FIRST CIRCUIT
2025 CA 0321
MATTHEW and JESSICA ORGAN
VERSUS
CARLOS J. JUAREZ INDIVIDUALLY and CARLOS J. JUAREZ D/B/A CARLOS J. JUAREZ CARPENTRY, LLC
Judgment Rendered: MUNFIR,
On Appeal from the 22nd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana Trial Court Docket Number 2021- 14618, Div. "H"
Honorable Allan A. Zaunbrecher, Judge Presiding
Coleman T. Organ Counsel for Plaintiffs/ Appellants, Metairie, Louisiana Matthew and Jessica Organ
Carlos J. Juarez, Pro Se Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee, Mandeville, Louisiana Carlos J. Juarez
BEFORE: THERIOT, PENZATO, AND BALFOUR, JJ. PENZATO, J.
Plaintiffs appeal a judgment rendered on October 17, 2024, wherein the trial
court ruled in their favor and against defendants in the amount of $1, 000. 00, plus
interest from the date of judicial demand until paid. On appeal, plaintiffs seek an
increase in the amount of damages awarded as well as additional damages for
inconvenience. After review, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A bench trial was held on August 12, 2024 to determine whether defendants,
Carlos J. Juarez, individually, and d/ b/ a Carlos J. Juarez Carpentry, LLC
collectively, " Mr. Juarez"), are liable to plaintiffs, Matthew and Jessica Organ, for
faulty workmanship concerning repairs performed by Mr. Juarez on a second -floor
balcony (hereafter referred to as a " deck"') on the Organs' home. The Organs sought
damages for the costs of repairs, inconvenience, loss of use, diminution in value, and
loss of enjoyment of their home.2 The following facts were established at trial:
In 2018, the Organs noticed puddling on the surface of their deck, softness in
the wood, and wet spots underneath. Mr. Organ explained there was " bellying" and
a couple of spots that needed to be corrected." He was unsure what caused the
bellying; however, he believed there was a water intrusion problem.
Mr. Organ personally " demoed" the top of the deck by first removing the deck
boards. Once the boards were up, Mr. Organ saw rot in the areas where puddling
occurred. He did not remove or replace the rotten wood beneath the deck boards.
Mr. Organ next installed " ZIP tech orange plywood" between the joists.
He explained that ZIP tech is a roof deck system, which is plywood " impregnated"
1 At trial the parties referred to the balcony as a " deck." We do the same to maintain consistency. 2 The Organs filed a petition for damages in October 2021 against Mr. Juarez. Mr. Juarez, appearing through counsel, answered the petition and admitted the parties entered a contract for a repair and installation.[]" He otherwise denied the Organs' allegations and asserted several affirmative defenses. Mr. Juarez' s counsel withdrew from the representation in July 2023. Mr. Juarez thereafter has represented himself, including at trial.
2 with a waterproof membrane. Mr. Organ inserted a sheet of the ZIP tech between
each joist and taped the seams to create a waterproof barrier to " mitigate any
continued water damage" and allow time to " come up with a plan on how to fix it."
However, Mr. Organ testified that he was not a certified ZIP tech installer and had
never installed the product before. Puddling continued, and the deck remained in
this condition, with ZIP tech and seam tape and no surface deck boards, until the
Organs contracted with Mr. Juarez in 2020.
Mr. Organ testified that he and Mr. Juarez, an experienced carpenter, agreed
that Mr. Juarez would install ice and water shield, correct any puddling that was
occurring, and install replacement deck boards. Mr. Organ stated that, before work
began, Mr. Juarez removed the ZIP tech to " examine the rot" and determine what
else needed to be done. Mr. Organ recalled that Mr. Juarez recommended replacing
the beam running on the outside front of the deck. This was added to the scope of
Mr. Juarez' s work, raising the total cost from $ 1, 750. 00 to $ 2,950. 00. Although
some of the boards near the outside beam were also damaged, Mr. Organ testified
that no other boards were replaced because the rot was " not significant[.]" Mr.
