OppEnhEimER, J.,
delivered the majority opinion of the Court. Barnes, J., dissents. Dissenting opinion at page 628, infra.
The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the City) has appealed an order of the Baltimore City Court reversing the action of the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals of Baltimore City (the Board) which denied the Appellee’s application to construct an office and warehouse building on her property in a Residential Use District.
I
The Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the City’s appeal [615]*615on the grounds that, although the order for appeal was entered on behalf of both the City and the Board, the appeal is, in fact, the appeal of the Board; that the order for appeal to this Court was not approved by the Mayor as provided for by the Baltimore City Charter; and that the City is not properly a party to this cause.
When the Appellee filed her Motion of Appeal to the Baltimore City Court from the resolution of the Board, she made both the Board and the City parties defendant. Both the City and the Board, through the office of the City Solicitor, filed an answer to the Appellee’s petition in support of her Order of Appeal. Judgment was made absolute for the Appellee in the Baltimore City Court on November 10, 1964. On the same day, the Board, by majority action, voted to have its Chairman and Executive Secretary write to the City Solicitor or meet with him to request that an appeal be taken from the order of the Baltimore City Court to this Court. On November 12, 1964, the Chairman of the Board wrote to the City Solicitor giving reasons why, in the opinion of the Board, an appeal “must be taken.” Section 65 of the Baltimore City Charter (1946) states that the City Solicitor is the legal advisor of the City and its several departments, commissions and boards. Section 66 of the Charter provides that no appeal shall be taken except upon written order of the City Solicitor, approved by the Mayor. An Order of Appeal was filed in the Baltimore City Court, signed by the City Solicitor and an Assistant City Solicitor, on November 23, 1964. As of that date, (admittedly, the letter was actually written on December 9), the Mayor wrote to the City Solicitor approving the entering of this appeal. The Mayor’s letter was not filed in the Baltimore City Court and did not accompany the Record when it was sent to this Court, but was sent directly to the Clerk of this Court and was received by him on December 10, within the 30 day period from the entering of the final judgment in the court below.
The City, in the argument before us, conceded that the Board is not a proper party to an appeal which involves its own decision. The Board is an administrative body which has no official interest in the matters which come before it other than to decide them according to the law and the proved facts. Nuova [616]*616Realty Co. v. City of Baltimore, 197 Md. 266, 272, 78 A. 2d 765 (1951); Zoning Appeals Board v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 562, 199 Atl. 540 (1938).
The City, however, is clearly a proper party in these proceedings. The zoning ordinance is an exercise of the City’s police power. Grant v. City of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 314, 129 A. 2d 363 (1957) ; Jack Lewis, Inc. v. Baltimore, 164 Md. 146, 153, 164 Atl. 220 (1933); Tighe v. Osborne, 150 Md. 452, 456-57, 133 Atl. 465 (1926). The City has a legitimate interest in the effectuation of its policies.
In Mayor & C. C. of Baltimore v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 51 A. 2d 273 (1947), we overruled a motion to dismiss an appeal which the City had filed, as here, from an order of the Baltimore City Court reversing an action of the Board. In that case, Judge Henderson, for the Court, referred to the provisions of the Enabling Act, Code Article 66 B, Section 7, which provide for an appeal from any decision of the Board, by any person, officer, board or bureau of the municipality, and said, at 187 Md. 627, “we cannot say that * * * the City has no legitimate interest in the subject matter or outcome of the litigation, even if such inquiry were open under the unqualified provisions of the statute.” See also Town of Berwyn Heights v. Rogers, 228 Md. 271, 280, 179 A. 2d 712 (1962).
The Appellee' contends that the City should not have been named as a party in the appeal to the lower court from the Board’s decision, and that she should have merely filed a Petition for Review, as the Enabling Act provides. The City answers that, the Appellee having made it a party, she has no standing now to question her own act. If the City had not been joined as a party defendant, it would have had the right, on petition, in the court below, to be made a party because of its interest. Having been made a party by the Appellee, its right to appeal from the order below is clear.
