1 2
3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 STANTON HARRY MCCAIN, II, NO. 4:18-CV-5174-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; FRANK JOHN 11 SMITH, M.D.; STEPHEN SINCLAIR; DONALD 12 HOLBROOK; STEVEN HAMMOND, M.D.; LISA 13 KLEMME; and KAREN FORSS,
14 Defendants. 15
16 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 17 (ECF No. 71). This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. 18 The Court has reviewed the record and files herein, the completed briefing, and is 19 fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion for 20 Summary Judgment (ECF No. 71) is GRANTED. 1 BACKGROUND 2 This case concerns alleged violations of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
3 rights, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act 4 (“RA”), while Plaintiff was confined to an Intensive Management Unit (“IMU”) 5 cell at Airway Heights Corrections Center for 85 days. ECF No. 45. On or about
6 April 11, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred to the IMU after receiving an infraction 7 for threatening another incarcerated individual. ECF No. 72 at 2, ¶ 2, at 6, ¶ 14. 8 The IMU houses inmates on Disciplinary Segregation, Administrative Segregation 9 Referral, or Maximum Custody. Id. at 5, ¶ 10. Prior to being sent to the IMU,
10 Plaintiff underwent a Nursing Assessment to ensure he was medically suitable for 11 housing in the IMU. Id. at 7, ¶ 15; ECF No. 74-18. Individuals who are not able 12 to stand or ambulate in the IMU are placed in the inpatient unit of the health
13 services building. ECF No. 72 at 7, ¶ 15. Plaintiff was deemed medically suitable 14 for housing in the IMU. ECF No. 74-18 at 3. 15 Individuals housed in the IMU are closely monitored by IMU staff. ECF 16 No. 72 at 5, ¶ 10. Staff members conduct frequent and random security checks,
17 which include visual observation of the incarcerated individual and their cell. Id. 18 Individuals can incur infractions for failing to comply with IMU rules, such as 19 placing blankets or bedlinens on the floor. Id. at 6, ¶ 13. Additionally, IMU staff
20 interact with incarcerated individuals three times daily to distribute meals. Id. at 5, 1 ¶ 11. Individuals who wish to receive meal services are required to turn on their 2 cell light, step toward the doorway, and remain behind the safety line. Id.
3 Similarly, medical staff also perform daily wellness checks. Id. at 6, ¶ 12. During 4 those checks, individuals have the opportunity to request medical assistance or 5 discuss medical concerns. Id. Any concerns raised by the individual or noted by
6 medical staff are recorded on a Daily Report of Segregated Offender. Id. 7 Plaintiff was initially scheduled to remain in the IMU for 20 days, but he 8 refused to be returned to general population on two occasions. ECF No. 72 at 7, ¶ 9 17–18. His confinement to IMU was extended until July 6, 2018 for a total
10 confinement period of 85 days. Id. at 9, ¶ 22. During that time, Plaintiff contacted 11 prison staff and administrators on several occasions regarding his use of a 12 wheelchair, which he was not permitted to use while in his IMU cell. Id. at 8, ¶
13 19–21; 45 at 5. Metal wheelchairs pose a security concern due to the metal parts, 14 such as spokes, which can be removed or altered for use as a weapon. Id. at 4, ¶ 15 11. Prison staff responded to Plaintiff’s letters that raised issues regarding his 16 medical care and indicated he would need to discuss his medical concerns with
17 custody staff. Id. at 8, ¶ 19; 76-3. Plaintiff refused to see medical providers to 18 discuss his concerns. Id. at 8, ¶ 20. Plaintiff also raised other issues to prison 19 administrators relating to other prison facilities. Id. at ¶ 21. Those concerns are
20 beyond the scope of this motion and will not be addressed by the Court. 1 Defendants filed the present motion seeking summary judgment on all of 2 Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 71. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and also requests the
3 Court defer its consideration of the motion until Plaintiff is able to submit 4 additional evidence. ECF No. 83. 5 DISCUSSION
6 I. Legal Standard 7 The Court may grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party who 8 demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the 9 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling
10 on a motion for summary judgment, the court must only consider admissible 11 evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2002). The 12 party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the
13 absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 14 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to identify 15 specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. 16 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla
17 of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be 18 evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. 19 For purposes of summary judgment, a fact is “material” if it might affect the
20 outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248. Further, a dispute is 1 “genuine” only where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find in 2 favor of the non-moving party. Id. The Court views the facts, and all rational
3 inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. 4 Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). Summary judgment will thus be granted 5 “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
6 an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the 7 burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 8 A pro se litigant’s contentions offered in motions and pleadings are properly 9 considered evidence “where such contentions are based on personal knowledge
10 and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and where [a litigant] 11 attest[s] under penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions or pleadings are 12 true and correct.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (allegations
13 in a pro se plaintiff’s verified pleadings must be considered as evidence in 14 opposition to summary judgment). Conversely, unverified pleadings are not 15 treated as evidence. Contra Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399–400 (9th 16 Cir. 1998) (verified motion swearing that statements are “true and correct”
17 functions as an affidavit); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 n.10 (9th Cir. 18 1995) (pleading counts as “verified” if drafter states under penalty of perjury that 19 the contents are true and correct). Although pro se pleadings are held to less
20 stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys, pro se litigants in an ordinary 1 civil case should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of 2 record. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986).