Juarez put a self -leveling agent along the front of the deck and installed new surface
deck boards. Mr. Juarez completed his work in May 2020.
Within a month, the Organs noticed puddling in the same places on the deck
when it rained. The Organs contacted Mr. Juarez and told him about the continued
puddling, but he did not return to their home until 2022, after suit was filed. At that
time, the deck boards were removed, revealing that some nails were not placed into
the joists and had penetrated the ice and water shield installed by Mr. Juarez.
Additionally, there were no nails in some areas.
Mr. Juarez testified that the deck boards need to be nailed into the joists, and
nailing outside of the joists is incorrect. He confirmed that water would be allowed
to flow through the holes and into the deck if nails missed the joists and penetrated
3 the ice and water shield. Mr. Juarez admitted that it was improper workmanship if
his crew installed nails with the ice and water shield without going through the joist.
He candidly acknowledged that fault would be attributed to himself and his crew if this caused or contributed to further erosion of the quality of the deck.
Most significantly, Mr. Juarez testified that he pointed out pre- existing rot to
Mr. Organ and told him it needed to be fixed. Mr. Juarez stated that Mr. Organ
inquired about the price, then stated he did not have the money. When Mr. Juarez
found more rotten areas, Mr. Organ asked the price to fix the whole deck. Mr. Juarez
verbally gave Mr. Organ an estimate of $10, 000. 00 to " fix it properly." According
to Mr. Juarez, Mr. Organ could not pay that amount and gave him the " thumbs up to
close it back up." During trial, Mr. Juarez was asked whether he told Mr. Organ that
the rot that was going to be covered up would impair his deck. Mr. Juarez testified,
Yes, I did. It was going to continue shifting, moving in any way, and water is going
to start puddling." Mr. Juarez testified that, when Mr. Organ told him that puddling
continued after the work was complete, he knew the cause — it was the pre- existing
rot he discussed with Mr. Organ.
On redirect, Mr. Organ recalled a conversation with Mr. Juarez regarding
beams with " slight, minor damages" and denied there was any " significant" or
structural" rot. Mr. Organ testified that Mr. Juarez told him that he could close it
up and that he did not need to do " this" right now, presumably meaning Mr. Organ
did not need to replace the beams with " very minor damage." Mr. Organ
acknowledged that Mr. Juarez told him, "[ y] ou might have a problem down the road
long-term but nothing like within the next six months you are going to have rotten
boards all over the place." Mr. Organ stated that he would not have gone ahead with
the repairs if Mr. Juarez had told him the beams would continue to get worse if they
were covered.
Gd Eventually, Mr. Organ, along with a new contractor, decided the entire deck should be demolished and rebuilt to eliminate " this problem" and to avoid having
to do this again" in the near future. Mr. Organ explained the deck was rebuilt by
William " Willie" Martin, a carpenter, using marine grade treated plywood. Wood
was installed running one way then taped; a second layer of plywood was installed
going in the opposite direction, creating an elevated surface for installation of the
final surface deck boards ( rather than nailing the deck boards directly to the joists as
Mr. Juarez had done per the parties' agreement). This allowed Mr. Martin to
penetrate the top layer of plywood instead of "impacting" the ice and water shield.
At trial, the Organs tendered Mr. Martin as an expert in the fields of framing
and deck construction and demolition. However, the trial court declined to accept
Mr. Martin as an expert, " not so much because of his qualification but because his
opinions are of no import to this Court[.]" Mr. Martin' s testimony was limited to
what he did and saw at the Organs' home to demolish and rebuild the deck, including
creating a drip system within the structure of the deck so that water drained out of
the porch (using two layers of plywood as described by Mr. Organ).
