Matter of Peckham Rd. Corp. v Ulster County - 2026 NY Slip Op 04541
Matter of Peckham Rd. Corp. v Ulster County
2026 NY Slip Op 04541
July 23, 2026
Appellate Division, Third Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
In the Matter of Peckham Road Corp., Appellant,
v
Ulster County et al., Respondents.
Decided and Entered:July 23, 2026
CV-25-0612
Calendar Date: May 28, 2026
Before: Garry, P.J., Fisher, Mackey, Corcoran And Ryba, JJ.
Couch White, LLP, Albany (Donald J. Hillmann of counsel), for appellant.
Cook, Kurtz & Murphy, PC, Kingston (John Burns of counsel), for respondents.
[*1]
Ryba, J.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (David Gandin, J.), entered April 2, 2025 in Ulster County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, seeking to annul Local Law No. 5-2023 of the County of Ulster.
In 2023, the Ulster County Legislature enacted Local Law No. 5-2023 (hereinafter Local Law 5) for the stated purpose of promoting apprenticeship training in government contracts. To that end, Local Law 5 requires contractors bidding on certain contracts with respondent Ulster County to participate in an appropriate apprenticeship training program that is registered with and approved by the State Department of Labor. In addition, Local Law 5 requires contractors to demonstrate that, for each of the preceding five years, their apprenticeship program maintained a minimum annual graduation rate of 30% and graduated at least three trade-specific apprentices (hereinafter the graduation requirements). The graduation requirements apply to certain high-value construction contracts involving Ulster County that exceed a designated monetary threshold.
In January 2025, respondents incorporated the provisions of Local Law 5 into a request for bids for a county road resurfacing project. The bid specifications therefore limited eligibility to contractors participating in apprenticeship programs that were both approved by the Department of Labor and also satisfied the graduation requirements imposed by Local Law 5. Petitioner, a highway construction contractor that participates in an apprenticeship program that is approved by the Department of Labor but does not satisfy the graduation requirements, filed bid protests contending, among other things, that the graduation requirements conflict with General Municipal Law § 103 and Labor Law § 816-b by imposing an unauthorized precondition to the award of a public contract to the lowest responsible bidder. After respondents declined to remove the graduation requirements from the bid specifications, petitioner commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action challenging the graduation requirements. As relevant here, the petition/complaint alleges that Local Law 5 is invalid under the preemption doctrine, and that respondents' determination to include the graduation requirements in the bid specifications is arbitrary and capricious. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and petitioner appeals.
Supreme Court properly denied petitioner's request for a judgment declaring that Local Law 5 is invalid by virtue of conflict and field preemption under state and federal law. First addressing state law, conflict preemption exists where a local law directly conflicts with state law by either permitting conduct the state law prohibits, prohibiting conduct specifically permitted by state law or imposing restrictions on rights granted by the state (see People v Torres, 37 NY3d 256, 268-269 [2021]; Pusatere [*2]v City of Albany, 214 AD3d 91, 93 [3d Dept 2023], lv granted 40 NY3d 907 [2023]). Conflict preemption principles are applied with caution to avoid unduly restricting the authority of local governments to legislate in areas of legitimate local concern (see Garcia v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 31 NY3d 601, 617 [2018]; New York State Club Assn. v City of New York, 69 NY2d 211, 221 [1987], affd 487 US 1 [1988]). Thus, the mere fact that state and local laws address the same subject matter does not, standing alone, give rise to conflict preemption (see People v Torres, 37 NY3d at 265; Garcia v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 31 NY3d at 617; Pusatere v City of Albany, 214 AD3d at 93). Field preemption, by contrast, applies where the Legislature has evidenced an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation, thereby precluding supplementary local legislation even in the absence of a direct conflict (see People v Diack, 24 NY3d 674, 679 [2015]; DJL Rest. Corp. v City of New York, 96 NY2d 91, 95 [2001]; Matter of Blueline Commuter, Inc. v Montgomery County, 126 AD3d 1161, 1163 [3d Dept 2015]). Such intent may be express or implied from the nature of the subject matter being regulated and the scope and purpose of the state's legislative and regulatory scheme (see Glen Oaks Vill. Owners, Inc. v City of New York, 44 NY3d 468, 473 [2025]; People v Diack, 24 NY3d at 679; Albany Area Bldrs. Assn. v Town of Guilderland, 74 NY2d 372, 377 [1989]).
