UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Chad T. Maynard
v. Civil No. 14-cv-467-LM Opinion No. 2015 DNH 076 Meggitt-USA, Inc.
O R D E R
Plaintiff Chad T. Maynard (“Maynard”) filed a three-count
complaint against his former employer, Meggitt-USA, Inc.
(“Meggitt”), for violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and
defamation. Meggitt moves to dismiss the IIED claim for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the court grants
Meggitt's motion.
Standard of Review
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, construe reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and “determine whether the
factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint set forth a
plausible claim upon which relief may be granted.” Foley v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). A claim is facially plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Analyzing plausibility is “a context-specific task” in
which the court relies on its “judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 679. However, dismissal is proper if “the
facts, evaluated in [a] plaintiff-friendly manner, [do not]
contain enough meat to support a reasonable expectation that an
actionable claim may exist.” Andrew Robinson Int’l, Inc. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2008).
Background
The following facts are drawn from the complaint. Maynard
began working for Meggitt in July 2004, when he was hired to
work in the information technology department of Vibro-Meter,
Inc., a Meggitt subsidiary company. After Maynard was diagnosed
with degenerative disc disease, arthritis, and Lyme disease,
Maynard requested and obtained medical leave for back surgery.
In 2011, prior to Maynard's medical leave, Meggitt announced its
plans to consolidate its workforce and transfer manufacturing
operations from its Londonderry, New Hampshire facility to a
facility in California.
2 Maynard had back surgery in April 2013, but due to
complications, required an extension of his medical leave.
Maynard alleges that Meggitt was frustrated at this extension
and his prolonged absence.
Maynard returned from his medical leave in late May 2013.
During the summer of 2013, Meggitt notified certain employees
that their positions would be eliminated as part of the
consolidation process. Maynard alleges that he was not given
notice at that time, but that on June 12, 2013, he “was suddenly
. . . informed that his position was being eliminated.” Compl.
(doc. no. 1) ¶¶ 16, 21.
Shortly thereafter, Meggitt suspected its welding equipment
had been stolen. Meggitt suspected that Maynard was
responsible, and Meggitt placed him on administrative leave. In
spite of the fact that the missing equipment was later found,
Meggitt “kept Maynard on administrative leave and refused to
communicate with him about coming back to work.” Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
Furthermore, Maynard alleges that Meggitt spread false
allegations to other employees that Maynard was responsible for
the missing equipment. Maynard was not allowed to return to
work, and Meggitt terminated him on October 31, 2013. Based on
the foregoing, Maynard alleges that Meggitt is liable for IIED.
3 Discussion
To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must “allege that a
defendant by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or
recklessly caused severe emotional distress to another.”
Tessier v. Rockefeller, 162 N.H. 324, 341 (2011) (quoting
Morancy v. Morancy, 134 N.H. 493, 496 (1991) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted)). Meggitt moves to dismiss the
IIED claim arguing both that the complaint fails to identify the
requisite emotional injury and Meggitt’s alleged actions, taken
as true, are insufficiently extreme and outrageous to give rise
to a viable claim for IIED.
A. Emotional Distress
Maynard must allege severe emotional distress to state a
plausible claim for IIED. See Tessier, 162 N.H. at 341. Severe
emotional distress
includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. . . . The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.
Morancy, 134 N.H. at 496 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 46 cmt. j).
4 Maynard’s complaint alleges that he suffered “damages,
including[] back pay, front pay, loss of employment benefits,
interest and other monetary losses, attorney’s costs and expert
fees.” Nowhere in his complaint does Maynard allege that he
suffered emotional distress of any kind. Further, Maynard does
not seek to amend his complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Instead — and for the first time — Maynard offers in his
objection that he suffered “severe emotional distress including
loss of sleep, depression, loss of appetite and anxiety.”
The law on this is clear. A plaintiff cannot overcome the
deficiencies in his complaint by asserting new facts in a
responsive brief. See Cadegan v. McCarron, No. 00-540-JD, 2001
WL 716111, at *2 (D.N.H. June 25, 2001); Bauchman v. West High
Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 550 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ounsel may not
overcome pleading deficiencies with arguments that extend beyond
the allegations contained in the complaint. The complaint
itself must show [the plaintiff] is entitled to relief under
each claim raised.”) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Because Maynard’s complaint is wholly devoid of allegations
that he suffered emotional distress of any kind, and because he
is barred from inserting new facts into his complaint via his
5 objection, Maynard’s IIED claim fails. Thus, Meggitt is
entitled to dismissal of this claim.
B. Extreme or Outrageous Conduct
Even if this court credited Maynard’s new allegations of
emotional injury, his IIED claim fails for an additional reason.