Testimony and evidence established that the Organs paid $ 24, 985. 98 to
demolish and rebuild the deck. The Organs introduced documentary evidence,
primarily consisting of invoices and photographs of the deck in various stages of
demolition and repair. After the conclusion of evidence and testimony, the trial court
took the matter under advisement. Thereafter, the Organs proffered Mr. Martin' s
affidavit, setting forth the testimony he would have provided if he had been allowed
to testify as an expert.
On October 17, 2024, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Organs
and against Mr. Juarez in the amount of $1, 000. 00, plus judicial interest from the
date of demand until paid. In written reasons, the trial court explained that it found
a " small portion of the work performed by [ Mr. Juarez] was defective and contrary"
5 to the parties' verbal agreement. Specifically, the court concluded that the Organs
proved that a " small number of nails driven by [ Mr. Juarez] failed to hit an
underlying stud." However, in the court' s opinion, the Organs failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the misapplied nails caused the underlying floor
joists to rot.
The trial court found Mr. Juarez' s testimony established the presence of
significant pre- existing rot. The trial court expressly found that Mr. Juarez was
credible and accepted his testimony that he warned Mr. Organ there was still rot and
that rot would continue, but Mr. Juarez was told to go ahead and do the work.
Finally, the trial court concluded that the extensive subsequent repairs for which the
Organs sought compensation were not proven to have been caused by the minimal
deficiencies shown in Mr. Juarez' s work. Instead, the alleged repairs were a
significant `betterment' and unrelated to the limited scope of [Mr.] Juarez' s work."
The trial court awarded the Organs $ 1, 000.00 as compensation for damage
caused by Mr. Juarez' s failure to drive all nails into the studs, including all associated
tear out and replacement costs. The trial court declined to award any sums for
alleged inconvenience, loss of use, diminution in value, and loss of enjoyment,
finding the Organs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that these
damages were legally caused by Mr. Juarez' s defective work.
The Organs timely filed this appeal, asserting the trial court erroneously failed
to: ( 1) apply the inference of faulty workmanship set forth in Joyner v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 259 La. 660, 251 So. 2d 166, 167- 68 ( La. 1971); ( 2) accept
Mr. Martin as an expert; ( 3) award damages for reconstruction of the deck; and ( 4)
award damages for inconvenience. Mr. Juarez did not file an appeal brief.3
3 This court advised Mr. Juarez on April 3, 2025 that no provision in the law allows representation of a limited liability corporation by a non -attorney in the appellate courts of this state. Thus, as a non -attorney, Mr. Juarez was not allowed to file pleadings or appear as an advocate for Carlos J. Juarez Carpentry, LLC before this court. No brief has been filed on behalf of Carlos J. Juarez Carpentry, LLC.
0 DISCUSSION
Failing to Accept Mr. Martin as an Expert
Any alleged evidentiary errors must be addressed first on appeal, since this court must conduct a de novo review if the trial court committed an evidentiary error
that interdicted its fact-finding process. See Thompson v. Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 2019- 0440 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2/ 21/ 20), 293 So. 3d 80, 84,
writ denied, 2020- 00802 ( La. 10/ 14/ 20), 302 So. 3d 1115. The decision to admit or
exclude expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its
judgment will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless it is clearly erroneous.
Thompson, 293 So. 3d at 86.
The Organs argue the trial court " erred in not allowing [ Mr.] Martin to give
4 his opinions simply because the court did not dispute his qualifications." The
Organs cite no legal authority for their position, which is contrary to the well- settled
principle that " the ultimate determination of the admissibility of expert testimony
under [ La. C.E.] art. 702 turns upon whether it would assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Thompson, 293 So. 3d at
86; Carpenter v. Thomas, 2022- 0872 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 13/ 23), 362 So. 3d 977,
983. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702( A)( 1) states, " A witness who is
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if [... ] t][ he expert' s scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier offact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue[.]" ( Emphasis added.)
