Matter of Gamble

208 B.R. 598, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1339, 1997 WL 256814
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedMarch 3, 1997
Docket13-21143
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 208 B.R. 598 (Matter of Gamble) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Gamble, 208 B.R. 598, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1339, 1997 WL 256814 (Ga. 1997).

Opinion

ORDER ON DEBTORS’ MOTION TO TURNOVER EXEMPT PROPERTY

LAMAR W. DAVIS, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

Debtors’ case was filed October 11, 1996. Debtors’ Schedule “C” claimed $10,800.00 as exempt property representing their equity in a residence located in Illinois. On November 8, 1996, Debtors sought approval of a sale of that real estate, post-petition which closed on October 18,1996. The gross proceeds of sale *599 totaled $150,000.00 and after all debts and expenses of sale, net proceeds remained in the amount of $6,731.22. By order dated December 10, 1996, the Honorable James D. Walker, Jr., approved the sale and provided that the net proceeds be held pending further order of court in light of this court’s prior rulings. See Matter of Deeble & McBride, 169 B.R. 240 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1994).

Debtors filed their Motion for Turnover on December 23,1996, and a hearing to consider the distribution of proceeds was held on January 14, 1997. Debtors acknowledge that precedent in this Court as exemplified by Deeble requires the Chapter 13 Trustee to hold the cash proceeds of debtors’ exemption “until the conclusion of all payments called for by the terms of [debtor’s] confirmed plan.” Debtors’ assert in their motion filed December 23, 1996, however, that (1) the proceeds have been exempted, (2) that the exemption is not property of the estate, (3) that the property “will never become” property of the estate, and (4) that Deeble is erroneous and should not be followed.

At oral argument, Debtors’ counsel cited Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992), as authority for the proposition that Debtors’ exemption cannot be contested, inasmuch as Debtors claimed this equity as exempt, and no objection to the exemption was filed. I agree that Taylor so holds. I also hold that no objection to Debtors’ claim of exemption can now be entertained, since none was filed within the thirty (30) day time allowed under Rule 4003(b).

The question remains: What is the appropriate disposition of exempt property during the pendency of a Chapter 13 case? Does Taylor, as argued by Debtors, require a finding that property claimed as exempt, to which no objection has been filed, must be immediately delivered to the debtors? Or does the exemption remain inchoate, pending other events, as I held in Deeble? 1 After *600 revisiting those cases, and considering the argument that Taylor requires a different result, I hold that the Deeble rationale is still correct. Now as then, no authority has been cited which controls this decision.

A threshold question is whether property claimed as exempt ever constituted property of the estate. Debtors argue that the claimed exemption is not and never will be property of the estate. This is incorrect. 11 U.S.C. Section 541 defines property of the estate, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property ...
(1) ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
(6) Proceeds ... of ... property of the estate____

11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (6). This clearly includes the real estate which Debtors owned at the commencement of the case. Thus, contrary to Debtors’ assertion, this real estate and proceeds of this real estate constitute estate property. Debtors are granted the right to “exempt from property of the estate” certain types and values of property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). Georgia, as permitted by the Code, has adopted its own schedule of exemptible property. O.C.G.A. § 44 — 13-100. It was Debtors’ election whether to claim their equity in real estate as exempt, and they did. No party in interest filed a timely objection, and the exemption cannot be objected to after thirty (30) days. Taylor, supra. However, as I read Taylor, it does not establish the timing of delivery of possession of exempt property, but rather governs the timing of objections to claims of exemption. The legal effect of an unassailable claim of exemption must be found elsewhere.

What then is the effect of an unobjectionable claim of exempt property? In other words, what does it mean for property to become “exempt” from property of the estate? In a Chapter 7 case, only unencumbered property of the estate is distributed to pay creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 725, 726. Logically enough, exempt property is not distributed to creditors. But does the Code specifically provide the legal consequence of a claim of exempt property, or state when vesting of that property is final? The only provision that defines the effect and timing of exemptions of which I am aware is Section 522(e) which provides:

(c) Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose ... before the commencement of the case....

This language, which I consider pivotal, is the operative language which defines a debt- or’s rights in exempt property. Section 522(c) provides that as to property which is exempted, no pre-petition claim attaches to it, unless the case is dismissed. If the case is dismissed, however, the Code is silent as to the legal effect of a claim of exemption. Since after a dismissal, however, the Code provides no similar protection against creditors’ claims, the exemption presumably is a nullity, even if there was no objection to its allowance. The issue, after dismissal, is not whether the type of property or its value was exemptible, but whether the claim of exemption itself is efficacious. I hold that it is not, because the phrase “unless the case is dismissed” qualifies the phrase which defines the legal effect of the exemption. This is not the only example of dismissal of a ease altering substantive rights of the parties. For example, 11 U.S.C. Section 349 reinstates virtually all avoided liens and transfers and vacates all orders for turnover of estate property in an apparent attempt to “un-ring the bell” and return the debtor/creditor relationship to the status quo ante.

It first appears inconsistent to hold, as Taylor does, that after thirty (30) days “property claimed as exempt .... is exempt,” while suggesting that a subsequent event may alter that result.

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Related

In Re Hunton
253 B.R. 580 (N.D. Georgia, 2000)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
208 B.R. 598, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1339, 1997 WL 256814, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-gamble-gasb-1997.