The Appellee further contends that her motion should be granted because, in fact, the City is only appealing on behalf of the Board, which had no right to appeal. The contention is answered in Mayor & C. C. of Baltimore v. Shapiro, supra. There, it was alleged in the motion to dismiss that the City had simply consented to permit the appeal to be prosecuted in its [617]*617name for the benefit of and at the expense of certain private parties. We refused to inquire into the City’s motives for taking the appeal, and said, at 187 Md. 627, we did not regard the fact that private persons, denied the right to intervene for the purpose of appeal, had agreed to reimburse the City for costs, as controlling. We said: “Whether a particular case should be appealed * * * must rest in the sound discretion of the City authorities.”
The fact that the Board joined in the appeal to this Court, when it was not a proper party, is immaterial. If, as here, one of the parties to the appeal has legal standing, that is sufficient. Windsor Hills Improvement Association, Inc. v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, 195 Md. 383, 73 A. 2d 531 (1950).
It is immaterial also, in our view, that the necessary approval of the appeal by the Mayor was not filed with the original order of appeal and was filed in this Court instead of below. The purpose of the requirement in the Charter is to show that the appeal was authorized by the Chief Executive of the City. That authorization was made manifest within the necessary 30 day period. That the Mayor’s letter was filed with the Clerk of this Court instead of below, and that the letter was pre-dated, like the language of the Board intimating that an appeal must be taken, are unimportant trivia. There was compliance with the substance of the statutory requirements, and, if there were technical irregularities, the Appellee was in no way prejudiced. See Irvine v. Montgomery Co., 239 Md. 113, 210 A. 2d 359 (1965) and Board of Co. Comm. v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 210 A. 2d 367 (1965).
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. We turn to the merits.
II
The Appellee, Sarah Borinsky, and her brother Louis are the owners of a lot of ground situate in Baltimore City and known as 2649 Quantico Avenue, midway between Park Heights Avenue and Pimlico Road. The property was inherited by them from their deceased parents who acquired it in 1925 or 1926. At that time, the property was improved by 53 garages which were then rented to neighbors for the storage of automobiles. Ten of these garages have been razed and the remaining 43 [618]
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OppEnhEimER, J.,
delivered the majority opinion of the Court. Barnes, J., dissents. Dissenting opinion at page 628, infra.
The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the City) has appealed an order of the Baltimore City Court reversing the action of the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals of Baltimore City (the Board) which denied the Appellee’s application to construct an office and warehouse building on her property in a Residential Use District.
I
The Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the City’s appeal [615]*615on the grounds that, although the order for appeal was entered on behalf of both the City and the Board, the appeal is, in fact, the appeal of the Board; that the order for appeal to this Court was not approved by the Mayor as provided for by the Baltimore City Charter; and that the City is not properly a party to this cause.
When the Appellee filed her Motion of Appeal to the Baltimore City Court from the resolution of the Board, she made both the Board and the City parties defendant. Both the City and the Board, through the office of the City Solicitor, filed an answer to the Appellee’s petition in support of her Order of Appeal. Judgment was made absolute for the Appellee in the Baltimore City Court on November 10, 1964. On the same day, the Board, by majority action, voted to have its Chairman and Executive Secretary write to the City Solicitor or meet with him to request that an appeal be taken from the order of the Baltimore City Court to this Court. On November 12, 1964, the Chairman of the Board wrote to the City Solicitor giving reasons why, in the opinion of the Board, an appeal “must be taken.” Section 65 of the Baltimore City Charter (1946) states that the City Solicitor is the legal advisor of the City and its several departments, commissions and boards. Section 66 of the Charter provides that no appeal shall be taken except upon written order of the City Solicitor, approved by the Mayor. An Order of Appeal was filed in the Baltimore City Court, signed by the City Solicitor and an Assistant City Solicitor, on November 23, 1964. As of that date, (admittedly, the letter was actually written on December 9), the Mayor wrote to the City Solicitor approving the entering of this appeal. The Mayor’s letter was not filed in the Baltimore City Court and did not accompany the Record when it was sent to this Court, but was sent directly to the Clerk of this Court and was received by him on December 10, within the 30 day period from the entering of the final judgment in the court below.
The City, in the argument before us, conceded that the Board is not a proper party to an appeal which involves its own decision. The Board is an administrative body which has no official interest in the matters which come before it other than to decide them according to the law and the proved facts. Nuova [616]*616Realty Co. v. City of Baltimore, 197 Md. 266, 272, 78 A. 2d 765 (1951); Zoning Appeals Board v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 562, 199 Atl. 540 (1938).
The City, however, is clearly a proper party in these proceedings. The zoning ordinance is an exercise of the City’s police power. Grant v. City of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 314, 129 A. 2d 363 (1957) ; Jack Lewis, Inc. v. Baltimore, 164 Md. 146, 153, 164 Atl. 220 (1933); Tighe v. Osborne, 150 Md. 452, 456-57, 133 Atl. 465 (1926). The City has a legitimate interest in the effectuation of its policies.
In Mayor & C. C. of Baltimore v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 51 A. 2d 273 (1947), we overruled a motion to dismiss an appeal which the City had filed, as here, from an order of the Baltimore City Court reversing an action of the Board. In that case, Judge Henderson, for the Court, referred to the provisions of the Enabling Act, Code Article 66 B, Section 7, which provide for an appeal from any decision of the Board, by any person, officer, board or bureau of the municipality, and said, at 187 Md. 627, “we cannot say that * * * the City has no legitimate interest in the subject matter or outcome of the litigation, even if such inquiry were open under the unqualified provisions of the statute.” See also Town of Berwyn Heights v. Rogers, 228 Md. 271, 280, 179 A. 2d 712 (1962).
The Appellee' contends that the City should not have been named as a party in the appeal to the lower court from the Board’s decision, and that she should have merely filed a Petition for Review, as the Enabling Act provides. The City answers that, the Appellee having made it a party, she has no standing now to question her own act. If the City had not been joined as a party defendant, it would have had the right, on petition, in the court below, to be made a party because of its interest. Having been made a party by the Appellee, its right to appeal from the order below is clear.
The Appellee further contends that her motion should be granted because, in fact, the City is only appealing on behalf of the Board, which had no right to appeal. The contention is answered in Mayor & C. C. of Baltimore v. Shapiro, supra. There, it was alleged in the motion to dismiss that the City had simply consented to permit the appeal to be prosecuted in its [617]*617name for the benefit of and at the expense of certain private parties. We refused to inquire into the City’s motives for taking the appeal, and said, at 187 Md. 627, we did not regard the fact that private persons, denied the right to intervene for the purpose of appeal, had agreed to reimburse the City for costs, as controlling. We said: “Whether a particular case should be appealed * * * must rest in the sound discretion of the City authorities.”
The fact that the Board joined in the appeal to this Court, when it was not a proper party, is immaterial. If, as here, one of the parties to the appeal has legal standing, that is sufficient. Windsor Hills Improvement Association, Inc. v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, 195 Md. 383, 73 A. 2d 531 (1950).
It is immaterial also, in our view, that the necessary approval of the appeal by the Mayor was not filed with the original order of appeal and was filed in this Court instead of below. The purpose of the requirement in the Charter is to show that the appeal was authorized by the Chief Executive of the City. That authorization was made manifest within the necessary 30 day period. That the Mayor’s letter was filed with the Clerk of this Court instead of below, and that the letter was pre-dated, like the language of the Board intimating that an appeal must be taken, are unimportant trivia. There was compliance with the substance of the statutory requirements, and, if there were technical irregularities, the Appellee was in no way prejudiced. See Irvine v. Montgomery Co., 239 Md. 113, 210 A. 2d 359 (1965) and Board of Co. Comm. v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 210 A. 2d 367 (1965).
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. We turn to the merits.
II
The Appellee, Sarah Borinsky, and her brother Louis are the owners of a lot of ground situate in Baltimore City and known as 2649 Quantico Avenue, midway between Park Heights Avenue and Pimlico Road. The property was inherited by them from their deceased parents who acquired it in 1925 or 1926. At that time, the property was improved by 53 garages which were then rented to neighbors for the storage of automobiles. Ten of these garages have been razed and the remaining 43 [618]*618are not being used save for nine or ten which are from time to time used by tradespeople for the storage of miscellaneous items. Practically all of the garages are dilapidated. The district in which the lot is located has always been zoned for Residential Use.
The lot is. irregular in shape in that its width at its northern boundary line, fronting on Quantico Avenue, is approximately 115 feet, and it tapers down for a distance of approximately 297 feet so that at its south end it is only about 20 feet wide. This is the only lot of ground in the block on the south side of Quantico Avenue with frontage on Quantico Avenue. The lot of ground lies between two alleys. The entire eastern line of the lot binds on an alley running in the rear of the back yards of dwelling houses fronting on Pimlico Road. The property to the west, across the other alley, consists of converted houses used for commercial purposes, fronting on Park Heights Avenue.
The property to the west is in a First Commercial Use District. The property to the east is zoned Residential, as is the property to the north, except for a one-story masonry office and warehouse building on the north side of Quantico Avenue. This building was recently permitted by the Board by allowing an extension into the residential zone under the provisions of Section 14 of the Baltimore Zoning Ordinance. That section is not applicable to the property here involved, because the adjacent commercial zone to the west is separated from the property by an alley. Quantico Avenue is about 50 feet wide between the building lines to the north and south.
The Appellee filed an application with the Building Inspection Engineer to construct a one-story masonry building and warehouse on her property, similar to the building on the north side of Quantico Avenue. The Engineer has no legal power to permit an office or commercial use in a residential zone and refused the application. The Appellee appealed to the Board. In her appeal, she requested a special exception under Section 36 (b) and (c) of the Zoning Ordinance. The appeal was heard by four of the Board members, the fifth member being absent.
At the hearing before the Board, Louis Borinsky, the Appellee’s brother and one of the owners of the property, testi[619]*619fied that the garages on the lot are no longer rentable for the storage of private automobiles because of the size of modern cars, the fact that automobiles can now be parked on the streets, and the changes in the neighborhood. Some of the garages, however, an average of nine or ten, are rented for commercial uses other than the storage of cars, such as the storage of building materials. Mr. Borinsky testified he and his sister had tried to sell the property for residential purposes. “We have talked to agents on and off throughout the years and haven’t had any success at all.” In Mr. Borinsky’s opinion, the lot cannot be sold or used for residential purposes.
Mr. Richard M. Hutman, a registered architect, testified on behalf of the Appellee that he found the site not feasible for residential construction, because of the shape and depth of the lot. He pointed out that the residences in the neighborhood are of a rowhouse type, built on lots approximately 15^2 feet wide by 110 feet deep. The lot involved has an area of about 1700 square feet. In an area of this size, if it were rectangular, a developer might hope to get nine or ten family units. However, because of the triangular shape of the lot, only five houses could be built. Therefore, only slightly more than 52]/£% of the property is usable, whereas a developer building row houses would normally expect close to 100% use of the land. In response to a question from a member of the Board, Mr. Hutman admitted that the remaining “48%” of the land could be used for extended back yards or a park for the five houses, although the developer would only get a density of about 13.2 families per acre instead of the 27.3 families he would normally expect. It would be pleasant, Mr. Hutman thought, for tenants to have the additional 110 or 115 feet of backyard, but he doubted that it would be income producing to a developer. He would not advise a client to develop houses on the property.
Mr. Melvin Goldman, a developer and real estate expert, testified for the Appellee that he was familiar with the property and that Mr. Hutman had covered the situation adequately. He, Mr. Goldman, would not think of developing the tract if it were offered to him. In his opinion, it would be economically unsound and unwise to build houses on it; the use of the land for residential purposes would be “economic suicide.” The oc[620]*620•cupants of the houses in the residential portions of the general neighborhood have changed from homeowners to renters; the use of the houses on the west, fronting on Park Heights Avenue, has changed from residential to commercial; and there have been other changes to commercial in the neighborhood. In his opinion, it would be “most difficult” to secure financing for the construction of residential dwellings on the property.