In Hattori v. Peairs, 95- 0144 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 6/ 95), 662 So. 2d 509, 513,
writ denied, 95- 2677 ( La. 1/ 12/ 96), 666 So. 2d 322, the trial court declined to admit
4 The Organs assert that the trial court' s " cryptic" statement that Mr. Martin' s opinions are " of no import" did not comply with La. C. C. P. art. 1425( F)( 3). However, this provision sets forth the pretrial procedure a party may follow to challenge a witness' s qualification as an expert and the requirements for the content of the trial court' s pretrial ruling. There is no authority to expand the scope of this article to apply to rulings made during trial.
W testimony from the defendants' proposed use of force expert, finding the testimony
was not necessary. Without specifically concluding whether the witness was
qualified as an expert, this court found no abuse of the trial court' s discretion and no
error in the court' s conclusion that testimony on the issue of use of force was not
needed to aid the trial court in making the factual determination of whether the
defendants acted reasonably. Hattori, 662 So. 2d at 514, citing La. C. E. art. 702,
1988 Comment (c). This comment explains that, under Article 702, whether expert
testimony is admissible turns upon whether it would assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Article 702 permits the
expert to testify as to such matters if the court concludes that his testimony would
be helpful to the trier of fact. La. C. E. art. 702, 1988 Comment ( c).
In Anderson v. Beauregard Memorial Hospital, 97- 1222 ( La. App. 3d Cir.
3/ 6/ 98), 709 So. 2d 283, 287, a medical malpractice action, the trial court concluded
that expert testimony from a pathologist was not necessary to make the factual
determination of when the plaintiff discovered she was infected with hepatitis C for
purposes of ruling on defendants' exceptions of prescription. The pathologist' s
qualifications were not at issue; however, the court of appeal found no error in the
trial court' s decision, noting the pathologist had never treated the plaintiff and had
no knowledge of when she discovered she was infected. Therefore, the testimony
had no bearing on whether the plaintiffs claim was prescribed. Anderson, 709 So.2d
at 287. The court of appeal stated, " The prescription fact boils down to one issue:
When did [the plaintiff] find out she was infected with hepatitis C' Anderson, 709
So. 2d at 286.
In their appeal brief, the Organs assert it is " essential" for this court to evaluate
one " linchpin issue" on which the trial court based its decision, i.e., " To what extent
did pre- existing rot contribute to the damage ultimately sustained." We agree this
was the focus of the trial court' s written reasons and judgment. We also agree with the trial court' s conclusion that expert testimony from Mr. Martin was " of no import"
and would not aid the trial court in making this factual determination. Regardless of
Mr. Martin' s qualifications, his testimony had no bearing on whether and to what
extent rot existed at the time Mr. Juarez performed and completed the deck repairs
and/ or the conversations between Mr. Juarez and Mr. Organ about the long-term
consequences of leaving the existing rot. Mr. Martin' s knowledge of the condition
of the Organs' deck was based on his observations years after Mr. Juarez' s work was
completed. Thus, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
qualify Mr. Martin as an expert. See Thompson, 293 So. 3d at 86.
Failing to Apply the Joyner Inference
On the merits, the Organs assert the trial court failed to apply the inference of
faulty workmanship articulated in Joyner, 251 So.2d at 167, a premises defect case.
The Organs maintain that, under Joyner, Mr. Juarez was required to prove that the
defects and damages resulted from something other than his work, since the defects
in the Organs' deck appeared within one month after Mr. Juarez completed the
repairs.
In Joyner, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether the contractor
and/ or the premises owner had the burden to prove that the injury -causing defect
resulted from faulty construction or from misuse after completion of the contract and
delivery to the owner. The court of appeal placed the burden on the owner. Joyner,
251 So. 2d at 167. On review, the supreme court noted that, in so holding, the court
of appeal " overlooked that, under the [ present] circumstances, an inference of faulty
workmanship or material arises when construction designed as a permanent
installation fails shortly after being put into use." Joyner, 251 So. 2d at 167- 68.
