ORDER
JOHN S. DALIS, Bankruptcy Judge.
By application Angela McLeroy and Evita Paschall, attorneys for the debtors in the foregoing Chapter 13 cases, seek an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $950.00 in each case. In essence, counsel seeks an award in excess of the maximum compensation established under General Order Number 9 (1990) issued by the Honorable Lamar W. Davis, Jr., Chief Judge of this Court and filed May 3, 1990, which General Order provides in pertinent part:
I have reviewed the present procedures for allowance of attorney’s fees in Chapter 13 cases. This included consideration of the typical obligations undertaken by Chapter 13 attorneys, the time and effort devoted to the task, the current customary allowed fee ..., the passage of time since [the] ... fee was last adjusted, and the fees customarily awarded in other districts.
Effective in all cases filed after May 15, 1990, a claim for attorney’s fees for services rendered and expenses advanced to a Chapter 13 debtor will be deemed automatically approved by the Court, in the absence of an objection, so long as said claim
does not exceed
the sum of $750.00_ Debtors’ counsel are directed to file written statements pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b) disclosing the fee arrangement with their clients.
In the event that debtors’ attorney subsequently determines that an award of $750.00 does not adequately compensate the attorney for legal services rendered, the attorney may petition for additional compensation, but shall be required to establish the reasonableness of all attorney’s fees from the beginning of the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330 under the standard set in
Norman v. Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery,
836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir.1988).
Debtors’ attorney may, of course, agree to represent debtors in said cases for a
lesser amount should they choose and are urged to do so in appropriate cases when the amount and nature of the debt or other relevant factors result in less substantial expenditure of attorney’s time.
In each case, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 329
and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2016(b)
the attorney representing the debtor has disclosed an agreement for compensation of $950.00. Under § 329(b) the compensation must be reasonable. The determination of reasonableness for debtor’s attorney’s compensation is in part determined pursuant to § 330, “... the court may award ... to the debtor’s attorney — (1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by such ... attorney ... based on the nature, the extent, the value of such services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a case under this title; and (2) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.”
The “lodestar” method of fee determination, the reasonable time expended by counsel in performing the reasonably required services rendered multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, is the required analysis.
See Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery Co.,
908 F.2d 874, 878-79 (11th Cir.1990);
Norman, supra,
at 1299 (citing
Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983);
In re Curtis,
83 B.R. 853 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1988). Under General Order Number 9 (1990) this court took into consideration the typical obligations undertaken by a Chapter 13 attorney in representing a debtor, the time and effort typically devoted to the representation, and applied to that expenditure of time an hourly rate of $100.00 to arrive at an approved fee without separate application of $750.00.
A reasonable hourly rate is determined by the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience and reputation.
Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 889 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n. 11, 79 L.E.2d 891, 900 n. 11 (1984). Accord
Gains v. Dougherty County Board of Education,
775 F.2d 1565, 1571 (11th Cir.1985). The relevant legal community used in determining the prevailing market rate by this court is the legal community within the Southern District of Georgia,
see In re S.T.N. Enterprises,
70 B.R. 823 (Bankr.D.Vt.1987). While the applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the requested hourly rate is in line with prevailing market rates,
NAACP v. City of Evergreen,
812 F.2d
1332, 1338 (11th Cir.1987), this court has previously established, from competent evidence presented, that an hourly rate not exceeding One Hundred and No/100 ($100.00) Dollars per hour represents a reasonable hourly rate for competent legal services in this legal community.
In re: Lighting Galleries,
Chapter 11 Case No. 87-10455 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1987).
In re Burke Manufacturing Company, Inc.,
Chapter 13 case No. 91-10468, slip op. at 2-3 (Bankr.S.D.Ga. Dalis, J. September 10,1991), citing
In re Georgian Arms Properties and Windover Properties
Consolidated Chapter 11 case No. 89-10313, slip op. at 5-6 (Bankr.S.D.Ga. Dalis, J. April 20, 1990).
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ORDER
JOHN S. DALIS, Bankruptcy Judge.
By application Angela McLeroy and Evita Paschall, attorneys for the debtors in the foregoing Chapter 13 cases, seek an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $950.00 in each case. In essence, counsel seeks an award in excess of the maximum compensation established under General Order Number 9 (1990) issued by the Honorable Lamar W. Davis, Jr., Chief Judge of this Court and filed May 3, 1990, which General Order provides in pertinent part:
I have reviewed the present procedures for allowance of attorney’s fees in Chapter 13 cases. This included consideration of the typical obligations undertaken by Chapter 13 attorneys, the time and effort devoted to the task, the current customary allowed fee ..., the passage of time since [the] ... fee was last adjusted, and the fees customarily awarded in other districts.