After the hearing, two members of the Board voted to disapprove the application and two to approve it. In view of the requirement that at least four members of the Board must vote in favor of granting the permit for the Appellee to prevail, the application stood as disapproved. The effect of the Board’s action was to leave the denial of the application by the Building Inspection Engineer in force. Levy v. Seven Slade, Inc., 234 Md. 145, 148-152, 198 A. 2d 267 (1964) and cases therein cited.
The two members of the Board who approved the denial of the application relied upon four violations of the Zoning Ordinance shown on the face of the application: (1) a violation of Sections 9 and 10 of the Ordinance in that the proposed use was a prohibited one in a Residential Use District, (2) a violation of Section 13-H-l of the Ordinance which prevents the changing of the garage buildings to any other form of non-conforming use, and which provides that where garage buildings have the status of non-conforming uses, such buildings may not be extended, expanded, enlarged or added to in any manner; *1 (3) a violation of Section 24 of the Ordinance in that the [621]*621application provided for 100 per cent lot coverage which would be in excess of the permissible 50 per cent; (4) a violation of Section 28 of the Ordinance in that the application showed that there would be no front yard setback as required by that Section.
The respective reasons for the votes of the members of the Board were given as follows:
“The Board, in considering this case, reviewed the Court of Appeals’ decision in Frankel versus the May- or and City Council and Sapero versus the Mayor and City Council but, in the judgment of the Board, it was felt that this case does not come within the purview of these decisions. It was also observed that recently a non-conforming use provision was passed and set forth that garages cannot be changed to uses of any classification and must revert to residential use unless a non-conforming use is established. (Section 13). The Board, (two members) felt that the use of the premises for commercial purposes would have an adverse effect upon the neighborhood. Two of the members of the Board were of the opinion that a hardship does exist and that this case is similar to the previously cited Court of Appeals’ cases mentioned above and that the evidence adduced at the public hearing warranted a finding favorable to the appellant.
[622]*622“In accordance with the above facts and findings, the Board disapproves the application.” 2
Judge Sodaro, of the Baltimore City Court, decided the case on the record made before the' Board. In reversing the action of the Board, he held that the Board, in denying the exception asked by the Appellee, was in a legal sense arbitrary and capricious; and that the Appellee had met the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that she would be deprived of all reasonable use of her property under the present zoning.
These are the two legal issues presented on this appeal. We shall consider them in reverse order.
Ill
The legal principles whose application determines whether or not the restrictions imposed by the zoning action on the property involved are an unconstitutional taking are well established. If the owner affirmatively demonstrates that the legislative or administrative determination deprives him of all beneficial use of the property, the action will be held unconstitutional. But the restrictions imposed must be such that the property cannot be used for any reasonable purpose. It is not enough for the property owners to show that the zoning action results in substantial loss or hardship. Pallace v. Inter City Land Co., 239 Md. 549, 212 A. 2d 262; DePaul v. Board, 237 Md. 221, 227-29, 205 A. 2d 805 (1965) and cases therein cited. Where, as here, the facts are undisputed, the question is one of law, and the conclusion of the lower court is not entitled to the presumption of correctness which attaches to findings of fact. Pallace v. Inter City Land Co., supra.
In this case, all three of the Appellee’s witnesses testified that, in their opinion, the property could not be economically or feasibly used for residential purposes. However, facts ad[623]*623duced by the evidence must also be considered. Some of the garages on the property have been and are being rented for the storage of building materials or personal property other than automobiles. Five row houses, similar to those in the immediate neighborhood, although perhaps with larger back yards or a small community park, can be built on the tract. While the structures to the west of the property, separated by an alley, are used for commercial purposes and there is an office and warehouse building on the north side of Quantico Avenue, the areas in the neighborhood immediately to the east and to the north are occupied almost entirely by residences.