3 A. Construed Motion for Extension of Time 4 As an initial matter, Plaintiff appears to move for an extension of time so 5 that he may submit additional evidence he has yet to receive through his public
6 records requests. ECF No. 83 at 22. Plaintiff’s request is denied. First, the time 7 for discovery ended on May 28, 2021. ECF No. 61 at 3. Plaintiff has not offered 8 any basis for extending discovery beyond the cutoff date. Second, Plaintiff has 9 failed to seek a continuance of the summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule
10 56(d), which permits courts to defer consideration of the motion if the nonmoving 11 party can specify by affidavit or declaration why it cannot present facts essential to 12 justify its opposition to the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Plaintiff merely states
13 that his documents have not yet arrived. ECF No. 83 at 22. Notably, Plaintiff did 14 not submit these particular records requests until well after the discovery cutoff 15 date. See id. at 70, 79, 81, 102. For these reasons, the Court will not extend the 16 discovery deadlines and will proceed with its ruling on Defendants’ motion.
17 B. Eighth Amendment Claim 18 Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 19 claim on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate his condition was
20 sufficiently serious to implicate an Eighth Amendment violation or that Defendants 1 possessed the requisite knowledge to trigger liability. ECF No. 71 at 3–4. Plaintiff 2 argues he suffers from several medical conditions that entitle him to medical
3 treatment and that Defendants denied Plaintiff his proper medical treatment, 4 leading to further injury and harm. ECF No. 45 at 8–16. 5 It is well settled that “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
6 conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth 7 Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation omitted). In 8 addition to its prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments,” the Eighth 9 Amendment imposes a duty upon prison officials to provide “humane conditions of
10 confinement,” including adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Id. To 11 establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment premised on prison medical 12 treatment, an inmate must show “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”
13 Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 14 “In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two 15 parts.” Id. First, the prisoner must show a “serious medical need” by 16 demonstrating the failure to treat the condition will result in “further significant
17 injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citation and internal 18 quotations omitted). Second, the prisoner must demonstrate the prison official 19 acted with deliberate indifference. Id. Deliberate indifference is shown by: (1) a
20 purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, 1 and (2) a resulting harm. Id. For example, a prison official acts with deliberate 2 indifference in denying, delaying, or intentionally interfering with a prisoner’s
3 medical treatment. Id. Inadvertent or negligent failures to provide adequate 4 medical care are insufficient to establish liability under the Eighth Amendment. 5 Id. Isolated incidents in a prisoner’s overall medical treatment history are also
6 generally insufficient for an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. 7 1. Serious Medical Need 8 As to the first prong, Plaintiff claims he suffers from several medical 9 conditions that render him unable to walk or stand, and he is thus, dependent upon
10 a wheelchair. ECF No. 45 at 7–8. Specifically, Plaintiff claims to suffer from 11 chronic coronary artery disease, angina, a “spinal birth defect,” and several joint 12 and bone issues that have required surgery or other medical treatments over the
13 years (e.g., foot and shoulder reconstructive surgery). Id. at 8. Plaintiff argues an 14 “unbiased medical review” would demonstrate his conditions worsened during his 15 time in IMU because he was forced to over-exert himself when Defendants’ denied 16 him use of a wheelchair. Id. at 8–9.
