Mazariegos Alvarado v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-5586
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YEYBIT YAMILET MAZARIEGOS No. 24-5586 ALVARADO; J.R.O.M; M.Y.M.O Agency Nos. A220-988-943 Petitioners, A220-988-944 A220-988-945 v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 11, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: BUMATAY, JOHNSTONE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Lead Petitioner, Yebit Yamilet Mazariegos Alvarado (“Mazariegos”) and

her co-petitioning minor children, J.R.O.M. and M.Y.M.A., are citizens of

Guatemala. She seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). dismissal of her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application

for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the

petition.

Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning and supplements that

reasoning with its own analysis, we review both decisions. See Bhattarai v. Lynch,

835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). We review factual findings, including

credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence standard, and we review

legal questions de novo. See id. Factual findings are conclusive unless “any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Garcia v.

Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). In

other words, to reverse a factual finding of adverse credibility, “we must find that

the evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion but compels it.” Yali Wang

v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d

1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

determination, and Petitioner has not identified any evidence in the record that

compels a contrary conclusion. Of the IJ’s numerous cited inconsistencies, the

BIA identified four specific and cogent reasons that support the adverse credibility

determination: (1) Petitioner’s omission of her former boyfriend repeatedly

2 24-5586 physically abusing her; (2) Petitioner’s omission of her former boyfriend’s mother

abusing Petitioner’s children; (3) Petitioner’s omission of a physical altercation

with a different former boyfriend; and (4) Petitioner’s inconsistency in her

testimony regarding the abuse she suffered from her former boyfriend’s mother.

See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Even minor inconsistencies

that have a bearing on a petitioner’s veracity may constitute the basis for an

adverse credibility determination.”) (citation modified); Dong v. Garland, 50 F.4th

1291, 1297 (9th Cir. 2022) (“An applicant’s omission of information from a

written application or interview that is later revealed through testimony” may

support an adverse credibility determination) (citation modified).

In addition to her testimony, Petitioner submitted a police report and

supporting affidavits from her mother, sister, and neighbor. The documents,

however, do not provide details from which the IJ could corroborate the nature,

severity, or frequency of the abuse alleged in Petitioner’s testimony. See

Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that the

petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof where an adverse credibility

determination was made and where the petitioner failed to submit sufficient

corroborating evidence). Accordingly, the IJ, as affirmed by the BIA, properly

considered the totality of the circumstances when making the adverse credibility

determination, and substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Petitioner’s

3 24-5586 testimony was not credible.

2. Because Petitioner was found non-credible but also provided evidence

other than her account to support her claims, the agency was required to—and

did—assess whether that evidence independently proved her eligibility for relief.

See Kalulu v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 1009, 1023 (9th Cir. 2024). However, a petitioner

properly found non-credible “will usually be unable to meet [her] burden for

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection because any remaining

evidence in the record is often insufficient.” Singh v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 1142, 1148

(9th Cir. 2025). That is the case here. “Without credible testimony or sufficient

corroborating evidence,” Petitioner did not show” past persecution or “that [she]

has a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ based on a protected ground.”

Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).

3. Since Petitioner did not meet the standard for asylum, she did not

meet the higher burden of demonstrating the clear probability of persecution

required for withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §

1208.16(b); Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927. And, because she did not establish

past persecution, the BIA correctly determined she was ineligible for humanitarian

asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii).

4. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT relief. Petitioner

presented the narrow question of whether her account of childhood abuse in

4 24-5586 primary school constituted government acquiescence. She did not challenge the

BIA and IJ’s determination that she is not more likely than not to be tortured upon

removal. Here, the IJ and BIA considered all evidence relevant to the possibility

of future torture, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3), including the childhood abuse she

faced. Therefore, neither erred in determining that Petitioner did not meet her

burden of proof.

5. Lastly, Petitioner’s due process claim is without merit. A due process

violation occurs where (1) the proceeding is “so fundamentally unfair” that the

non-citizen was “prevented from reasonably presenting” her case, and (2) the non-

citizen “demonstrates prejudice, which means that the outcome of the proceeding

may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Olea-Serefina v. Garland, 34

F.4th 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2022) (simplified). Petitioner alleges that the IJ refocused

Petitioner’s counsel away from questioning Petitioner on the harm she suffered as

a child and that the IJ ignored evidence in her declaration that she suffered harm as

a child based on her indigenous ethnicity. But Petitioner raised her claim of past

persecution as a child at the hearing, and the IJ rejected it, reasoning that her fear

of future persecution was unrelated to the past abuse she endured as a child under 8

C.F.R 1208.13(b)(1). Because her past abuse does not support a credible fear of

future persecution, it cannot affect the outcome of the proceeding.

5 24-5586 PETITION DENIED.1

1 Petitioners’ Motion to Stay Removal, Dkt. Nos. 3 and 8, is DENIED effective upon issuance of the mandate from this Court.

6 24-5586