Mayne v. Frazer Ryan Goldberg & Arnold, LLP

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LINDA FURST MAYNE, AKA Linda No. 25-5540 Furst Mayne, D.C. No. 4:25-cv-00323-KAW Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

FRAZER RYAN GOLDBERG & ARNOLD, LLP; JOHN R. FITZPATRICK; T.J. RYAN; JAMES W. RYAN; JOSHUA MOYA; BARBARA BERMAN; MARILYN CAGE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Kandis A. Westmore, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 31, 2026**

Before: WARDLAW, BADE, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Linda Furst Mayne appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of her

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). complaint for lack of jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003)

(dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

1. The district court erred in dismissing Mayne’s claims for lack of

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Mayne complains “of a legal

injury caused by an adverse party,” as opposed to a “legal injury caused by a state

court judgment.” Miroth v. County of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1148 (9th Cir.

2025) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163). Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman does not

preclude the exercise of jurisdiction. Id.

2. Nonetheless, we affirm the district court’s judgment because Mayne’s

claims are time-barred. See Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs., Inc., 816 F.3d

550, 554 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “we may affirm on any ground supported

by the record” when reviewing a district court’s dismissal of an action under Rule

12(b)(1)). Although Mayne frames her injury as a breach of contract, the

gravamen of her complaint is that Defendants were negligent in rendering their

professional services in July 2019. See Collins v. Miller & Miller, Ltd., 943 P.2d

747, 755 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that a breach of contract action “cannot be

maintained if the contract merely requires generally that the professional render

services”). Mayne’s claims are thus subject to Arizona’s two-year limitations

2 25-5540 period.1 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542; Keonjian v. Olcott, 169 P.3d 927, 930

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that “claims for professional malpractice are

generally tort claims” that are subject to the two-year limitations period). Because

Mayne did not file her complaint until January 2025, her claims are barred by the

statute of limitations, and amendment would be futile.2 See Deutsch v. Turner

Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 718 n.20 (9th Cir. 2003).

AFFIRMED.

1 We assume without deciding that Arizona law applies because the parties agree that Arizona law governs, and the outcome would not change if we instead applied California law. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.6(a) (stating that a legal malpractice action “shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first”); Lee v. Hanley, 354 P.3d 334, 341–42 (Cal. 2015) (concluding that “section 340.6(a)’s time bar applies to claims whose merits necessarily depend on proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation in the course of providing professional services”). 2 While Mayne asserts other “breach[es] of contract” with respect to the arbitration proceedings following the failed guardianship in 2019, her relationship with Defendants terminated in September 2019. Defendants cannot be liable for legal malpractice based on conduct that occurred after the attorney-client relationship ended, as Defendants no longer owed “a continuing duty” to Mayne. See In re Weiner, 586 P.2d 194, 197 (Ariz. 1978) (in banc); Glaze v. Larsen, 83 P.3d 26, 29 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc).

3 25-5540