A claim for IIED requires an allegation of extreme and
outrageous conduct — conduct that is more than intentional or
driven by malice. See Tessier, 162 N.H. at 341 (citing Mikell
v. Sch. Admin. Unit No. 33, 158 N.H. 723, 729 (2009)).
“Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Chad T. Maynard
v. Civil No. 14-cv-467-LM Opinion No. 2015 DNH 076 Meggitt-USA, Inc.
O R D E R
Plaintiff Chad T. Maynard (“Maynard”) filed a three-count
complaint against his former employer, Meggitt-USA, Inc.
(“Meggitt”), for violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and
defamation. Meggitt moves to dismiss the IIED claim for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the court grants
Meggitt's motion.
Standard of Review
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, construe reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and “determine whether the
factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint set forth a
plausible claim upon which relief may be granted.” Foley v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). A claim is facially plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Analyzing plausibility is “a context-specific task” in
which the court relies on its “judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 679. However, dismissal is proper if “the
facts, evaluated in [a] plaintiff-friendly manner, [do not]
contain enough meat to support a reasonable expectation that an
actionable claim may exist.” Andrew Robinson Int’l, Inc. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2008).
Background
The following facts are drawn from the complaint. Maynard
began working for Meggitt in July 2004, when he was hired to
work in the information technology department of Vibro-Meter,
Inc., a Meggitt subsidiary company. After Maynard was diagnosed
with degenerative disc disease, arthritis, and Lyme disease,
Maynard requested and obtained medical leave for back surgery.
In 2011, prior to Maynard's medical leave, Meggitt announced its
plans to consolidate its workforce and transfer manufacturing
operations from its Londonderry, New Hampshire facility to a
facility in California.
2 Maynard had back surgery in April 2013, but due to
complications, required an extension of his medical leave.
Maynard alleges that Meggitt was frustrated at this extension
and his prolonged absence.
Maynard returned from his medical leave in late May 2013.
During the summer of 2013, Meggitt notified certain employees
that their positions would be eliminated as part of the
consolidation process. Maynard alleges that he was not given
notice at that time, but that on June 12, 2013, he “was suddenly
. . . informed that his position was being eliminated.” Compl.
(doc. no. 1) ¶¶ 16, 21.
Shortly thereafter, Meggitt suspected its welding equipment
had been stolen. Meggitt suspected that Maynard was
responsible, and Meggitt placed him on administrative leave. In
spite of the fact that the missing equipment was later found,
Meggitt “kept Maynard on administrative leave and refused to
communicate with him about coming back to work.” Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
Furthermore, Maynard alleges that Meggitt spread false
allegations to other employees that Maynard was responsible for
the missing equipment. Maynard was not allowed to return to
work, and Meggitt terminated him on October 31, 2013. Based on
the foregoing, Maynard alleges that Meggitt is liable for IIED.
3 Discussion
To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must “allege that a
defendant by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or
recklessly caused severe emotional distress to another.”
Tessier v. Rockefeller, 162 N.H. 324, 341 (2011) (quoting
Morancy v. Morancy, 134 N.H. 493, 496 (1991) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted)). Meggitt moves to dismiss the
IIED claim arguing both that the complaint fails to identify the
requisite emotional injury and Meggitt’s alleged actions, taken
as true, are insufficiently extreme and outrageous to give rise
to a viable claim for IIED.
A. Emotional Distress
Maynard must allege severe emotional distress to state a
plausible claim for IIED. See Tessier, 162 N.H. at 341. Severe
emotional distress
includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. . . . The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.
Morancy, 134 N.H. at 496 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 46 cmt. j).
4 Maynard’s complaint alleges that he suffered “damages,
including[] back pay, front pay, loss of employment benefits,
interest and other monetary losses, attorney’s costs and expert
fees.” Nowhere in his complaint does Maynard allege that he
suffered emotional distress of any kind. Further, Maynard does
not seek to amend his complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Instead — and for the first time — Maynard offers in his
objection that he suffered “severe emotional distress including
loss of sleep, depression, loss of appetite and anxiety.”
The law on this is clear. A plaintiff cannot overcome the
deficiencies in his complaint by asserting new facts in a
responsive brief. See Cadegan v. McCarron, No. 00-540-JD, 2001
WL 716111, at *2 (D.N.H. June 25, 2001); Bauchman v. West High
Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 550 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ounsel may not
overcome pleading deficiencies with arguments that extend beyond
the allegations contained in the complaint. The complaint
itself must show [the plaintiff] is entitled to relief under
each claim raised.”) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Because Maynard’s complaint is wholly devoid of allegations
that he suffered emotional distress of any kind, and because he
is barred from inserting new facts into his complaint via his
5 objection, Maynard’s IIED claim fails. Thus, Meggitt is
entitled to dismissal of this claim.
