Matthew Hartley v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 9, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01078
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 MATTHEW HARTLEY, CASE NO. 24-cv-01078-JHC 8

Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 SUNBELT RENTALS, INC. et al., 11

Defendants. 12 13

14 I 15 INTRODUCTION 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Custom Equipment LLC’s Motion for 17 Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 39) and Defendant Sunbelt Rentals, Inc.’s Motion for Summary 18 Judgment (Dkt. # 45). Defendants1 seek summary judgment dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s 19 claims. See Dkt. ## 39; 45. Plaintiff responds that questions of material fact preclude summary 20 21 22

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint names another Defendant, Stratford-Cambridge Group (SGI). See Dkt. # 23 1-1. Custom Equipment moves for summary judgment dismissal of the claims against SGI. Dkt. # 39 at 17. As explained below, the Court grants SGI summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s claims, so the 24 Court uses the term “Defendants” to refer solely to Custom Equipment and Sunbelt Rentals. 1 judgment for Defendants. Dkt. ## 49; 50. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part 2 and DENIES in part Defendants’ motions. 3 II BACKGROUND 4 A. Factual Background 5 Plaintiff Matthew Hartley sues Defendants Custom Equipment and Sunbelt Rentals to 6 recover for personal injuries sustained in a workplace accident on June 14, 2021. Dkt. # 1-1 at 5. 7 Plaintiff testified that at the time of the accident, he was moving a Sunbelt Rentals Hy-Brid HB- 8 1030 scissor lift between buildings. Dkt. # 51-1 at 9:6–10:2; see Dkt. # 51-25 at 5. As he 9 navigated down a ramp, he let go of the joystick that controlled the movement of the lift because 10 the lift “was starting to speed up.” Dkt. # 51-1 at 9:7–11. When he released the joystick, 11 Plaintiff expected the lift to stop moving. Id. Instead, the lift “kept speeding up,” even after he 12 hit the lift’s emergency stop button (e-stop). Id. at 9:12–14. Plaintiff understood this was “not 13 good,” so he braced himself on the lift’s back rail. Id. at 9:14–10:2. The lift then collided with a 14 concrete wall and came to an abrupt stop. Id. at 21:23–22:7. 15 Plaintiff retained Craig Sylvester, a forensic engineering expert, to determine the “root 16 cause” of the accident. Dkt. # 53 at 2; see also Dkt. ## 41 at 2; 51-25 at 5–6. According to 17 Sylvester, the lift “experienced a loss of braking control while descending the parking garage 18 ramp and crashed into a concrete wall due to (1) a mis-wired e-stop on the Platform Control box 19 and (2) the lift’s drive system that had one or both parking brakes mechanically disengaged.” 20 Dkt. # 51-25 at 29. Sylvester also concluded that the lift’s “drive system parking brake 21 mechanical lever and drive enable interlock design is inadequate to prevent the lift from 22 inadvertently being operated with the drive brakes mechanically disengaged AND the drive 23 system enabled at the same time.” Id. at 30. He contends that these conclusions are “based on a 24 1 reasonable degree of engineering and scientific probability and are based on the ongoing 2 investigation conducted by Sylvester Forensics.” Id. at 29. He adds that his conclusions are 3 based on several sources of information, including eye-witness deposition testimony from

4 Plaintiff and his spotter, Arturo Caleb Zertuche, three hands-on inspections of the lift, his own 5 engineering analysis of the lift’s braking design, and the incident investigation results provided 6 by Defendants. Id. at 29–30. 7 Defendants retained four expert witnesses: (1) John L. Straubinger, a mechanical 8 engineer tasked with “attend[ing] joint inspections of the Hy-Brid lift and evaluat[ing] the 9 braking system[,]” see Dkt. # 58 at 11; (2) Mark J. Lawless, President of Construction Systems 10 Management Inc. (CSMI), see Dkt. # 43 at 53; (3) Dr. Lawrence Murphy, a board-certified 11 neurologist, see id. at 88; and (4) Dr. Bruce A. Rolfe, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, see 12 id. at 115.

13 B. Procedural History 14 This case was removed from King County Superior Court on the basis of diversity of 15 citizenship. Dkt. # 1 at 4; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In July 2024, Sunbelt Rentals answered 16 Plaintiff’s Complaint, and in September 2024, Custom Equipment answered Plaintiff’s 17 Complaint. See Dkt. ## 1-3; 15. In July 2025, nearly a year later, Defendants sought to amend 18 their Answers to add BNBuilders, Inc.—a nonparty that was the General Contractor at the jobsite 19 where the accident occurred—as a defendant. See Dkt. ## 27 at 2; 28 at 2. But the Court denied 20 these motions. Dkt. # 36. The Court also denied Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of 21 Plaintiff’s expert, and it denied Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Defendants’ expert 22 witnesses. Dkt. # 69.

23 Defendants now move for summary judgment. Dkt. ## 39; 45. Plaintiff clarifies that he 24 intends to bring only a design defect claim and a failure to warn claim against Custom 1 Equipment, and he says that his only claim against Sunbelt Rentals is for negligence. Dkt. ## 49 2 at 20; 50 at 16.2 Plaintiff also pursues a theory of res ipsa loquitur against both Defendants. Dkt. 3 ## 49 at 17–20; 50 at 20–23. 4 III DISCUSSION 5 A. Summary Judgment Standards 6 “[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law and federal 7 procedural law.” Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 8 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)). This case is in federal court 9 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, so the Court applies Washington state substantive law and 10 the federal summary judgment standard. See Dkt. ## 1 at 3; 8. 11 Under federal law, summary judgment is warranted when the evidence, viewed in the 12 light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any 13 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 14 see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is “material” if it might affect the 15 outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual 16 dispute is “‘genuine’ only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for 17 18

19 2 On this basis, the Court grants summary judgment as to all claims in favor of SGI. See Dkt. ## 49 at 20–21; 39 at 17. Plaintiff says that he does not dispute SGI’s nonliability for the manufacture and 20 distribution of the scissor lift at issue. Dkt. # 49 at 21. While Plaintiff also says that he “reserve[s] the right to seek a remedy from the Court” if evidence surfaces that SGI was involved in the manufacture and 21 distribution of the lift, id., summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact about SGI’s liability. Dkt. # 39 at 17; see, 22 e.g., James v. City of Long Beach, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24) (“Where, as here, the non-moving party has the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to come forward with any evidence which would create a 23 genuine issue of material fact.”). For the same reasons, the Court grants Custom Equipment’s motion for summary judgment as to any after sale duty to warn claim under RCW 7.72.030(1)(c). See Dkt. ## 39 at 24 14; 64 at 1. 1 the non-moving party.” Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 2 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49). Courts must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in 3 the light most favorable to the [non-moving] party.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

4 The moving party bears the initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of 5 material fact and that it is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the 6 moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it can show the lack of 7 such a dispute by either: (1) producing evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 8 party’s case, or (2) showing that the nonmoving party lacks evidence of an essential element of 9 its claim or defense. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fite, 738 F. Supp. 3d 1371, 1376 10 (W.D. Wash. 2024) (citing Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 11 (9th Cir. 2000)). If the moving party meets its burden of production, the burden then shifts to the 12 nonmoving party to identify specific facts from which a factfinder could reasonably find in the

13 nonmoving party’s favor. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). 14 B. State Law Claims 15 The Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA) is “the exclusive remedy for product 16 liability claims” as it “supplants all common law claims or actions based on harm caused by a 17 product.” Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 175 Wash. 2d 402, 409, 282 P.3d 1069 (2012) 18 (citations omitted). The statute defines a “product liability claim” broadly to include “any claim 19 or action brough for harm caused by the manufacture, . . . design, . . . warnings, instructions, . . . 20 or labeling of the relevant product. RCW 7.72.010(4). Thus, the WPLA “creates a single cause 21 of action for product-related harm with specified statutory requirements for proof.” Kirkland v. 22 Emhart Glass S.A., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1076 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (citing Stanton v. Bayliner

23 Marine Corp., 123 Wash.2d 64, 71, 866 P.2d 15 (1993)). 24 1 Under the WPLA, there are different standards of liability for manufacturers and product 2 sellers. See RCW 7.72.030–.040. Manufacturers, among other things, are strictly liable for 3 products that are not reasonably safe as designed and for products that are not reasonably safe

4 due to inadequate warnings. RCW 7.72.030; see Macias, 175 Wash. 2d at 409 (“Strict liability 5 principles apply to both defective design and failure to warn cases.”). On the other hand, product 6 sellers are liable under the WPLA only if the plaintiff’s harm was proximately caused by the 7 product seller’s (1) negligence; (2) breach of an express warranty; or (3) the intentional 8 misrepresentation of facts or intentional concealment of information. RCW 7.72.040(1)(a)–(c). 9 Custom Equipment moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s manufacturer design 10 defect and failure to warn claims under RCW 7.72.030(1)(a) and (b). Dkt. # 39. Sunbelt Rentals 11 moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s product seller negligence claim under RCW 12 7.72.040. Dkt. # 45.

13 1. Design Defect and Failure to Warn 14 Defective Design. The elements of a design defect claim under the WPLA are (1) a 15 manufacturer’s product; (2) that was not reasonably safe as designed; and (3) caused harm to the 16 plaintiff. RCW 7.72.030(1); see Bruns v. PACCAR, Inc., 77 Wash. App. 201, 208, 890 P.2d 469 17 (1995). The causation element of a design defect claim requires the plaintiff to show that the 18 alleged defect or unsafe condition proximately caused their injuries. RCW 7.72.030(1); see 19 Bruns, 77 Wash. App. at 214. Proximate cause consists of cause in fact and legal causation. 20 Tyner v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 141 Wash.2d 68, 82, 1 P.3d 1148 (2000). Cause in fact 21 is the “but for” cause of the injury. Id. (citing Schooley v. Pinch’s Deli Mkt., Inc., 134 Wash.2d 22 468, 478, 951 P.2d 749 (1998)). Legal causation is a “much more fluid concept” that considers

23 “whether, as a matter of policy, the connection between the ultimate result and the act of the 24 1 defendant is too remote or insubstantial to impose liability.” Id. (quoting Schooley, 134 Wash.2d 2 at 478–79). 3 As for Plaintiff’s design defect claim, Custom Equipment contends that Plaintiff cannot

4 show legal causation. Dkt. # 39 at 12–13. According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s expert— 5 Sylvester—offers opinions about the accident that are little more than “speculation.” Id. at 13. 6 Custom Equipment also contends that Sylvester’s report contradicts Plaintiff’s testimony that he 7 drove the lift 15–20 times down the same ramp without incident before the accident. Id. 8 But these arguments principally address “but for” causation. The Court has deemed that 9 Sylvester’s report is admissible.3 Dkt. # 69 at 6. His report is relevant because it will help the 10 trier of fact decide facts in issue and is reliable because he reviewed numerous sources of 11 information, used dependable principles and methods of forensic engineering, and applied these 12 principles and methods to the facts of the case. Id. The trier of fact may still view Sylvester’s 13 opinions as less credible because Plaintiff repeatedly used the lift without incident before the 14 accident and testing after the accident showed that the lift would not roll uncontrollably. See 15 Dkt. # 39 at 13. Yet viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Sylvester’s 16 report establishes that the defective design of the lift’s parking brakes was a root cause of the 17 accident. Dkt. # 51-25 at 29; see Dkt. # 69 at 7. This shows there is a connection between 18 Custom Equipment’s design and Plaintiff’s accident. 19 3 Custom Equipment’s arguments on this point ignore that an “expert may base an opinion on 20 facts or data . . . that the expert has been made aware of . . . [and] they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.” Fed. R. Evid. 703; see Dkt. # 64 at 4–9 (arguing Sylvester should be unable to 21 rely on the BNBuilder incident report because it is, in Custom Equipment’s view, not admissible evidence); see also Feldman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Most evidentiary 22 rules are procedural in nature, and the Federal Rules of Evidence ordinarily govern.”). Even if this evidentiary rule could be considered procedural, see id. (“state evidence rules that are ‘intimately bound up’ with the state’s substantive decision making must be given full effect by federal courts sitting in 23 diversity”) (citation omitted), Washington courts employ a similar rule. Desranleau v. Hyland’s, Inc., 10 Wash. App. 2d 837, 844, 450 P.3d 1203 (2019) (“ER 703 allows an expert witness to base their opinion 24 on facts or data regardless of their admissibility[.]”). 1 The case Custom Equipment principally relies on is Little v. Countrywood Homes, Inc., 2 132 Wash. App. 777, 133 P.3d 944 (2006). See Dkt. # 39 at 13. Here, unlike in Little, Plaintiff 3 has submitted evidence—in the form of Sylester’s report—that would “allow[] a reasonable