17 Plaintiff submitted numerous documents to support his claims of serious 18 medical needs. See generally ECF No. 83. However, the documents do not 19 support the severity of impairment Plaintiff claims. For example, a thorough
20 medical examination conducted on October 5, 2011, which included an extensive 1 review of Plaintiff’s medical history, revealed some health complications (e.g., 2 severe coronary disease, possible anxiety and adjustment disorders, polyarthralgia
3 and degenerative joint disease of the cervical thoracic and lumbar spine), but 4 specifically stated Plaintiff “does not have organic paralysis of the lower 5 extremities at this time.” ECF No. 83 at 145–46. Moreover, the treatment plan
6 indicated Plaintiff should undergo consultations for physical therapy, occupational 7 therapy, and mental health to determine whether Plaintiff “should be encouraged to 8 go back to a walker and get him out of the wheelchair.” Id. at 146. 9 Of the documents submitted by Plaintiff that relate specifically to Plaintiff’s
10 wheelchair concerns is a letter from the prison Ombuds, issued over six weeks 11 after Plaintiff was released from IMU. Id. at 67. While the Ombuds 12 “substantiated” Plaintiff’s complaint after evaluating Plaintiff’s case and
13 interviewing Department of Health Services and Prisons staff, the Ombuds does 14 not cite to any medical evaluations or consultations with Plaintiff’s care providers 15 to support his conclusions. Id. Notably, the letter acknowledges that Department 16 of Health Services and Prison staff had concerns about whether Plaintiff required
17 the use of a wheelchair while in his cell. Id. Moreover, the Ombuds did not 18 consult with IMU staff regarding any potential safety concerns they may have had 19 that related to in-cell wheelchair access. See ECF No. 75 at 4, ¶ 11. Thus, a single
20 letter unsupported by any medical evidence or evidence of a thorough investigation 1 is insufficient to corroborate Plaintiff’s claim of a serious medical need that would 2 require use of a wheelchair in his cell. The remaining documents submitted by
3 Plaintiff relate primarily to his complaints about other conditions of his 4 confinement or records requests pertaining to this litigation. See, e.g., ECF No. 83 5 at 99–114.
6 Conversely, Defendants have submitted additional medical records and 7 internal care records to support their contention that Plaintiff does not suffer from a 8 serious medical need that requires further treatment beyond what Plaintiff is 9 already receiving. A review of these records reveals that Plaintiff does suffer from
10 several medical conditions, but those conditions have been, and continue to be, 11 well-monitored and treated. For example, Plaintiff underwent shoulder surgery in 12 September 2006, which resulted in “good improvement with that shoulder” and
13 “no evidence of recurrent instability.” ECF No. 74-4 at 3. In June 2011, after 14 presenting with chest pains, Plaintiff was evaluated with an EKG, which did not 15 reveal any evidence of acute ischemia; Plaintiff was discharged without pain 16 symptoms and directed to get a stress test one week later. ECF No. 74-5 at 3. It is
17 unclear whether Plaintiff followed through with the stress test. 18 More importantly, the objective medical evidence does not support 19 Plaintiff’s claims of serious medical needs. Regarding Plaintiff’s alleged spinal
20 injury from sometime in 1999, several imaging studies were conducted on or about 1 June 13, 2008 to evaluate his conditions, which resulted in generally benign and 2 unremarkable findings. ECF No. 74-4 at 3–4. Towards the end of June 2008,
3 Plaintiff continued to complain of significant pain in his lower extremities to the 4 point of not being able to walk, despite no objective medical evidence of a severe 5 or debilitating injury. ECF No. 74-4 at 4. Curiously, Plaintiff also complained of
6 restless leg syndrome around that same time period and demonstrated the condition 7 to a nurse by “tossing his legs from side to side as well as up and down, right and 8 left legs.” Id. An evaluation in June 2011 continued to show generally benign and 9 unremarkable findings with regard to Plaintiff’s alleged conditions. See id. at 6
