Maurice Lydell Harris v. Cleric Muhammad (K. Fasish), et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 MAURICE LYDELL HARRIS, Case No. 21-cv-00283-HSG 7 Plaintiff, ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT AND REOPENING ACTION; 8 v. REQUIRING SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING; SETTING BRIEFING 9 CLERIC MUHAMMAD (K. FASISH), et SCHEDULE al., 10 Defendants. 11 12 Plaintiff, an inmate currently housed at Corcoran State Prison (“CSP”), filed the instant pro 13 se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 14 VACATES the portion of the April 23, 2024 Order denying Plaintiff’s request for a temporary 15 restraining order and preliminary injunction, Dkt. No. 47; REOPENS this action; ORDERS the 16 parties to file supplemental briefing; and SETS a briefing schedule. 17 DISCUSSION 18 I. Background 19 Plaintiff has filed a civil rights action alleging that prison officials have unconstitutionally 20 denied him a diet that complies with his religious faith and provides adequate nutrition. 21 According to Plaintiff, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)’s 22 meal plan for Muslims, the Religious Meal Alternative Program (“RMAP”), best accommodates 23 the dietary requirements of his Nichiren Buddhist faith. Plaintiff occasionally consumes ramen 24 soups to supplement his diet when the RMAP meals provide inadequate nutrition and calories. 25 These ramen soups comply with Nichiren Buddhist dietary requirements but are not compliant 26 with Islamic dietary laws. Prison officials have conditioned Plaintiff’s enrollment in RMAP on 27 maintaining a diet consistent with Islamic dietary laws. However, prison officials provide Muslim 1 requirements on them. Plaintiff alleges that the requirement that he abide by Islamic dietary laws 2 to remain in the RMAP violates his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion, the 3 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the Equal Protection Clause, 4 and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 5 See generally Dkt. No. 25, 29. 6 When Plaintiff commenced this action on or around July 12, 2021, he was housed at San 7 Quentin Rehabilitation Center (“SQRC”) and enrolled in RMAP. Plaintiff therefore named as 8 defendants the SQRC individuals who had decision-making authority regarding enrollment in 9 religious diets: Chaplain K. Fasish (also referred to as Cleric Muhammad); Chaplain Jackson (the 10 Christian chaplain); and the Community Resources Manager (“CRM”) chaplain Charles Richey. 11 On July 5, 2023, Plaintiff was transferred to Corcoran State Prison (“CSP”), and he 12 remains housed there as of the date of this order. Currently, CSP staff – specifically Chaplain C. 13 Ugwu, the CSP Religious Review Committee, and the CSP CRM M. Robicheaux – have decision- 14 making authority regarding Plaintiff’s enrollment in a religious diet. On July 6, 2023 and on 15 December 8, 2023, the CSP Religious Review Committee (“RRC”) issued Plaintiff notices of non- 16 compliance with the RMAP due to having purchased food items that contained non-halal certified 17 meats. Pursuant to prison policy, CSP staff members, including Chaplain Ugwu, the CSP 18 Religious Review Committee, and CRM Robicheaux, removed Plaintiff from the RMAP for 19 receiving two notices of non-compliance within a six-month period. Dkt. No. 40-1 at 2, 5. 20 II. First Request for Temporary Restraining Order / Preliminary Injunction 21 On June 10, 2022, while still housed at SQRC, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting “a 22 Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction from the further denial of his ability to 23 supplement his GMO-free (RMAP) diet, which his religion requires, with non Halal or non- 24 Kosher food items from the prison canteen or vendors, while seeking redress in this Court.” Dkt. 25 No. 17. The Court denied the request for a TRO/PI for the following reasons:

26 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s TRO/PI request. Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim because the RMAP diet is not providing Plaintiff with the GMO- 27 free diet required by his religion. Expulsion from the RMAP diet would therefore not dictates of Plaintiff’s religion, requiring Plaintiff to abide by the restrictions in the RMAP 1 diet does not treat Plaintiff differently from Jewish and Muslim inmates and does not require Plaintiff to abide by another religion’s requirements to receive a diet compliant 2 with his religion. Finally, there is no Eighth Amendment violation because Plaintiff does not need to stay in the RMAP diet to observe his religion. He can therefore choose a 3 different diet – or exit the RMAP diet – and supplement his diet with purchases from the canteen and other vendors to meet his nutritional and health requirements. For the same 4 reason, expulsion from the RMAP diet would not cause him irreparable harm because the RMAP diet does not satisfy his religion’s dietary requirements. Given that participation in 5 the RMAP diet is not necessary for Plaintiff to fulfill his religious dietary requirements and expulsion from the RMAP diet would not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the 6 balance of equities does not tip in Plaintiff’s favor and the TRO/PI would not serve the public interest. 7 Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion and DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants from 8 denying him the ability to supplement the RMAP diet with non-Halal or non-Kosher food items from the prison canteen or vendors. To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking a TRO/PI 9 requiring prison officials to provide him with a GMO-free diet, Plaintiff has not raised that claim in this action. This action challenges Plaintiff’s inability to supplement the RMAP 10 diet with non-Halal items. If Plaintiff wishes to require prison officials to provide him with a GMO-free diet so that he may comply with the dietary restrictions of his religion, he 11 should amend the complaint accordingly. Plaintiff is reminded that he must exhaust administrative remedies for any claims that he brings in a civil rights action. 12 13 Dkt. No. 22 at 5-6. 14 III. Second Request for Temporary Restraining Order / Preliminary Injunction 15 On January 16, 2024, after being removed from RMAP by CSP Chaplain Ugwu, CSP 16 CRM Robicheaux, and the CSP Religious Review Committee, Plaintiff filed a renewed request for 17 a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to re-enroll him in 18 RMAP and to allow him to stay in RMAP without requiring him to refrain from purchasing items 19 containing non-halal certified meats. Dkt. No. 39. In the motion, Plaintiff stated that “[a]s a 20 Nichiren Buddhist, . . . his (Buddha) body is a temple that should not be polluted with genetically 21 modified (GMO) or other non-‘clean’ meats.” Dkt. No. 39 at 3. Plaintiff stated that his 22 understanding of Nichiren Buddhism is that it requires him to follow a “clean eating” diet. 23 Plaintiff described “clean eating” as eating organic or natural foods, and avoiding foods that are 24 highly processed, artificial, synthetic, or have chemical sounding names. Dkt. No. 39 at 17. 25 Plaintiff specified that whether meat is halal is irrelevant to his religious practice: “Whether the 26 ‘methods of slaughtering’ food fits the Islamic – halal – standard is irrelevant to my Buddhist 27 practice.” Dkt. No. 39 at 18. The RMAP diet differs from other prison diets in only one respect: 1 Regs. § 3054.4(c); Dkt. No. 20-1 at 5-6. 2 Relying on Plaintiff’s interpretation of his religious faith as requiring GMO-free food and 3 “clean” meats, but not requiring halal meats, the Court denied the request for a TRO/PI:

4 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s TRO/PI request. Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim because the RMAP diet is not providing Plaintiff with the diet 5 required by his religion. Plaintiff states that he has made the RMAP a substantial portion of his religious practice. However, Plaintiff has not indicated how the RMAP is consistent 6 with his religious beliefs. Plaintiff states that his religion requires him to eat “wisely” or “cleanly,” which he describes as eating organic foods and avoiding foods that are highly 7 processed, artificial, synthetic, have genetically modified organisms, or have chemical- sounding names. But the primary difference between the RMAP and other prison diets is 8 that the meat served is halal-certified. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that the RMAP provides him with organic foods, or omits foods that are highly processed, 9 artificial, synthetic, have genetically modified organisms, or have chemical sounding names. And Plaintiff has stated that whether meat is certified halal is irrelevant to his 10 religious dietary restrictions. Expulsion from the RMAP diet would therefore not affect Plaintiff’s ability to observe his religion, as guaranteed by the First Amendment’s free 11 exercise clause or by RLUIPA. Similarly, because the RMAP diet does not fulfill the dictates of Plaintiff’s religion, requiring Plaintiff to abide by the restrictions in the RMAP 12 diet does not treat Plaintiff differently from Jewish and Muslim inmates and does not require Plaintiff to abide by another religion’s requirements to receive a diet compliant 13 with his religion. For the same reason, expulsion from the RMAP diet has not caused Plaintiff irreparable harm because the RMAP diet does not satisfy his religion’s dietary 14 requirements. Given that participation in the RMAP diet is not necessary for Plaintiff to fulfill his religious dietary requirements and expulsion from the RMAP diet does not 15 violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the balance of equities does not weigh in Plaintiff’s favor and the TRO/PI would not serve the public interest. 16 17 Dkt. No. 47 at 10-11. 18 IV. Ninth Circuit Opinion 19 Plaintiff appealed the Court’s denial and on February 4, 2026, the Ninth Circuit found that 20 this Court erred in concluding that Plaintiff had no likelihood of success under RLUIPA by 21 questioning whether a halal diet is central to Plaintiff’s Nichiren Buddhist beliefs:

22 Harris sufficiently shows that the prison imposed a substantial burden on his religious exercise as he understands and interprets his faith. His Second Amended 23 Complaint details how his removal from RMAP leaves him to choose “between his religious diet or receiving a prison violation, and possible loss of his religious diet 24 accommodation of fifteen years.” By conditioning his ability to receive the diet which most aligns with his beliefs on whether he keeps Islamic dietary laws, Harris has shown a 25 substantial burden on his religious exercise. See Apache Stronghold v. United States, 101 F.4th 1036, 1091 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (Nelson, J., concurring) (“A government act 26 imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise if it (1) requires the plaintiff to participate in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief, (2) prevents the 27 plaintiff from participating in an activity motivated by a sincerely held religious belief, or 1 Holding otherwise imposes a judicial assessment of what diet is required by Harris’s Nichiren Buddhist faith, which is the incorrect mode of analysis. The district court 2 concluded that Harris “is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim because the RMAP diet is not providing Plaintiff with the diet required by his religion.” The district court 3 reasoned that “whether meat is certified halal is irrelevant to his religious dietary restrictions.” Thus, the district court concluded that “[e]xpulsion from the RMAP diet 4 would . . . not affect Plaintiff’s ability to observe his religion, as guaranteed by the First Amendment’s free exercise clause or by RLUIPA.” 5 But “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the validity of particular litigants’ 6 interpretations of those creeds.” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884 (citation omitted). Judges ought not be Pharisees, decreeing from on high what practices are relevant to a prisoner’s 7 understanding of his own faith. See Matthew 23:23. It is for Harris to determine whether being on RMAP satisfies Harris’s Nichiren Buddhist beliefs. And if external forces cause 8 Harris to fall short of the exact dictates of his religion, it is for him and his conscience, not us as courts, to decide what compromises are appropriate. Thus, it is sufficient that Harris 9 asserts that he sincerely believes that the RMAP program “is closest to his spiritual needs.” In holding that an Islamic diet is not required by Harris’s Buddhist faith, the district court 10 erred by discounting Harris’s own understanding of his faith—that he should eat meat as close “to its natural state as possible”—and instead reduced his faith to requiring a non- 11 GMO diet. [FN 4]

12 FN 4: Harris refers to his diet as a non-GMO diet in his complaint. And when he claims his religion instructs him to eat meat as close “to its natural state as 13 possible,” he references a non-GMO diet. But as explained, courts should not decide what Harris’s religion requires, and Harris asserts that he enrolled in RMAP 14 on the advice of a prison chaplain. . . . 15 Harris believes that Islamic slaughter and animal husbandry makes that meat 16 religiously permissible under the dictates of his religious conscience. Harris’s departures from the Islamic diet—or even a Buddhist diet— do not demonstrate that his beliefs do not 17 require him to adhere to that diet if possible. “[A] sincere religious believer doesn’t forfeit his religious rights merely because he is not scrupulous in his observance; for where would 18 religion be without its backsliders, penitents, and prodigal sons?” Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2012). Each man’s faith is his own, and judges must avoid 19 questioning whether a prisoner has strictly abided by the letter of his own sincere belief. The district court erred by considering these backslides as part of a centrality inquiry (i.e., 20 concluding that expulsion from RMAP would not affect Harris’s ability to practice his own religion). Thus, we vacate and remand for the district court to reassess Harris’s prima facie 21 substantial burden argument.

