Mayfield v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Mayfield v. State

401 S.E.2d 297, 198 Ga. App. 252, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1586

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedDecember 5, 1990

DocketA90A1991

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 401 S.E.2d 297 (Mayfield v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mayfield v. State, 401 S.E.2d 297, 198 Ga. App. 252, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1586 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).

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Deen, Presiding Judge.

Defendant was arrested on December 23, 1989, on warrants charging him with selling crack cocaine to an undercover agent on two separate occasions on the same day. He appeals from the trial court’s pre-trial order setting bail, and contends that the amount of bail set was excessive.

Defendant filed a petition for bond pursuant to OCGA § 17-6-1, which was heard and denied on March 8, 1990. On May 29, 1990, defendant filed a second petition to set bail, as authorized by OCGA § 17-7-50, which requires the trial court to set bail upon the application of any person who is confined for more than 90 days without bail and without an indictment having been returned. See Burke v. State, 234 Ga. 512, 517 (216 SE2d 812) (1975). Following a hearing the trial court entered an order on June 7, 1990, setting bail in the total amount of $100,000 ($50,000 on each warrant), from which this appeal was taken. Held:

Excessive bail is prohibited by the Georgia Constitution (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII), and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. “Bail set at a figure higher than an [253]*253amount reasonably calculated to . . . [insure the presence of the defendant] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 5 (72 SC 1, 96 LE 3) (1951); Jones v. Grimes, 219 Ga. 585, 587 (134 SE2d 790) (1964). “The amount of bail to be assessed in each criminal case is generally within the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. [Cits.] When fixing the amount of bail, the judge is to consider chiefly the probability that the accused, if freed, will appear at trial; other factors to be considered include the accused’s ability to pay, the seriousness of the. offense, and the accused’s character and reputation. [Cit.] ” Spence v. State, 252 Ga. 338, 341 (313 SE2d 475) (1984).

The record reflects that the trial judge was apprised of the defendant’s lengthy residency in the community and his financial status, and weighed these factors against the serious nature and potential consequences of the charges. In considering these circumstances, the amount of bail set reflects the trial judge’s concern that the defendant’s presence at trial be secured. We find no clear abuse of discretion.

Judgment affirmed.

Carley, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Birdsong and Sognier, JJ., concur. Pope, Beasley and Cooper, JJ., dissent.

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Deen, Presiding Judge.

Defendant was arrested on December 23, 1989, on warrants charging him with selling crack cocaine to an undercover agent on two separate occasions on the same day. He appeals from the trial court’s pre-trial order setting bail, and contends that the amount of bail set was excessive.

Defendant filed a petition for bond pursuant to OCGA § 17-6-1, which was heard and denied on March 8, 1990. On May 29, 1990, defendant filed a second petition to set bail, as authorized by OCGA § 17-7-50, which requires the trial court to set bail upon the application of any person who is confined for more than 90 days without bail and without an indictment having been returned. See Burke v. State, 234 Ga. 512, 517 (216 SE2d 812) (1975). Following a hearing the trial court entered an order on June 7, 1990, setting bail in the total amount of $100,000 ($50,000 on each warrant), from which this appeal was taken. Held:

Excessive bail is prohibited by the Georgia Constitution (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII), and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. “Bail set at a figure higher than an [253]*253amount reasonably calculated to . . . [insure the presence of the defendant] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 5 (72 SC 1, 96 LE 3) (1951); Jones v. Grimes, 219 Ga. 585, 587 (134 SE2d 790) (1964). “The amount of bail to be assessed in each criminal case is generally within the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. [Cits.] When fixing the amount of bail, the judge is to consider chiefly the probability that the accused, if freed, will appear at trial; other factors to be considered include the accused’s ability to pay, the seriousness of the. offense, and the accused’s character and reputation. [Cit.] ” Spence v. State, 252 Ga. 338, 341 (313 SE2d 475) (1984).

The record reflects that the trial judge was apprised of the defendant’s lengthy residency in the community and his financial status, and weighed these factors against the serious nature and potential consequences of the charges. In considering these circumstances, the amount of bail set reflects the trial judge’s concern that the defendant’s presence at trial be secured. We find no clear abuse of discretion.

Judgment affirmed.

Carley, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Birdsong and Sognier, JJ., concur. Pope, Beasley and Cooper, JJ., dissent.

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Bluebook (online)

401 S.E.2d 297, 198 Ga. App. 252, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1586, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mayfield-v-state-gactapp-1990.

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