Effective in all cases filed after May 15, 1990, a claim for attorney’s fees for services rendered and expenses advanced to a Chapter 13 debtor will be deemed automatically approved by the Court, in the absence of an objection, so long as said claim
does not exceed
the sum of $750.00_ Debtors’ counsel are directed to file written statements pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b) disclosing the fee arrangement with their clients.
In the event that debtors’ attorney subsequently determines that an award of $750.00 does not adequately compensate the attorney for legal services rendered, the attorney may petition for additional compensation, but shall be required to establish the reasonableness of all attorney’s fees from the beginning of the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330 under the standard set in
Norman v. Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery,
836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir.1988).
Debtors’ attorney may, of course, agree to represent debtors in said cases for a
lesser amount should they choose and are urged to do so in appropriate cases when the amount and nature of the debt or other relevant factors result in less substantial expenditure of attorney’s time.
In each case, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 329
and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2016(b)
the attorney representing the debtor has disclosed an agreement for compensation of $950.00. Under § 329(b) the compensation must be reasonable. The determination of reasonableness for debtor’s attorney’s compensation is in part determined pursuant to § 330, “... the court may award ... to the debtor’s attorney — (1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by such ... attorney ... based on the nature, the extent, the value of such services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a case under this title; and (2) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.”
The “lodestar” method of fee determination, the reasonable time expended by counsel in performing the reasonably required services rendered multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, is the required analysis.
See Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery Co.,
908 F.2d 874, 878-79 (11th Cir.1990);
Norman, supra,
at 1299 (citing
Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983);
In re Curtis,
83 B.R. 853 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1988). Under General Order Number 9 (1990) this court took into consideration the typical obligations undertaken by a Chapter 13 attorney in representing a debtor, the time and effort typically devoted to the representation, and applied to that expenditure of time an hourly rate of $100.00 to arrive at an approved fee without separate application of $750.00.
A reasonable hourly rate is determined by the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience and reputation.
Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 889 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n. 11, 79 L.E.2d 891, 900 n. 11 (1984). Accord
Gains v. Dougherty County Board of Education,
775 F.2d 1565, 1571 (11th Cir.1985). The relevant legal community used in determining the prevailing market rate by this court is the legal community within the Southern District of Georgia,
see In re S.T.N. Enterprises,
70 B.R. 823 (Bankr.D.Vt.1987). While the applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the requested hourly rate is in line with prevailing market rates,
NAACP v. City of Evergreen,
812 F.2d
1332, 1338 (11th Cir.1987), this court has previously established, from competent evidence presented, that an hourly rate not exceeding One Hundred and No/100 ($100.00) Dollars per hour represents a reasonable hourly rate for competent legal services in this legal community.
In re: Lighting Galleries,
Chapter 11 Case No. 87-10455 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1987).
In re Burke Manufacturing Company, Inc.,
Chapter 13 case No. 91-10468, slip op. at 2-3 (Bankr.S.D.Ga. Dalis, J. September 10,1991), citing
In re Georgian Arms Properties and Windover Properties
Consolidated Chapter 11 case No. 89-10313, slip op. at 5-6 (Bankr.S.D.Ga. Dalis, J. April 20, 1990).
Counsel urges that I revisit the One Hundred and No/100 ($100.00) Dollar per hour lodestar rate for the relevant legal community, the Southern District of Georgia and increase that rate to One Hundred Twenty-Five and No/100 ($125.00) Dollars per hour. In support of counsel’s position, several members of the Augusta bar appeared and testified regarding the ordinary customary hourly fees charged by lawyers in this community ranging from a base rate of One Hundred Twenty-Five and No/100 ($125.00) Dollars upward to Two Hundred and No/100 ($200.00) Dollars per hour for representation requiring a high level of experience and expertise. Counsel has established to my satisfaction that the current hourly fee for comparable legal services other than in the area of bankruptcy within the relevant legal community, the Southern District of Georgia, charged by lawyers of comparable skill, experience and reputation for basic legal services comparable to Chapter 13 debtor representation, is One Hundred Twenty-Five and No/ 100 ($125.00) Dollars per hour. Applying this reasonable hourly rate of One Hundred Twenty-Five and No/100 ($125.00) Dollars per hour to the typical obligations undertaken by a Chapter 13 debtor’s attorney and the time and effort devoted to the task of representation the requested fee of $950.00 is reasonable and is ORDERED allowed.