ORDER ON DEBTORS’ MOTION TO TURNOVER EXEMPT PROPERTY
LAMAR W. DAVIS, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.
Debtors’ case was filed October 11, 1996. Debtors’ Schedule “C” claimed $10,800.00 as exempt property representing their equity in a residence located in Illinois. On November 8, 1996, Debtors sought approval of a sale of that real estate, post-petition which closed on October 18,1996. The gross proceeds of sale
totaled $150,000.00 and after all debts and expenses of sale, net proceeds remained in the amount of $6,731.22. By order dated December 10, 1996, the Honorable James D. Walker, Jr., approved the sale and provided that the net proceeds be held pending further order of court in light of this court’s prior rulings.
See Matter of Deeble & McBride,
169 B.R. 240 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1994).
Debtors filed their Motion for Turnover on December 23,1996, and a hearing to consider the distribution of proceeds was held on January 14, 1997. Debtors acknowledge that precedent in this Court as exemplified by
Deeble
requires the Chapter 13 Trustee to hold the cash proceeds of debtors’ exemption “until the conclusion of all payments called for by the terms of [debtor’s] confirmed plan.” Debtors’ assert in their motion filed December 23, 1996, however, that (1) the proceeds have been exempted, (2) that the exemption is not property of the estate, (3) that the property “will never become” property of the estate, and (4) that
Deeble
is erroneous and should not be followed.
At oral argument, Debtors’ counsel cited
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992), as authority for the proposition that Debtors’ exemption cannot be contested, inasmuch as Debtors claimed this equity as exempt, and no objection to the exemption was filed. I agree that
Taylor
so holds. I also hold that no objection to Debtors’ claim of exemption can now be entertained, since none was filed within the thirty (30) day time allowed under Rule 4003(b).
The question remains: What is the appropriate disposition of exempt property during the pendency of a Chapter 13 case? Does
Taylor,
as argued by Debtors, require a finding that property claimed as exempt, to which no objection has been filed, must be immediately delivered to the debtors? Or does the exemption remain inchoate, pending other events, as I held in
Deeble?
After
revisiting those cases, and considering the argument that
Taylor
requires a different result, I hold that the
Deeble
rationale is still correct. Now as then, no authority has been cited which controls this decision.
A threshold question is whether property claimed as exempt ever constituted property of the estate. Debtors argue that the claimed exemption is not and never will be property of the estate. This is incorrect. 11 U.S.C. Section 541 defines property of the estate, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property ...
(1) ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
(6) Proceeds ... of ... property of the estate____
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (6). This clearly includes the real estate which Debtors owned at the commencement of the case. Thus, contrary to Debtors’ assertion, this real estate and proceeds of this real estate constitute estate property. Debtors are granted the right to “exempt from property of the estate” certain types and values of property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). Georgia, as permitted by the Code, has adopted its own schedule of exemptible property. O.C.G.A. § 44 — 13-100. It was Debtors’ election whether to claim their equity in real estate as exempt, and they did. No party in interest filed a timely objection, and the exemption cannot be objected to after thirty (30) days.
Taylor, supra.
However, as I read
Taylor,
it does not establish the timing of delivery of possession of exempt property, but rather governs the timing of objections to claims of exemption. The legal effect of an unassailable claim of exemption must be found elsewhere.
What then is the effect of an unobjectionable claim of exempt property? In other words, what does it mean for property to become “exempt” from property of the estate? In a Chapter 7 case, only unencumbered property of the estate is distributed to pay creditors.
See
11 U.S.C. §§ 725, 726. Logically enough, exempt property is not distributed to creditors. But does the Code specifically provide the legal consequence of a claim of exempt property, or state when vesting of that property is final? The only provision that defines the effect and timing of exemptions of which I am aware is Section 522(e) which provides:
(c) Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose ... before the commencement of the case....
This language, which I consider pivotal, is the operative language which defines a debt- or’s rights in exempt property. Section 522(c) provides that as to property which is exempted, no pre-petition claim attaches to it,
unless the case is dismissed.
If the case is dismissed, however, the Code is silent as to the legal effect of a claim of exemption. Since after a dismissal, however, the Code provides no similar protection against creditors’ claims, the exemption presumably is a nullity, even if there was no objection to its allowance. The issue, after dismissal, is not whether the type of property or its value was exemptible, but whether the claim of exemption itself is efficacious. I hold that it is not, because the phrase “unless the case is dismissed” qualifies the phrase which defines the legal effect of the exemption. This is not the only example of dismissal of a ease altering substantive rights of the parties. For example, 11 U.S.C. Section 349 reinstates virtually all avoided liens and transfers and vacates all orders for turnover of estate property in an apparent attempt to “un-ring the bell” and return the debtor/creditor relationship to the
status quo ante.