B. Extreme or Outrageous Conduct
Even if this court credited Maynard’s new allegations of
emotional injury, his IIED claim fails for an additional reason.
A claim for IIED requires an allegation of extreme and
outrageous conduct — conduct that is more than intentional or
driven by malice. See Tessier, 162 N.H. at 341 (citing Mikell
v. Sch. Admin. Unit No. 33, 158 N.H. 723, 729 (2009)).
“Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
Mikell, 158 N.H. at 729.
Maynard alleges that Meggitt spread false allegations, kept
him on administrative leave, and refused to communicate with
him. Even if driven by malice, this conduct is not sufficiently
“atrocious” to sustain a claim for IIED. See Mikell, 158 N.H.
at 729.
In the workplace, false accusations, inadequate
investigations, humiliating treatment, and abuse of authority
generally do not amount to outrageous or atrocious conduct
6 sufficient to state a plausible IIED claim. See Palmerini v.
Fidelity Brokerage Serv., LLC, No. 12-cv-505-JD, 2014 WL
3401826, at *9 (D.N.H. July 9, 2014) (dismissing IIED claim
under New Hampshire law where defendant badgered plaintiff about
his work performance, falsely accused him of making mistakes,
alleged him to be a “corporate spy,” and yelled at and insulted
him). Cf. Soto-Lebron v. Fed. Express Corp., 538 F.3d 45, 60–61
(1st Cir. 2008) (upholding denial of IIED claim under Puerto
Rico law where defendant conducted inadequate investigation into
plaintiff's alleged misconduct, immediately suspended plaintiff,
and then publicly escorted him off company premises during work
hours); Walton v. Nalco Chem. Co., 272 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir.
2001) (upholding dismissal of IIED claim under Maine law where
defendant transferred plaintiff’s sales accounts to a younger
employee, spread a false and demeaning performance review about
plaintiff, and repossessed a company car in front of plaintiff’s
family and neighbors).
Here, Maynard admits in his objection that “being placed on
administrative leave alone might not constitute ‘extreme and
outrageous’ conduct.” Maynard argues instead that the extreme
and outrageous element is met by the combination of (1) Meggitt
7 placing him on administrative leave,1 (2) Meggitt’s discovery
that the welding equipment was not stolen, and (3) Meggitt’s
continued false allegations against him. While this alleged
conduct could certainly be characterized as offensive, it does
not rise to the requisite level of outrageousness. See
Palmerini, 2014 WL 3401826, at *9 (“false accusations of
criminal conduct, defamation, humiliating treatment during an
investigation, and failure to conduct an adequate investigation
to exonerate the employee do not amount to outrageous conduct
that would support an [IIED] claim”).
In his objection, Maynard relies on Karch v. Baybank, 147
N.H. 525 (2002). In Karch, the employer allegedly used an
illegally intercepted telephone conversation between the
plaintiff and a co-worker, a conversation that was personal and
took place outside the workplace, to accuse the plaintiff of
misconduct. Id. at 528, 531. The employer then threatened,
without cause or legal authority, to monitor her conversations
1 Maynard also argues that Meggitt is liable because it refused to reinstate Maynard from his administrative leave, even after the missing welding equipment was found. However, this action is “well within the latitude we afford employers investigating employee misconduct.” Soto-Lebron, 538 F.3d at 60. As such, Meggitt’s decision not to reinstate Maynard cannot form the basis of an IIED claim.
8 and discipline her. Id. at 531. After the plaintiff reported
to the employer that she was “susceptible to emotional
distress,” the employer did nothing to abate the hostile and
abusive conduct it directed at her. Id. Ultimately, the
plaintiff took medical leave and then resigned to escape the
hostility. Id. at 529. The fact that the employer escalated
the hostile environment after it learned of the plaintiff’s
susceptibility to emotional distress rendered the conduct
sufficiently outrageous to state an IIED claim. Id. at 531.
Maynard’s reliance on Karch is misplaced. Maynard does not
allege that Meggitt illegally listened to his private
conversations, or that Meggitt created a hostile work
environment in response to a legitimate complaint from Maynard
about the illegal conduct. Nor does Maynard allege that Meggitt
continued to direct hostility toward him after learning that he
was susceptible to emotional distress.
In short, Maynard’s allegations in support of his IIED
claim fall short of the mark. The court therefore finds that
Meggitt is entitled to dismissal of the IIED claim on this
additional basis.
9 Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to
dismiss Count II (document no. 7) is granted.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________ Landya McCafferty United States District Judge
April 7, 2015
cc: Jon N. Strasburger, Esq. Christopher Cole, Esq. Brian Bouchard, Esq.