10 (impressions indicated Plaintiff’s alleged paralysis was likely “somatization and 11 not an organic paralysis” because it was “ inconsistent with the lack of bowel or 12 bladder incontinence, as well as the irregularities of his history in which he was
13 noted to be moving his right lower extremity”). 14 As to his alleged heart conditions, reviews of Plaintiff’s chest images and 15 medical records in 2011 indicated his chest pains were not likely cardiac in nature 16 as his symptoms were inconsistent with angina due to ischemia and atypical for
17 acute coronary syndrome. ECF Nos. 74-4 at 6; 74-5 at 3; 74-6 at 2. Plaintiff’s 18 medical history after July 2011 becomes less clear because he began to refuse 19 treatments, medications, and evaluations. See ECF Nos. 74-7 at 2; 74-12 at 5; 74-
20 16 at 2. 1 Based on the objective medical evidence in the record, there is no genuine 2 issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s medical needs. While he has several
3 medical conditions, none rise to the level of a serious medical need that will result 4 in further injury or cause wanton pain if left untreated. In fact, any failure to treat 5 Plaintiff’s medical conditions appear to come at the behest of Plaintiff himself, not
6 Defendants, who have routinely attended to Plaintiff’s symptoms and complaints. 7 Plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material fact simply by disagreeing with 8 the medical experts and Defendants’ decisions in light of the expert advice. Scott 9 v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different
10 stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable 11 jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes 12 of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).
13 2. Deliberate Indifference 14 Plaintiff alleges Defendants knew he required use of a wheelchair for his 15 serious medical needs as evidenced by his Health Status Reports (“HSR”) in place 16 at the time, and that Defendants purposely denied Plaintiff access to the
17 wheelchair, causing Plaintiff to “suffer inhumanely.” ECF No. 45 at 9–11. To 18 support his argument, Plaintiff submitted the relevant HSRs in place at the time 19 (ECF No. 83 at 63, at 64, at 65) as well as letters he wrote to several Defendants
20 outlining his wheelchair concerns (ECF No. 45 at 22, at 28, at 30, at 32, at 39). 1 Plaintiff’s argument and supporting evidence misinterprets the knowledge 2 required to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim. Knowledge of an inmate’s
3 complaints and disagreements with medical opinions is insufficient. Toguchi v. 4 Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather, Plaintiff must demonstrate 5 Defendants had knowledge of facts from which an inference could have been
6 drawn that a substantial risk of harm existed, and Defendants must have actually 7 drawn those inferences. Id. at 1957 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 8 (1994)). Here, the evidence in the record shows Defendants were not aware of any 9 serious medical need that would affect Plaintiff’s health and safety if left untreated.
10 Conversely, the record demonstrates Defendants regularly provided Plaintiff with 11 adequate medical care, even when Plaintiff refused medical treatments and 12 examinations.
13 To illustrate, prison and medical staff interact with inmates in IMU on a 14 daily basis. ECF No. 72 at 5–6, ¶ 11–12. Food services are delivered three times 15 daily, during which the inmate is directed to turn on their cell light and stand 16 behind the safety line. Id. at 5, ¶ 11. Failure to comply would result in an
17 infraction. Id. at 7, ¶ 16. Similarly, wellness checks are conducted once daily. Id. 18 at 6, ¶ 12. Any concerns raised by the inmates or medical staff are documented on 19 a daily report. Id. The daily report would also contain “medical observations” or
20 “unusual occurrences and/or behaviors.” Id. Plaintiff’s allegations that he was 1 forced to sleep on the floor or that he had to drag himself across the floor are not 2 documented in any report. Id. at 7, ¶ 16. Plaintiff was also never infracted for
3 failing to comply with food service requirements. Id. Thus, Defendants had no 4 reason to be aware of a serious medical condition threatening Plaintiff’s health and 5 safety.