There are, moreover, material gaps in the testimony of the Appellee’s witnesses. It was not shown how much revenue is being derived from the rental of some of the garages for storage other than of automobiles. The Appellee intimates that this storage may not be permitted under present zoning, because there has been no determination that there is a non-conforming use. But the burden is on the Appellee to show that her property cannot be used for any reasonable purpose. Part of it, at least, brings in some income, and the Appellee has' not affirmatively proved that this use cannot be legally continued. Section 13-H-l. of the Baltimore Zoning Law expressly provides that where any structure constructed for the storage or parking of privately owned automobiles is devoted to a use other than such storage or parking, then, if that use is nonconforming, (subject to certain conditions not here applicable) it may be continued.
The testimony that the property had been offered for sale for residential purposes, without success, was not supported by evidence of the price at which the property had been offered. The testimony that the building of the five row houses was not economically feasible was not supported by any evidence of the cost of the erection of such houses, the sales or rental value of the houses, if built, or the extent of the occupancy and the marketability of similar houses in the neighborhood. That real estate developers were not interested in the project does not necessarily mean that it was economically unfeasible for the property owners themselves to build one or more houses for sale or rental. There was no specific evidence that the owners had at[624]*624tempted to finance the building of the houses and had been unsuccessful. Nor was there any evidence that the property could not be economically used for purposes other than individual residences, permissible under the present zoning, as, for example, a small apartment house, church or synagogue.
We have found a constitutional taking by zoning action on expert opinion testimony, when that opinion was factually supported. In the first Sapero case, Baltimore v. Sapero, 230 Md. 291, 186 A. 2d 884 (1962), the overwhelming commercialization of the area was undisputed, including an adjacent service station and shopping center across from the lot. In Frankel v. City of Baltimore, 223 Md. 97, 103, 162 A. 2d 447 (1960), we held that the opinion testimony was supported by “the uncontrovertible physical facts.” The lot there involved was located on a corner of an arterial highway and another street, and was bounded on two sides entirely by parking lots and public and semi-public institutions, with a synagogue, a public parking area and a large public junior high school across the street; the lot had formerly been used as a bus station. However, when the expert opinion testimony was not supported by substantial factual evidence, we have held that general claims of economic unfeasibility are not sufficient to prove an unconstitutional taking. Pallace v. Inter City Land Co., supra; Sapero v. M. & C. C., 235 Md. 1, 200 A. 2d 74 (1964) and cases therein cited. See also Pahl v. County Bd. of Appeals, 237 Md. 294, 297, 206 A. 2d 245 (1965).
In his opinion, in holding that there was an unconstitutional taking of the property in this case, Judge Sodaro found that Frankel was controlling; We disagree. It is true that the same expert witness who testified for the applicant in Frankel testified for the Appellee in this case; he was asked the same general questions as in Frankel and gave the same answers; indeed, he testified that if, as he had stated in Frankel, the use of the land there involved for residential purposes would be “economic suicide,” it would “certainly be doubly true in this instance.” However, even emphatic opinion testimony does not take the place of the necessary factual support. In Frankel, Judge Prescott, for the Court, relied largely upon the nature of the surrounding neighborhood. In that case, the property was [625]*625virtually an island in the midst of public and private institutions and parking lots; while there were five residences to the south, these were row houses not ordinarily permitted in the residential “E” zone there involved. In this case, as we have pointed out, while the areas to the west of the property are commercial and there is a commercial structure on the other side of Quantico Avenue, the area to the east and north are residential in nature. It is immaterial that many of the homes to the west are rented rather than owner occupied; if a property is used as a home, it is a residence irrespective of the nature of the legal interest of the persons who occupies it. It is true that in Frankel there was testimony that two semi-detached homes could be built upon the property, but there was strong evidence from the applicant’s witnesses that residences could not be sold because of the nature of the neighborhood. In this case, as we have pointed out, not only is the nature of the neighborhood different from that in Frankel, but there is no specific evidence as to the cost or marketability of the five row houses which can be erected, nor any testimony that the property cannot be used for permitted non-residential purposes, while admittedly a portion of the property, even at the present time, and despite the dilapidation which the owners have permitted, brings in at least some revenue.
