McCann v. Core Civic Agency

• Court: District Court, N.D. Ohio
• Decided: August 27, 2025
• Docket: 4:25-cv-00673
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

PEARSON, J. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

LONNIE MCCANN, ) ) CASE NO. 4:25-CV-00673 Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON ) CORE CIVIC AGENCY, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION ) ORDER Defendants. ) [Resolving ECF No. 1]

Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Lonnie McCann’s Complaint against “Core Civic Agency (CCA)” (“Core Civic”), a private company that owns and manages private prisons and detention centers, as well as employees of Core Civic or the Northeastern Ohio Correctional Center (“NEOCC”), a private prison owned and operated by Core Civic. ECF No. 1. At the time he filed his complaint, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee housed at NEOCC. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) which shall be granted in a separate ruling. Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his constitutional rights to due process and free speech in January 2025, when he and other detainees at NEOCC were placed on lock- down with no commissary privileges for weeks, prohibiting him from purchasing hygiene items and stationery he needed to file materials in a state criminal case. ECF No. 1 at PageID ##: 4, 6-7. Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief: $1,000,000.00 in U.S. Currency and an order requiring Core Civic to allow limited commissary privileges during lock-down. ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 9. Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), district courts are expressly required to screen all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such action that the Court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint warrants dismissal for failure to state a plausible claim. Plaintiff alleges claims occurring during federal custody. He cannot, therefore, sue for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a remedy for constitutional rights violations committed by persons acting under color of state law. Although the Supreme Court created a limited private right of action for damages against individual federal government

officials alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges no plausible Bivens claim. The Supreme Court has made clear that a private corporation (such as Core Civic) that operates a federal prison, and privately-employed personnel working in a privately-operated prison (similar to the individual Defendants Plaintiff seeks to sue) cannot be sued for constitutional rights violations under Bivens. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70–74 (2001); Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 131 (2012). Accordingly, under Malesko and Minneci, Plaintiff has no plausible damages claim under Bivens against any Defendant he names. Additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible Bivens claim, even if he had named federal

officials subject to suit. Bivens is a judicially-created cause of action that has been implied in limited circumstances. See Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 490-93 (2022); Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman, ― F.4th ―, 2025 WL 2408658, at *3 (6th Cir. 2025). The Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens claim in only three contexts: a Fourth Amendment claim in the search and seizure context, a Fifth Amendment discrimination claim against a congressmen who fired a female secretary, and an Eighth Amendment claim for a prison official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Egbert, 596 U.S. at 490-91. The Supreme Court instructed that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity,” and that federal courts are cautioned from extending the remedy if there are “sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficicacy or necessity of a damages remedy.” Id. at 491 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017)). Here, Plaintiff's claims clearly do not fit within the specific contexts that have been recognized for Bivens suits, and there is no basis to imply a Bivens cause of action on his allegations. Finally, the docket in the case makes clear that Plaintiff is no longer detained at NEOCC.

Accordingly, any claim for injunctive relief he asserts relating to his conditions of confinement is moot. See Nunez v. FCI Elkton, 32 F. App’x 724, 726 (6th Cir. 2002) (“To the extent that Nunez asserted a claim for injunctive relief against the defendants based upon their alleged failure to open his legal mail in his presence, his claim is moot in light of his transfer from FCI Elkton to MDC Brooklyn.”). Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

August 27, 2025 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson Date Benita Y. Pearson United States District Judge