6 Plaintiff alleges he provided “formal notice” to Defendants Sinclair, 7 Hammond, and Holbrook of the “horrific sufferings” he endured while in IMU. 8 ECF Nos. 45 at 11; 83 at 37. Defendants argue Plaintiff’s letters did not contain 9 specific information that would have led to knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged
10 medical needs. ECF No. 71 at 10. For example, neither letter cited by Plaintiff 11 contains references to Defendant Hammond. See ECF No. 45 at 22–23, at 32. 12 Plaintiff has also failed to identify, or provide evidence of, any particular
13 knowledge Defendant Hammond had of Plaintiff’s alleged medical conditions. See 14 ECF No. 83 at 2–60. 15 Similarly, one letter allegedly providing notice to Defendant Sinclair 16 contains no reference to Defendant Sinclair (ECF No. 45 at 22–23), and the other
17 letter purportedly giving notice to Defendant Sinclair contains no mention of 18 Plaintiff’s concerns about his wheelchair while in IMU (id. at 32). The same two 19 letters allegedly provided notice to Defendant Holbrook. However, as noted, the
20 1 second letter does not mention Plaintiff’s wheelchair concerns, and it is unclear 2 whether the first letter even reached Defendant Holbrook. ECF No. 71 at 11.
3 Moreover, Plaintiff’s Care Conference notes indicate Plaintiff’s medical care 4 providers were working closely with prison officials to ensure Plaintiff’s medical 5 needs were being met. ECF Nos. 74-3; 74-7; 74-8. While these conference notes
6 are dated several years prior to the relevant time period, they do establish 7 Plaintiff’s health and safety were well-cared for. Notably, they also indicate 8 Plaintiff has a history of disruptive and manipulative behavior, particularly related 9 to his use of a wheelchair. Based on the evidence in the record, Defendants
10 Sinclair, Hammond, and Holbrook could not have possessed the requisite 11 knowledge to trigger Eighth Amendment liability. 12 As to Defendants Forss and Klemme, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
13 what specific knowledge either Defendant possessed regarding Plaintiff’s need of a 14 wheelchair while in IMU. Defendant Forss does not recall taking part in the 15 determination of Plaintiff’s wheelchair use while in IMU. ECF No. 77 at 2, ¶ 4. 16 She does recall interviews with Plaintiff and medical staff in August 2018, about
17 one month after Plaintiff was moved out of IMU, during which Defendant Forss 18 determined Plaintiff’s disagreements and concerns regarding his medical care 19 related primarily to his own refusals of care, not a failure to treat a serious medical
20 condition. Id. at ¶ 5. Defendant Klemme is the ADA Compliance Manager for 1 DOC. Id. at 2, ¶ 4. She is not a medical care provider, nor does she partake in 2 medical care determinations for inmates. To the extent Plaintiff’s letters to
3 Defendant Klemme raised medical concerns, the letters were forwarded to the 4 Correspondence Unit. Id. Thus, she could not have acted with deliberate 5 indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs because those matters fell outside
6 of her purview. Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants Forss and Klemme 7 possessed the requisite knowledge to trigger Eighth Amendment liability. 8 Finally, Plaintiff has likewise failed to establish that Defendant Dr. Smith 9 possessed knowledge of any serious medical need. Dr. Smith conducted several
10 thorough medical exams of Plaintiff and reviewed his medical history, concluding 11 there was no objective medical evidence to support Plaintiff’s alleged inability to 12 walk. Id. at 2, ¶¶ 4–5; at 8, ¶ 26. Dr. Smith’s opinion was also based on Plaintiff’s
13 behavior during his time in IMU, which did not include any documentation that 14 would have raised serious medical concerns. ECF No. 71 at 14. Moreover, Dr. 15 Smith does not recall partaking in the decision regarding Plaintiff’s wheelchair; it 16 appears to have been decided by another care provider. Id. at 13–14.
