Mazant v. Visioneering Inc.

250 F. App'x 60
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedOctober 4, 2007
Docket06-30758
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 250 F. App'x 60 (Mazant v. Visioneering Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mazant v. Visioneering Inc., 250 F. App'x 60 (5th Cir. 2007).

Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-appellant Visioneering, Inc. appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees on their Louisiana products liability action, arguing (1) that the district court abused its discretion in reconciling the jury’s special verdicts and (2) in the alternative, that the jury’s reconciled verdict is unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-appellee Paul Mazant and Jeannette Mazant, individually and on behalf of Kendall Mazant, filed a personal injury products liability action against Defendant-appellant Visioneering, Inc. (“Visioneering”) under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”), La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 9:2800.51-59, in Louisiana state court. After removal to federal court, the case proceeded to trial.

Paul Mazant, a production supervisor for Lockheed Martin Manned Space Systems (“Lockheed”), was injured at work when the scaffolding on which he was standing partially collapsed. Visioneering designed and manufactured the scaffolding, referred to as the Unit 5 intertank platform, in accordance with a Statement of Work (“SOW’) that Lockheed provided to Visioneering. The Unit 5 intertank platform was one of five intertank platforms that Visioneering manufactured at Lockheed’s direction. Lockheed planned to use these intertank platforms in constructing the external tanks of the space shuttle. The previous intertank platforms used by Lockheed inside the fuel tank were aluminum platforms. However, the new inter-tank platforms were to be designed using composite materials for the decking of the platform, thus reducing the weight and quantity of individual parts. Lockheed sent out a Request for Proposal, requesting a bid for the design and fabrication of five intertank platforms, and Visioneering was awarded the contract.

Under the contract, Visioneering was to adhere to the SOW, the document produced by Lockheed that outlined the design criteria and responsibilities of the parties for the intertank platform project. Lockheed directed Visioneering to base its design of the new intertank platforms on the drawings of the old aluminum inter-tank platforms. Visioneering drafted the engineering drawings for the new inter-tank platforms, and Lockheed participated by providing recommendations and specifications on different aspects of the design. The contract also required Lockheed and Visioneering to document any changes to the designs, drawings, or specifications of the intertank platforms in the SOW or through a Change Order. During the course of the intertank platform project, *62 there were five separate revisions to the original SOW, all of which reflected changes in the responsibilities of the parties. Change Order No. 1 involved Lockheed’s authorization of Visioneering to perform a proof-load test on the Unit 1 intertank platform as part of its design. After approval of the cost, the SOW was revised to reflect the change in the contract regarding Visioneering’s responsibility to perform the proof-load test. A proof-load test focuses on the overall capacity of the intertank platform to support the weight of multiple workers on multiple levels, simultaneously, whereas a point-load test analyzes each point of the three levels of an intertank platform to determine the weight bearing capabilities of all areas of those three levels. Plaintiffs’ expert metallurgist, Dr. Thomas Shelton, provided uncontested testimony that had a point-load test been performed on the Unit 5 intertank platform, Paul Mazant’s accident would not have occurred. Dr. Shelton testified that the point-load test should have been performed as part of the design of the intertank platforms and if it had been performed, Visioneering would have discovered that the failed panel on the Unit 5 intertank platform had insufficient strength to support the required loads.

Visioneering’s corporate representative, Kevin Yakes, whose employment responsibilities included the intertank platform project, identified communications in which he recommended the point-load test be performed on the intertank platforms. On December 19, 2001, Yakes sent an email to a business Visioneering used for outsourcing design work that documented his concerns that point-load testing should be discussed as part of the design concept of the intertank platforms. Yakes also recommended to Lockheed, during the design phase of the platforms, that the point-load test be performed. Yakes testified that he verbally recommended the test to Lockheed. Yakes also emailed Lockheed on May 23, 2002 stating: “I recommend an FEA (point load of say 250 lbs.) to make sure all is good. Need your direction to quote that as part of the SOW.” In response, Larry Cooper of Lockheed forwarded an email simply stating “Agree” in reference to the point-load test recommendation. Cooper testified that this response to the Yake’s email recommendation for point-load testing was an agreement by Lockheed to perform the testing, prompting Visioneering to submit a Request for Action (“RFA”) and a cost quote to Lockheed. Visioneering failed to submit either the RFA or cost quote for point-load testing. In fact, Yakes could not recall any follow-up actions he took with regard to this email exchange, and prior to Paul Mazant’s accident, neither Lockheed nor Visioneering had performed the point-load test.

At trial, Paul Mazant argued that his injury was the result of an unreasonably dangerous design defect in the Unit 5 intertank platform that Visioneering manufactured. Specifically, Visioneering’s defective design of the Unit 5 intertank platform included the use of cantilevered decking panels that were inadequately supported and the failure to conduct the proper point-load testing that would have detected this inadequate support. Visioneering argued that the design specifications, and therefore, any defect regarding the design of the Unit 5 intertank platform, were solely in Lockheed’s control by the SOW. Moreover, Visioneering argued that Lockheed’s failure to conduct a point-load test on the Unit 5 intertank platform was an intervening and superceding cause of Paul Mazant’s injuries, precluding the plaintiffs’ recovery from Visioneering.

*63 The jury returned a special verdict finding that the Unit 5 intertank platform involved in Paul Mazant’s injury was unreasonably dangerous by design but not unreasonably dangerous in either composition or construction. Additionally, the jury found that “the failure to perform point[-]load testing on [the] Unit 5 inter-tank platform prior to [the] accident was a superceding or intervening cause of the existence of any unreasonably dangerous condition of the Unit 5 intertank platform that proximately caused plaintiffs’ injuries,” and that both Visioneering and Lockheed failed to perform the point-load test. Finally, the jury apportioned fault, finding Visioneering 30% at fault for causing Paul Mazant’s injuries and Lockheed 70% at fault.

In briefing filed with the court after the jury’s verdict, the plaintiffs contended that the court should enter judgment in their favor and against Visioneering for 30% of the total damages awarded. Visioneering filed a proposed judgment and contended that the jury’s finding of an intervening cause necessitated a complete verdict in its favor.

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