Matthew Strum v. Exxon Company, Usa, a Division of Exxon Corporation Exxon Corporation

15 F.3d 327, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1455, 1994 WL 22753
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 31, 1994
Docket93-1358
StatusPublished
Cited by106 cases

This text of 15 F.3d 327 (Matthew Strum v. Exxon Company, Usa, a Division of Exxon Corporation Exxon Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matthew Strum v. Exxon Company, Usa, a Division of Exxon Corporation Exxon Corporation, 15 F.3d 327, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1455, 1994 WL 22753 (4th Cir. 1994).

Opinion

*329 OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

This case requires us to address various rationales for using tort remedies to compensate contract breaches. Because the plaintiff pled fanciful tort theories where redress, if any, lay in the law of contract, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

I.

Plaintiff Matthew Strum operated an Exxon service station in Hillsborough, North Carolina. After leasing the station for many years, Strum purchased it in 1975 and continued to operate it as an Exxon station pursuant to a series of gasoline distribution agreements with the company. In April 1988, Exxon informed Strum that it would not renew his distribution agreement because his station was unprofitable, and Strum ceased selling Exxon gasoline on September 1,1988. He did, however, continue to operate the station as an automobile repair business.

Once Exxon had terminated its distribution agreement with Strum, it began negotiations with him regarding recovery of its underground storage tanks which were used to hold the station’s gasoline. The two parties reached an agreement governing removal of the tanks in March 1989. The agreement provided that Exxon would remove the tanks from Strum’s property within three days of starting work ■ “[u]nless any environmental problems develop or unanticipated events arise.... ”

Removal of the tanks began on May 15, 1989. For reasons which are in dispute, the removal took much longer than three days. The record does make clear that Exxon discovered at least some soil contamination while removing the tanks and was still involved in various remedial actions on Strum’s property as late as December 1989. Exxon’s activities during this period included the taking of multiple soil samples and the installation of monitoring wells to evaluate any groundwater contamination. Exxon also negotiated a second agreement with Strum in November 1989, which laid out procedures for solving the soil problems and for. the restoration of Strum’s property.

Strum was ultimately unsatisfied with Exxon’s activities at the station and brought suit against the company in North Carolina state court in March 1992. Strum alleged causes, of action for fraudulent inducement, negligence, and gross negligence. 1 Strum claimed that during the period when Exxon was removing the tanks, the excavations impeded access to the service and repair bays of his station, making it impossible for him to operate a profitable auto service business. Exxon removed thé case to federal district court on diversity grounds and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Exxon’s motion on each of the three counts. It found that Strum could not establish the essential elements of fraud, and could not provide sufficient evidence to ground a cause of action for either negligence or gross negligence. Strum now appeals, contending that each cause of action should have proceeded to trial.

II.

At the outset, it is necessary to place the claims underlying this appeal in the appropriate context. Simply put, this ease involves an attempt by the plaintiff to manufacture a tort dispute out of what is, at bottom, a simple breach of contract claim. Whatever injury Strum may have sustained here resulted from the possible breach of a commercial relationship memorialized in contract. However, because plaintiff suffered little, if any, actual damages, he attempted to shoehorn this case into a tort framework. Each of the counts as now pleaded by Strum holds the prospect of a hefty punitive damages award. This attempt to turn a contract dispute into a tort action with an accompanying punitive dimension' is inconsistent both with North Carolina law and sound commercial practice.

*330 Contract law is simply more restrictive than tort law in awarding damages. Indeed, the punitive damages recovery Strum would seek in tort is not generally permitted in the context of a contract breach. See 5 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1077, at 438 (1964) (“It can be laid down as a general rule that punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract_”); 1 Linda L. Schlueter & Kenneth R. Redden, Punitive Damages § 7.2, at 275 (2d ed. 1989) (“[Pjuni-tive damages cannot be recovered for a mere breach of contract ... no matter how reprehensible the breach was by the defendant.”) (footnotes omitted).

This difference in awarding damages results from the fact that tort and contract law serve different goals. Tort law emerges from duties individuals owe generally to other members of society; it is faultbased and seeks both to compensate the victim and punish the wrongdoer. Accordingly, punitive awards may be appropriate where the requisite standards of culpability under, state law have been met. Contract law, by contrast, arises out of the attempt by private individuals to order relationships among themselves. When such relationships collapse, the law has long recognized that compensating the individual only for actual loss will suffice. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 355 cmt. a, at 154 (1981) (stating that “[t]he purposed of awarding contract damages is to compensate the injured party,” not to punish the party in breach) (emphasis added).

The distinction between tort and contract possesses more than mere theoretical significance. Parties contract partly to minimize their future risks. Importing tort law principles of punishment into contract undermines their ability to do so. Punitive damages, because they depend heavily on an individual jury’s perception of the degree of fault involved, are necessarily uncertain. Their availability would turn every potential contractual relationship into a riskier proposition. See A & E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 669, 671-72 (4th Cir.1986). Indeed, Corbin cautioned against punitive damages in contract for just this reason, stating that, “[i]n the innumerable cases arising from the breach of an ordinary commercial contract, it has seemed wise to adhere to the general rule excluding the punitive element and to avoid the frequently futile attempt to determine the degree of moral obliquity.” Corbin, supra, § 1077, at 440.

The parties in this case deserved the chance to lay out their obligations and to limit their liabilities through the medium of contract. The presence of punitive damages claims deprives defendant of the very benefit it bargained for. Exxon did not bargain for the risk of an openended jury award, the most palpable risk that punitive damages create. Instead, the company bargained for liability limited to damages that might arise from deficient performance under the agreement. The contractual relationship does make Exxon liable for consequential damages to Strum’s business arising out of any unreasonable delay by Exxon during the tank .removal process. It does not make Exxon liable, however, for an award unrelated to the actual damages Strum sustained.

Here the actual damages were not significant.

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Bluebook (online)
15 F.3d 327, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1455, 1994 WL 22753, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matthew-strum-v-exxon-company-usa-a-division-of-exxon-corporation-exxon-ca4-1994.