Matter of Kochell

53 B.R. 250, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 732, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 5448, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6282
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 26, 1985
Docket3-15-11630
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 53 B.R. 250 (Matter of Kochell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Kochell, 53 B.R. 250, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 732, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 5448, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6282 (Wis. 1985).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

ROBERT D. MARTIN, Bankruptcy Judge.

The trustee has filed a motion for determination of tax liability, asking the court to determine whether the estate was liable for additional taxes under Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) sections 408(f) and 72(m)(5) (26 U.S.C. §§ 408(f), 72(m)(5)). A hearing was held before the court on March 11, 1985 with the United States opposing the trustee’s motion. The court established a briefing schedule and the parties have complied with that schedule.

On December 23, 1982, 26 B.R. 86, this court held that the rollover individual retirement account (“IRA”) and pension account of the debtor were not exempt property under section 522(d)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)) and therefore became property of the estate at the time the debtor filed his petition on April 6, 1982. That decision was subsequently affirmed by the U.S. District Court, 31 B.R. 139, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 732 F.2d 564. Approximately $190,000 from the IRA and $15,000 from the pension account were distributed to the estate in 1984, triggering income tax recognition.

I. IRC § 1398 applies to the taxation of bankruptcy estates in cases under chapters *252 7 and 11 in which the debtor is an individual. Section 1398(c)(1) states:

Computation and payment of tax. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the taxable income of the estate shall be computed in the same manner as for an individual. The tax shall be computed on such taxable income and shall be paid by the trustee.

Section 1398(f)(1) provides:

Transfer to estate not treated as disposition. A transfer (other than by sale or exchange) of an asset from the debtor to the estate shall not be treated as a disposition for purposes of any provision of this title assigning tax consequences to a disposition, and the estate shall be treated as the debtor would be treated with respect to such asset.

Section 1398(g) reads: 1

Estate succeeds to tax attributes of debtor. The estate shall succeed to and take into account the following items (determined as of the first day of the debt- or’s taxable year in which the case commences) of the debtor—
(1) Net operating loss carryovers....
(2) Charitable contributions carryovers ....
(3) Recovery exclusion....
(4) Credit carryovers, etc....
(5) Capital loss carryovers....
(6) Basis, holding period, and character of assets. In the case of any asset acquired (other than by sale or exchange) by the estate from the debtor, the basis, holding period, and character it had in the hands of the debtor.
(7) Method of accounting....
(8) Other attributes. Other tax attributes of the debtor, to the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary as necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section. 2

The United States has not argued that section 1398(g)(6)’s “character of assets” covers the penalty tax attribute of IRA’s and pension accounts held by an individual. “Character” of an asset is generally construed to mean whether an asset is capital (section 1221), depreciable (section 1231), or subject to ordinary income treatment. “Character” may also refer to whether an asset is considered “tainted” with ordinary income treatment. 3

Congress has sought to prevent IRA’s and pension accounts from being used as collateral or otherwise assigned to creditors. Section 408(e)(4) applicable to constructive distributions from IRA’s states: “[i]f, during any taxable year of the individual for whose benefit an individual retirement account is established, that individual uses the account or any portion thereof as security for a loan, the portion so used is treated as distributed to that individual.” The purpose of this rule is to prevent taxpayers from taking advantage of the tax sheltering potential of IRA’s while continuing to enjoy the benefit of those assets. A similar rule applied to constructive distributions from pension plans under former section 72(m)(4). TE-FRA, effective September 3, 1982, introduced a more complicated rule in which limited borrowing against pension plan accounts is now permitted without triggering a constructive distribution. Rather than using a character taint device, these sections treat the act of assignment of an individual’s rights in an IRA or pension account as the event triggering a construc *253 tive distribution. Other events, such as testamentary disposition of those assets are not triggering events. Therefore, section 1398(g)(6) cannot be used by the United States to apply the penalty tax provisions to the bankruptcy estate.

Although neither party so argues, the question is basically whether the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius is to be given effect in this instance. 4 Since the fact of the debtor being under the age of 59 V2 years cannot be fit into any of the enumerated tax attributes carried over to the estate by section 1398(g), it must be decided whether the general language of section 1398(f)(1) controls the later specific listing. Note that section 1398(g) does not say that the estate shall take into effect all of the debtor’s tax attributes. The implication is that some tax attributes of the debtor are not to be included.

Policy analysis favors the employment of the maxim. The pre-retirement disincentive which Congress intended to create is unnecessary and disfunctional where a bankruptcy court has ordered a debtor to turn over retirement account assets to the trustee. Where a taxpayer dies, the penalty tax does not apply to distributions to beneficiary(s). By analogy, the bankruptcy of a debtor should not result in the penalty tax being applied to the “beneficiaries” of the bankruptcy estate. On the other hand, it may be possible to construct a set of circumstances in which an individual utilizes chapter 11 to free assets tied up in a large rollover IRA and escape the penalty tax. Since there is no evidence or suggestion that is the case here, the court need not address the policy considerations of such a case.

II. IRC § 408(f) provides:

Additional tax on certain amounts included in gross income before age 59 Vs.
(1) Early distributions from an individual retirement account, etc.

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2021 IL App (1st) 191781-U (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2021)
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158 B.R. 163 (N.D. California, 1993)
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55 B.R. 380 (W.D. Wisconsin, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
53 B.R. 250, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 732, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 5448, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6282, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-kochell-wiwb-1985.