Contrary to petitioner's contention, Local Law 5 does not directly conflict with either General Municipal Law § 103 or Labor Law § 816-b. General Municipal Law § 103 embodies the longstanding policy favoring open and competitive bidding for government contracts by requiring municipalities to award public contracts to the lowest responsible bidder unless expressly authorized otherwise by statute (see General Municipal Law § 103 [1]; Matter of L & M Bus Corp. v New York City Dept. of Educ., 17 NY3d 149, 156 [2011]; Matter of Council of City of N.Y. v Bloomberg, 6 NY3d 380, 391 [2006]; Matter of New York State Ch., Inc., Associated Gen. Contrs. of Am. v New York State Thruway Auth., 88 NY2d 56, 68 [1996]; Matter of Conduit & Found. Corp. v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 66 NY2d 144, 148 [1985]). However, General Municipal Law § 103 does not prohibit all bid specifications that may favor certain bidders over others (see Matter of Blueline Commuter, Inc. v Montgomery County, 126 AD3d at 1163). Municipalities retain discretion to establish reasonable qualifications designed to further legitimate public interests, provided that such requirements are not enacted for the purpose of favoring a particular bidder and bear a rational relationship to the objectives sought to be achieved (see Matter of L & M Bus Corp. v New York City Dept. of Educ., 17 NY3d at 156-157; Matter of Blueline Commuter, Inc. v Montgomery County, 126 AD3d at 1163).
Here, Local Law 5 does not directly conflict with General Municipal [*3]Law § 103 because it does not alter the requirement that public contracts be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. Rather, it establishes uniform apprenticeship-related qualifications applicable to all bidders seeking certain high-value public works contracts. Nor does the local law violate the competitive bidding principles underlying General Municipal Law § 103. Although the graduation requirements may reduce the pool of eligible bidders, respondents could rationally conclude that apprenticeship programs demonstrating sustained graduation rates and a consistent record of producing trained workers are more likely to provide a skilled and stable workforce for large public construction projects. Accordingly, the graduation requirements further a legitimate public purpose and do not constitute the type of anticompetitive restriction prohibited by General Municipal Law § 103 (see Matter of L & M Bus Corp. v New York City Dept. of Educ., 17 NY3d at 156; Matter of Blueline Commuter, Inc. v Montgomery County, 126 AD3d at 1163).
Nor does Labor Law § 816-b conflict with the challenged graduation requirements. That statute expressly authorizes governmental entities to require contractors and subcontractors to maintain apprenticeship agreements that are registered with and approved by the Commissioner of Labor and are appropriate for the type and scope of work to be performed (see Labor Law § 816-b [2]). Although petitioner contends that Labor Law § 816-b bars municipalities from imposing any apprenticeship requirements beyond Department of Labor registration and approval, the statutory language contains no such limitation. Significantly, Local Law 5 does not alter the criteria governing Department of Labor registration, purport to regulate the internal operation of apprenticeship programs or disqualify any program from state approval. Instead, it simply establishes additional bidder qualifications applicable only to contractors seeking to compete for certain high-value public construction contracts. Accordingly, Local Law 5 supplements, rather than conflicts with, the state statutory scheme.
We are likewise unpersuaded that Local Law 5 is barred by field preemption inasmuch as the Legislature has not so comprehensively regulated apprenticeship programs so as to evince an intent to assume full regulatory authority over the subject matter to the exclusion of all local legislation. The relevant statutes and regulations govern the registration and oversight of apprenticeship programs, but they do not purport to regulate the qualifications that municipalities may impose upon bidders for public works contracts. Indeed, nothing in the relevant statutory scheme expressly prohibits local governments from adopting apprenticeship-related requirements when awarding public contracts, nor does it reveal a clear intent to exercise exclusive control over all matters relating to apprenticeship qualifications to the exclusion of local governments. The mere fact that the [*4]Legislature enacted specific legislation in the particular field of apprentice training is alone insufficient to conclude that local agency regulation of the same field is precluded (see Glen Oaks Vil. Owners, Inc. v City of New York, 44 NY3d at 473; Garcia v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 31 NY3d at 620). As the state has not completely occupied the entire field of apprenticeship regulation, field preemption under state law has not been established.