17 Based on the evidence in the record, Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine 18 issue of material facts as to whether Defendants acted with deliberate indifference 19 to Plaintiff’s alleged serious medical needs. Defendants are entitled to summary
20 judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. 1 C. Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act Claims 2 3 Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act 4 (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) by denying him access to a wheelchair 5 while he was confined to IMU for 85 days. ECF No. 45 at 9–10. Defendants
6 argue Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims fail because they are premised on issues 7 relating to adequate medical treatment, not allegations of disability discrimination, 8 and because Plaintiff cannot prove intentional discrimination. ECF No. 71 at 16. 9 Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating against
10 individuals based on their disability status. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Thompson v. 11 Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). To state a claim for disability 12 discrimination, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the plaintiff is an individual with a
13 disability, (2) the plaintiff is qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of the 14 public entity’s services, programs, or activities, (3), the plaintiff was excluded from 15 participation or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or 16 activities, and (4) the exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was based on
17 the plaintiff’s disability. Id. The RA, which applies to programs or activities that 18 receive federal funding, similarly prohibits discrimination based on disability. 19 Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997). The requirements to
20 state a claim under the RA are substantially similar to the ADA. Collings v. 1 Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995); Wright v. N.Y. State 2 Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2016).
3 Here, Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence demonstrating his claim 4 meets the elements required for an ADA and RA claim. With regard to the first 5 element, courts are to resolve issues of disability by construing the definition in
6 favor of broad coverage, “to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the] 7 chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A); Munoz v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 8 842 F. App’x 59, 61 (9th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff has not submitted any 9 documentation of a finding of disability. He relies primarily on his HSRs, which
10 list a wheelchair as his durable medical equipment, and his communications with 11 DOC administrators and Disability Rights Washington regarding his concerns 12 about his wheelchair access, to support his claimed disability. ECF No. 83 at 63–
13 64, at 67, at 91, at 98, at 175–79, at 162–64. A review of the evidence indicates 14 there were legitimate questions regarding Plaintiff’s claimed inability to walk. See, 15 e.g., ECF Nos. 74-4; 74-8. In any event, the Court does not find it necessary to 16 make a determination regarding Plaintiff’s alleged disability because his claim fails
17 in other respects. 18 Defendants argue Plaintiff has not identified any services, programs, or 19 activities from which he was excluded or that his exclusion was caused by
20 discrimination based on his disability. Plaintiff has alleged he was unable to 1 access the sink or bed in his cell and was unable to retrieve his meals and 2 medications. ECF No. 45 at 10. Access to food, medication, and his cell bed and
3 sink are certainly services to which Plaintiff was entitled while confined in IMU. 4 However, the evidence in the record does not substantiate Plaintiff’s claims that he 5 was unable to access these services without a wheelchair.
6 For example, Plaintiff underwent a medical evaluation before he was sent to 7 IMU, which indicated he was medically suitable for placement in the IMU. ECF 8 No. 72 at 7, ¶ 15. Inmates who cannot stand or ambulate in an IMU cell are 9 housed in the inpatient unit. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff’s DOC records do not
10 contain any evidence that he was unable to stand to retrieve his meals or 11 medication, or that was sleeping on the floor. Id. at ¶ 16. Any such behavior or 12 conditions would have been noted in Plaintiff’s daily wellness evaluations or his
13 infraction records. Id. Finally, while Plaintiff’s HSR was renewed for wheelchair 14 access when he was confined to IMU, DOC medical staff indicated Plaintiff would 15 need to “contact [custody staff] about the IMU restrictions” and that Plaintiff 16 would be scheduled for a medical appointment to address his mobility concerns.
17 Id. at 8, ¶ 20. When the time came for his appointment, Plaintiff refused to attend. 18 Id. Plaintiff has failed to meet the elements necessary to prove an ADA or RA 19 claim.
20 Alternatively, Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claim also fails because he has not 1 proven Defendants intentionally discriminated against him because of his 2 disability. In the Ninth Circuit, it is unclear whether intentional discrimination can
3 be demonstrated by proving discriminatory animus or if deliberate indifference is 4 sufficient. Memmer v. Marin Cty. Cts., 169 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1999). Either 5 way, Plaintiff has failed to prove even deliberate indifference.
