Matter of River Landings, Inc.

180 B.R. 701, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 470, 1995 WL 217258
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedApril 4, 1995
Docket19-40141
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 180 B.R. 701 (Matter of River Landings, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of River Landings, Inc., 180 B.R. 701, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 470, 1995 WL 217258 (Ga. 1995).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION AND REIMBURSEMENT

LAMAR W. DAVIS, Jr., Chief Judge.

Kathleen Horne, former counsel for the Debtor, River Landings, Inc., applied for approval of professional fees pursuant to Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code. Ms. Horne represented the Debtor in this Chapter 11 proceeding until a recent order was entered permitting her withdrawal. By order dated February 22, 1995, the Court approved Ms. Horne’s fee application based upon evidence and testimony presented at a hearing on the matter. Because the award was based upon a finding that the applicable lodestar rate in this district should be increased, I undertake herein to amplify that ruling.

1) The Award of Attorney’s Fees Generally

Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the award of compensation to a debtor’s attorney, and it provides:

(a) After notice to any parties in interest "and to the United States trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329 of this title, the court may award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to the debtor’s attorney—
(1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by such trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney, as the case may be, and by any paraprofessional persons employed by such trustee, professional person, or attorney, as the case may be, based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a case under this title; and
(2) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a). 1 The touchstone under section 330, then, is “reasonable compensa *704 tion” for actual and necessary services rendered, 2 and the legislative history to section 380 suggests that “reasonable compensation” is to be determined with reference to the cost of comparable non-bankruptcy services. 3 As one court has noted,

In enacting Section 330(a), Congress sought to ensure that bankruptcy attorneys would not be paid less than their colleagues practicing in other areas of the law. Congress expressed its concern that if the field did not provide adequate compensation, bankruptcy specialists, who enable the system to operate smoothly, efficiently and expeditiously would be driven elsewhere. H.Rep.No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 329-30 (1977), reprinted in U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, 5963, 6286.

In re Gianulias, 111 B.R. 867, 870 (E.D.Cal.1989). 4

2) Calculation of the Lodestar Amount in this Matter

The first' step under Section 330 is to determine the “lodestar” fee, which is arrived at by multiplying “the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended.” Grant, 908 F.2d at 878. See also Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir.1988) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). “A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. The applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence showing that the requested rate is in line with market rates, and this burden requires something more than the applicant’s own affidavit. Id. The applicant must present evidence of “rates actually billed and paid in similar lawsuits.” Id.

Ms. Horne met her burden by presenting the testimony and affidavits of four local attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation in bankruptcy and other commercial matters. Her evidence revealed that the usual and customary hourly rate in this district for legal services requiring expertise beyond that required for basic legal services ranges from $150.00 to $185.00 per hour, and may occasionally reach $200.00 per hour. Pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, I conclude that these four attorneys qualify as experts, and their opinion testimony as to the reasonable hourly rate is probative in arriving at an appropriate market rate for attorneys’ services in the Southern District of Georgia in Chapter 11 cases, or cases filed under other chapters which involve similarly complex issues. The testimony and affidavits of these members of the Savannah bar support a conclusion that the prevailing market rate for such services exceeds $125.00 per hour, the rate currently applicable in this district. Accordingly, I *705 find that, in the absence of special circumstances justifying á higher rate, the appropriate lodestar rate in this district for Chapter 11 representation and similar work is $150.00 per hour.

In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful of my colleague’s recent decision in In re Barger, et al., 180 B.R. 326 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1995). In Barger, Judge John S. Dalis ruled that the appropriate lodestar rate for “basic legal services,” including Chapter 13 debtor representation in this district, has increased from $100.00 to $125.00 per hour:

Counsel has established to my satisfaction that the current hourly fee for comparable legal services other than in the area of bankruptcy within the relevant legal community, the Southern District of Georgia, charged by lawyers of comparable skill, experience and reputation for basic legal services comparable to Chapter 13 debtor representation, is One Hundred Twenty-Five and No/100 ($125.00) Dollars per hour.

Id. at 329.

I adopt and follow his conclusions as to the appropriate rate for basic services. 5 This ease, however, raises the issue of the prevailing hourly rate for services in more complex and sophisticated commercial bankruptcy matters, and this Court has long recognized that the lodestar rate in bankruptcy is not monolithic:

Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession representation requires a level of expertise beyond minimal competency in bankruptcy law.

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Bluebook (online)
180 B.R. 701, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 470, 1995 WL 217258, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-river-landings-inc-gasb-1995.