Mattingly v. Justice

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MARGURIETE MATTINGLY, Case No. 24-cv-03061-EMC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE DEFENDANT’S MOTION 9 v. FOR IMPEACHMENT

10 HILLARY CARLVIN JUSTICE, Docket No. 32 11 Defendant.

12 13 14 Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff has filed a document captioned: “[Counter Plaintiff] moves 15 the Court for impeachment of United State[s] District Court Judge Edward Chen FRCP 55(b)(D), 16 60(d)(3). 28 USC § 455, § 1441(a), § 2283.” 17 Given the caption and content of this document, it seems unlikely that Defendant is 18 seeking any relief from the undersigned. In this regard, the Court notes that, at the end of the 19 filing, he states: “Laphonza Butler Senator Please submit for Impeachment of Judge Edward Chen 20 for failing to correct a wrong or act according to Plaintiff rights.” 21 Out of an abundance of caution, however, the Court addresses the main arguments raised 22 by Defendant. 23 To the extent Defendant seeks the disqualification of the undersigned, the Court reiterates 24 that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky 25 v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Simply because an adverse ruling has been rendered is 26 not a sufficient basis for disqualification. See Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 27 712 (9th Cir. 1993) (“To warrant recusal, judicial bias must stem from an extrajudicial source. 1 essentially seeking disqualification on the basis of prior adverse rulings alone. See, e.g., Mot. at 2 2 || (asserting that “Courts are bound by consistent circuit authority not to remand [flor procedural 3 defects that Judge Chen has attempted to pass over” and that “[s]ta[te] court action had no grounds 4 || for judg[|ment when failing to [p]rovide Constitutional protection”); Mot. at 3 (arguing that 5 “Judge Chen has display[ed] deep unfairness for grounds to [b]e removed for impeachment on the 6 || grounds of failing to follow the Court standing [o]rders and FRCP which apply to this Court as 7 || well”). 8 To the extent Defendant is seeking reconsideration of the Court’s remand order, that 9 || request for relief is denied. Ramos v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 379 F. Supp. 3d 437 (E.D. Pa. 2019), 10 || isnot on point. See id. at 443 (noting that there is both federal and state jurisdiction over FDCPA 11 claims). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does allow for supplemental jurisdiction; however, the statute 12 || requires that there first be original subject matter jurisdiction over a claim before supplemental 5 13 || jurisdiction over other claims is possible. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (providing that, “in any civil 14 action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have 3 15 supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within 16 such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article HI of 3 17 || the United States Constitution”) (emphasis added). As the Court held in its remand order, there is 18 no original subject matter jurisdiction over the case at bar. 19 Finally, the Court notes that this case is closed. If Defendant wishes to make further 20 || filings in this case, he must ask the Court for leave to do so and further establish good cause for 21 the filing. The filing shall otherwise be stricken. 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 Dated: September 12, 2024 26 27 EDWA . CHEN 28 United States District Judge