The Joyner court granted rehearing and, in a per curiam opinion, clarified its
holding concerning the inference of faulty workmanship: This holding was not intended to modify the requirement that before this inference of fault arises, the party claiming injury must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that after the construction left the control of the contractor upon its delivery to the owner, no fault independent of the contractor' s workmanship or material ( such as the injured party' s own fault) caused the failure. The party injured must also, of course, prove by such preponderance that his damages were caused by reason of the failure of construction.
Joyner, 251 So. 2d at 172 ( on rehearing).
Thus, before any inference of fault arises, Joyner required the Organs to first
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that no fault, independent of Mr.
Juarez' s workmanship or material, caused damage to the deck after Mr. Juarez' s
work was completed and the deck was returned to the Organs. The Organs were
also required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their damages were
caused by the failure of construction. Joyner, 251 So. 2d at 172 ( on rehearing). This
is consistent with the owner' s burden of proof articulated in more recent cases
involving faulty workmanship. Specifically, to recover damages against a builder
for faulty workmanship, the owner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that: 1) a defect exists; 2) faulty materials or workmanship caused the defect; and 3)
the cost of repairing the defect. Pinnacle Builders, Inc. v. Gilbert, 2021- 0335 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 12/ 22/ 21), 340 So. 3d 107, 113.
The trial court' s factual determination of whether the Organs proved the
damage to their deck was caused by Mr. Juarez' s alleged unworkmanlike
performance is reviewed under the manifest error standards See Pinnacle Builders,
Inc., 340 So. 3d at 113. When factual findings are based on determinations regarding
the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error standard demands great deference to
the trier of fact' s findings, for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in
5 To reverse a factfinder' s determination under this standard, the appellate court must satisfy a two- step process based on the record as a whole: there must be no reasonable factual basis for the trial court' s conclusion, and the finding must be clearly wrong. Hayes Fund for First United Methodist Church of Welsh, LLC v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain, LLC, 2014- 2592 ( La. 12/ 8/ 15), 193 So. 3d 1110, 1115- 16.
10 demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener' s understanding and
belief in what is said. Hayes Fundfor First united Methodist Church o,f Welsh, LLC
v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain, LLC, 2014- 2592 ( La. 12/ 8/ 15), 193 So. 3d 11101
1116.
As stated above, the trial court credited the testimony of Mr. Juarez rather than
Mr. Organ concerning two critical facts: there was significant pre- existing rot, and
Mr. Juarez advised Mr. Organ the rot would continue, but Mr. Organ told Mr. Juarez
to go ahead and do the work. See Hayes Fund, 193 So. 3d at 1116 ( when a factual
finding is based on the trier of fact' s decision to credit the testimony of one of two
or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly erroneous or clearly
wrong).
On appeal, the Organs urge this court to apply the de novo standard of review,
due to the trial court' s purported failure to apply the Joyner inference, and to then
credit Mr. Organ' s testimony. However, it is clear the trial court found the Organs
did not satisfy their burden of proving that the full extent of the damage to their deck
was caused by Mr. Juarez' s failure to drive a " small number" of nails into the joists.
See Joyner, 251 So. 2d at 172 ( on rehearing). Because the Organs did not satisfy
their initial burden of proof, the inference articulated in Joyner did not arise.
The Organs argue that, even under the manifest error standard, Mr. Juarez' s
testimony should be deemed not credible, because his testimony " makes no sense."
They cite Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844- 45 ( La. 1989), holding:
Where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness' s story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness' s story,the court of appeal may well find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination.
The circumstances relied on by the Organs do not satisfy this standard. The record
contains no documents or objective evidence that contradicts Mr. Juarez' s testimony,
11 nor is his testimony internally inconsistent or implausible on its face. Instead, the
Organs focus on what they contend is or is not reasonable to believe. For instance,
they question whether it is " reasonable to believe" they told Mr. Juarez to cover up
the rot after he told them the deck would continue to deteriorate, since their home is
expensive" and they agreed to pay more to Mr. Juarez to replace the front outside
beam, as he recommended. The Organs also pose the question of whether a
contractor, who was notified that a problem appeared immediately after his work
was complete but who refused to return to the job, is a " credible individual."
Conversely, they assert that Mr. Organ' s testimony "makes sense." These arguments
go to the essence of credibility and ignore that, where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder' s choice between them cannot be manifestly
erroneous or clearly wrong. See Hayes Fund, 193 So. 3d at 1116.
After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find no manifest error in the trial
court' s credibility determinations and factual conclusions. Accepting Mr. Juarez' s
testimony as true, it is reasonable to conclude that only a small portion of Mr.
Juarez' s work was defective and did not cause the extensive rot, which the Organs
maintain required a complete tear -down and reconstruction of their deck.
Failure to Award Damages for Reconstruction of the Deck and Inconvenience
The Organs argue the trial court erred by failing to award the full costs of
reconstructing their deck after concluding that some of the nails driven by Mr. Juarez
missed the studs and penetrated the ice and water shield.
If a contractor does not execute the contract in the agreed upon matter, he will
be liable for damages that may ensue from his breach of the contract.' See La. C. C.
art. 2769; Caronna v. Outdoor Living, LLC, 2023- 1048 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 12/ 30/ 24),
6 Every building contract implicitly obligates the contractor to perform the work in a good, workmanlike manner, free from defects in either materials or workmanship, with the work suitable for its intended purpose. See La. C. C. arts. 1994 and 2769; Caronna, 403 So. 3d at 1179.
12 403 So.3d 1164, 1179. It is only where the defects are such that they cannot be
corrected except by removing and replacing the construction that the jurisprudential
remedy is to award whatever it takes to place the homeowner in the position he deserved to be in when the construction was completed, as if the obligation had been
fulfilled. Caronna, 403 So. 3d at 1179.
We have already concluded that no manifest error exists in the trial court' s
factual determination that only a small portion of Mr. Juarez' s work was defective.'
Therefore, we find no error in the trial court' s decision to limit the Organs' damages
accordingly, compensating them for the damages caused by Mr. Juarez' s failure to
drive all nails into the studs, including all associated tear out and replacement costs.
Additionally, the record supports the trial court' s factual conclusion that the
subsequent repairs to the Organs' deck were a significant betterment and were not
necessitated by the minimal deficiencies in Mr. Juraez' s work. Both Mr. Organ and
Mr. Martin testified that the preexisting deck was entirely demolished and was
replaced with a deck constructed of multiple layers of marine grade plywood to form
a drip system.
Regarding damages for inconvenience, the Organs acknowledge they did not
present testimony on this issue. Nevertheless, they assert the trial court erred by
failing to award damages for inconvenience. After review, and in light of our
holdings, we find no error in the trial court' s refusal to award damages for
inconvenience. In addition to the minimal damage attributed to Mr. Juarez' s
deficient work, the record contains no evidence that the contract was intended to
gratify a non -pecuniary interest and that Mr. Juarez knew or should have known that
his failure to perform would cause that kind of loss. See La. C. C. art. 1998;
7 For this reason, we also reject the Organs' alternative argument that damages in the amount of 11, 774. 76 should be awarded, representing the amounts paid to Mr. Juarez, the costs of materials for Mr. Juarez' s work, the purchase of materials for the new deck, and one- third of the labor costs for the deck reconstruction.
13 Matherne v. Barnum, 2011- 0827 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 19/ 12), 94 So. 3d 782, 791, writ
denied, 2012- 0865 ( La. 6/ 1/ 12), 90 So. 3d 442. This argument lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court' s October 17, 2024 judgment in favor of Matthew
and Jessica Organ and against Carlos J. Juarez, individually and d/ b/ a Carlos J.
Juarez Carpentery, LLC in the amount of $1, 000. 00, plus interest from the date of
judicial demand until paid. All costs of this appeal are assessed against
plaintiffs/ appellants, Matthew and Jessica Organ.
AFFIRMED.