Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), Jul 09 2013, 6:27 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CARA SCHAEFER WIENEKE GREGORY F. ZOELLER Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana Plainfield, Indiana ELLEN H. MEILAENDER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MATTHEW A. BAUGH, ) ) Appellant-Petitioner, ) ) vs. ) No. 18A05-1210-PC-545 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE DELAWARE CIRCUIT COURT The Honorable John M. Feick, Judge Cause No. 18C04-0804-FB-7
July 9, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge Case Summary
Matthew A. Baugh was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of Sexual
Misconduct with a Minor, as Class B felonies,1 was adjudicated to be a Sexually Violent
Predator (“SVP”),2 and was sentenced to two consecutive twelve-year terms of imprisonment.
Baugh appealed his conviction; this Court affirmed, as did our supreme court after accepting
transfer of jurisdiction over Baugh’s appeal. Baugh then pursued a petition for post-
conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. He now appeals the denial of the
petition.
We affirm.
Issues
Baugh raises several issues for our review; we restate these as:
I. Whether Baugh’s trial counsel was ineffective because:
A. Counsel did not request a jury instruction concerning the requirements of jury unanimity in the verdict;
B. Counsel did not properly challenge the State’s evidence that resulted in Baugh’s SVP adjudication; and
II. Whether Baugh’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the SVP adjudication.
Facts and Procedural History
We take our statement of facts from this Court’s opinion on Baugh’s direct appeal:
1 See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9. 2 See I.C. § 35-38-1-7.5.
2 In the fall of 2007, fourteen-year-old Z. (born August 1, 1993) and E. were eighth-grade classmates and best friends. Z.’s parents had recently divorced, and E.’s father had recently died. Z. frequently spent the night at E.’s residence.
Baugh, E.’s half-brother, was twenty-six years old in November 2007. According to Z., in November 2007, Baugh demonstrated an interest in Z.— holding her hand, making eye contact, talking to her on her cell phone—and then “started dating” her. Tr. at 124. In December 2007, in E.’s room, they “had sex,” id., by which Z. meant that “[Baugh’s] penis went in [her] vagina.” Id. at 100, 110. Baugh had sex with Z. “[o]ver ten” times between December 2007 and mid-March 2008. Id. at 101. In addition, they engaged in oral sex, with “[Z.’s] mouth on his penis and his mouth on [her] vagina,” and he asked her “to call him Daddy Matt.” Id. at 103. Baugh told Z. that no one could “know” about their relationship “[b]ecause he would go back to prison.” Id. at 105. At the end of March 2008, Z. admitted to her mother “[t]hat [she] and [Baugh] were sleeping together.” Id. at 112.
On April 18, 2008, the State charged Baugh with two counts of class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor. As amended on April 25, 2008, each count alleged that “between November 1, 2007, and March 30, 2008,” Baugh had intentionally performed or submitted to sexual intercourse with Z., “a child at least fourteen (14) years of age but less than sixteen (16) years of age.” Appellant’s App. at 23, 24. At trial, Z. testified to the foregoing. On September 1, 2009, the jury found Baugh guilty on both counts.
On September 4, 2009, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35–38–1–7.5(e), the State filed a petition asking the trial court to order evaluations to determine whether Baugh was a sexually violent predator. The trial court granted the petition and requested that Dr. Rebecca Mueller and Dr. Frank Krause examine Baugh “to determine whether or not he is a Sexually Violent Predator.” Id. at 175. The doctors conducted their examinations and submitted reports, each opining that Baugh suffered from a personality disorder and was likely to commit additional sexual offenses.
On October 7, 2009, the trial court held the sentencing hearing. The State argued that “[b]ased upon” the evaluations of Dr. Mueller and Dr. Krause and “the definition of a sexually violent predator,” the trial court should find Baugh “to be a sexually violent predator and require him to register for life in the sex registry.” Tr. at 427, 428. Baugh’s counsel asserted that with respect “to the determination of the sexual violent predator, I think that the Court has to make that determination based upon the charge that he's been convicted [sic] and the
3 doctors’ reports, and I would leave that up to the Court.” Id. at 429–30. The trial court “reviewed the reports of Dr. Mueller and Dr. Krause” and found that Baugh was a sexually violent predator “within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at 277. The trial court sentenced Baugh to serve twelve years executed on each count, with the sentences “served consecutively.” Id. at 432.
Baugh v. State, 926 N.E.2d 497, 498-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) aff’d in part, vacated in part,
933 N.E.2d 1277 (Ind. 2010).
Upon Baugh’s direct appeal from his convictions, this Court reviewed three issues,
which we stated as:
I. Has Baugh procedurally defaulted his argument that the trial court failed to comply with statutory requirements in determining that he is a sexually violent predator?
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering consecutive sentences?
III. Do Baugh's convictions violate the Indiana Constitution's prohibition of double jeopardy under the continuing crime doctrine?
Id. at 498. Finding no error, a two-judge majority affirmed the trial court’s decision in all
respects. Judge Darden, writing in dissent, would have held that Baugh did not, through
argument of counsel alone, waive his right to cross-examine expert witnesses at a hearing
concerning an SVP adjudication. Id. at 503 (citing, inter alia, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.
356 (2010)) (arguing that an SVP adjudication is a consequence of conviction within the
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
Baugh filed a petition to transfer, which our supreme court granted. On transfer, the
court addressed a single issue: whether the trial court’s SVP adjudication was in error
because the trial court did not hold a hearing and receive testimony from Dr. Krause and Dr.
Mueller, each of whom opined that Baugh was a SVP. Baugh v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1277,
4 1278 (Ind. 2010) [hereinafter Baugh II]. The Baugh II Court first held that the SVP
adjudication was not “made without a hearing.” Id. at 1280. The court went on to hold that
while the statute governing SVP adjudications requires consideration of testimony, Baugh’s
trial counsel’s actions appeared intended to mitigate the introduction of testimony
unfavorable to Baugh, and thus any failure on the part of the trial court to conduct a hearing
with the opportunity for cross-examination of the State’s expert witnesses was invited error.
Id. In a three-justice concurrence, Justice Rucker, joined by then-Chief Justice Shepard and
then-Justice Sullivan, opined that but for the conclusion that the absence of testimony was the
result of invited error, Baugh would have been entitled to relief on appeal. Id. at 1281.
Justice Rucker’s concurring opinion observed in passing that Baugh’s appellate counsel did
not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the SVP adjudication. Id. at 1281 n.
4.
After the Baugh II Court’s ruling, Baugh filed his petition for post-conviction relief on
December 15, 2011. Baugh alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by inviting error
concerning the absence of testimony at the SVP hearing, and that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of evidence underlying the SVP
adjudication. Baugh also identified as ineffective assistance his trial counsel’s failure to
request a modified version of the jury instruction that instructs the jury of the necessity that
its verdict be unanimous.
On July 16, 2012, an evidentiary hearing was conducted on Baugh’s petition. During
the hearing, Baugh’s trial and appellate counsel offered testimony, as did Dr. Martin Smith
5 (“Dr. Smith”), a psychologist Baugh retained as an expert on sexual offender evaluations for
purposes of pursuing the instant petition, and Baugh himself. On September 25, 2012, after
the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court entered
its findings and conclusions denying Baugh’s petition for relief.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing the
grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5);
Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004). When appealing from the denial of post-
conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative
judgment. Fisher, 810 N.E.2d at 674. On review, we will not reverse the judgment of the
post-conviction court unless the evidence as a whole unerringly and unmistakably leads to a
conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. A post-conviction court’s
findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error, that which leaves
us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In this review,
findings of fact are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous and no deference is accorded
to conclusions of law. Id. The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
A petition for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for a direct appeal from a
conviction or sentence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b). Post-conviction petitions afford
6 defendants with the opportunity to raise issues not known at trial or unavailable upon direct
appeal; claims that were available to a petitioner on direct appeal are not available in a
proceeding for post-conviction relief. Bunch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1285, 1290 (Ind. 2002).
“These are applications of the basic principle that post-conviction proceedings do not afford
the opportunity for a super-appeal.” Id. (citing Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1187
(Ind. 2001)). Thus, a petitioner waives any freestanding claim of error in his petition where
that issue was “known or available at the time of direct appeal but [was] not raised.” Reed v.
State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1193-94 (Ind. 2006).
Assistance of Trial Counsel
We turn first to Baugh’s contention that he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. The legal standard in such cases is well-defined:
Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are generally reviewed under the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Thus, a claimant must demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms, and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Prejudice occurs when the defendant demonstrates that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability arises when there is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. 2006).
The two parts of the Strickland test are separate inquiries, and a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel may be disposed of on either the prejudice or the performance prong.
Id. Here, Baugh raises two issues that he claims amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
7 We will address each in turn.
Unanimity Instruction
Baugh first contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not request
an instruction to the jury concerning unanimity of its verdict. In his argument, he directs our
attention to our supreme court’s opinion in Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169 (Ind. 2011).
The Baker court was presented with a direct appeal from a criminal conviction, in
which the defendant was charged with molestation of three children, and there was evidence
presented “of a greater number of separate criminal offenses than the defendant is charged
with.” Id. at 1175. The court recognized that in many cases a jury’s decision to convict a
defendant boils down to a credibility determination—whether the jury believes the victim or
the defendant. Adopting the approach of the California Supreme Court in California v.
Jones, 792 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1990), our supreme court held:
[t]he State may in its discretion designate a specific act (or acts) on which it relies to prove a particular charge. However if the State decides not to so designate, then the jurors should be instructed that in order to convict the defendant they must either unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same act or acts or that the defendant committed all of the acts described by the victim and included within the same time period charged.
Id. at 1178 (emphasis added).
The modified jury instruction on unanimity must be given when “the testimony of the
victim recounts undifferentiated or generic occurrences of the sexual act,” because “‘it would
be impossible for the prosecutor to select a specific act he relies on to prove the charge, or for
the jury to unanimously agree the defendant committed the same specific act.’” Id. at 1177
(quoting Jones, 792 P.2d at 650). In these circumstances, the modified instruction’s
8 requirement that the jury reach a unanimous verdict as to all of the acts described by the
victim within the time period charged safeguards the unanimity requirement because “‘if the
jury believes the defendant committed all the acts it necessarily believes he committed each
specific act.’” Id. (quoting Jones, 792 P.2d at 659).
Here, Baugh argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
modified unanimity instruction as required by Baker. In response to the State’s argument that
Baugh’s reliance on Baker is misplaced because Baugh’s case preceded Baker, Baugh argues
that Baker did not “establish a change or extension in the law.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3.)
Thus, Baugh insists, he does not seek to hold his trial counsel accountable for an as-yet
unannounced legal standard. Rather, Baugh argues that prior Indiana cases recognized the
necessity of unanimous verdicts, while Baker “merely crafted a pattern instruction that courts
can use when such an instruction is requested.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3.)
We disagree. Indiana has long recognized that failure of counsel to anticipate or
create changes in the law does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Bailey v.
State, 472 N.E.2d 1260, 1265 (Ind. 1985). In Bailey, the defendant challenged his counsel’s
failure to request a jury instruction on bodily injury that would have anticipated a change in
the law on an element of robbery. Id. at 1264. Our supreme court concluded that “for
appellant to succeed in gaining a reversal based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we
would have to find that his representation was inadequate because his counsel failed, in
effect, to change then-existing law.” Id. at 1264-65.
Here, Baugh relies on Baker for the premise that the modified unanimity instruction
9 should have been issued. While Baugh contends that the Baker decision merely set forth a
pattern jury instruction, the Baker decision clearly considered several different alternatives in
resolving a then-undecided question in Indiana: whether a defendant in a case like Baugh’s is
entitled to a modified instruction, and if so, what modification is appropriate. See Bailey,
472 N.E.2d at 1263-65 (concluding that no ineffective assistance of counsel was established
by counsels’ failure to request a jury instruction that would anticipate a change in substantive
law). Under those circumstances, we cannot conclude that Baugh’s trial counsel would, in
2009, have been ineffective in failing to request the modified unanimity instruction first
required by the Indiana Supreme Court in 2011. We therefore find no error in the post-
conviction court’s denial of Baugh’s petition for relief with respect to this issue.
The SVP Hearing
Baugh also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to call as
witnesses and/or conduct cross-examination of Dr. Krause and Dr. Mueller, and instead
waived presentation of testimony during Baugh’s SVP adjudication hearing.
In advancing this claim, Baugh relies on our supreme court’s adjudication of his direct
appeal, in which a three-justice concurrence opined that but for the conclusion that the
absence of testimony was the result of invited error, Baugh would have been entitled to relief
on appeal. The State contends in response that 1) during the post-conviction hearing, Baugh
did not elicit testimony from trial counsel to establish the reasons for counsel’s decision to
forego a full SVP adjudication hearing, and thus failed to carry the burden of proving
counsel’s ineffectiveness; and 2) trial counsel acted within the scope of professional
10 judgment when he decided that, as a matter of strategy and professional judgment, Baugh
was better served by not obtaining testimony from Dr. Krause and Dr. Mueller as part of the
SVP adjudication proceeding.
Baugh argues in reply that there is no question of second-guessing counsel’s strategy
or professional judgment involved with this issue. Rather, he says, the decision to forego the
SVP adjudication hearing was not within the bounds of professional judgment, and that
decision prejudiced him to such a degree that trial counsel must be deemed ineffective. Thus,
Baugh argues, the procedure from which the SVP adjudication arose is sufficiently unreliable
as to undermine our confidence in the result.
We agree with the State on its first point. We cannot conclude that the post-
conviction court erred when Baugh did not introduce post-conviction evidence that
necessarily gives rise to a conclusion that, had trial counsel challenged Dr. Krause’s and Dr.
Mueller’s opinions, there was a reasonable likelihood of a different result from the SVP
adjudication hearing. At best, Baugh elicited evidence that, several years after the SVP
adjudication, a different expert could reach a different conclusion.
In challenging the SVP adjudication during the post-conviction proceedings, Baugh
introduced testimony from Dr. Smith. Dr. Smith opined that Baugh did not fit the
characteristics required for adjudication as a SVP. Dr. Smith based his opinion upon the
results of his own examination and evaluation of Baugh. While he testified that he reviewed
the final reports of Dr. Krause and Dr. Mueller, Dr. Smith was not retained to make a
thorough assessment of the accuracy of the experts’ opinions and did not make such an
11 assessment. Rather, Dr. Smith reached a different opinion as to whether Baugh met the
criteria set forth by the SVP statute based upon his examination of Baugh at a date later and
in a different environment than that in which Dr. Krause and Dr. Mueller evaluated Baugh.
And while Dr. Smith criticized Dr. Krause’s scoring of several assessment instruments, Dr.
Smith also acknowledged that he does not rely solely on the results of assessment instruments
in his own practice of assessing individuals for SVP adjudications.
The evidence Baugh produced from Dr. Smith and Baugh’s arguments more closely
pertain to reassessing Baugh’s SVP status. They do not establish that trial counsel was
ineffective when he waived testimony from Dr. Krause and Dr. Mueller, because Dr. Smith’s
testimony does not establish that, at the time of Baugh’s SVP adjudication, a different result
was reasonably likely and that eliciting testimony from the State’s experts would have been
reasonably likely to lead to that result. Even assuming trial counsel’s decision not to solicit
testimony during the SVP hearing was conduct below professional norms, the evidence
presented did not establish that the post-conviction court could only reach the conclusion that
Baugh was prejudiced by counsel’s error. Construing Dr. Smith’s testimony in a light most
favorable to the judgment, we cannot conclude that the post-conviction court erred when it
denied Baugh’s petition for relief. We therefore affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment
on this issue.
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
We turn now to Baugh’s final contention, namely, that he received ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel upon direct appeal of his criminal conviction. We follow the
12 same standard for claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as we do for
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (Ind. 2006).
Here, Baugh argues that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to raise an issue on appeal with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying
the SVP adjudication. There are three general categories of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claims: denial of access to an appeal, waiver of issues, and failure to
present issues well. Reed, 856 N.E.2d at 1195. To show counsel was ineffective in failing to
raise an issue on appeal, “the defendant must overcome the strongest presumption of
adequate assistance, and judicial scrutiny is highly deferential.” Id. We apply the following
test to determine whether appellate counsel’s performance was ineffective: we determine
“(1) whether the unraised issues are significant and obvious from the face of the record and
(2) whether the unraised issues are clearly stronger than the raised issues.” Id. (internal
quotes omitted).
If counsel’s performance was deficient under this test, we then examine whether the
issues counsel failed to raise “‘would have been clearly more likely to result in reversal or an
order for a new trial.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ind. 1997)). We
do so considering “‘the totality of an attorney’s performance to determine whether the client
received constitutionally adequate assistance.’” Id. at 1195-96 (quoting Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d
at 194). Courts must be “‘particularly sensitive to the need for separating the wheat from the
chaff in appellate advocacy, and should not find deficient performance when counsel’s
choice of some issues over others was reasonable in light of the facts of the case and the
13 precedent available to counsel when that choice was made.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler, 690
N.E.2d at 194). Thus, ineffective assistance is rarely found when a petitioner claims that
counsel failed to raise an issue on direct appeal, in part because deciding what issues to raise
“is one of the most important strategic decisions to be made by appellate counsel.” Id.
Here, Baugh argues that his appellate counsel’s performance was ineffective because
counsel did not designate as an issue on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence underlying
Baugh’s SVP adjudication. Baugh also contends that his appellate counsel’s selection of
issues was not reasonable because, in selecting the question of the waiver of an opportunity
to obtain testimony at the SVP hearing and the other issues presented in the direct appeal of
his conviction, counsel forewent the sufficiency challenge to Baugh’s detriment. As
evidence of this, Baugh directs our attention to a footnote in Justice Rucker’s concurring
opinion in our supreme court’s resolution of his direct appeal. In that note, Justice Rucker
observed “in passing [that] Baugh makes no claim that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the trial court’s determination that he met the statutory definition of ‘sexually violent
predator’ under Indiana Code § 35-38-1-7.5.” Baugh II, 933 N.E.2d at 1281 n. 4.
Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5 sets forth the substantive and procedural
requirements for adjudicating an individual to be a SVP. A SVP is defined by the statute as
“a person who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the
individual likely to repeatedly commit a sex offense.” I.C. § 35-38-1-7.5(a). Where, as here,
the defendant has not committed one of the offenses listed in subsection (b) of the statute, the
State “may request the court to conduct a hearing to determine whether the person … is a
14 sexually violent predator under subsection (a).” I.C. § 35-38-1-7.5(e). In such
circumstances, the court must appoint two psychiatrists or psychologists with expertise in
criminal behavior disorders to evaluate the defendant and testify at the hearing. Id. After
hearing and considering the experts’ testimony, the determination of whether the defendant is
a SVP as defined by subsection (a) of the statute is left to the court’s discretion.
Our review of a SVP adjudication for sufficiency of the evidence is limited. We look
to “‘whether there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s
finding.’” Mays v. State, 982 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Williams v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 377, 385-86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). We neither reweigh evidence nor
reassess the credibility of witnesses, and consider only the evidence that supports the
judgment and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. Id.
Given the evidence presented to the trial court at the time of Baugh’s SVP
adjudication, we cannot conclude that it is reasonably likely that Baugh’s appeal would have
led to a different result had appellate counsel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the SVP adjudication. Dr. Krause and Dr. Mueller both diagnosed Baugh with
Antisocial Personality Disorder pursuant to the guidelines in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM IV-TR-April 2005). Dr. Krause’s
report indicates that Baugh “has had a pervasive pattern of disregard for the violation of the
rights of others since approximately age fifteen,” provided assessment responses similar to
other individuals with substance dependence disorders, “has a history of not conforming to
social norms with respect to lawful behaviors,” and “is impulsive.” Based upon this
15 assessment, which included notice of Baugh’s extensive criminal history and his convictions
in the instant matter, Dr. Krause opined that it was likely Baugh would engage in one or more
of the offenses that fall within the SVP statute.
Dr. Mueller reached the same conclusion. Dr. Mueller’s report took into further
account that Baugh was “deceitful,” “demonstrates a reckless disregard for the safety of
others,” and “shows lack of remorse evident by rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or
stolen from another.” Dr. Mueller therefore concluded that Baugh “more than meets the
criteria established in DSM-IV-TR” for Antisocial Personality Disorder.
At the hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief, Baugh presented testimony
from Dr. Smith, whom he retained for purposes of challenging the SVP adjudication. Dr.
Smith provided testimony and reports opining that Baugh did not, as of the post-conviction
hearing, meet the statutory requirements for adjudication as an SVP, and specifically
identified points of disagreement with Dr. Krause’s use of assessment tools. None of this,
however, indicates that a different result would have been reasonably likely had appellate
counsel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the SVP adjudication on direct
appeal—let alone that counsel was ineffective in selecting issues for presentation on appeal.
We therefore cannot conclude that the post-conviction court erred when it denied Baugh’s
petition for relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Conclusion
The post-conviction court did not err when it denied Baugh’s petition for post-
conviction relief for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The same is true with respect to
16 Baugh’s petition on the basis of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We therefore
affirm the judgment denying Baugh’s petition for post-conviction relief.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and BARNES, J., concur.