PER CURIAM.
Arthur J. Sullivan has been a member of the Delaware Bar since 1955. By Order of this Court, dated December 27, 1984, Mr. Sullivan was suspended from the practice of law in this State pending further proceedings before the Board on Professional Responsibility (the Board). After a hearing, the Board’s Final Report recommended that Mr. Sullivan be disciplined because of the number and seriousness of his acts of misconduct. The respondent has filed objections to the Board’s Final Report.
At the disciplinary hearing, Mr. Sullivan admitted all factual allegations of the petition to discipline, but presented a defense of mental incompetence under Board Rule 20(g).
The respondent contends that the
Board erred in concluding that he had failed to prove mental incompetence under Board Rule 20(g)(1). Mr. Sullivan also claims that the Board failed to consider his mental condition as a mitigating factor, and erroneously refused to consider placing him on disability inactive status under Board Rule 20(c).
The record fully supports the Board’s findings. Given the seriousness and extent of Mr. Sullivan’s misconduct, we have no alternative but to disbar him.
I.
The Board found that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of serious misconduct. In 1976 he was disciplined by this Court for failing to preserve the identity of clients’ funds, withholding and converting to his own use funds belonging to others, and filing false Certificates of Compliance regarding the handling of clients’ funds. His later misconduct is of a similar nature.
In July, 1984, this Court found after a hearing that Mr. Sullivan had again failed
to
maintain a segregated escrow account for clients’ funds, had failed to maintain a balance in his escrow account sufficient to pay all clients’ funds therein, and failed to keep adequate records of the disposition of these funds. In numerous instances during the 1980’s he also failed to record various documents associated with real estate transactions, including mortgages and deeds, and misappropriated clients’ funds for his own use.
On July 27, 1984, this Court entered an order prohibiting Mr. Sullivan from handling fiduciary funds. However, he violated that order on four separate occasions. During a second hearing before this Court in December, 1984, he denied having violated the order, and represented that he had not held any clients’ funds in escrow since the July 27, 1984 order. At the time of these false representations, Mr. Sullivan had in fact conducted at least four real estate settlements, and had held clients’ funds in connection with those transactions. On April 16, 1985, respondent was found in contempt for his knowing and deliberate violation of the July, 1984 order and his false testimony of December, 1984.
In addition, on three separate occasions Mr. Sullivan falsely represented to this Court that certain funds in the case of
Home Insurance Co. v. Honaker,
Del. Supr., 480 A.2d 652 (1984), were being held by him in a segregated escrow account. In fact they had been commingled with Mr. Sullivan’s personal funds and misappropriated by him.
At the hearing before the Board, Mr. Sullivan admitted these facts, but asserted the defense of mental incompetence. He further claimed to have made full restitu
tion of all funds held, commingled, or misappropriated by him. The Board concluded that restitution was not a defense to the misuse of clients’ funds. The Board also concluded that Mr. Sullivan did not sustain his burden of establishing mental incompetence. At best, the testimony on this point only established an impairment of functioning that made choosing right from wrong “more difficult” for Mr. Sullivan. It did not evidence an inability to function as contemplated by Board Rule 20(g).
II.
Mr. Sullivan contends that the Board erred in concluding that he had failed to meet his burden of proof under Rule 20(g). Specifically, he maintains that it was error for the Board to apply the standards for criminal insanity found in 11
Del.C.
§ 401
to determine whether he was mentally incompetent under the Rule. He argues that the Board should have applied the definition of mental incompetence found in the Maryland Rules on Discipline and Inactive Status of Attorneys:
Unable to render adequate legal service by reason of mental ... illness or infirmity ...
Md.Ann.Code Rule BVl.(i) (1987).
The Board, however, did not expressly adopt any standard for mental incompetence. The Final Report suggests merely that mental incompetence, under the complete defense provision of Rule 20(g), must mean an inability to function. The proof offered in this case only established an impairment of functioning which made choosing right from wrong more difficult. The evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Mr. Sullivan had the ability to choose right from wrong. Given the misconduct here, involving repeated acts of dishonesty, we consider the Board’s analysis of Mr. Sullivan’s ability to function to be a proper application of the standard under Board Rule 20(g).
Mr. Sullivan also contends that the Board erred in refusing to place him on disability inactive status under Board Rule 20(c). The Board concluded that such a disposition on this record was wholly inappropriate. We agree.
III.
Mr. Sullivan’s numerous instances of misconduct have shown that he is unfit to practice his profession. In viewing his conduct, the Board concluded that he violated seven separate provisions of the Disciplinary Rules a total of twelve times.
The commingling and misappropriation of
clients’ funds by a lawyer have been considered sufficient grounds for disbarment by this Court.
See, In re Clark,
Del.Supr., 250 A.2d 505, 506 (1969);
Matter of England,
Del.Supr., 421 A.2d 885, 886-87 (1980). Here, Mr. Sullivan has compounded his misconduct by filing false certifications that he was in compliance with the disciplinary rules regarding the segregation of clients’ funds, and by falsely testifying to this. As the Supreme Court of New Hampshire has stated when faced with similar misconduct:
Inattention and negligence in handling matters entrusted to an attorney by clients, and the resort to misleading statements to cover up these deficiencies to the detriment of clients do not measure up to the standards demanded of members of the bar of this State ... Misappropriation of clients’ funds is a serious error which in and of itself justified disbarment. Falsely representing that state of affairs under oath is reprehensible ...
Eshleman’s Case,
N.H.Supr., 126 N.H.
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PER CURIAM.
Arthur J. Sullivan has been a member of the Delaware Bar since 1955. By Order of this Court, dated December 27, 1984, Mr. Sullivan was suspended from the practice of law in this State pending further proceedings before the Board on Professional Responsibility (the Board). After a hearing, the Board’s Final Report recommended that Mr. Sullivan be disciplined because of the number and seriousness of his acts of misconduct. The respondent has filed objections to the Board’s Final Report.
At the disciplinary hearing, Mr. Sullivan admitted all factual allegations of the petition to discipline, but presented a defense of mental incompetence under Board Rule 20(g).
The respondent contends that the
Board erred in concluding that he had failed to prove mental incompetence under Board Rule 20(g)(1). Mr. Sullivan also claims that the Board failed to consider his mental condition as a mitigating factor, and erroneously refused to consider placing him on disability inactive status under Board Rule 20(c).
The record fully supports the Board’s findings. Given the seriousness and extent of Mr. Sullivan’s misconduct, we have no alternative but to disbar him.
I.
The Board found that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of serious misconduct. In 1976 he was disciplined by this Court for failing to preserve the identity of clients’ funds, withholding and converting to his own use funds belonging to others, and filing false Certificates of Compliance regarding the handling of clients’ funds. His later misconduct is of a similar nature.
In July, 1984, this Court found after a hearing that Mr. Sullivan had again failed
to
maintain a segregated escrow account for clients’ funds, had failed to maintain a balance in his escrow account sufficient to pay all clients’ funds therein, and failed to keep adequate records of the disposition of these funds. In numerous instances during the 1980’s he also failed to record various documents associated with real estate transactions, including mortgages and deeds, and misappropriated clients’ funds for his own use.
On July 27, 1984, this Court entered an order prohibiting Mr. Sullivan from handling fiduciary funds. However, he violated that order on four separate occasions. During a second hearing before this Court in December, 1984, he denied having violated the order, and represented that he had not held any clients’ funds in escrow since the July 27, 1984 order. At the time of these false representations, Mr. Sullivan had in fact conducted at least four real estate settlements, and had held clients’ funds in connection with those transactions. On April 16, 1985, respondent was found in contempt for his knowing and deliberate violation of the July, 1984 order and his false testimony of December, 1984.
In addition, on three separate occasions Mr. Sullivan falsely represented to this Court that certain funds in the case of
Home Insurance Co. v. Honaker,
Del. Supr., 480 A.2d 652 (1984), were being held by him in a segregated escrow account. In fact they had been commingled with Mr. Sullivan’s personal funds and misappropriated by him.
At the hearing before the Board, Mr. Sullivan admitted these facts, but asserted the defense of mental incompetence. He further claimed to have made full restitu
tion of all funds held, commingled, or misappropriated by him. The Board concluded that restitution was not a defense to the misuse of clients’ funds. The Board also concluded that Mr. Sullivan did not sustain his burden of establishing mental incompetence. At best, the testimony on this point only established an impairment of functioning that made choosing right from wrong “more difficult” for Mr. Sullivan. It did not evidence an inability to function as contemplated by Board Rule 20(g).
II.
Mr. Sullivan contends that the Board erred in concluding that he had failed to meet his burden of proof under Rule 20(g). Specifically, he maintains that it was error for the Board to apply the standards for criminal insanity found in 11
Del.C.
§ 401
to determine whether he was mentally incompetent under the Rule. He argues that the Board should have applied the definition of mental incompetence found in the Maryland Rules on Discipline and Inactive Status of Attorneys:
Unable to render adequate legal service by reason of mental ... illness or infirmity ...
Md.Ann.Code Rule BVl.(i) (1987).
The Board, however, did not expressly adopt any standard for mental incompetence. The Final Report suggests merely that mental incompetence, under the complete defense provision of Rule 20(g), must mean an inability to function. The proof offered in this case only established an impairment of functioning which made choosing right from wrong more difficult. The evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Mr. Sullivan had the ability to choose right from wrong. Given the misconduct here, involving repeated acts of dishonesty, we consider the Board’s analysis of Mr. Sullivan’s ability to function to be a proper application of the standard under Board Rule 20(g).
Mr. Sullivan also contends that the Board erred in refusing to place him on disability inactive status under Board Rule 20(c). The Board concluded that such a disposition on this record was wholly inappropriate. We agree.
III.
Mr. Sullivan’s numerous instances of misconduct have shown that he is unfit to practice his profession. In viewing his conduct, the Board concluded that he violated seven separate provisions of the Disciplinary Rules a total of twelve times.
The commingling and misappropriation of
clients’ funds by a lawyer have been considered sufficient grounds for disbarment by this Court.
See, In re Clark,
Del.Supr., 250 A.2d 505, 506 (1969);
Matter of England,
Del.Supr., 421 A.2d 885, 886-87 (1980). Here, Mr. Sullivan has compounded his misconduct by filing false certifications that he was in compliance with the disciplinary rules regarding the segregation of clients’ funds, and by falsely testifying to this. As the Supreme Court of New Hampshire has stated when faced with similar misconduct:
Inattention and negligence in handling matters entrusted to an attorney by clients, and the resort to misleading statements to cover up these deficiencies to the detriment of clients do not measure up to the standards demanded of members of the bar of this State ... Misappropriation of clients’ funds is a serious error which in and of itself justified disbarment. Falsely representing that state of affairs under oath is reprehensible ...
Eshleman’s Case,
N.H.Supr., 126 N.H. 1, 489 A.2d 571, 573-74 (1985).
The Supreme Court of California has stated that fraudulent misrepresentations to the State Bar and before the Supreme Court may constitute a “greater offense” than misappropriation.
Worth v. State Bar of California,
Cal.Supr., 22 Cal.3d 707, 150 Cal.Rptr. 273, 276, 586 P.2d 588, 590 (1978).
Cain v. State Bar of California,
Cal.Supr., 25 Cal.3d 956, 160 Cal.Rptr. 362, 365, 603 P.2d 464, 467 (1979). This Court has also taken a stern view of misconduct involving false representations before it:
When there can be no reliance upon the word or oath of a party, he is, manifestly, disqualified, and, when such fact satisfactorily appears, the court not only have the power, but it is their duty to strike the party from the role of attorneys.
In re Bennethum,
Del.Supr., 161 A.2d 229, 235
reh’g denied,
162 A.2d 429 (1960) (quoting
In re Percy,
N.Y.Ct.App., 36 N.Y. 651 (1867)).
See also, In re Green,
Del.Supr., 464 A.2d 881, 885 (1983);
Kosseff v. Board of Bar Examiners,
Del.Supr., 475 A.2d 349, 353 (1984).
Other courts have held that false testimony alone, absent other misconduct, warrants disbarment.
See, e.g., People v. McMichael,
Colo.Supr., 199 Colo. 433, 609 P.2d 633, 634 (1980). The neglect of legal matters, similar to that shown by Mr. Sullivan, taken alone, warranted disbarment in
Matter of McKenna,
Ind.Supr., 422 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1981):
Respondent’s misconduct relates to uncomplicated, routine matters which can and should be expeditiously accomplished by any attorney. A client should be able to anticipate prompt resolution of legal questions of this nature. Respondent’s conduct demonstrates that, for whatever reason, he is not capable of handling the simplest of legal matters.
In view of these considerations, this Court is forced to conclude that in order to protect an unsuspecting public from conduct of this nature and in order to preserve the integrity of the profession, the strongest sanction available should be imposed.
Thus, when viewed alone, many of Mr. Sullivan’s acts of misconduct would justify disbarment. When they are viewed together, this Court can reach no other conclusion. In performance of our duty to protect the public from a lawyer who has shown himself unfit to practice his profession, we have no alternative but to impose this sanction.
Disbarment is not an act of punishment. Rather, it is for the protection of the public. Since the focus is not on the lawyer, but instead on the danger to the public, Mr. Sullivan’s mental condition is not a mitigating factor here.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Keller,
Pa.Supr., 509 Pa. 573, 506 A.2d 872, 877-78 (1986).
Under our exclusive jurisdiction over the Bar, the respondent, Arthur J. Sullivan, is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys entitled to practice before the courts of this State.