On the record and the authorities, we find that the Appellee has not sustained the burden of demonstrating that the present zoning of her property and the refusal of the Board to allow an exception constitute an unconstitutional taking.
IV
The refusal of a zoning board to permit an exception or variance, if arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory, may be illegal, even though there is no unconstitutional taking. Baltimore v. Sapero, supra. However, if there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision, its action will be upheld; a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the wisdom or soundness of the action taken; it is only where the question decided is not fairly debatable that the decision will be declared invalid. Sapero v. M. & C. C., supra; Montgomery Co. v. Scrimgeour, 211 Md. 306, 312, 127 A. 2d [626]*626528 (1956); Offutt v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 204 Md. 551, 562, 105 A. 2d 219 (1954) and cases therein cited.
In this case, in denying the application for an exception, the Board relied upon four violations of the Zoning Ordinance shown on the face of the application. It is clear that these violations exist. From our discussion of the issue of unconstitutional taking, it follows that the Board could reasonably have found from the testimony and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom, that, under the present zoning, the Appellee can derive some income from her property. The Appellee, nevertheless, was entitled to the exception if she proved practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships, or the peculiar topography of her tract, which entitled her thereto. To sustain this burden, she must show that her plight is due to unique circumstances and not to general conditions in the neighborhood. Penn Construction Co. v. Baltimore City, 233 Md. 372, 376-77, 196 A. 2d 879 (1964); Marino v. City of Baltimore, 215 Md. 206, 219, 137 A. 2d 198 (1957) and cases therein cited.
That the Appellee’s property is adjacent to commercial areas to the west and that there is a business structuré on the other side of Quantico Avenue is not enough. As we pointed out in Marino, at 215 Md. 222, if the neighborhood is gradually changing as a result of additional commercial use, the City Council may have the power to extend the adjacent commercial district to include the property involved, but that is a legislative, not a judicial function.
It is unnecessary for us to add to what we have said above as to our holdings that mere financial hardship or an opportunity to obtain an increased return from the property is not sufficient to show the zoning action is illegal. The topography of the Appellee’s tract, because of its triangular nature, is such that only slightly more than one-half of her ground can be used for row houses. But even if this circumstance reduces the value of her property under its present zoning to one-half or less of what the worth would be if the exception were granted, that is not enough to make the Board’s refusal illegal. In Marino, there was testimony that the commercial value of the property was ten times that for residential use; we held that the application for the erection of a store building was not illegally de[627]*627nied. See also Greenblatt v. Toney Schloss, 235 Md. 9, 200 A. 2d 70 (1964).
Nor does the fact that the original use to which the property was put, the renting of the garages for the storage of private automobiles, is no longer feasible, entitle the Appellee to the relief she prayed. It was admitted in the argument that there are many properties throughout the city, in residential use districts, which are occupied by garages which have become obsolete. That a non-conforming use 3 is no longer profitable does not mean that the property owner is entitled to an exception or variance. As we pointed out in Grant v. City of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 307, 129 A. 2d 363 (1957), “the earnest aim and ultimate purpose of zoning was and is to reduce nonconformance to conformance as speedily as possible with due regard to the legitimate interests of all concerned.” Here, as we have found, the Board could well have determined, as in effect it did, that there was some income-producing use of the property possible within the residential zoning, even though the majority of the garages can no longer be used for their original purpose.
The City contends, and the Appellee denies, that Section 13 of the Zoning Ordinance as enacted in 1962 makes inapplicable the authority of the Board to grant exceptions as to garage buildings located in residential use districts. We do not reach that question. We hold that, assuming arguendo that the Board’s power to grant exceptions was unchanged by the 1962 Ordinance, the question of whether to grant or deny the exception was fairly debatable, that the Board’s denial was not arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory, and that the court below erred in reversing the Board’s action.
Motion to dismiss appeal denied; order reversed; case remanded for the passage of an order affirming the action of the Board; appellee to pay the costs.