Mayweather-Brown - RESTRICTED - ACCEPT NO FILINGS v. Biggler

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedMarch 30, 2020
Docket3:14-cv-02089
StatusUnknown

This text of Mayweather-Brown - RESTRICTED - ACCEPT NO FILINGS v. Biggler (Mayweather-Brown - RESTRICTED - ACCEPT NO FILINGS v. Biggler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mayweather-Brown - RESTRICTED - ACCEPT NO FILINGS v. Biggler, (N.D. Ind. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

QUINTIN J. MAYWEATHER-BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO.: 3:14-CV-2089-JD-MGG

STEFFANY BIGLER, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Quintin J. Mayweather-Brown, a prisoner without a lawyer, was granted leave to proceed against Steffany Bigler, John Perry, and Gary Yoder for failing to provide him with constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement, including adequate clothing, bedding, and heat while housed at the Elkhart County Jail (“Elkhart Jail”) in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF 32, 143.) He was also granted leave to proceed against Bigler, Perry, Yoder, Dr. Josh Mathew, and Robin Yohn for failing to provide him with constitutionally adequate medical care while housed at the Elkhart Jail in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.) On October 1, 2019, the court issued an Amended Opinion and Order (ECF 299) denying Mayweather-Brown’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether he received constitutionally adequate medical care while he was housed at the Elkhart Jail in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and granting the Defendants’ motions on the same issue. The court further denied the parties’ motions for summary judgment on the conditions of confinement issue with leave to refile their motions utilizing the “objective unreasonableness” standard for Fourteenth Amendment claims pertaining to conditions of confinement issues as articulated in Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2019).

On October 31, 2019, Defendants Mathew, Yohn, and Yoder filed their motion for summary judgment, as it relates to Yoder, on the conditions of confinement issue.1 (ECF 306.) About a month later, on November 27, 2019, Defendants Bigler and Perry filed a motion for summary judgment on the same issue. (ECF 314.) The parties’ motions for summary judgment were accompanied by notices informing Mayweather-Brown of the motions as required by N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f). (ECF 308, 318.) Next, on December 12,

2019, Mayweather-Brown filed a summary judgment motion on the conditions of confinement issue, but he later withdrew that motion along with his related filings. (ECF 324, 356.) On February 24, 2020, Mayweather-Brown filed a response to the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (ECF 352.) On March 12, 2020, Defendants Mathews, Yohn, and Yoder filed a reply. (ECF 357.) Several weeks later, on March 23,

2020, Defendants Bigler and Perry filed their reply. (ECF 358.) On March 24, 2020, Mayweather-Brown filed a sur-reply. (ECF 360.) Thus, the motions are now fully briefed. Furthermore, Mayweather-Brown has filed a “Motion to Exclude Relivent (sic) Evidence (on grounds of prejudice, confusion or waste of time) and Exclusion of

Character Evidence” which this court construes as a motion to strike. (ECF 359.) It is the function of the court, with or without a motion to strike, to carefully review the

1 Mayweather-Brown did not bring a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against either Mathew or Yohn. evidence and to eliminate from consideration any argument, conclusions, and assertions unsupported by the documented evidence of record. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. KPMG

LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), superseded on other grounds as recognized in S.E.C. v. Wey, 246 F. Supp. 3d 894 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Sullivan v. Henry Smid Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., No. 04 C 5167, 05 C 2253, 2006 WL 980740, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2006); Tibbetts v. RadioShack Corp., No. 03 C 2249, 2004 WL 2203418, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2004); Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 917, 920 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 2004). Mayweather- Brown’s motion will be denied, but the court notes that, in ruling on the motion for

summary judgment, the court considers only relevant evidence that could be presented in an admissible form at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir. 2000). The court is able to sift through the evidence and to consider each piece under the applicable federal rules; thus, there is no need to address Mayweather-Brown’s motion to strike and it will be denied.

FACTS2 As a threshold matter, Mayweather-Brown’s response brief is deficient and does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 or the Local Rules of this Court. See N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1. In his response brief, Mayweather-Brown contends that there are

material facts that are genuinely disputed. In support of this proposition, Mayweather-

2 The facts in the case have already been set forth in detail by this court in the earlier order granting summary judgment on Mayweather-Brown’s medical claims. (ECF 299.) In this order, the facts are limited to those directly relevant to the issue currently before the court. Brown provides five numbered paragraphs under “Statement of Material Facts that are in Genuine Dispute.” (ECF 352 at 4.) However, none of these paragraphs contain

citations to any evidence that supports his argument that there are materials facts that are genuinely in dispute. (Id.) Mayweather-Brown cannot create issues of material fact with statements that lack citations. Mayweather-Brown’s response brief also contains a second section titled, “Where in Support of Plaintiff’s Response Brief in opposition to the Defendants’ Summary Judgment, the Material Facts are as follows” which contain ten bullet-point paragraphs.

(ECF 352 at 4-5.) However, while some of these paragraphs are supported by citation to evidence, and they have been considered to the extent that they are supported by citations, the statements are largely irrelevant to any material issue. (Id. at 5.) Many of the statements in his response brief are merely statements of times when he did not have a mattress and his conclusion that he was deprived of adequate bedding. (Id. at 6-

11.) These legal conclusions are not admissible at trial, and therefore will not be considered here. Liberles v. Cook County, 709 F.2d 1122, 1129 (7th Cir. 1983). He also asserts that there is a material fact claiming that he was deprived of adequate heating. (Id. at 6.) However, he cannot circumvent his deposition testimony by citing a self- serving affidavit. Bank of Illinois v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Sys., 75 F.3d 1162, 1168

(7th Cir. 1996) (“parties cannot thwart the purposes of Rule 56 by creating ‘sham’ issues of fact with affidavits that contradict their prior depositions”). Parties Mayweather-Brown was a pretrial detainee at the Elkhart Jail from March 20, 2014, to June 6, 2014, when he was transferred to the Indiana Department of Correction

(“IDOC”). (ECF 212-2 at ¶ 5, 212-2 at 6-8, 42-55, 212-4 at 27:15-20.) He returned to the Elkhart Jail on May 22, 2015, and remained there until January 21, 2016, when he was again transferred to the IDOC. (Id.) Mayweather-Brown is proceeding against Lieutenant Bigler, Captain Perry, and Yoder on his conditions of confinement claim. Bigler was employed by the Elkhart

County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Department”) as a Sergeant, Lieutenant, and Corrections Officer in the Corrections Division from February 2013 through October 2015.

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