6 Consequently, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, 7 there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was excluded 8 from programs, services, or activities to which he was entitled due to his inability 9 to use his wheelchair while confined in IMU. Defendants are entitled to summary
10 judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claim. 11 D. Construed Request for Injunctive Relief 12 Plaintiff requests the Court “follow-up” with Defendants to ensure Plaintiff’s
13 medical needs are being met. ECF No. 45 at 16. Defendants move for summary 14 judgment on Plaintiff’s construed request for injunctive relief on the grounds that it 15 does not comport with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 16 3626, because the relief sought is not tailored to the alleged violation. ECF No. 71
17 at 17. 18 In the context of the PLRA, courts may grant preliminary injunctive relief 19 that is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the harm, and
20 is the least intrusive means necessary. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)–(2). Those 1 requirements are known as the “need-narrowness-intrusiveness” requirements. See 2 Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). Courts must
3 make need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings “sufficient to allow a clear 4 understanding of the ruling.” Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 783 (9th Cir. 5 2019). However, the Ninth Circuit has never required such findings to be so
6 specific as to require a provision-by-provision explanation; rather, “overall 7 statements by the district court that the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard has 8 been met” are sufficient. Armstrong, 622 F.3d at 1070–71. “What is important, 9 and what the PLRA requires, is a finding that the set of reforms being ordered—the
10 ‘relief’—corrects the violations of prisoners’ rights with the minimal impact 11 possible on defendants’ discretion over their policies and procedures.” Id. at 1071. 12 Having determined that Defendants have provided, and continue to provide,
13 adequate medical care to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s construed request for injunctive relief 14 is unwarranted. An order requiring general oversight into Plaintiff’s care would 15 not be narrowly drawn to the alleged harm, i.e., that Plaintiff was denied access to 16 a wheelchair while confined to his IMU cell for 85 days, and would unnecessarily
17 intrude upon Defendants’ ability to efficiently operate its prison system. See 18 Armstrong, 622 F.3d at 1071. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 19 Plaintiff’s construed request for injunctive relief.
20 1 II. Qualified Immunity 2 Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity from damages
3 because they did not have any reason to know their conduct violated a clearly 4 established law nor were they on notice of any conditions that violated Plaintiff’s 5 rights. ECF No. 71 at 18.
6 Qualified immunity shields government actors from civil damages unless 7 their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 8 which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 9 223, 231 (2009). In evaluating a state actor’s assertion of qualified immunity, a
10 court must determine: (1) whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to 11 the plaintiff, show that the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and 12 (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation
13 such that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have understood 14 that his actions violated that right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001), 15 overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). The 16 second prong of the Saucier analysis must be “undertaken in light of the specific
17 context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 18 U.S. 7, 12 (2015). “Only when an officer’s conduct violates a clearly established 19 constitutional right—when the officer should have known he was violating the
20 Constitution—does he forfeit qualified immunity.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 1 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012). Courts may address the two-prong analysis in any 2 order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237–242.
3 Regarding the first prong, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious 4 medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 5 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). However, the Court has already
6 determined that Plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 7 whether Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. 8 Defendants routinely evaluated and cared for Plaintiff’s medical needs, even when 9 Plaintiff began refusing medical treatment and evaluations. ECF No. 72 at 7, ¶ 16,
10 at 8, ¶ 20. Moreover, Defendants’ decision to deny Plaintiff’s access to a 11 wheelchair was based on legitimate medical care opinions, which indicated a 12 wheelchair was not medically necessary. ECF Nos. 71 at 18; 74-4. See Thomas v.
13 Quintana, 672 Fed. Appx. 657, 660 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding qualified immunity 14 where prison medical officials determined the medical equipment at issue was not 15 medically necessary). Thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity where 16 there is no constitutional violation; the Court need not address the second prong of
17 the Saucier analysis. Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 18 703, 711 (9th Cir.2010) (a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if there is no 19 constitutional violation).
20 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 2 1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 71) is 3 GRANTED. 4 2. Plaintiff’s construed request for an extension of time is DENIED. 5 3. Plaintiffs in forma pauperis status is REVOKED. 6 4. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal 7 of this Order would not be taken in good faith and would lack any 8 arguable basis in law or fact. 9 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order, enter judgment for Defendants, furnish copies to the parties, and close the file. 11 DATED September 20, 2021. / re © © = Shits O Kies 13 THOMAS O. RICE United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY