This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-2063
Matthew Steven Benson, Relator,
vs.
Universal Truck Service LLC, Respondent,
Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent.
Filed August 24, 2015 Affirmed Ross, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development File No. 32601386-3
Matthew Steven Benson, New Brighton, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Universal Truck Service LLC, Roseville, Minnesota (respondent employer)
Lee B. Nelson, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Willis,
Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Matthew Benson quit his job as a mechanic for Universal Truck Service and an
unemployment law judge determined that he is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Benson challenges that decision, arguing that the judge improperly denied him a second
evidentiary hearing, made deficient credibility determinations, and erroneously decided
that because of his employer’s requirement that he drive an unsafe vehicle was not a good
reason to quit. We affirm because the unemployment law judge acted within her
discretion by not holding an additional evidentiary hearing and by determining witness
credibility, and because the evidence supports the finding that Benson lacked a good
reason to quit.
FACTS
Matthew Benson worked as a fulltime mechanic for Universal Truck Service,
which provides repair services for diesel trucks. On a morning in April 2014, Universal’s
night-shift supervisor (whom the record identifies only as Jeff) ordered Benson to service
a client’s vehicle about 20 miles from Universal’s office. Jeff told Benson to drive to the
site using a particular Universal truck, which contained tools needed for the job. Benson
refused. He was concerned that the truck had a cracked windshield and was missing
wipers. Jeff directed Benson to drive a different truck. Benson again refused. He was
concerned that this truck had a worn tire, gas residue on its fuel tank, and an expired
inspection sticker. Jeff finally directed Benson to a third truck—one that lacked the
necessary tools for the job—and Benson complied.
2 What happened next is the subject of some disagreement between Benson and
Universal. According to Michael Perry, Universal’s general manager, Benson told the
off-site client that he lacked the necessary tools and Jeff drove the tire-worn truck to the
site so Benson could use its tools. Jeff told Benson that he intended to leave that truck
and drive the one that Benson had used back to Universal’s office. Benson acknowledges
that he did not expressly refuse to drive that swapped truck back to Universal, but he
reiterated his safety concern. Jeff replied to that stated concern by telling Benson that he
would send someone else to drive the tire-worn truck. Benson admits that he countered,
“[N]ormally I just drive the vehicle back,” to which Jeff suggested that Benson do so
unless he determined that he could not drive it. According to Benson, at the end of their
conversation Jeff said, “[W]ell you know you’re just gonna have to drive it back.”
Benson never attempted to contact Perry, the duty supervisor. But Perry learned
that Benson was upset, and he tried to reach him by phone. Benson did not answer.
Benson decided to drive the truck back to Universal and confront Perry. He did. After a
heated exchange, Benson quit.
Benson applied to the department of employment and economic development for
unemployment benefits and was approved. Universal appealed, and an unemployment
law judge (ULJ) held a hearing at which she elicited the testimony just described. Benson
also testified that Universal’s trucks were generally in poor condition. Perry denied that
assertion, but he acknowledged the worn tire. He explained that it had gone unnoticed
until Benson complained about it but that Benson could have easily replaced it. The ULJ
determined that Benson was ineligible for benefits because he did not quit for a good
3 reason caused by Universal. Benson requested reconsideration and a new evidentiary
hearing. The ULJ refused to hold another hearing, and she affirmed her decision denying
benefits.
Benson appeals by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Benson challenges the ULJ’s benefits decision on three grounds. He first
maintains that he was entitled to a second hearing where he could introduce additional
evidence. He also argues that the ULJ improperly relied on Perry’s incredible testimony.
And he maintains that the evidence established that he had a good reason to quit caused
by Universal. None of these arguments leads us to reverse.
Benson wanted a second evidentiary hearing. A ULJ must order an additional
evidentiary hearing if the requesting party demonstrates that the new evidence would
likely change the outcome of the decision and that either the party had good cause for not
previously submitting the evidence or the new evidence would show that previously
admitted evidence was likely false. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(c) (2014). We defer to
a ULJ’s decision whether to grant an additional evidentiary hearing and will reverse that
decision only if the ULJ abused her discretion. Vasseei v. Schmitty & Sons Sch. Buses
Inc., 793 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. App. 2010). Benson says the second hearing would
have given him the chance to introduce photographs showing that the tire-worn truck had
a “K” designation on its license plate. He maintains that this would prove the truck
needed an inspection sticker, and that this in turn would prove that his safety concerns
were legitimate and that Perry falsely asserted that the truck needed no sticker.
