McBeath v. Estrada Oaks Apartments
This text of 135 S.W.3d 694 (McBeath v. Estrada Oaks Apartments) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION
Nancy McBeath appeals summary judgment granted in favor of Estrada Oaks Apartments. McBeath presents three issues, arguing: (1) the court erred in hearing Estrada Oaks’ summary judgment because Estrada Oaks had failed to confer with McBeath before filing its motion; (2) the summary judgment in favor of Estrada Oaks was error because her notices comprised substantial compliance with the Texas Property Code; and (3) because the notices comprised substantial compliance, summary judgment should have been granted in her favor. Because our conclusion on McBeath’s first and third issues is determinative of this case, it is not necessary to address her remaining issue. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1. We reverse the trial court’s judgment.
Background
McBeath, a tenant at Estrada Oaks Apartments, requested disclosure of ownership and management from Estrada Oaks Apartments. McBeath’s first letter to Estrada Oaks requested the name and address of the apartment owner; she sent that request on December 17, 2001. She then sent Estrada Oaks letters on January 19, 2002 and January 25, 2002, again requesting the name and address of the owner of her rental unit. McBeath stated in the letters that if she did not receive the information within seven days, she “may take legal action.” Estrada Oaks respond[696]*696ed to McBeath on January 23, 2002, but provided only an address for its corporate office.
Because she did not receive the requested information within seven days of her request, specifically the name and address of the owner of her apartment and the name of the headquarters of the management company, McBeath initiated legal action by way of an original petition filed February 15, 2002.1 She requested remedies as listed in the property code. See Tex. PROp.Code Ann. § 92.205 (Vernon Supp.2003).2 In its April 5, 2002 answer, Estrada Oaks argued McBeath had not performed all of the conditions precedent to a right of recovery under the property code. See id. § 92.202(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2003).3 Using that same argument, Estrada Oaks moved for summary judgment. McBeath responded and also moved for summary judgment, arguing she was enti-[697]*697tied to judgment as a matter of law by virtue of her summary judgment evidence attached — copies of her three letters. Estrada Oaks responded to McBeath’s motion contending the sole dispute was whether the three notices sent by McBeath to Estrada Oaks satisfied the statutory requirements of the property code. After hearing and overruling McBeath’s objection to Estrada Oaks’ summary judgment motion, the court entered final summary judgment on July 25, 2002 in favor of Estrada Oaks.
Granting of Summary Judgment
In her third issue, McBeath argues the court erred in granting summary judgment in Estrada Oaks’ favor because the three notices she sent to Estrada Oaks substantially complied with the relevant sections of the Texas Property Code. Based on the same reasoning, she also argues, in her first issue, the court should have granted her motion for summary judgment. We agree.
This Court reviews a summary judgment de novo to determine whether a party’s right to prevail is established as a matter of law. See Capitan Enters., Inc. v. Jackson, 908 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied). When both parties move for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Guynes v. Galveston County, 861 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex.1998).
When a tenant requests a disclosure of ownership and management under the property code, a landlord is liable for failing to disclose the information if the tenant makes a request and gives written notice the tenant “may exercise his remedies under [the] subchapter” if the landlord fails to comply within seven days. Tex. PROP.Code Ann. § 92.202(a)(2). Estrada Oaks argues on appeal McBeath was required to direct the landlord to the specific statutory provisions under which she could bring a cause of action and the specific provision requiring it to provide the information. Estrada Oaks argues the specific language was necessary to put it on notice of the specific penalties under the property code. However, Estrada Oaks does not direct us to any case law stating or supporting its position, and we find none.4
McBeath sent Estrada Oaks letters on January 19, 2002 and January 25, 2002, and in both letters she requested the name and address of the owner of her rental unit. Also in these letters, McBeath stated that if she did not receive the information within seven days, she “may take legal action.” Because her letter notified Estrada Oaks the consequence of its failure to respond would be “legal action,” we conclude McBeath substantially complied with section 92.202(a)(2). Because McBeath’s letters serve as substantial compliance for conditions precedent to recovery under section 92.202(a)(2), we further conclude McBeath established, as a matter of law, she was entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, we resolve McBeath’s first and third issues in her favor.
We reverse the judgment entered by the trial court. We grant summary judgment in favor of McBeath. We remand this cause to the trial court to determine remedies under section 92.205 of the Texas Property Code.
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135 S.W.3d 694, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 2902, 2003 WL 1753224, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcbeath-v-estrada-oaks-apartments-texapp-2003.