May Dept. Store Co v. CW, DEQ, etc

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedAugust 6, 2002
Docket3356012
StatusUnpublished

This text of May Dept. Store Co v. CW, DEQ, etc (May Dept. Store Co v. CW, DEQ, etc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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May Dept. Store Co v. CW, DEQ, etc, (Va. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Annunziata Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

MAY DEPARTMENT STORES COMPANY MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 3356-01-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. AUGUST 6, 2002 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND THOMAS L. HOPKINS (NOW ROBERT G. BURNLEY), DIRECTOR

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY George F. Tidey, Judge

John S. Hahn (Julie Anna Potts; William C. Wood; Michael Ewing; Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw; Rawlings & Wood, on briefs), for appellant.

(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Roger L. Chaffe, Senior Assistant Attorney General; John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

May Department Stores Company ("May") appeals the judgment of

the trial court affirming a Department of Environmental Quality

("DEQ") denial of reimbursement for soil removal undertaken as a

result of a petroleum release. May contends that the trial court

erred in affirming the decision because (1) DEQ relied on post hoc

rationales on appeal, and (2) DEQ's decision was arbitrary and

capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. For the

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and

order the case remanded to DEQ for further consideration.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 30 and April 5, 1993, May reported to DEQ the

discovery of petroleum releases at the Hecht's Distribution

Center in Henrico County, where May's contractors were removing

underground storage tanks. Two tanks had been removed and were

intact. However, the surrounding soil was visibly contaminated,

apparently from the release of fuel oil.

By letter dated April 2, 1993, DEQ directed May to submit

an initial abatement measure report ("IAR") and a site

characterization report ("SCR"). The letter explained that

DEQ's review of the SCR would determine whether "further actions

and/or a Corrective Action Plan" would be required. On April 5,

1993, May's contractor sought guidance from DEQ as to the extent

of the necessary cleanup. Without receiving a directive or site

visit by DEQ, May's contractor began removing visibly

contaminated soil for offsite disposal.

On April 21, 1993, in a teleconference with May's

consultant, DEQ directed May to remove visibly contaminated

soil. This directive was unqualified as to volume or scope, and

made no reference to the water table. May's IAR and SCR

documented the removal of visibly contaminated soils.

Photographs of the site excavation confirmed such. In response

to May's IAR and SCR, DEQ approved closure of the site, noting,

- 2 - "this investigation is considered closed" and that "corrective

action is not required." Thus, May's efforts satisfied all

cleanup requirements and no Corrective Action Plan was required.

May applied for reimbursement from the Virginia Petroleum

Storage Tank Fund ("Tank Fund") of approximately $600,000 in

costs expended on the site cleanup. See Code § 62.1-44.34:11; 9

VAC 25-590-210. DEQ authorized reimbursement of $76,706.30 and

denied reimbursement of $525,592.30. Its reasons for the denial

included: (1) May's incorrect application of DEQ's "usual and

customary rates"; (2) DEQ's need for additional documentation

for certain costs; and (3) May's failure to justify the

necessity of certain actions.

May sought reconsideration. It reduced its claim to comply

with DEQ's uniform customary rates and sought reimbursement of

$420,979.63 of the $525,592.30 denied in the initial decision.

A reconsideration panel awarded May reimbursement of an

additional $61,891.04. The panel based its denial of further

reimbursement on May's failure to obtain written approval for

soil removal before April 21, 1993, and on May's excavation

below the water table, which DEQ asserted was at 5.5 feet below

grade. The reconsideration panel gave May credit for

considering as sufficient the oral authorization that it

received in the April 21, 1993 teleconference, and it allowed

May reimbursement, in part, for the cost of excavation pursuant

to that oral authorization.

- 3 - The reconsideration panel determined that May had excavated

3,374 tons of soil prior to the April 21, 1993 authorization.

Holding that excavation to be unauthorized, it denied

reimbursement for its cost. It found that pursuant to the April

21, 1993 authorization, May excavated an additional 1,675 tons

of soil, but that this included excavating to a depth of 13.5

feet, whereas the water table was encountered at 5.5 feet below

grade. It disallowed reimbursement for the cost of excavation

below the water table. It found that May had excavated 683 tons

of soil, pursuant to authorization, down to the 5.5 foot water

table level. It allowed reimbursement for that amount of

excavation.

The trial court affirmed DEQ's reconsideration panel

decision.

II. ANALYSIS

Separate standards of review determine the degree of

deference, if any, to be given on appeal to an administrative

agency's decision. Holtzman Oil Corp. v. Commonwealth, 32

Va. App. 532, 539, 529 S.E.2d 333, 337 (2000).

Where the issue is whether there is substantial evidence to support findings of fact, great deference is to be accorded the agency decision. Where the issue falls outside the specialized competence of the agency, such as constitutional and statutory interpretation issues, little deference is required to be accorded the agency decision. Where, however, the issue concerns an agency decision based on the proper application of its expert discretion, the reviewing court

- 4 - will not substitute its own independent judgment for that of the agency but rather will reverse the agency decision only if that decision was arbitrary and capricious. Finally, in reviewing an agency decision, the courts are required to consider the experience and specialized competence of the agency and the purposes of the basic law under which the agency acted.

Id. (quoting Johnston-Willis Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231,

246, 369 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1988)). Agency decisions must be in

writing and become part of the record. See Code §§ 2.2-4020

and -4023.

When the decision on review is to be made on the agency record, the duty of the court with respect to issues of fact shall be limited to ascertaining whether there was substantial evidence in the agency record upon which the agency . . . could reasonably find them to be as it did.

Code § 2.2-4027.

A. POST HOC RATIONALE

May first argues that the trial court erroneously

considered, as grounds for affirmance, reasons not underlying

DEQ's decision. "Under well-established principles of

administrative law, the Court may not accept counsel's post hoc

rationalizations for agency action. Rather, the Court must

determine the validity of agency rules solely on the basis

articulated by the agency itself in the administrative record

made in connection with the rulemaking." Jordan v. Lyng, 659

F. Supp.

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Related

Holtzman Oil Corp. v. Commonwealth
529 S.E.2d 333 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2000)
Johnston-Willis, Ltd. v. Kenley
369 S.E.2d 1 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1988)
Jordan v. Lyng
659 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Virginia, 1987)

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