4 person to infer, without speculating,” that Custom Equipment’s defective design “more probably 5 than not caused the accident.” Little, 132 Wash. App. at 782. And while Custom Equipment 6 says that Plaintiff cannot show legal causation, the Little court considered factual causation. Id. 7 (“But even assuming that those conditions constituted breaches of a duty that Countrywood 8 owed Little, he did not provide evidence showing more probably than not that one of those 9 breaches caused his injuries.”). Washington courts recognize that “[c]ause in fact usually is a 10 question for the jury.” Id. at 780. This “but for” causation can be decided as a question of law 11 only when “the causal connection is so speculative and indirect that reasonable minds could not 12 differ.” Moore v. Hagge, 158 Wash. App. 137, 148, 241 P.3d 787 (2010) (citing Doherty v.

13 Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 83 Wash. App. 464, 469, 921 P.2d 1098 (1996); Yong Tao v. Heng Bin 14 Li, 140 Wash. App. 825, 834, 166 P.3d 1263 (2007)). Sylvester’s report could allow a 15 reasonable juror to find that there is a factual connection between the lift’s brake design and the 16 accident, so “but for” causation remains a question for the jury. 17 Thus, the Court denies the motion for summary judgment on the design defect claim. 18 Failure to Warn. Custom Equipment’s motion does not mention the elements of a failure 19 to warn claim under the WPLA nor does it substantively address the merits of this claim. See 20 Dkt. # 39 at 11–13.4 Alone, this precludes summary judgment. Hoover v. Switlik Parachute 21

22 4 In its reply brief, Custom Equipment says the failure to warn claim is based on “speculation” that the brake levers were in the intermediate position. Dkt. # 64 at 8. The Court rejects this argument. 23 Sylvester’s report establishes that the position of the brake levers is a material fact in dispute. See Dkt. # 51-25 at 29–30. Besides, the Court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. 24 Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). 1 Co., 663 F.2d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Even where no evidence is presented in opposition to 2 the motion, summary judgment should not be granted if the evidence in support of the motion is 3 insufficient.”). Even so, “[c]ausation is an element of all three theories of liability under the

4 WPLA.” Moore v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Grp., 158 Wash. App. 407, 425, 241 P.3d 808 5 (2010); see RCW 7.72.030(1). And for the reasons discussed in relation to the design defect 6 claim, Custom Equipment has not shown there is no genuine dispute of material fact on the 7 element of causation. Thus, the Court denies Custom Equipment’s motion with respect to 8 Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim under RCW 7.72.030(1)(b) too. 9 2. Product Seller Negligence 10 Sylvester reports that during an inspection of the lift in January 2023, he identified a fault 11 with the lift’s e-stop. Dkt. # 51-25 at 6. According to Sylvester’s report, “With the lift traveling 12 forward or reverse, pressing the e-stop button did not stop the lift as designed. Instead, the lift

13 continued to travel forward until the joystick was released.” Id. He reports that during a 14 subsequent inspection of the lift in July 2025, he found the lift’s e-stop was wired incorrectly. 15 Dkt. # 51-25 at 11–12. According to the report, this “defeated the emergency stop function 16 designed to remove power from the lift’s drive and prevent motion.” Id. at 12. The report 17 concludes that this incorrect wiring configuration was a “root cause” of the accident. Id. at 29. 18 But Sunbelt Rentals contends that this evidence cannot show that there is a genuine 19 dispute of material fact about whether it negligently miswired the lift’s e-stop because these 20 inspections took place years after the 2021 accident. Dkt. # 45 at 8–9. Sunbelt acknowledges 21 that its technicians repaired the e-stop wiring twice in June 2020, but it notes there is no evidence 22 the e-stop was miswired at that time. Id. at 9; see Dkt. # 51-25 at 27. Sunbelt also points out that

