Matthew Shilo v. Comm'r of Social Security

600 F. App'x 956
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 28, 2015
Docket14-3417
StatusUnpublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 600 F. App'x 956 (Matthew Shilo v. Comm'r of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matthew Shilo v. Comm'r of Social Security, 600 F. App'x 956 (6th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

OPINION

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge.

Claimant Matthew Shilo appeals the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability benefits and social security income. The district court reviewed the Commissioner’s decision and affirmed. Shilo alleges that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in rejecting the opinion of Shilo’s treating physician and in failing to consider whether Shilo’s obesity limited his ability to work. For the reasons set forth below, we REMAND the case to the district court, to be REMANDED to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Shilo is now 47 years old, has a G.E.D., and in the past has worked as a truck *957 driver and lawn care worker. Shilo is morbidly obese: he is 6 feet 3 inches and weighs approximately 430 pounds. In addition, he has a number of medical conditions, including: back pain due to' spinal stenosis; bone spurs, bone and joint degeneration, and swelling in his lower extremities; sleep apnea and shortness of breath; hypertension; and depression.

From December 1993 through May 1999, Shilo received Social Security benefits due to his obesity and back problems. The benefits ended in July 1999 when he returned to work. Since just over a year later, Shilo has sought to reclaim those benefits. He filed an application in October 2000 that was denied in April 2001, filed again in July 2002, and was denied again in April 2004 after an administrative hearing.

This case constitutes Shilo’s third attempt. In December 2007, Shilo again applied for disability insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., 1381 et seq. He alleges disability since April 8, 2004. The claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. Shilo timely appealed and requested a hearing, which was held before an ALJ on January 11, 2011.

The ALJ found that Shilo has several severe impairments: lumbar spine degenerative changes, obesity, right foot arthritic changes, mild degenerative changes in the right knee, obstructive sleep apnea, and dysthymic disorder. He determined, however, that Shilo was not sufficiently impaired to be eligible for benefits as he had a residual capacity to do light work with restrictions — despite multiple assessments by Dr. Rajendra K. Aggarwal, Shi-lo’s treating family physician, finding that Shilo’s impairments rendered him unemployable. Shilo’s request that the decision be reviewed was denied. Shilo then filed suit in federal district court, the district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision and adopted its findings, arid Shilo appealed to this court.

Shilo disputes the ALJ’s findings, arguing that the ALJ: (1) improperly applied the treating physician rule and erred in rejecting Dr. Aggarwal’s assessments of Shilo’s ability to work; and (2) did not adequately consider Shilo’s morbid obesity in the context of his analysis.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s decision concerning Social Security disability benefits. Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir.2013). In such cases, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act and thus entitled to benefits. Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir.2009). Our review is limited to “determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 374 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir.2001), and requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of evidence, Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir.2007). Therefore, we defer to the ALJ’s decision “even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.” Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The ALJ’s decision, however, must incorporate the correct legal analysis: “reversal is required” when “the agency fail[s] to follow its own procedural regulation.” *958 Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir.2004). “An ALJ’s failure to follow agency rules and regulations ‘denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record.’ ” Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir.2011) (quoting Blakley, 581 F.3d at 407).

To determine if a person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the ALJ must adhere to a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, if a claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” he will not be found to be disabled. Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir.2007). Second, a claimant “who does not have a severe impairment will not be found to be disabled.” Id. Third, an unemployed claimant suffering from a severe impairment “which meets the duration requirement and which meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the Regulations,” will be found to be disabled. Id. Fourth, if a claimant can perform work done in the past, he will not be found to be disabled. Id. Fifth, if a claimant cannot do his former work, the ALJ must determine if the claimant can perform other work, taking into account factors including “age, education, past work experience and residual functional capacity.” Id. While the claimant bears the burden in steps one through four, the Commissioner bears the burden of identifying “a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant’s residual functional capacity ... and vocational profile.” Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 Fed.Appx. 435, 438 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.2003)).

B. The Treating Physician Rule and Obesity

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600 F. App'x 956, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matthew-shilo-v-commr-of-social-security-ca6-2015.