Matthew William Ezell, V. Audrey Leigh Cavins-ezell

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: January 26, 2026
• Docket: 86739-3
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In re the Marriage of No. 86739-3-I (consolidated with No. 86740-7-I) MATTHEW WILLIAM EZELL, DIVISION ONE Appellant, UNPUBLISHED OPINION and

AUDREY LEIGH CAVINS-EZELL,

Respondent.

FELDMAN, J. — Matthew William Ezell appeals various orders issued by the

trial court regarding a dissolution of marriage proceeding involving his ex-spouse,

Audrey Leigh Cavins-Ezell. He asserts numerous arguments, ranging from the

trial court’s purported reliance on unsupported findings of psychological

aggression in formulating the parties’ parenting plan to alleged violations of his

constitutional rights. Because Ezell has not established an entitlement to relief,

we affirm. We also deny his request for attorney fees on appeal.

I

Ezell and Cavins 1 married in 2016 and have two young children. While

living in Kentucky, police were called to their family home twice due to alleged

1 This opinion refers to the respondent herein as Cavins and utilizes male pronouns with regard to

Cavins because that is how he self-identifies in his brief of respondent. No. 86739-3-I (Consolidated w/No. 86740-7-I)

domestic violence. In 2020, the family moved from Kentucky to Washington,

seeking better employment and healthcare opportunities. After moving to

Washington, the police were called to the family home on multiple occasions due

to concerns of domestic violence. Cavins and Ezell would regularly argue about

housework and money. They would sometimes argue in front of their children,

occasionally waking them from sleep.

On January 24, 2022, Cavins and the two children left the family home to

stay at a domestic violence shelter. Soon after, Cavins filed a petition for a

domestic violence protection order (DVPO) against Ezell, alleging that Ezell took

money without asking, tracked Cavins’ location by phone, withheld medical care,

drove under the influence with the children in the vehicle, slammed Cavins to the

ground, choked Cavins, hit the children, made verbal threats toward Cavins,

engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior, and threatened Cavins with further

violence. The trial court entered a one-year DVPO against Ezell, granting Cavins

temporary custody of the children and Ezell visitation by video. Ezell filed a motion

for revision of the DVPO, which was denied.

On May 25, 2022, Cavins contacted police to report that Ezell forwarded

Cavins a bill via e-mail in violation of the DVPO. Three days later, Ezell filed for

divorce. Two months after, Cavins filed another report with the police because it

appeared that someone had tried to break into his garage and car. In the report,

Cavins noted that Ezell “has a garage door opener to[o] and will not give [it] back.”

On February 6, 2023, Cavins filed a motion to renew the DVPO, alleging that Ezell

may have broken into Cavins’ home, had engaged in sexually inappropriate

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behavior, was unlawfully watching the children through home security cameras,

had caused an auto accident while driving the children, and may be using drugs

and alcohol. The trial court renewed the DVPO for another year. Ezell again filed

a motion to revise this renewal order, which was denied.

Ezell and Cavins’ dissolution proceedings began on February 27, 2024 and

ended on March 6, 2024. Ezell, Cavins, the children’s guardian ad litem, Ezell’s

domestic violence treatment assessor, and Ezell’s mother testified during the

proceedings. Ezell admitted to using marijuana from 2019 to 2022 but denied

using it since. During the cross examination of Cavins, Ezell’s counsel played

three videos of Cavins hitting himself in the face. An image of Cavins’ bloodied

face that Cavins had previously submitted as evidence that Ezell hit him appeared

to be a screenshot from one of these videos. During his later testimony, Ezell

requested that the DVPO be realigned so that he would be the protected party.

The trial court declined to renew the DVPO against Ezell; while it noted that

Cavins and Ezell were both perpetrators of domestic abuse, it found that this

conduct was unlikely to recur following dissolution of the marriage. The trial court

granted Cavins major decision-making authority and made him the “custodian” of

the children “solely for the purpose of all state and federal statutes which require

a designation or determination of custody,” though the children would live with Ezell

for part of the week as well. Ezell appeals.

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II

A. Findings of Psychological Aggression and Parenting Plan Limitations

Ezell argues that the trial court’s findings in the denial order, dissolution

findings and conclusions, and parenting plan that he engaged in psychological

aggression are not supported by substantial evidence. He makes this argument

even though the trial court declined to renew the DVPO against him because,

under RCW 26.09.191(1)(c), 2 parenting plans must be limited when previous

findings of abuse exist against a parent. Thus, Ezell contends that the limitations

of the parenting plan are erroneous because they are based on unsupported

findings of abuse. Contrary to Ezell’s argument, substantial evidence supports the

challenged findings.

Under RCW 7.105.010(4)(a), “psychological aggression” is a form of

“coercive control,” which in turn is a form of abuse as outlined in the statute.

“Psychological aggression” includes “inflicting fear, humiliating, degrading, or

punishing the other party.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)(vi). We review the trial court’s

findings of such aggression for substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Fahey, 164

Wn. App. 42, 55, 262 P.3d 128 (2011). “Substantial evidence exists if the record

contains evidence of a sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational

person of the truth of the declared premise.” Id. In reviewing the record, we defer

to the trial court’s determinations on “the persuasiveness of the evidence, witness

2 Updated versions of RCW 26.09 and RCW 7.105 took effect in July 2025. Because the trial court decisions were entered in 2024, we apply the prior versions of the statutes here.

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credibility, and conflicting testimony.” In re Vulnerable Adult Pet. For Knight, 178

Wn. App. 929, 937, 317 P.3d 1068 (2014).

Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Ezell had

engaged in psychological aggression by degrading, punishing, and inflicting fear

in Cavins. Ezell degraded Cavins by disparaging him in discussions with their

children. Ezell punished Cavins by blocking communication between Cavins and

the children when the children were in Ezell’s care. Ezell also inflicted fear in

Cavins by threatening that he would retain both their home and custody of their

children if Ezell filed for divorce. As such, substantial evidence supports the trial

court’s finding that Ezell had engaged in psychological aggression.

Having rejected Ezell’s argument that the findings of abuse are not

supported by substantial evidence, we likewise reject his argument that the trial

court erroneously limited his decision-making in the parenting plan. “We review

the trial court’s parenting plan decisions for abuse of discretion.” French v. French,

32 Wn. App. 2d 308, 314, 557 P.3d 1165 (2024). “And while the trial court has

broad discretion in the context of a parenting plan, its discretion must be exercised

within the confines of applicable statutes.” Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs if

the trial court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds

or reasons.” Id. at 314-15. “A decision is based on untenable grounds or reasons

if it is factually unsupported or was reached by applying an incorrect legal

standard.” Id.

In the parenting plan, the court noted that “[m]ajor decision-making must be

limited because one of the parents has problems as described in 3.a above.” In

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section 3.a of the parenting plan, the trial court found that “BOTH parents, Matthew

Ezell and Avery Cavins-Ezell (or someone living in that parent’s home) has a

history of domestic violence as defined in RCW 7.105.010.” Under RCW

26.09.191(1)(c), the trial court must order sole decision-making if it is found that a

parent has a history of domestic violence. In re Parenting & Support of C.A.S., 25

Wn. App. 2d 21, 28-29, 522 P.3d 75 (2022). When a finding of domestic violence

is entered against a parent, that parent is not barred from any decision-making;

they simply cannot engage in mutual decision-making. See DeVogel v. Padilla, 22

Wn. App. 2d 39, 46, 509 P.3d 832 (2022).

Here, to meet the statutory requirements, the trial court had to limit major

decision-making to one parent to ensure that Cavins and Ezell did not engage in

mutual decision-making. Though the trial court gave Cavins the authority to make

major decisions, it provided Ezell with decision-making authority as well. Not only

must Cavins provide Ezell with notice of all major decisions, but Ezell can make

day-to-day decisions for the children when they are in his care. Further, both

Cavins and Ezell “shall have independent access to communicate with the

children’s school and [the] children’s teachers” and “access to the children’s school

records, medical and counseling records, therapy records, and all other records

related to the children.” The trial court correctly concluded that Cavins and Ezell

cannot engage in mutual decision-making based on the statutory requirements and

reasonably allocated decision-making authority. Thus, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion.

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B. Constitutional Claims

Ezell also asserts various constitutional arguments. First, he claims the

definition of psychological aggression in RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)(vi) is void for

vagueness. “‘A statute is void for vagueness if it is framed in terms so vague that

persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ

as to its application.’” State v. Evergreen Freedom Found., 192 Wn.2d 782, 797,

432 P.3d 805 (2019) (quoting In re Contested Election of Schoessler, 140 Wn.2d

368, 388, 998 P.2d 818 (2000)). “The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to

ensure that citizens receive fair notice as to what conduct is proscribed, and to

prevent the law from being arbitrarily enforced.” Id. “[T]he constitution does not

require ‘impossible standards of specificity’ or ‘mathematical certainty’ because

some degree of vagueness is inherent in the use of our language. Thus, a

vagueness challenge cannot succeed merely because a person cannot predict

with certainty the exact point at which conduct would be prohibited.” State v. Riles,

135 Wn.2d 326, 348, 957 P.2d 655 (1998) (quoting State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d

109, 118, 857 P.2d 270 (1993)). “For a statute to be unconstitutional, its terms

must be ‘so loose and obscure that they cannot be clearly applied in any context.’”