22 Although courts may not determine what actions are dictated by a plaintiff’s personal religious beliefs, a court may determine whether those beliefs are sincerely held. 23 See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 885 (adopting sincerity test); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682, 717–19 (2014). Sincerity is a low bar, and all that it requires is “to determine whether 24 the line drawn reflects an honest conviction.” Burwell, 573 U.S. at 725 (cleaned up); see also Ackerman v. Washington, 16 F.4th 170, 180 (6th Cir. 2021). In other words, sincerity 25 is a permissible inquiry for courts to make; centrality is not. This rule makes sense. RLUIPA does not entitle insincere believers in the “Church of Surf ‘n’ Turf” to luxury 26 lobster and steak dinners. But it also protects the rights of sincere believers, who may not fully adhere to their stated beliefs. Neither the district court nor the prison inquired into the 27 sincerity of Harris’s beliefs, only their centrality to his religion. The district court should regulation is the least restrictive means to achieve its compelling interest. The government 1 has not yet established whether forcing Harris off RMAP satisfies this standard. See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 998–99 (prison officials have the burden to “establish that the . . . 2 policy is the least restrictive alternative”). If the government cannot establish that its regulation is the least restrictive alternative, then Harris would have a likelihood of success 3 on the merits of his RLUIPA claim.

4 Harris v. Muhammad, et al., No. 24-3307, slip op. at 12-13 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2026).1 5 The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion is based on its finding that Plaintiff “believes that Islamic 6 slaughter and animal husbandry makes that meat religiously permissible under the dictates of his 7 religious conscience,” but Plaintiff contended in his motion that whether meat is halal is irrelevant 8 to his religious practice. However, regardless of the role of halal meat in Plaintiff’s religious 9 practice, it is clear that the Ninth Circuit has found that Plaintiff’s belief that enrollment in the 10 RMAP is necessary to practice his faith is sufficient to show that dis-enrollment from RMAP 11 would be a substantial burden on his religious exercise. 12 Therefore, as directed by the Ninth Circuit, the Court VACATES the portion of the April 13 23, 2024 Order denying Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 14 injunction, Dkt. No. 47, REOPENS this action, and will reassess Plaintiff’s prima facie substantial 15 burden argument. The Court ORDERS the parties to file supplemental briefing addressing (1) 16 whether Plaintiff has articulated a sincere religious belief; (2) if so, whether removal from RMAP 17 is the least restrictive means for the CDCR to achieve a compelling interest; and (3) whether 18 Plaintiff still has standing to bring the claims for injunctive relief against the current defendants, 19 given that he has been transferred to Corcoran State Prison, and whether Plaintiff will seek to 20 amend the operative complaint to name the proper defendant. In addressing the sincerity of 21

22 1 Plaintiff reports that, in response to his request for a GMO-free diet in order to comply with his religious dietary restrictions, prison chaplain Hyman offered him the RMAP diet. Dkt. No. 17 at 23 9-10. However, the record is silent as to why prison chaplain Hyman offered Plaintiff the RMAP diet. Plaintiff describes the RMAP diet as providing GMO-free foods, Dkt. No. 17 at 10, but 24 prison officials have since clarified that the RMAP diet is not GMO-free and that none of the CDCR diets are GMO-free, Dkt. No. 20-1 at 3, 5-6. It appears that prison chaplain Hyman may 25 have offered Plaintiff the RMAP diet pursuant to state regulations which require the CDCR to make reasonable efforts to accommodate those incarcerated persons who have been determined to 26 require a Religious Personal Ethical Diet (“RPED”) program meal, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3054(a), and further provides that the RMAP diet is the diet offered to incarcerated persons with a religious 27 dietary need that cannot be met by the RPED options (vegetarian, plant-based, or kosher), or by ] Plaintiff's beliefs, the parties should address the Ninth Circuit’s observation that many of 2 || Plaintiff's canteen purchases “appear highly processed, contain artificial sounding ingredients, and 3 are not GMO-free.” Harris, slip op. at 6-7. Defendants shall file their supplemental briefing by 4 || April 10, 2026. Plaintiff shall file his supplemental briefing by May 11, 2026. 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows. 7 1. The Court VACATES the portion of the April 23, 2024 Order denying □□□□□□□□□□□ 8 || request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 47). 9 2. The Clerk is directed to REOPEN this action. 10 3. The Court ORDERS the parties to file supplemental briefing addressing the topics 11 above. Defendants shall file their supplemental briefing by April 10, 2026. Plaintiff shall file his 12 || supplemental briefing by May 11, 2026. 13 4. The Court sets the following briefing schedule. Defendants shall file their 14 || dispositive motion by July 10, 2026. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed 15 and served no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date the dispositive motion is filed. a 16 || Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after Plaintiffs opposition is 17 || filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No hearing will Zz 18 || be held on the motion. If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by 19 || summary judgment, Defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date the dispositive motion 20 || is due. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 || Dated: 3/9/2026 °3 Absurd 5 bbl |). HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28