4 Benson’s argument for reversal based on the allegedly improperly denied second
hearing fails because the hearing would have been futile. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd.
2(c) (requiring an additional hearing only if the new evidence would affect the decision).
The ULJ determined that Benson’s new evidence would not change her decision. This
determination is well supported because, whatever safety issues the second truck might
have had, the ULJ found that Universal never required Benson to drive it. And
undermining Benson’s contention that the photos discredit Perry because they belie his
testimony that the truck needed no inspection, the inspection requirement is not so
absolute as Benson suggests. Compare Minn. Stat. § 168.013, subds. 3(a) (defining gross
weight as the weight of the unloaded truck plus “the maximum load the applicant
proposes to carry on it”), (3)(c) (requiring license plates to display gross weight) (2014),
with Minn. Stat. §§ 169.011, subd. 32(a) (defining gross vehicle weight for chapter 169
as the greater of either the weight of the unloaded vehicle plus its actual load or the
maximum gross weight specified by the vehicle’s manufacturer), .781, subds. 1(a)(1)(i), 2
(requiring a valid inspection sticker for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight greater than
26,000 pounds) (2014).
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-2063
Matthew Steven Benson, Relator,
vs.
Universal Truck Service LLC, Respondent,
Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent.
Filed August 24, 2015 Affirmed Ross, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development File No. 32601386-3
Matthew Steven Benson, New Brighton, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Universal Truck Service LLC, Roseville, Minnesota (respondent employer)
Lee B. Nelson, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Willis,
Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Matthew Benson quit his job as a mechanic for Universal Truck Service and an
unemployment law judge determined that he is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Benson challenges that decision, arguing that the judge improperly denied him a second
evidentiary hearing, made deficient credibility determinations, and erroneously decided
that because of his employer’s requirement that he drive an unsafe vehicle was not a good
reason to quit. We affirm because the unemployment law judge acted within her
discretion by not holding an additional evidentiary hearing and by determining witness
credibility, and because the evidence supports the finding that Benson lacked a good
reason to quit.
FACTS
Matthew Benson worked as a fulltime mechanic for Universal Truck Service,
which provides repair services for diesel trucks. On a morning in April 2014, Universal’s
night-shift supervisor (whom the record identifies only as Jeff) ordered Benson to service
a client’s vehicle about 20 miles from Universal’s office. Jeff told Benson to drive to the
site using a particular Universal truck, which contained tools needed for the job. Benson
refused. He was concerned that the truck had a cracked windshield and was missing
wipers. Jeff directed Benson to drive a different truck. Benson again refused. He was
concerned that this truck had a worn tire, gas residue on its fuel tank, and an expired
inspection sticker. Jeff finally directed Benson to a third truck—one that lacked the
necessary tools for the job—and Benson complied.
2 What happened next is the subject of some disagreement between Benson and
Universal. According to Michael Perry, Universal’s general manager, Benson told the
off-site client that he lacked the necessary tools and Jeff drove the tire-worn truck to the
site so Benson could use its tools. Jeff told Benson that he intended to leave that truck
and drive the one that Benson had used back to Universal’s office. Benson acknowledges
that he did not expressly refuse to drive that swapped truck back to Universal, but he
reiterated his safety concern. Jeff replied to that stated concern by telling Benson that he
would send someone else to drive the tire-worn truck. Benson admits that he countered,
“[N]ormally I just drive the vehicle back,” to which Jeff suggested that Benson do so
unless he determined that he could not drive it. According to Benson, at the end of their
conversation Jeff said, “[W]ell you know you’re just gonna have to drive it back.”
Benson never attempted to contact Perry, the duty supervisor. But Perry learned
that Benson was upset, and he tried to reach him by phone. Benson did not answer.
Benson decided to drive the truck back to Universal and confront Perry. He did. After a
heated exchange, Benson quit.
Benson applied to the department of employment and economic development for
unemployment benefits and was approved. Universal appealed, and an unemployment
law judge (ULJ) held a hearing at which she elicited the testimony just described. Benson
also testified that Universal’s trucks were generally in poor condition. Perry denied that
assertion, but he acknowledged the worn tire. He explained that it had gone unnoticed
until Benson complained about it but that Benson could have easily replaced it. The ULJ
determined that Benson was ineligible for benefits because he did not quit for a good
3 reason caused by Universal. Benson requested reconsideration and a new evidentiary
hearing. The ULJ refused to hold another hearing, and she affirmed her decision denying
benefits.
