Matter of Santana

583 A.2d 1011, 1990 WL 207324
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 14, 1990
Docket89-498
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 583 A.2d 1011 (Matter of Santana) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Santana, 583 A.2d 1011, 1990 WL 207324 (D.C. 1990).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Respondent was charged with neglecting two separate legal matters entrusted to him in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). Specifically, respondent was charged with failing to file appropriate documents, failing to communicate with clients after receiving *1012 pre-payment, and failing to notify clients of his change of address and that he was leaving town.

After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing committee found that by clear and convincing evidence, these violations had in fact occurred. The Board subsequently found that respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(3) by neglecting legal matters. Bar counsel recommended a suspension of 30 days.. In addition, a requirement of restitution in the amount of $500.00 to complainant Bar-rantes and $250.00 to complainant Deskin representing half of prepayment, was recommended. At the hearing, respondent agreed to pay back the parties; however, it was never done.

The Board recommends that respondent be suspended for 60 days due to his failure to return fees as promised, his lack of contrition, and the harm and aggravation caused to his clients. In addition, the Board adopts the recommendation that restitution in the amount of $500.00 be ordered to Complainant Barrantes because no legal work was performed on her behalf. The Board made no recommendation regarding the return of fees to the complainant Deskin due to the fact that respondent did draft and negotiate a property settlement for her.

We accept the Board’s findings of fact as supported by substantial evidence. We attach the Board’s Report and Recommendation hereto and incorporate it by reference.

Accordingly, it is:

ORDERED that, pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-2502 (1989), respondent, Jose A. Santana, Jr., is suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for 60 days. In addition, respondent is required to return fees in the amount of $500.00 to Eloí-sa Barrantes. This order shall be effective thirty (30) days from the date of this opinion. Respondent’s attention is directed to the provisions of District of Columbia Bar Rule XI, § 14 governing disbarred and suspended attorneys.

APPENDIX

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Bar Docket Numbers: 304-88 and 375-88

In The Matter of: Jose A. Santana, Jr., respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Background

Hearing Committee Number Ten has found, as to two separate cases, that Respondent neglected legal matters entrusted to him in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). The Hearing Committee has recommended that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for thirty days. Except as specifically noted herein, the Board concurs in the factual findings of the Hearing Committee. We, however, disagree with the Hearing Committee recommendation for sanction and find that the misconduct, because of the significant factors in aggravation, warrants a suspension of sixty days.

Respondent did not respond in any manner to the charges served on him. He did not file an answer to the specification of charges and was not present when the Hearing Committee proceedings began. He arrived at the hearing after Bar Counsel had rested its case. At that point, he chose neither to testify nor contest the charges.

Facts

In Bar Docket 304-88, the complainant, Carmen Deskin, retained Respondent in October 1986 to assist her in obtaining a divorce. Ms. Deskin paid Respondent $500. Respondent drafted a property settlement agreement for Ms. Deskin and negotiated it with Mr. Deskin. Thereafter, Respondent did nothing. He did not file a complaint for divorce with the appropriate court. He did not communicate with Ms. Deskin.

Ms. Deskin attempted many times to reach Respondent by telephone and was told that he was not in his office or in *1013 court. Thereafter, Ms. Deskin took a day off from work and went to Respondent’s office address at 450 5th Street, N.W. Upon her arrival, she was told that Respondent had moved to an office on Pennsylvania Avenue. She visited the Pennsylvania Avenue address and was told that Respondent was not in, that no one knew where he was or how he could be reached, and that Respondent would soon be moving from the Pennsylvania Avenue address. She went to the court in an effort to find Respondent — with no success. Respondent simply disappeared. Ms. Deskin could not recover the documents that she had given to him. Nor could she obtain the property agreement which he had prepared for her. 1

In Bar Docket 375-88, the complainant, Eloisa Barrantes, retained Respondent in December 1986 to assist her sister in immigrating to the United States from Colombia, South America. Ms. Barrantes paid Respondent $500 of his $1,000 fee and, at his request, turned over to Respondent her birth certificate, her tax returns, bank statements, a property agreement and her sister’s birth certificate. Thereafter, Respondent did nothing. He never filed any documents designed to permit Ms. Bar-rantes’ sister to immigrate to the United States.

As did the complainant in the first matter, Ms. Barrantes attempted to reach Respondent on numerous occasions without success. She then visited his office and was told that Respondent had moved but no one informed her of the location of the new office. Again, Respondent had disappeared.

Discussion

There is no question that Respondent neglected his obligations to both clients— Ms. Deskin and Ms. Barrantes. DR 6-101(A)(3) provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.

The Hearing Committee found, by clear and convincing documentary evidence as well as the oral testimony of the complainant, that Respondent in the Deskin matter did nothing after he drafted and secured the signatures on the property settlement agreement. He did not file the complaint for divorce in the court. He failed to communicate with Ms. Deskin and did not inform her of her changes in office address, nor the fact that he had left town. At the hearing, he offered little explanation for his behavior except to say that once he drafted the property settlement he “had to leave town” (Transcript, page 48-49).

In the Barrantes matter, the Hearing Committee found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent accepted a $500 fee and then did nothing. He filed no documents, he failed to communicate with his client, he did not notify her of the change in his office address and did not tell her he was leaving town. Respondent claims he never followed through on this matter “because of personal reasons and leaving town” (Transcript, page 49).

Lawyers cannot simply disappear and leave their clients in the lurch. Clients have a right to expect that their legal interests are being represented. Lawyers have an obligation not only to communicate with their clients but to let them know if, for some reason, they can no longer handle their cases. Respondent, in the matter before us, did neither. In re Jones,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
583 A.2d 1011, 1990 WL 207324, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-santana-dc-1990.