This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A13-2258
Maurion Jameal Travis, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed October 6, 2014 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69DUCR111364
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this postconviction appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred by
refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea on a charge of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g) (2010), alleging that the plea was
invalid because it was inaccurate and involuntary. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Maurion Jameal Travis was charged by complaint with three counts of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct based on allegations that he had engaged in sexual
intercourse with 16-year-old S.E.C. S.E.C. is the daughter of L.A.L., who was Travis’s
girlfriend at the time.
Travis pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in
exchange for the state’s agreement to recommend a dispositional departure with one year
of executed probationary time to be served at Northeast Regional Corrections Center
(NERCC) and to dismiss the remaining charges. At the plea hearing, Travis was
represented by counsel and answered a series of questions indicating that he was entering
the plea voluntarily and knowingly and that he understood his rights. Travis admitted
that he engaged in sexual penetration with S.E.C. while she was 15 years old, that he
lived with the family on and off, and that he had a significant relationship with the
family, but he denied having authority in the household.
Travis was sentenced to 144 months with execution stayed, representing a
downward dispositional departure, and seven years of probation. Under the terms of his
2 probation, Travis was ordered to serve one year at NERCC and to complete sex-offender
treatment. Travis entered NERCC, but was transferred to jail a month later because of
behavioral issues. Following a contested probation-revocation hearing, the district court
revoked Travis’s stay of execution and committed him to the commissioner of corrections
for 144 months, plus 10 years of conditional release.
In August 2013, Travis petitioned for postconviction relief, requesting to withdraw
his guilty plea for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Travis alleged that (1) the plea
was inaccurate because there was an insufficient factual basis for the plea; (2) he did not
understand the meaning of “significant relationship” at the time of the plea hearing; and
(3) he felt pressured to plead guilty to avoid prison, rendering his plea involuntary. The
district court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that (1) Travis did
not allege facts that would entitle him to a dismissal or new trial; (2) an adequate factual
basis existed to support his guilty plea; and (3) Travis understood the terms of the plea
agreement and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered the guilty plea. This
appeal followed.
DECISION
A postconviction court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing unless “the
petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner
is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2012). This court reviews a
district court’s ultimate decision to deny postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Minn. 2004). Because the validity of a guilty
3 plea is a question of law, we apply de novo review. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94
(Minn. 2010).
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364, 371 (Minn. 2007). A defendant may withdraw a guilty
plea after sentencing only if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Manifest injustice exists when a guilty plea is invalid.
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). A valid guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. The defendant bears the burden
of establishing that the plea was invalid. Id.
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd 1(g), provides that a person is guilty of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct if that person engages in sexual penetration with another person
and “the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant and the complainant was
under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual penetration.” Travis argues that his guilty
plea was inaccurate because there is no factual basis for establishing that he had a
significant relationship with S.E.C., a required element of his conviction for first-degree
criminal sexual conduct. “The accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading
guilty to a more serious offense than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted
on his right to trial.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. “To be accurate, a plea must be
established on a proper factual basis,” which is adequate “if the record contains sufficient
evidence to support the conviction.” Id. “The factual basis of a plea is inadequate when
the defendant makes statements that negate an essential element of the charged crime
4 because such statements are inconsistent with a plea of guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664
N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003).
A “[s]ignificant relationship” exists when the defendant is “an adult who jointly
resides intermittently or regularly in the same dwelling as the complainant and who is not
the complainant’s spouse.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15(3) (2010). Travis asserts that
because he denied having authority in S.E.C.’s house and testified that his relationship
with L.A.L. “was back and forth” and that he “stayed gone,” he “negated the element of
having a significant relationship with S.E.C.” But the statute does not require that the
defendant assume a role of authority over the complainant to constitute a significant
relationship. Moreover, Travis agreed that he was a member of the household and that he
lived in the household periodically.
Travis also argues that the affidavit that he submitted with his postconviction
petition “supports the lack of a factual basis” because he attested that he did not have a
significant relationship with S.E.C. Additionally, Travis claims in his affidavit that he
did not reside in S.E.C.’s home and was dating other women while he dated S.E.C.’s
mother, so his relationship with the family was only casual, not significant. But the
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A13-2258
Maurion Jameal Travis, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed October 6, 2014 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69DUCR111364
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this postconviction appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred by
refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea on a charge of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g) (2010), alleging that the plea was
invalid because it was inaccurate and involuntary. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Maurion Jameal Travis was charged by complaint with three counts of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct based on allegations that he had engaged in sexual
intercourse with 16-year-old S.E.C. S.E.C. is the daughter of L.A.L., who was Travis’s
girlfriend at the time.
Travis pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in
exchange for the state’s agreement to recommend a dispositional departure with one year
of executed probationary time to be served at Northeast Regional Corrections Center
(NERCC) and to dismiss the remaining charges. At the plea hearing, Travis was
represented by counsel and answered a series of questions indicating that he was entering
the plea voluntarily and knowingly and that he understood his rights. Travis admitted
that he engaged in sexual penetration with S.E.C. while she was 15 years old, that he
lived with the family on and off, and that he had a significant relationship with the
family, but he denied having authority in the household.
Travis was sentenced to 144 months with execution stayed, representing a
downward dispositional departure, and seven years of probation. Under the terms of his
2 probation, Travis was ordered to serve one year at NERCC and to complete sex-offender
treatment. Travis entered NERCC, but was transferred to jail a month later because of
behavioral issues. Following a contested probation-revocation hearing, the district court
revoked Travis’s stay of execution and committed him to the commissioner of corrections
for 144 months, plus 10 years of conditional release.
In August 2013, Travis petitioned for postconviction relief, requesting to withdraw
his guilty plea for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Travis alleged that (1) the plea
was inaccurate because there was an insufficient factual basis for the plea; (2) he did not
understand the meaning of “significant relationship” at the time of the plea hearing; and
(3) he felt pressured to plead guilty to avoid prison, rendering his plea involuntary. The
district court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that (1) Travis did
not allege facts that would entitle him to a dismissal or new trial; (2) an adequate factual
basis existed to support his guilty plea; and (3) Travis understood the terms of the plea
agreement and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered the guilty plea. This
appeal followed.
DECISION
A postconviction court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing unless “the
petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner
is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2012). This court reviews a
district court’s ultimate decision to deny postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Minn. 2004). Because the validity of a guilty
3 plea is a question of law, we apply de novo review. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94
(Minn. 2010).
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364, 371 (Minn. 2007). A defendant may withdraw a guilty
plea after sentencing only if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Manifest injustice exists when a guilty plea is invalid.
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). A valid guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. The defendant bears the burden
of establishing that the plea was invalid. Id.
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd 1(g), provides that a person is guilty of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct if that person engages in sexual penetration with another person
and “the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant and the complainant was
under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual penetration.” Travis argues that his guilty
plea was inaccurate because there is no factual basis for establishing that he had a
significant relationship with S.E.C., a required element of his conviction for first-degree
criminal sexual conduct. “The accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading
guilty to a more serious offense than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted
on his right to trial.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. “To be accurate, a plea must be
established on a proper factual basis,” which is adequate “if the record contains sufficient
evidence to support the conviction.” Id. “The factual basis of a plea is inadequate when
the defendant makes statements that negate an essential element of the charged crime
4 because such statements are inconsistent with a plea of guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664
N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003).
A “[s]ignificant relationship” exists when the defendant is “an adult who jointly
resides intermittently or regularly in the same dwelling as the complainant and who is not
the complainant’s spouse.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15(3) (2010). Travis asserts that
because he denied having authority in S.E.C.’s house and testified that his relationship
with L.A.L. “was back and forth” and that he “stayed gone,” he “negated the element of
having a significant relationship with S.E.C.” But the statute does not require that the
defendant assume a role of authority over the complainant to constitute a significant
relationship. Moreover, Travis agreed that he was a member of the household and that he
lived in the household periodically.
Travis also argues that the affidavit that he submitted with his postconviction
petition “supports the lack of a factual basis” because he attested that he did not have a
significant relationship with S.E.C. Additionally, Travis claims in his affidavit that he
did not reside in S.E.C.’s home and was dating other women while he dated S.E.C.’s
mother, so his relationship with the family was only casual, not significant. But the
record shows that Travis spent nights at S.E.C.’s house, lived in the household at times,
and was at the house when S.E.C.’s mother was at work. This behavior constitutes
residing with S.E.C. “intermittently,” which includes “frequent, but discontinuous, stays.”
State v. Sebasky, 547 N.W.2d 93, 100 (Minn. App. 1996) (finding a significant
relationship with the complainants who “slept, ate, occasionally left personal items there,
and apparently never returned to their homes during” two- to six-day stays at appellant’s
5 apartment), review denied (Minn. June 19, 1996). The facts on the record, as admitted by
Travis, establish that he jointly resided with S.E.C. at least intermittently, satisfying the
definition of “significant relationship” provided in Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15(3).
Travis seems to assert that his plea was not knowing because he did not
understand the legal definition of “significant relationship” at the plea hearing. But
“[w]hen a defendant is represented by counsel, it is generally presumed that he has been
informed of the nature of the offense.” State v. Lyle, 409 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Minn. App.
1987). Further, Travis testified to individual facts sufficient to establish that his
relationship with S.E.C. satisfied the definition of “significant relationship,” even if he
did not know its legal definition.
Travis further contends that his plea was not voluntary. “The voluntariness
requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or
inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
To analyze the voluntariness requirement, “the court examines what the parties
reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at
96. In determining whether a guilty plea is voluntary, courts employ a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach. Id.
Travis contends that he “was induced by undue pressure and the fear of a prison
sentence,” attesting that “[t]he fear of going to prison caused him extreme stress and
pressure to accept the state’s offer.” He points out that all parties were concerned about
his success at NERCC, contending that he “was being set up for failure.” While the
parties did discuss concerns about Travis’s behavior in institutional settings, there is no
6 indication that the state exploited these problems in offering the deal or that he was
otherwise pressured to accept the deal. And there is no authority supporting Travis’s
contention that a plea deal is manifestly unjust because a defendant is motivated to accept
the deal by his fear of prison. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 (rejecting as a basis for
withdrawal the argument that the appellant was under extreme stress when he entered his
plea, explaining that the appellant “offers no further explanation of how stress, irrational
thinking, improper pressure, or coercion influenced his plea decision, nor does he cite any
authority permitting a plea withdrawal under these circumstances”).
Additionally, Travis was fully informed of the terms of the plea agreement before
accepting it, including the time in NERCC and the possibility that his prison sentence
would be executed. Travis repeatedly confirmed that he was entering the guilty plea
voluntarily and that he had been afforded ample time to consider his options and discuss
them with his attorney. And the record shows that Travis’s attorney initially advised him
against entering the plea and requested that he give it longer consideration, which Travis
did. Travis knew the terms of the deal before making his plea and the court may rely on
his indications of voluntariness on the record. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 (rejecting
claims of extreme stress, irrational thinking, and fear of federal prosecution when
defendant’s statements indicated voluntariness). The totality of the circumstances
demonstrates that Travis voluntarily and intelligently entered his guilty plea for first-
degree criminal sexual conduct. Because there was no manifest injustice, the district
7 court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Travis’s postconviction petition
to withdraw his guilty plea.
Affirmed.