Benson appeals by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Benson challenges the ULJ’s benefits decision on three grounds. He first
maintains that he was entitled to a second hearing where he could introduce additional
evidence. He also argues that the ULJ improperly relied on Perry’s incredible testimony.
And he maintains that the evidence established that he had a good reason to quit caused
by Universal. None of these arguments leads us to reverse.
Benson wanted a second evidentiary hearing. A ULJ must order an additional
evidentiary hearing if the requesting party demonstrates that the new evidence would
likely change the outcome of the decision and that either the party had good cause for not
previously submitting the evidence or the new evidence would show that previously
admitted evidence was likely false. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(c) (2014). We defer to
a ULJ’s decision whether to grant an additional evidentiary hearing and will reverse that
decision only if the ULJ abused her discretion. Vasseei v. Schmitty & Sons Sch. Buses
Inc., 793 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. App. 2010). Benson says the second hearing would
have given him the chance to introduce photographs showing that the tire-worn truck had
a “K” designation on its license plate. He maintains that this would prove the truck
needed an inspection sticker, and that this in turn would prove that his safety concerns
were legitimate and that Perry falsely asserted that the truck needed no sticker.
4 Benson’s argument for reversal based on the allegedly improperly denied second
hearing fails because the hearing would have been futile. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd.
2(c) (requiring an additional hearing only if the new evidence would affect the decision).
The ULJ determined that Benson’s new evidence would not change her decision. This
determination is well supported because, whatever safety issues the second truck might
have had, the ULJ found that Universal never required Benson to drive it. And
undermining Benson’s contention that the photos discredit Perry because they belie his
testimony that the truck needed no inspection, the inspection requirement is not so
absolute as Benson suggests. Compare Minn. Stat. § 168.013, subds. 3(a) (defining gross
weight as the weight of the unloaded truck plus “the maximum load the applicant
proposes to carry on it”), (3)(c) (requiring license plates to display gross weight) (2014),
with Minn. Stat. §§ 169.011, subd. 32(a) (defining gross vehicle weight for chapter 169
as the greater of either the weight of the unloaded vehicle plus its actual load or the
maximum gross weight specified by the vehicle’s manufacturer), .781, subds. 1(a)(1)(i), 2
(requiring a valid inspection sticker for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight greater than
26,000 pounds) (2014). The ULJ did not abuse her discretion by not holding an additional
evidentiary hearing.
Benson’s credibility challenge also is not convincing. He argues that the ULJ
improperly found Perry’s testimony credible, citing an inconsistency. He points out
particularly that Perry testified that Universal repairs its own vehicles immediately but
then admitted that some of its trucks were driven despite problems. This is not the sort of
inconsistency that leads us to reverse. We generally defer to a ULJ’s credibility
5 determination so long as the ULJ states her grounds for support. Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 1a(a); 2015 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 1, art. 6, § 12 (amending Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2014)); Icenhower v. Total Auto., Inc., 845 N.W.2d 849, 855
(Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2014). The ULJ stated her grounds for
deeming Perry’s testimony more credible than Benson’s. She found that Perry’s
testimony was more logical, plausible, certain, and coherent. And she found Benson’s
testimony one-sided and apparently “exaggerated, defensive, and distorted.” The
transcript supports the finding. We have no ground to unsettle the ULJ’s credibility
determination. And we add that the benefits decision can rest largely on Benson’s own
testimony.
We also are not persuaded to reverse based on Benson’s argument that the ULJ
erroneously decided that he did not quit for a good reason caused by his employer. An
employee who voluntarily quits his job is not eligible for unemployment benefits unless
he falls within an enumerated statutory exception. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2014).
One of these exceptions covers an applicant who quits for a good reason caused by his
employer. Id., subd. 1(1). Among other things, a good reason to quit must be so
significant that it would “compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become
unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.” Id., subd. 3(3) (2014). Benson
argues that a reasonable worker would quit rather than drive an unsafe truck, but the
ULJ’s decision rested on her finding that Universal never required Benson to drive the
allegedly unsafe truck. Substantial evidence, including Benson’s own testimony, supports
the finding. According to Benson, Jeff told him that someone else would pick up the
6 truck at the end of the work day and that Benson need not drive the truck if he determined
it was unsafe. And Perry’s testimony, which the ULJ found more credible than Benson’s,
indicated that no manager ordered Benson to drive it.
Affirmed.