We also reject petitioners' contention that Local Law 5 is preempted by federal law under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (see 29 USC § 1001 et seq. [hereinafter ERISA]) and the National Labor Relations Act (see 29 USC § 157 [hereinafter the NLRA]). Under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution, federal law may preempt state or local enactments where Congress expressly so provides, where federal regulation occupies an entire field, or where the challenged enactment directly conflicts with federal law (see Matter of Quigley v Village of E. Aurora, 193 AD3d 207, 210-211 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 908 [2021]; Matter of Pascazi v Gardner, 106 AD3d 1143, 1144 [3d Dept 2013], appeal dismissed 21 NY3d 1057 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 857 [2013]). The presumption against federal preemption is strong in matters traditionally regulated by state and local government (see Sutton 58 Assoc. LLC v Pilevsky, 36 NY3d 297, 306 [2020], cert dismissed ___ US ___, 142 S Ct 53 [2021]; Matter of Pascazi v Gardner, 106 AD3d at 1144).
ERISA broadly preempts any state or local law that "relates to any employee benefit plan" (29 USC § 1144 [a]), which includes apprenticeship or other training programs (29 USC § 1002 [1]). Petitioner contends that because Local Law 5 regulates apprenticeship programs that may be governed by ERISA, it intrudes upon an area expressly occupied by federal law and is therefore preempted. However, Local Law 5 does not require contractors to establish, maintain, fund or alter any apprenticeship or employee benefit plan, nor does it dictate the terms or administration of such programs. Rather, the local law simply establishes qualifications applicable to contractors seeking to compete for certain public works contracts. Any effect on apprenticeship programs is merely incidental to respondents' legitimate objective of ensuring a sufficiently trained workforce on large public construction projects and is therefore insufficient to warrant ERISA preemption.
Nor is Local Law 5 preempted by the NLRA, which is a comprehensive federal framework governing labor relations and employee rights to engage in collective bargaining (see 29 USC §§ 151, 157). While petitioner argues that Local Law 5 conflicts with the NRLA by favoring larger apprenticeship programs that tend to be union affiliated, the challenged provisions neither require union participation nor regulate aspects of collective bargaining or labor-management relations. Petitioner at most identifies a potential tension [*5]between federal and local law that is insufficient to establish conflict preemption, particularly given respondents' legitimate local interest in ensuring the quality and reliability of work performed on its construction projects (see Sutton 58 Assoc. LLC v Pilevsky, 36 NY3d at 315; Matter of Cannabis Impact Prevention Coalition, LLC v Hochul, ___ AD3d ___, ___, 254 NYS3d 717, 720 [3d Dept 2026]).
Finally, we decline to invalidate the graduation requirements as an arbitrary and capricious bid specification. Although Supreme Court correctly recognized that a direct challenge to the substantive validity of a legislative enactment is generally not cognizable in a CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioner's hybrid pleading also sought declaratory relief, thereby permitting review of whether the challenged provisions bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose (see Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 202 [1987]). The purpose of the graduation requirements is to promote apprenticeship training and ensure that contractors performing substantial public works projects utilize established training programs capable of producing skilled workers. Respondents could rationally conclude that apprenticeship programs demonstrating sustained graduation rates and a consistent record of producing trained tradespersons are more likely to provide a stable pipeline of qualified workers for complex public construction projects. The fact that petitioner may disagree with respondents' policy judgment or believes that different standards should have been adopted does not render the graduation requirements irrational. As the graduation requirements are rationally related to respondents' legitimate government interest in workforce development, project quality, efficiency and public safety, they were properly included in the bid specifications (see Blueline Commuter, Inc. v Montgomery Cnty., 126 AD3d at 1163).
Petitioner's remaining contentions, including those grounded upon alleged constitutional violations, have been reviewed and found to be without merit.
Garry, P.J., Fisher, Mackey and Corcoran, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.