McCarley v. McCarley

Court of Appeals of Georgia

McCarley v. McCarley

539 S.E.2d 871, 246 Ga. App. 171, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 4045, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1174

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedSeptember 27, 2000

DocketA00A2330; A00A2331

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 539 S.E.2d 871 (McCarley v. McCarley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McCarley v. McCarley, 539 S.E.2d 871, 246 Ga. App. 171, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 4045, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1174 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).

Pincite

Opinion

Phipps, Judge.

In her capacity as executrix of Earl McCarley’s estate, his second wife sought to probate his will. Three of McCarley’s natural children by his first marriage filed a caveat, which the probate court denied. The children appealed to superior court. In successive order, the appeal was dismissed, the executrix died, and the successor co-executors named in the will filed an OCGA § 9-15-14 motion for an award of attorney fees and litigation expenses against the caveators and their attorney, Johnson.

The caveators and counsel moved to dismiss the motion because the co-executors had never been substituted as parties in this litigation. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that there was a substitution of the parties by operation of law. After the court entered an order awarding fees and expenses against the caveators and their attorney, applications for discretionary appeal were filed and granted. Case No. A00A2330 is the caveators’ appeal. Case No. A00A2331 is the attorney’s appeal. We conclude that the [172]*172superior court erred in denying appellants’ motion to dismiss and, therefore, reverse.

Decided September 27, 2000. John D. Rasnick, for appellants (case no. A00A2330). Donald W. Johnson, pro se (case no. A00A2331). Willis, McKenzie & Long, Charles J. Willis, for appellee.

With certain exceptions not applicable here, an estate is not a legal entity which can be a party to legal proceedings.¹ An action by or against an estate must be brought or defended by the legal representative of the estate.² Where the estate’s representative dies during the pendency of the litigation, the successor representative must be substituted as a party.³ Substitution of parties does not occur by operation of law but must be effected under OCGA § 9-11-25, which requires notice to the parties and a hearing.⁴ A hearing is required because there may be issues concerning whether the claim has survived or whether the person or persons claiming to be legal representatives actually occupy such status. But even where there is no confusion as to such issues, substitution still is required.⁵ Until the substitution is made, the proceedings are void as to the deceased party.⁶ For these reasons, the motions to dismiss should have been granted.

Judgment reversed in both cases.

Johnson, C. J, and Smith, P. J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Phipps, Judge.

In her capacity as executrix of Earl McCarley’s estate, his second wife sought to probate his will. Three of McCarley’s natural children by his first marriage filed a caveat, which the probate court denied. The children appealed to superior court. In successive order, the appeal was dismissed, the executrix died, and the successor co-executors named in the will filed an OCGA § 9-15-14 motion for an award of attorney fees and litigation expenses against the caveators and their attorney, Johnson.

The caveators and counsel moved to dismiss the motion because the co-executors had never been substituted as parties in this litigation. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that there was a substitution of the parties by operation of law. After the court entered an order awarding fees and expenses against the caveators and their attorney, applications for discretionary appeal were filed and granted. Case No. A00A2330 is the caveators’ appeal. Case No. A00A2331 is the attorney’s appeal. We conclude that the [172]*172superior court erred in denying appellants’ motion to dismiss and, therefore, reverse.

Decided September 27, 2000. John D. Rasnick, for appellants (case no. A00A2330). Donald W. Johnson, pro se (case no. A00A2331). Willis, McKenzie & Long, Charles J. Willis, for appellee.

With certain exceptions not applicable here, an estate is not a legal entity which can be a party to legal proceedings.¹ An action by or against an estate must be brought or defended by the legal representative of the estate.² Where the estate’s representative dies during the pendency of the litigation, the successor representative must be substituted as a party.³ Substitution of parties does not occur by operation of law but must be effected under OCGA § 9-11-25, which requires notice to the parties and a hearing.⁴ A hearing is required because there may be issues concerning whether the claim has survived or whether the person or persons claiming to be legal representatives actually occupy such status. But even where there is no confusion as to such issues, substitution still is required.⁵ Until the substitution is made, the proceedings are void as to the deceased party.⁶ For these reasons, the motions to dismiss should have been granted.

Judgment reversed in both cases.

Johnson, C. J, and Smith, P. J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

539 S.E.2d 871, 246 Ga. App. 171, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 4045, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1174, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mccarley-v-mccarley-gactapp-2000.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack