Mayson v. Malone

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Mayson v. Malone

178 S.E.2d 806, 122 Ga. App. 814, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1046

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedNovember 13, 1970

Docket45664

StatusPublished

Cited by17 cases

This text of 178 S.E.2d 806 (Mayson v. Malone) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Mayson v. Malone, 178 S.E.2d 806, 122 Ga. App. 814, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1046 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970).

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Opinion

Quillian, Judge.

Appellees (defendants below) filed what they denominate "a motion to set aside default judgment” which sought to attack a judgment rendered against them on January 8, 1963. The motion was predicated on the ground that neither defendant was personally served and that the return of service showed it to be insufficient and improper. On the hearing of this motion, the order of the trial judge recited "upon hearing evidence and upon argument of counsel,” there was no valid process and the default judgment was void. Accordingly, the judgment of January 8, 1963, was vacated and set aside in its entirety. The appellant (plaintiff below) brings this appeal and *815 contends that the motion was barred by the statute of limitation. Held:

Argued September 9, 1970 Decided November 13, 1970. James L. Mayson, for appellant. Jones, Bird & Howell, Ruth H. Gershon, for appellees.

1. "A judgment void because of lack of jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter may be attacked at any time.” Code Ann. § 81A-160 (f) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 662; 1967, pp. 226, 239, 240). Where there is lack of personal service the three-year limitation contained in Code Ann. § 81A-160 is not applicable. This is in accordance with the law prior to the Civil Practice Act. See Strickland v. Willingham, 49 Ga. App. 355, 357 (175 SE 605); Buchan v. Williamson, 131 Ga. 501 (3) (62 SE 815).

2. The appellees make a motion to dismiss the instant appeal on the grounds that it is not a final judgment and is premature. There was no certificate by the trial judge as provided in Code Ann. § 6-701 (a 2) (Ga. L. 1965, p. 18; 1968, pp. 1072, 1073). Of course, the denial of a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment is final and appealable. Farr v. Farr, 120 Ga. App. 762 (172 SE2d 158). However, the grant of a motion to set aside a judgment, like the grant of a motion for new trial, leaves the case still pending in the court below and thus is not a final judgment. Finch v. Kilgore, 120 Ga. App. 320 (170 SE2d 304). See also in this connection Watson v. Parke, Davis & Co., 117 Ga. App. 162 (159 SE2d 446), decided prior to the 1968 amendment to the Appellate Practice Act. The appeal is premature and must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Bell, C. J., and Whitman, J., concur.

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Quillian, Judge.

Appellees (defendants below) filed what they denominate "a motion to set aside default judgment” which sought to attack a judgment rendered against them on January 8, 1963. The motion was predicated on the ground that neither defendant was personally served and that the return of service showed it to be insufficient and improper. On the hearing of this motion, the order of the trial judge recited "upon hearing evidence and upon argument of counsel,” there was no valid process and the default judgment was void. Accordingly, the judgment of January 8, 1963, was vacated and set aside in its entirety. The appellant (plaintiff below) brings this appeal and *815 contends that the motion was barred by the statute of limitation. Held:

Argued September 9, 1970 Decided November 13, 1970. James L. Mayson, for appellant. Jones, Bird & Howell, Ruth H. Gershon, for appellees.

1. "A judgment void because of lack of jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter may be attacked at any time.” Code Ann. § 81A-160 (f) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 662; 1967, pp. 226, 239, 240). Where there is lack of personal service the three-year limitation contained in Code Ann. § 81A-160 is not applicable. This is in accordance with the law prior to the Civil Practice Act. See Strickland v. Willingham, 49 Ga. App. 355, 357 (175 SE 605); Buchan v. Williamson, 131 Ga. 501 (3) (62 SE 815).

2. The appellees make a motion to dismiss the instant appeal on the grounds that it is not a final judgment and is premature. There was no certificate by the trial judge as provided in Code Ann. § 6-701 (a 2) (Ga. L. 1965, p. 18; 1968, pp. 1072, 1073). Of course, the denial of a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment is final and appealable. Farr v. Farr, 120 Ga. App. 762 (172 SE2d 158). However, the grant of a motion to set aside a judgment, like the grant of a motion for new trial, leaves the case still pending in the court below and thus is not a final judgment. Finch v. Kilgore, 120 Ga. App. 320 (170 SE2d 304). See also in this connection Watson v. Parke, Davis & Co., 117 Ga. App. 162 (159 SE2d 446), decided prior to the 1968 amendment to the Appellate Practice Act. The appeal is premature and must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Bell, C. J., and Whitman, J., concur.

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178 S.E.2d 806, 122 Ga. App. 814, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1046, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mayson-v-malone-gactapp-1970.

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