It first appears inconsistent to hold, as
Taylor
does, that after thirty (30) days “property claimed as exempt .... is exempt,” while suggesting that a subsequent event may alter that result.
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ORDER ON DEBTORS’ MOTION TO TURNOVER EXEMPT PROPERTY
LAMAR W. DAVIS, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.
Debtors’ case was filed October 11, 1996. Debtors’ Schedule “C” claimed $10,800.00 as exempt property representing their equity in a residence located in Illinois. On November 8, 1996, Debtors sought approval of a sale of that real estate, post-petition which closed on October 18,1996. The gross proceeds of sale
totaled $150,000.00 and after all debts and expenses of sale, net proceeds remained in the amount of $6,731.22. By order dated December 10, 1996, the Honorable James D. Walker, Jr., approved the sale and provided that the net proceeds be held pending further order of court in light of this court’s prior rulings.
See Matter of Deeble & McBride,
169 B.R. 240 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1994).
Debtors filed their Motion for Turnover on December 23,1996, and a hearing to consider the distribution of proceeds was held on January 14, 1997. Debtors acknowledge that precedent in this Court as exemplified by
Deeble
requires the Chapter 13 Trustee to hold the cash proceeds of debtors’ exemption “until the conclusion of all payments called for by the terms of [debtor’s] confirmed plan.” Debtors’ assert in their motion filed December 23, 1996, however, that (1) the proceeds have been exempted, (2) that the exemption is not property of the estate, (3) that the property “will never become” property of the estate, and (4) that
Deeble
is erroneous and should not be followed.
At oral argument, Debtors’ counsel cited
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992), as authority for the proposition that Debtors’ exemption cannot be contested, inasmuch as Debtors claimed this equity as exempt, and no objection to the exemption was filed. I agree that
Taylor
so holds. I also hold that no objection to Debtors’ claim of exemption can now be entertained, since none was filed within the thirty (30) day time allowed under Rule 4003(b).
The question remains: What is the appropriate disposition of exempt property during the pendency of a Chapter 13 case? Does
Taylor,
as argued by Debtors, require a finding that property claimed as exempt, to which no objection has been filed, must be immediately delivered to the debtors? Or does the exemption remain inchoate, pending other events, as I held in
Deeble?
After
revisiting those cases, and considering the argument that
Taylor
requires a different result, I hold that the
Deeble
rationale is still correct. Now as then, no authority has been cited which controls this decision.
A threshold question is whether property claimed as exempt ever constituted property of the estate. Debtors argue that the claimed exemption is not and never will be property of the estate. This is incorrect. 11 U.S.C. Section 541 defines property of the estate, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property ...
(1) ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
(6) Proceeds ... of ... property of the estate____
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (6). This clearly includes the real estate which Debtors owned at the commencement of the case. Thus, contrary to Debtors’ assertion, this real estate and proceeds of this real estate constitute estate property. Debtors are granted the right to “exempt from property of the estate” certain types and values of property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). Georgia, as permitted by the Code, has adopted its own schedule of exemptible property. O.C.G.A. § 44 — 13-100. It was Debtors’ election whether to claim their equity in real estate as exempt, and they did. No party in interest filed a timely objection, and the exemption cannot be objected to after thirty (30) days.
Taylor, supra.
However, as I read
Taylor,
it does not establish the timing of delivery of possession of exempt property, but rather governs the timing of objections to claims of exemption. The legal effect of an unassailable claim of exemption must be found elsewhere.
What then is the effect of an unobjectionable claim of exempt property? In other words, what does it mean for property to become “exempt” from property of the estate? In a Chapter 7 case, only unencumbered property of the estate is distributed to pay creditors.
See
11 U.S.C. §§ 725, 726. Logically enough, exempt property is not distributed to creditors. But does the Code specifically provide the legal consequence of a claim of exempt property, or state when vesting of that property is final? The only provision that defines the effect and timing of exemptions of which I am aware is Section 522(e) which provides:
(c) Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose ... before the commencement of the case....
This language, which I consider pivotal, is the operative language which defines a debt- or’s rights in exempt property. Section 522(c) provides that as to property which is exempted, no pre-petition claim attaches to it,
unless the case is dismissed.
