LUMPKIN, Judge.
Petitioner William Raymond Mayes appeals to this Court from the denial of post-conviction relief by the District Court of Jefferson County, Case No. CRF-89-77. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of Murder in the First Degree (21 O.S.Supp.1982, § 701.7) and Conspiracy to Commit Murder (21 O.S.1981, § 421). After finding the presence of one aggravating circumstance — that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel — the jury recommended punishment of death for murder and ten (10) years and a $5,000 fine for conspiracy. This Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal, and certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. Mayes v. State, 887 P.2d 1288 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1260, 131 L.Ed.2d 140 (1995).
[370]*370I.
Petitioner raised the following propositions of error in his application to the trial court: (1)ineffective trial counsel (failure to present mitigating evidence); (2) ineffective appellate counsel (failure to present cumulative error argument); (3) cumulative error; (4) this Court improperly weighed evidence presented at the trial; (5) the death penalty statute is unconstitutional; (6) error in instruction (failure to define to the jury what “life without parole” meant). In the application, he also requested an evidentiary hearing to prove the claims.
The trial court denied relief in an order dated August 25, 1995, and filed August 28, 1995.1 No evidentiary hearing was held. Petitioner appeals that denial to this Court, setting forth the following propositions: (1) ineffective trial counsel (failure to present mitigating evidence); (2) ineffective appellate counsel (failure to present cumulative error argument); (3) cumulative error ((a) improper questioning of the jury by the trial court concerning ability to impose the death penalty; (b) admission of inadmissible, irrelevant and prejudicial evidence in the form of a civil settlement; (c) improper evidence of prior bad acts and Petitioner’s propensity for violence; (d) improper evidence of polygraph examination; (e) error by the trial court in precluding defense counsel from asking questions concerning bias; (f) inadmissible hearsay statements; (g) error in denying proper cross-examination, of key witness); (4) this Court improperly weighed evidence presented at the trial; (5) the death penalty statute is unconstitutional; (6) error in instruction (failure to define to the jury what “life without parole” meant); (7) error by the district court in denying post-conviction relief.
II.
The post-conviction procedure is not intended to be a second direct appeal. Fox v. State, 880 P.2d 383, 384 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1318, 131 L.Ed.2d 199 (1995). This Court does not consider an issue which was raised on direct appeal (and is therefore res judicata) or an issue which could have been raised on direct appeal but which was not (and is therefore waived). Thomas v. State, 888 P.2d 522, 525 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 123, 133 L.Ed.2d 73 (1995); Castro v. State, 814 P.2d 158, 159 (Okl.Cr.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1063, 112 S.Ct. 947, 117 L.Ed.2d 116 (1992).
III.
In his first proposition of error, Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level. He bases this on affidavits presented to this Court on direct appeal from various friends and family members who claimed they would have presented mitigating evidence showing Petitioner did not deserve the death penalty. He also presented to the district court in his post-conviction application an affidavit from a psychologist.
We addressed this issue on direct appeal. Mayes, 887 P.2d at 1314-16. Consequently, it is res judicata, and we shall not consider it again. Berget v. State, 907 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Okl.Cr.1995).
That does not dispose of the affidavit from the psychologist. The record reflects that the psychologist, Michael M. Gelbort, PhD., did not interview Petitioner until March 1995, after Petitioner’s direct appeal was handed down. There is no evidence in the direct appeal record that Petitioner had any kind of a mental deficiency. Accordingly, this claim is properly before this Court on post conviction. See 22 O.S.1991,2 § 1080(d); [371]*371Berget, 907 P.2d at 1085. We find no merit to the claim, however.
Our analysis of a claim of ineffective trial counsel begins with the presumption trial counsel was competent; therefore, the burden is on Petitioner to demonstrate both a deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Fisher v. State, 736 P.2d 1003, 1011-12 (Okl.Cr.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 2833, 100 L.Ed.2d 933 (1988) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-64, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Petitioner must demonstrate counsel’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and the challenged action could not be considered sound trial strategy. Fisher, 736 P.2d at 1012 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65; Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)). To establish prejudice, Petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is one that undermines confidence in the outcome. Id. Although we consider the totality of the evidence which was before the fact-finder, the “ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.” Fisher, 736 P.2d at 1012 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95, 104 S.Ct. at 2068). We now turn to Petitioner’s specific allegation.
Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective at trial because he did not present any evidence of Petitioner’s mental disorders at trial. He claims the neuropsychological evaluation of Petitioner in 1995 shows he suffers from cognitive dysfunction associated with brain damage. The evaluation shows Petitioner had a below-normal intelligence quotient, and his cognitive handicaps allowed him to learn very slowly. His problem solving and reasoning abilities were “moderately impaired,” and he exhibited characteristics “indicative of behavioral disinhibition or im-pulsivity.” Despite these defects, the psychologist opined Petitioner was able to “appear ‘normal’ outwardly,” although testing would have revealed “dysfunction in the form of deficits in reasoning, judgment, problem solving, insight, left side sensoiy motor abilities and slowed cognition” and would have shown Petitioner was “prone to making odd, poorly thought out decisions which reflect a lack of foresight and anticipation of the outcome of his actions.” However, the psychologist also admitted in his affidavit Petitioner’s mental status “certainly does not completely explain his current situation.”
Based on this evidence, Petitioner’s claim must fail. The psychologist admitted in his affidavit Petitioner would appear outwardly normal; therefore, there would be nothing indicating Petitioner exhibited any mental impairment.
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LUMPKIN, Judge.
Petitioner William Raymond Mayes appeals to this Court from the denial of post-conviction relief by the District Court of Jefferson County, Case No. CRF-89-77. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of Murder in the First Degree (21 O.S.Supp.1982, § 701.7) and Conspiracy to Commit Murder (21 O.S.1981, § 421). After finding the presence of one aggravating circumstance — that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel — the jury recommended punishment of death for murder and ten (10) years and a $5,000 fine for conspiracy. This Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal, and certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. Mayes v. State, 887 P.2d 1288 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1260, 131 L.Ed.2d 140 (1995).
[370]*370I.
Petitioner raised the following propositions of error in his application to the trial court: (1)ineffective trial counsel (failure to present mitigating evidence); (2) ineffective appellate counsel (failure to present cumulative error argument); (3) cumulative error; (4) this Court improperly weighed evidence presented at the trial; (5) the death penalty statute is unconstitutional; (6) error in instruction (failure to define to the jury what “life without parole” meant). In the application, he also requested an evidentiary hearing to prove the claims.
The trial court denied relief in an order dated August 25, 1995, and filed August 28, 1995.1 No evidentiary hearing was held. Petitioner appeals that denial to this Court, setting forth the following propositions: (1) ineffective trial counsel (failure to present mitigating evidence); (2) ineffective appellate counsel (failure to present cumulative error argument); (3) cumulative error ((a) improper questioning of the jury by the trial court concerning ability to impose the death penalty; (b) admission of inadmissible, irrelevant and prejudicial evidence in the form of a civil settlement; (c) improper evidence of prior bad acts and Petitioner’s propensity for violence; (d) improper evidence of polygraph examination; (e) error by the trial court in precluding defense counsel from asking questions concerning bias; (f) inadmissible hearsay statements; (g) error in denying proper cross-examination, of key witness); (4) this Court improperly weighed evidence presented at the trial; (5) the death penalty statute is unconstitutional; (6) error in instruction (failure to define to the jury what “life without parole” meant); (7) error by the district court in denying post-conviction relief.
II.
The post-conviction procedure is not intended to be a second direct appeal. Fox v. State, 880 P.2d 383, 384 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1318, 131 L.Ed.2d 199 (1995). This Court does not consider an issue which was raised on direct appeal (and is therefore res judicata) or an issue which could have been raised on direct appeal but which was not (and is therefore waived). Thomas v. State, 888 P.2d 522, 525 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 123, 133 L.Ed.2d 73 (1995); Castro v. State, 814 P.2d 158, 159 (Okl.Cr.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1063, 112 S.Ct. 947, 117 L.Ed.2d 116 (1992).
III.
In his first proposition of error, Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level. He bases this on affidavits presented to this Court on direct appeal from various friends and family members who claimed they would have presented mitigating evidence showing Petitioner did not deserve the death penalty. He also presented to the district court in his post-conviction application an affidavit from a psychologist.
We addressed this issue on direct appeal. Mayes, 887 P.2d at 1314-16. Consequently, it is res judicata, and we shall not consider it again. Berget v. State, 907 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Okl.Cr.1995).
That does not dispose of the affidavit from the psychologist. The record reflects that the psychologist, Michael M. Gelbort, PhD., did not interview Petitioner until March 1995, after Petitioner’s direct appeal was handed down. There is no evidence in the direct appeal record that Petitioner had any kind of a mental deficiency. Accordingly, this claim is properly before this Court on post conviction. See 22 O.S.1991,2 § 1080(d); [371]*371Berget, 907 P.2d at 1085. We find no merit to the claim, however.
Our analysis of a claim of ineffective trial counsel begins with the presumption trial counsel was competent; therefore, the burden is on Petitioner to demonstrate both a deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Fisher v. State, 736 P.2d 1003, 1011-12 (Okl.Cr.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 2833, 100 L.Ed.2d 933 (1988) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-64, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Petitioner must demonstrate counsel’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and the challenged action could not be considered sound trial strategy. Fisher, 736 P.2d at 1012 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65; Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)). To establish prejudice, Petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is one that undermines confidence in the outcome. Id. Although we consider the totality of the evidence which was before the fact-finder, the “ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.” Fisher, 736 P.2d at 1012 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95, 104 S.Ct. at 2068). We now turn to Petitioner’s specific allegation.
Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective at trial because he did not present any evidence of Petitioner’s mental disorders at trial. He claims the neuropsychological evaluation of Petitioner in 1995 shows he suffers from cognitive dysfunction associated with brain damage. The evaluation shows Petitioner had a below-normal intelligence quotient, and his cognitive handicaps allowed him to learn very slowly. His problem solving and reasoning abilities were “moderately impaired,” and he exhibited characteristics “indicative of behavioral disinhibition or im-pulsivity.” Despite these defects, the psychologist opined Petitioner was able to “appear ‘normal’ outwardly,” although testing would have revealed “dysfunction in the form of deficits in reasoning, judgment, problem solving, insight, left side sensoiy motor abilities and slowed cognition” and would have shown Petitioner was “prone to making odd, poorly thought out decisions which reflect a lack of foresight and anticipation of the outcome of his actions.” However, the psychologist also admitted in his affidavit Petitioner’s mental status “certainly does not completely explain his current situation.”
Based on this evidence, Petitioner’s claim must fail. The psychologist admitted in his affidavit Petitioner would appear outwardly normal; therefore, there would be nothing indicating Petitioner exhibited any mental impairment. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate counsel’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms: we know of no rule requiring an attorney to conduct a mental evaluation on a defendant who exhibits no signs of needing one, especially as the psychologist did not explain how Petitioner’s impairment contributed to his actions in this case.
Furthermore, Petitioner has failed to show prejudice. That Petitioner may have been a slow learner does not mean he could not learn. Petitioner has failed to present evidence to this Court showing that by the time he reached adulthood, he had not learned killing was wrong. That he had a “lack of foresight and anticipation of the outcome of his actions” in no way detracts from the evidence at trial, which showed Petitioner was propositioned well in advance of a plan to kill the victim, and told several friends he was to receive money and a car for his efforts in helping or finding someone who would help kill the victim. After considering the affidavit and comparing it to the evidence adduced at trial, we find Petitioner has failed to present evidence that his counsel’s conduct “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be [372]*372relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
For these reasons, this proposition is without merit.
IV.
For his second proposition of error, Petitioner claims his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective because she faded to present a “cumulative error” argument. The mere failure of direct appeal counsel to raise a claim does not, in and of itself, deprive a petitioner of “reasonably effective assistance” of counsel, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, which would amount to constitutionally ineffective counsel on direct appeal. As one federal appeals court has phrased it, “[b]ecause law is not an exact science, an ordinary, reasonable lawyer may fail to recognize or to raise an issue, even when the issue is available, yet still provide constitutionally effective assistance.” Pelmer v. White, 877 F.2d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir.1989). Here, Petitioner has not shown that, even if his counsel’s performance fell below that which we expect of counsel, he was prejudiced by that failure. Indeed, we conducted a plain-error review of the cumulative error argument in the petition for rehearing, and found it lacking. Mayes, 887 P.2d at 1325. Petitioner cannot show appellate counsel was ineffective. For this same reason, his third proposition, that the cumulative effect of errors in his trial warrant reversal, is without merit.
Accordingly, both Petitioner’s second and third propositions are without merit.3
V.
In his fourth proposition, Petitioner claims this Court improperly weighed evidence given by a prosecution witness concerning the schedule and time of events which took place the day of the murder. He claims that evi[373]*373dence was contradicted by other, more reliable testimony.
This Court reviewed this and other testimony in resolving a claim the evidence was insufficient to convict Petitioner. Mayes, 887 P.2d at 1301-06. Accordingly, this proposition will not be reviewed, as it is res judicata.
VI.
For his fifth proposition of error, Petitioner claims the death penalty statutes of this state are unconstitutional. Specifically, he claims Art. 7, § 15 of the OHahoma constitution prohibiting special verdicts is violated when the jury is required to designate in writing the statutory aggravating circumstances. This complaint is waived, as it could have been presented on direct appeal.
At the end of his argument on this proposition, Petitioner adds one sentence in the last paragraph that direct appeal counsel was incompetent for failing to raise this on direct appeal. Petitioner presents no argument or authority in support of this claim. As this claim is not adequately developed, we shall not consider it. See Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Rule 3.5(C), 900-904 Okl. Decs. (West) at LXXII (to be codified at 22 O.S.Supp.1996, ch. 18 app.)
VII.
Petitioner in his sixth proposition of error claims the trial court erred in not properly responding to the jury’s question concerning whether the life without parole option really meant Petitioner would never be released from prison. Petitioner admits we addressed this claim on direct appeal, Mayes, 887 P.2d at 1316-18, but contends new authority from the Supreme Court impacts on our holding.
We disagree. In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), the Court addressed a situation where a statute specifically prohibited parole under any circumstances when certain conditions were met. The specific punishment for first degree murder was either life or death; the life-without-parole provision arose from a separate statute which was applicable in that defendant’s case. As we noted in Mayes, 887 P.2d at 1318, there always exists the possibility in OHahoma a governor could commute a sentence to one where a possibility of parole exists. Therefore, the law addressed in Simmons does not accurately reflect the state of the law in OHahoma. Simmons is therefore not intervening law, and this issue is res judicata. We shall not address it again.
VIII.
In his seventh and last proposition of error, Petitioner contends the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. Evidentiary hearings at the post-conviction relief level must be held only when there exists “a material issue of fact.” 22 O.S.1991, § 1083(b). However, the district court can receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony or other evidence, which it did. 22 O.S.1991, § 1084. Here, we find nothing “which required proof not contained in those records” before the district court. Johnson v. State, 823 P.2d 370, 373-74 (Okl. Cr.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 926, 112 S.Ct. 1984, 118 L.Ed.2d 582 (1992). And since an evidentiary hearing is not otherwise required, Id. at 373, the district court did not err in deciding the claims without an evidentiary hearing. See also Moore v. State, 889 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Okl.Cr.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 215, 133 L.Ed.2d 146 (1995); Fox, 880 P.2d at 385.
Accordingly, the order of the district court denying post-conviction relief is AFFIRMED.
An Appeal from the District Court of Jefferson County; the Honorable George W. Lindley, District Judge.
William Raymond Mayes, Petitioner, appeals to this Court from the denial of post-conviction relief by the District Court of Jefferson County, Case No. CRF-89-77. Petitioner was convicted by jury of First Degree Murder and was sentenced to death. He was also convicted of Conspiracy to Commit Murder, and was sentenced to ten (10) years and a $5,000 fine. This Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal, and certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. Mayes v. State, 887 P.2d [374]*3741288 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1260, 131 L.Ed.2d 140 (1995). Denial of post-conviction relief is AFFIRMED.
JOHNSON, P.J., and LANE, J., concur.
CHAPEL, V.P.J., specially concurs.
STRUBHAR, J., concurs in result.