Matter of Marriage of Vinson

732 P.2d 79, 83 Or. App. 487, 1987 Ore. App. LEXIS 2857
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedJanuary 28, 1987
Docket15-85-00095; CA A39705
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 732 P.2d 79 (Matter of Marriage of Vinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Marriage of Vinson, 732 P.2d 79, 83 Or. App. 487, 1987 Ore. App. LEXIS 2857 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

*489 ROSSMAN, J.

Wife appeals from a judgment of dissolution. At issue is the amount of money husband is required to pay to wife as support for her and three of the parties’ four children. The judgment provides that, initially, husband is to pay to wife a collective sum of $1,750 per month as what the trial court characterizes as “family support.” Wife contends that the trial court erred in failing to designate separately the amount awarded as spousal support and the amount awarded as child support. She also contends that the support awarded is insufficient in both duration and amount and that the trial court erred in terminating husband’s support obligations in the event of her remarriage and in awarding husband the right to claim all four children as dependents on his state and federal income tax returns.

The parties were married in 1963. Husband was a graduate student, and wife had completed one year of college. Husband started law school shortly thereafter, and wife left school in order to work to help finance his education. Husband, who is 46 years old and in good health, is currently a practicing attorney and earns approximately $95,000 per year. Wife, who is 43 years old and also in good health, has not worked since husband graduated from law school but anticipates being able to earn approximately $400 per month babysitting.

The judgment provides that the “primary residence” of the parties’ two youngest children, who are four and eight years old, and their eldest daughter, who is 19 years old and attending college, will be with wife. It provides that the primary residence of their eldest son, who is 16 years old, will be with husband. With respect to support, it provides:

“[Husband] shall pay [wife], as and for her support and the support of the parties’ children, [the two youngest and the oldest], the sum of $1,750.00 each and every month commencing with the 5th day of April, 1986. Said payment shall continue each and every month through the March payment of 1990. Commencing with the April 5, 1990 payment, [husband] shall pay to [wife], as and for her support and the support of the parties’ children, [the two youngest and the oldest], the sum of $1,350.00 each and every month, until March payment 1994. Thereafter, [husband] shall pay to [wife] for the support of the parties’ [two youngest] children, *490 * * * the sum of $850.00 each and every month, commencing with the April 5,1995 payment until each child is 18, dies or is emancipated or 21 if attending school pursuant to statute. [Husband’s] obligation for support under this paragraph shall terminate in the event of the death of either party or [wife’s] remarriage.
“Husband shall be entitled to deduct for income tax purposes all sums payable to wife as family support pursuant to this decree, and wife shall pay Federal and State income taxes as required on all sums payable to her as family support pursuant to this decree. [Husband] shall be entitled to claim all of the children as dependants [sic] for tax purposes on his applicable State and Federal tax returns. [Wife] shall sign and [sic] appropriate IRS waiver form and a TIN form each year to accompany [husband’s] tax return.”

Although it is impossible to determine with certainty the intended allocation between spousal support and child support, we conclude that, for the purpose of review, certain inferences may be drawn. First, because the decree provides that, after March, 1994, husband’s support obligation decreases to $850 per month and is allocated solely as support for the two youngest children, we infer that $425 per month per child was allocated to their support from the outset. Similarly, because the ordered reduction from $1,750 per month to $1,350 per month after March, 1990, coincides approximately in time and amount with the oldest child’s projected educational needs, we infer that, through March, 1990, $400 per month was allocated to her support. We conclude that the remainder of the support award, which amounts to $500 per month payable through March, 1994, was intended as spousal support.

We first address wife’s contention that the trial court erred in awarding family support rather than separate amounts for spousal support and child support. Husband contends that a combined award enables him to deduct the entire amount of support he pays from his income on his federal income tax return as “alimony paid,” rather than just the amount paid as spousal support, and thereby enables him to realize a substantial tax saving. See Lester v. Commissioner, 366 US 299, 81 S Ct 1343, 6 L Ed 2d 306 (1961). Wife contends that the derivative effect is that she must declare the entire amount of support received as income and that that is unfair.

*491 ORS 107.105(l)(c) empowers the court to award the custodial parent “such amount of money * * * as constitutes just and proper contribution towards the support and welfare of such children.” ORS 107.105(l)(d) empowers the court to provide “[f]or the support of a party, such amount of money for such period of time as it may be just and equitable for the other party to contribute.” Neither provision expressly prohibits combining the awards into one lump sum payment designated as family support. However, neither is there a provision authorizing such an award.

On this record, we need not decide whether ORS 107.105 precludes a combined award in all instances. Suffice it to say that, regardless of how the award is designated, it must be of a sufficient amount and duration to provide adequate spousal support as well as adequate child support, and it must be fashioned in a manner which accommodates appellate review with respect to the sufficiency of both.

ORS 107.105(1)(d) provides that, in determining the appropriate amount of spousal support, the court shall consider all relevant circumstances, including the tax consequences of the award, in order that each party “shall have the opportunity to achieve an economic standard of living not overly disproportionate to that enjoyed during the marriage, to the extent that is possible.” Wife contends that spousal support of $500 per month for approximately eight years is insufficient in both amount and duration. She seeks permanent support of $1,575 per month. Husband contends that, given wife’s relatively young age and good health, permanent support is inappropriate. With respect to the amount, he contends that, given the unique nature of the parties’ uncontested property settlement agreement, the amount is not only just but more than he can afford.

The property settlement purportedly divides the parties’ net assets into two equal shares. Wife is entitled to the possession of one of the parties’ two homes, in which she intends to reside, free and clear of any mortgage debt. She is also entitled to the possession of the parties’ new car and various other unencumbered assets. Husband is entitled, inter alia,

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Bluebook (online)
732 P.2d 79, 83 Or. App. 487, 1987 Ore. App. LEXIS 2857, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-marriage-of-vinson-orctapp-1987.