If the case is dismissed, however, the Code is silent as to the legal effect of a claim of exemption. Since after a dismissal, however, the Code provides no similar protection against creditors’ claims, the exemption presumably is a nullity, even if there was no objection to its allowance. The issue, after dismissal, is not whether the type of property or its value was exemptible, but whether the claim of exemption itself is efficacious. I hold that it is not, because the phrase “unless the case is dismissed” qualifies the phrase which defines the legal effect of the exemption. This is not the only example of dismissal of a ease altering substantive rights of the parties. For example, 11 U.S.C. Section 349 reinstates virtually all avoided liens and transfers and vacates all orders for turnover of estate property in an apparent attempt to “un-ring the bell” and return the debtor/creditor relationship to the
status quo ante.
It first appears inconsistent to hold, as
Taylor
does, that after thirty (30) days “property claimed as exempt .... is exempt,” while suggesting that a subsequent event may alter that result. It is, however, no more metaphysical an exercise than the traditional property law concept of estates which are vested, subject to divestment upon the occurrence of a condition subsequent.
See generally
O.C.G.A. § 44r-6-41. Upon dismissal of a case, the Code provides that lots of things happen, and, among them, that onee-exempt property is no longer free of the
claims of pre-petition creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 349 and 522(e). In conclusion, I hold that property claimed exempt is property of the estate at filing. Upon resolution of any objection to the claim of exemption, it is carved out of the estate, but is not freed from the claims of pre-petition creditors until the case is concluded — and thus cannot be dismissed.
How then is exempt property to be administered in a Chapter 13 ease? As pointed out in
Deeble,
Section 522 works better in a Chapter 7 case. The case is filed, an estate is created,
the creditors meet,
the trustee collects assets,
determines whether to oppose discharge,
creditors have a similar opportunity,
burdensome property is abandoned,
unencumbered assets are paid to creditors,
the debtor’s discharge is entered and the case is closed.
Dismissal of a Chapter 7 case occurs only after notice to creditors and is controlled by the Court.
Debt- or’s receipt of the value of exempt property is closely supervised and timed to correspond to the completion and closing of the case. Debtors cannot dismiss and avoid the burdens of Chapter 7 while retaining the enjoyment of one of its benefits, the value of exempt property. In other words, they do not receive a present possessory interest in exempt property until it is certain that dismissal, cannot occur, or at least cannot occur without being conditioned on the debtor accounting for previously-received exempt property.
Chapter 13 is, however, very different. After confirmation, estate property, which includes debtors’ post-petition earnings, is vested in the
debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 1327(b). Debtors apparently contend that this provision evidences the Code’s intent that
exempt
property should also be vested in Debtors upon confirmation. At first glance, section 1327 does appear to contradict the
Deeble
holding that the Trustee should hold exempt funds until plan completion. A closer reading of Section 522 makes it clear, however, that there is no contradiction. The debtor’s exercise of an exemption “exempt[s] from property of the estate ... the property listed____” In other words, it reduces estate property by the amount of the exempt property. Then, when confirmation revests property of the estate in the debtor, the property which was estate property at filing no longer includes the property carved out of the estate as exempt. As a result, exempt property is not revested in the debtor upon confirmation under Section 1327.
Congress thus provided that property exempted in Chapter 13 be placed, in effect, in suspense, pending completion of the plan. It was to be removed from the estate which revests in debtor upon confirmation, yet its release from pre-petition claims remains subject to the “unless the case is dismissed” qualifier. The reason is clear. Debtors have the right to dismiss a Chapter 13 case at any time. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b). To hold that exempt property revests in debtors at confirmation and allow unfettered use of the property would,
defacto
or
dejure,
potentially result in property being placed beyond the reach of creditors’ claims prior to the time that debtor’s Chapter 13 plan is consummated by distribution of the monthly payments of debtor’s disposable income.
To avoid this injustice, I hold that the Code contemplates that possessory enjoyment of debtors exemptions be postponed, contingent on fu
ture payments. Pending completion of a Chapter 13 case, exempt property which has been converted to cash must remain in safekeeping to fulfill the Congressional purpose of allowing certain exemptions, yet making them conditional upon debtor’s performance of all duties imposed by the Code. I hold that the appropriate repository for the safekeeping of such funds is the Chapter 13 Trustee.
Once a debtor files a claim of exempt property and objections are not filed, or are resolved, exempt property is removed from the estate, eventually to be freed of creditors’ claims. Until it is, however, it must be safeguarded and preserved in the event of a dismissal, in order to permit those claims to attach. At confirmation, all remaining estate property revests in debtor. Upon completion of the plan, when debtor has fulfilled all his or her obligations, the Trustee is authorized to remit the proceeds of exempt property to debtor. These proceeds, and all other exempt property are free, pursuant to Section 522, from the claims of pre-petition creditors.
IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that Debtors’ Motion for Immediate Disbursement of Exempt Proceeds is denied.