. Well in the evening it was about a six foot stage as near as I can tell. Q. What stage had you in the morning ? A. Well as near as I can tell about a sixteen foot stage. Q. Raised about ten feet ? A. About ten feet that night. There had been heavy [207]*207rains through the day and that night. Q. Is that a sudden rise ? A. Yes, sir; it came pretty sudden. Been heavy rains up the river.”

James Arner, another witness for the plaintiffs, said: “ Q. The next morning when you say you saw the lines slipping, was the river pretty high ? A. Yes, sir; awful high. Q. It got very high that night ? A. Yes, sir. Q.

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Bluebook (online)
25 A. 499, 152 Pa. 202, 1893 Pa. LEXIS 959, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mccauley-v-logan-pa-1893.