State v. Alphonse, 142 Wn. App. 417, 437, 174 P.3d 684 (2008) (quoting City of

Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 182 n.7, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)). “We review

whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague de novo as a question of

constitutional law.” Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Zamora, 198 Wn. App. 44, 71,

392 P.3d 1124 (2017).

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Ezell claims RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)(vi) is unconstitutionally vague because

“[t]he ordinary man does not have fair notice of what constitutes inflicting fear,

humiliation, degrading, or punishment” and “[t]he emotional range of people

varies.” Ezell provides no legal authority in support of this assertion, which alone

is dispositive. “Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court

is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent

search, has found none.” Better Bus. Bureau Great W. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 32

Wn. App. 2d 748, 763, 561 P.3d 266 (2024) (quoting DeHeer v. Seattle Post-

Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962)); see also RAP 10.3(a)(6).

In any event, the terms fear, humiliation, degrading, and punishment are neither

loose nor obscure and are included in the statute to further define the phrase

“psychological aggression.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)(vi). A person of common

intelligence would not need to guess at their meaning. Evergreen Freedom

Found., 192 Wn.2d at 797. Ezell’s vagueness argument fails.

Second, Ezell asserts that his due process rights were violated by the trial

court proceedings below because RCW 7.105 does not permit a trial court to

vacate a DVPO entered in a prior proceeding. This argument ignores the available

procedure to seek review of such a ruling. It is the role of this court, not the trial

court, to review trial court decisions. RAP 2.4(a). Under RAP 5.2(a)(1), a litigant

seeking appellate review of a trial court’s decision has “30 days after the entry of

the decision” to file a notice of appeal. By failing to file a notice of appeal within 30

days of entry of such a decision, a litigant waives their right to challenge the

decision. See In re J.R.H., 83 Wn. App. 613, 616, 922 P.2d 206 (1996). Ezell did

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not appeal the initial DVPO or its first renewal, which would have provided him the

opportunity to argue that those decisions should be reversed or vacated by this

court. Ezell’s due process argument easily fails.

C. Unsupported Arguments

Ezell raises several additional issues that are not supported by adequate

argument. “[T]his court will not review issues for which inadequate argument has

been briefed or only passing treatment has been made.” State v. Thomas, 150

Wn.2d 821, 868-69, 83 P.3d 970 (2004) (citing State v. Johnson, 119 Wn.2d 167,

171, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992); State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 321, 893 P.2d 629

(1995)). We decline to address several such arguments as follows.

Ezell argues that, because the trial court entered findings that Cavins had

a history of engaging in domestic violence, it necessarily erred when it did not enter

a DVPO against Cavins. RCW 7.105.225(5) provides that “[i]f the court declines

to issue a protection order, the court shall state in writing the particular reasons for

the court’s denial.” Consistent with RCW 7.105.225(5), the trial court stated its

reasons for declining to issue a DVPO against Cavins; it reasoned “that the acts

of abuse the Court found the restrained party proved by a preponderance of the

evidence are not likely to reoccur as they are related to coercive control and

emotional abuse only during the marriage.” Though Ezell assigns error to the trial

court’s analysis, the entirety of this argument is set forth in his statement of facts

and any purported “argument” is devoid of meaningful analysis.

We similarly decline to review Ezell’s claims regarding abusive litigation, the

trial court’s reliance on exhibit 210, and residential time. Similar to Ezell’s

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argument regarding the trial court’s purported failure to enter a DVPO against

Cavins, these assignments of error are unsupported by argument, incorrectly

argued in the statement of facts without citation to legal authority, or both. RAP

10.3(a)(5). As such, these arguments similarly fail.

III

Lastly, Ezell argues that he is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. We

disagree.

RCW 26.09.140 permits a court to award fees to the prevailing party in a

family law case after considering the financial resources of the parties. In re

Marriage of Hannah and McAdams, 27 Wn. App. 2d 577, 591, 541 P.3d 372

(2023). In determining whether a fee award is appropriate pursuant to the statute,

we consider both the parties’ relative ability to pay and the arguable merit of the

issues raised on appeal. In re Marriage of Leslie and Verhey, 90 Wn. App. 796,

807, 954 P.2d 330 (1998).

Here, none of Ezell’s arguments have merit, and many of his arguments are

unsupported by legal authority. After considering Ezell’s arguments and the

parties’ relative ability to pay, we exercise our discretion under RCW 26.09.140 to

deny Ezell’s request for attorney fees on appeal.

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

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