23 it hired Equipment Experts, Inc. to repair the lift’s e-stop after the accident, in November 2021. 24 Dkt. # 45 at 9; see Dkt. # 46-5 at 16. And Sunbelt says Plaintiff testified that he released the 1 lift’s joystick while the accident unfolded. Dkt. # 45 at 9; see Dkt. # 51-1 at 9:13–21. So, 2 according to Sunbelt, the miswiring is not a fact in issue because the e-stop only interrupts power 3 to the drive motors if power is being supplied through the drive enable switch on the joystick.

4 Dkt. # 45 at 9. 5 Plaintiff responds that Sylvester’s report creates a genuine issue of material fact about 6 whether Sunbelt Rentals negligently maintained the lift’s e-stop. Dkt. # 50 at 16–18. He also 7 identifies additional evidence that he says could lead a reasonable juror to find the e-stop was 8 miswired at the time of the accident. Id. He notes Terrence Teetz, the Sunbelt technician that 9 repaired the lift’s e-stop in 2020, testified he did not recall having trouble figuring out the e- 10 stop’s wiring and that he would look at a wiring schematic only if “he had trouble figuring out 11 the wires.” See Dkt. # 67-2 at 15:3–25. And he says San Pan, the Sunbelt technician that 12 inspected the lift after the accident, testified that his inspection did not include the e-stop’s

13 control box or wiring. Dkt. # 51-19 at 10:11–12:8. Plaintiff also reiterates that the e-stop did not 14 function as intended during the accident because it did not stop the movement of the lift. Dkt. # 15 50 at 18. 16 The evidence that the lift was miswired at the time of the accident is not overwhelming, 17 but it must be considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. And Plaintiff has presented 18 evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find the lift’s e-stop was miswired at the time of 19 the accident. The evidence shows that the e-stop wiring was repaired multiple times before the 20 accident. See Dkt. # 67-1 at 1–4. The technician that worked on the e-stop before the accident 21 testified that he would look at a wiring diagram only if “he had trouble figuring out the wires,” 22 and that he did not recall having trouble figuring out the wiring when he conducted his repair.

23 See Dkt. # 67-2 at 15:3–25. In other words, there is circumstantial evidence that the technician 24 did not consult a wiring diagram to conduct this repair. Also, no inspection of the e-stop wiring 1 was conducted after the accident, even though Plaintiff reported that the e-stop did not work as 2 intended. See Dkt. # 51-19 at 10:11–12:8. Plaintiff also testified that he pressed the e-stop 3 during the accident, but the lift continued to move. Dkt. # 51-1 at 9:12–14. In addition, although

4 there is testimony that the switch was rewired after the accident, the technician that performed 5 the repair testified that he “look[ed] at a schematic from the manufacturer to put [all the wires] 6 back the same way that they were when they came out.” Dkt. # 67-4 at 13:1–25. Even so, the e- 7 stop was later found to be miswired. Dkt. # 51-25 at 11–12. A reasonable juror could find this 8 evidence shows that technicians were prone to miswiring the e-stop during repairs, even if they 9 consulted a wiring diagram. 10 What is more, Plaintiff presents evidence that rebuts Sunbelt’s contention the miswiring 11 is not a fact in issue because Plaintiff took his hand off the joystick during the accident. See Dkt. 12 # 45 at 9. In particular, Sylester’s testing showed that the lift would continue to move even if the

13 joystick were released. Dkt. # 51-25 at 26 (“Most notable during this test, however, was that the 14 lift continued to roll down the ramp at a reduced speed and never came to a full stop even after 15 the operator released the joystick.”). Sunbelt’s arguments on this point are just as unavailing 16 because it provides no citations to the record or other evidence to supports its claims that “the E- 17 stop would have had no impact on the brakes regardless of how it was wired” and “[t]he E-stop 18 switch simply interrupts power if it is being supplied through the drive enable switch.” Dkt. # 45 19 at 9 (emphasis removed); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 20 Thus, Sunbelt Rentals fails to show that there is no genuine dispute of material fact about 21 whether the e-stop was miswired at the time of the accident and whether a miswired e-stop was a 22 proximate cause of the accident. The Court denies the motion for summary judgment on this

23 claim. 24 1 3. Res Ipsa Loquitur 2 If the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, Plaintiff need not prove that Defendants 3 committed any specific act of negligence. Pacheco v. Ames, 149 Wn.2d 431, 436, 69 P.3d 324

4 (2003). Instead, an instruction on this doctrine “permits the inference of negligence on the basis 5 that the evidence of the cause of the injury is practically accessible to the defendant but 6 inaccessible to the injured person.” Id. (citing Covey v. W. Tank Lines, 36 Wash.2d 381, 390, 7 218 P.2d 322 (1950)). Under Washington law, res ipsa loquitur applies only when the evidence 8 shows, 9 (1) the accident or occurrence producing the injury is of a kind which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of someone’s negligence, (2) the injuries are caused 10 by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant, and (3) the injury-causing accident or occurrence is not due to any voluntary action or 11 contribution on the part of the plaintiff. Id. (citation omitted) (cleaned up). 12 Among other arguments, Defendants contend that they did not retain “exclusive control” 13 over the scissor lift at the time of the accident, so Plaintiff is not entitled to a res ipsa loquitur 14 instruction. Dkt. # 39 at 17; see Dkt. # 66 at 9–10. But Plaintiff says “exclusive control” is 15 construed broadly and refers to “the right to control at the time of the accident.” Dkt. # 49 at 19 16 (citing Ripley v. Lanzer, 152 Wash. App. 296, 320, 215 P.3d 1020 (2009)). He also says that this 17 requirement is satisfied if Defendants had “[l]egal control or responsibility for the proper and 18 efficient functioning of the instrumentality which caused the injury” and “a superior, if not 19 exclusive, position for knowing or obtaining knowledge of the facts which caused the injury[.]” 20 Id. (citing Ripley, 152 Wash. App. at 320 (2009)). So he asserts that a res ipsa loquitur 21 instruction should be given because Custom Equipment “had full and exclusive control over the 22 design and manufacture of the drive motors and parking brake lever system” installed in the lift. 23 24 1 Dkt. # 49 at 19. And because “the internal working of the e-stop button was exclusively within 2 control of Sunbelt.” Dkt. # 50 at 23. 3 Yet the evidence contradicts Plaintiff’s arguments. Plaintiff’s testimony shows that he

4 was operating the lift at the time of the accident. Dkt. # 51-1 at 9:13–10:2. He also testified that 5 he conducted a “daily lift inspection” on the day of the incident. Dkt. # 46-2 at 10:3–10. He also 6 testified he needed to (1) disengage the e-stop before he could use the lift, id. at 8:10–15; and (2) 7 that he activated the e-stop before the accident. Dkt. # 51-1 at 14:2–21. This testimony 8 illustrates that Plaintiff was able to control and access the instrumentalities—the parking brake 9 levers, drive motors, and e-stop switch—that he claims caused the accident. This evidence 10 likewise indicates that Plaintiff bore some responsibility for the proper functioning of these 11 instrumentalities at the time of the accident. In addition, Plaintiff identifies no evidence that 12 would allow a reasonable juror to find Defendants possessed a superior or exclusive position for

13 obtaining knowledge about the facts of the accident. Thus, the evidence shows that Plaintiff’s 14 injuries were not caused by instrumentalities within the exclusive control of Defendants. So all 15 the requirements for a res ipsa loquitur instruction under Washington law are not met, and the 16 Court concludes that this doctrine does not apply here. 17 IV CONCLUSION 18 For all these reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ 19 Motions for Summary Judgment. Dkt. ## 39; 45. 20 The Court GRANTS Defendants summary judgment with respect to (1) liability for all 21 claims against SGI; (2) any after sale duty to warn claim under RCW 7.72.030(1)(c); and (3) 22 Plaintiff’s theory of res ipsa loquitur; the Court DISMISSES these claims with prejudice. The 23 Court otherwise DENIES Defendants’ motions. 24 l Dated this 9th day of January 2026. ° Let 4, Chae 3 John H. Chun United States District Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24