FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
RYAN ALEXANDER MAYS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV 119-215 ) EVAN JOSEPH, ) ) Defendant. )
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, an inmate at Calhoun State Prison in Morgan, Georgia, has submitted to the Court for filing a complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, regarding events allegedly occurring at Richmond County Correctional Institute in Augusta, Georgia. Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”), Plaintiff’s complaint must be screened to protect potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 F. App’x 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). I. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT A. BACKGROUND Plaintiff names Warden Evan Joseph as the only defendant. (Doc. no. 1, pp. 1-2.) Taking all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, as the Court must for purposes of the present screening, the facts are as follows. Plaintiff alleges “intentional infliction of emotional distress, deliberate indifference, negligence” and First Amendment violations for restricting Plaintiff’s access to his religion. (Id. at 2.) On August 19, 2019, an unknown prison official denied Plaintiff the right to grow his (Id. at 3.) On August 20, 2019, Warden Joseph denied Plaintiff medical attention for a skin ailment. (Id.) An unknown prison official told Plaintiff to shave even though he had an ingrown hair and a shave profile. (Id.) On an unknown date, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole denied Plaintiff an exoneration hearing and immediate release because of an incomplete investigation, which would have proven Plaintiff’s innocence. (Id. at 5.) On September 19, 2019, an unknown prison
official singled Plaintiff out and punished him for his religious views, medical ailments, and desire for an exoneration hearing. (Id.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks $7,500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 3.) B. DISCUSSION 1. Legal Standard for Screening The complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
allegations in the complaint must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 2 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint is
insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” or if it “tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the complaint must provide a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Finally, the court affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant’s pleadings, holding them to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, this liberal construction does not mean that the court has a duty to re-write the complaint. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006). 2. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
Plaintiff alleges Warden Joseph denied him medical attention even though Plaintiff has had a skin ailment on his medical file for nine years. (Doc. no. 1, p. 3.) To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, Plaintiff must allege: (1) he had a serious medical need – the objective component, (2) a defendant acted with deliberate 3 defendant’s wrongful conduct. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1317 n.29 (11th Cir. 2010). To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must allege that his medical need “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or . . . is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir.1994)).
To satisfy the subjective component, Plaintiff must allege that a defendant (1) was subjectively aware of a serious risk of harm and (2) disregarded that risk (3) by following a course of action which constituted more than mere negligence. Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1223 (11th Cir. 2016). Furthermore, “not every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Amendment does not mandate that the medical care
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FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
RYAN ALEXANDER MAYS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV 119-215 ) EVAN JOSEPH, ) ) Defendant. )
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, an inmate at Calhoun State Prison in Morgan, Georgia, has submitted to the Court for filing a complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, regarding events allegedly occurring at Richmond County Correctional Institute in Augusta, Georgia. Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”), Plaintiff’s complaint must be screened to protect potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 F. App’x 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). I. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT A. BACKGROUND Plaintiff names Warden Evan Joseph as the only defendant. (Doc. no. 1, pp. 1-2.) Taking all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, as the Court must for purposes of the present screening, the facts are as follows. Plaintiff alleges “intentional infliction of emotional distress, deliberate indifference, negligence” and First Amendment violations for restricting Plaintiff’s access to his religion. (Id. at 2.) On August 19, 2019, an unknown prison official denied Plaintiff the right to grow his (Id. at 3.) On August 20, 2019, Warden Joseph denied Plaintiff medical attention for a skin ailment. (Id.) An unknown prison official told Plaintiff to shave even though he had an ingrown hair and a shave profile. (Id.) On an unknown date, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole denied Plaintiff an exoneration hearing and immediate release because of an incomplete investigation, which would have proven Plaintiff’s innocence. (Id. at 5.) On September 19, 2019, an unknown prison
official singled Plaintiff out and punished him for his religious views, medical ailments, and desire for an exoneration hearing. (Id.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks $7,500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 3.) B. DISCUSSION 1. Legal Standard for Screening The complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
allegations in the complaint must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 2 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint is
insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” or if it “tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the complaint must provide a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Finally, the court affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant’s pleadings, holding them to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, this liberal construction does not mean that the court has a duty to re-write the complaint. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006). 2. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
Plaintiff alleges Warden Joseph denied him medical attention even though Plaintiff has had a skin ailment on his medical file for nine years. (Doc. no. 1, p. 3.) To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, Plaintiff must allege: (1) he had a serious medical need – the objective component, (2) a defendant acted with deliberate 3 defendant’s wrongful conduct. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1317 n.29 (11th Cir. 2010). To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must allege that his medical need “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or . . . is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir.1994)).
To satisfy the subjective component, Plaintiff must allege that a defendant (1) was subjectively aware of a serious risk of harm and (2) disregarded that risk (3) by following a course of action which constituted more than mere negligence. Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1223 (11th Cir. 2016). Furthermore, “not every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Amendment does not mandate that the medical care
provided to the prisoner “be perfect, the best obtainable, or even very good.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Brown v. Beck, 481 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (Bowen, J.)). As the Supreme Court has explained: [A]n inadvertent failure to provide medical care cannot be said to constitute “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or to be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
4 malpractice do not amount to deliberate indifference. Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1363-72 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that medical malpractice cannot form the basis for Eighth Amendment liability); Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently held that a mere difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical officials over a diagnosis or course of treatment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 375 F. App’x 905, 910 (11th Cir. 2010).
Furthermore, the Court should not second-guess medical judgments. Wallace v. Sheriff, 518 F. App’x 621, 622-23 (11th Cir. 2013); Smith, 375 F. App’x at 910 (“[W]hether governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.”). Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deliberate difference to a serious medical need because there are no facts from which an inference could be drawn showing Warden Joseph
was subjectively aware of a serious risk of harm in Plaintiff’s skin ailment and then disregarded that risk. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege any injury from the lack of medical care, explain why medical was needed, or allege any facts indicating Warden Joseph knew of the skin ailment. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 3. As to His Remaining Claims, Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Warden Joseph
The Eleventh Circuit has held that a district court properly dismisses a defendant where a plaintiff fails to state any allegations that associate the defendant with the purported 5 constitutional violation. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.”). Plaintiff alleges multiple causes of action but fails to connect Warden Joseph to any of them. Nor does he allege any policy, custom, or widespread abuse for which a warden could be held liable. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Warden Joseph. Il. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and this civil action be CLOSED. SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 11th day of March, 2020, at Augusta, Georgia.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA