TICE, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment admitting a last will and testament dated June 16, 1970, executed by Paul Zech (deceased) into probate and the issuance of letters testamentary to Charles Tesch. The judgment appealed from was entered following a lengthy trial in which collateral heirs of decedent attempted to block entry of the will into probate on the basis of undue influence. We affirm.
FACTS
Decedent passed away at Aberdeen, South Dakota, on April 15,1977. He was at that time eighty-three years of age. Decedent had never been married and at the time of his death his four sisters and nine brothers were all deceased. Of the fourteen children in the Zech family only two married and left children. These children constitute the sole heirs at law of decedent. Charles Tesch, a child of decedent’s predeceased sister Emma Tesch, together with his wife, are the proponents of the disputed last will and testament of decedent (referred to jointly as proponents). Emma’s remaining children, brothers and sisters of Charles Tesch, namely, Albert Tesch, Arthur Tesch, John Tesch, and Lorraine Tesch (referred to jointly as contestants) objected to the admission of the June 16, 1970, instrument into probate as the last will and testament of Paul Zech. They contended that the will was the product of undue influence exerted by the proponents over decedent and that deceased was not competent to make a will on the date of execution.
[237]*237For many years decedent resided with his sister, Alma Zech, at the ancestral home near Watertown, South Dakota. As Alma began to slip into senility the living conditions on the farm became intolerable. Accordingly, in September of 1966 decedent became a resident of Jenkins Memorial Home in Watertown, South Dakota. Following a brief stay at the State Hospital in Yankton, South Dakota, Alma joined decedent in the Jenkins Home.
Decedent and his sister were not happy about living in the Jenkins Home. In the spring of 1967, decedent offered to purchase a house in Watertown, South Dakota, for the proponents if Charles and his wife would agree to care for decedent and his sister throughout the remaining years of their lives. In addition, decedent offered to pay to the proponents an amount equal to what it was costing them to live at the Jenkins Memorial Home.
In May of 1967, decedent and his sister left the Jenkins Home and moved in with the proponents. Title to the property was conveyed by decedent to the proponents; however, decedent continued to pay taxes and insurance on the property. In addition, decedent paid the proponents $3,000 to $3,500 a year for his care. Decedent also purchased an automobile and a pickup for the proponents.
On July 17,1967, Alma Zech passed away. Decedent continued to reside with the proponents. By all accounts this arrangement was an amicable one. Decedent received certain real property in lieu of a legacy from Alma’s estate.
During August and September of 1968, two contracts for deed, covering the property decedent received from Alma, were made between decedent and the children of the proponents. These contracts were prepared by an attorney and were executed out of the presence of the proponents.
Mary Tesch testified that when decedent moved into the home of the proponents he indicated that he did not wish to make a will because he did not believe that wills were of any value. She further testified that while she did not speak to decedent specifically about his will they did have conversations about wills in general. At some point decedent apparently changed his mind concerning the efficacy of a will, and on November 9, 1968, Mary Tesch typed up a will for decedent according to his instructions. This document is very brief and was, if valid in the first place, revoked by the instrument now at issue. The general outlines of the 1968 instrument are similar to decedent’s last will and testament at least insofar as the will results in the proponents receiving the bulk of decedent’s worldly goods.
A few days prior to execution of the June 16, 1970, will Mary Tesch called O. E. Beardsley, formerly of Watertown, South Dakota, and asked Mr. Beardsley to come to the house to see decedent. Attorney Beardsley met alone with decedent. Decedent then told Mr. Beardsley that he wished to make a will and discussed with the attorney the extent and nature of his property, who his relatives were, and how he wished to dispose of his property. Mr. Beardsley then returned to his office and prepared the will. On June 16, 1970, Mr. Beardsley, accompanied by his law partner, returned to the residence for execution of the will. After decedent had read the document and Mr. Beardsley had discussed its provisions with him, decedent signed the will in the presence of Mr. Beardsley and his law partner, both of whom signed the document as witnesses. The attorneys testified that no one else was in the room when the will was executed, and they also testified that each of them believed the instrument to be an expression of decedent’s free will and that decedent was competent to make a will at the time of execution.
During the next several years much of decedent’s property was transferred to the Teschs. On July 19, 1971, a savings certificate registered to decedent was transferred to the proponents and was increased to $10,000. On April 4, 1973, the name of Alma Zech, (decedent’s deceased sister), was removed from approximately $60,000 worth of decedent’s Series H savings bonds, and Mary Tesch’s name was added. Certificates [238]*238of deposit totaling approximately $13,500 were purchased between April 4, 1970, and July 29, 1974. These certificates were registered in joint-ownership between decedent and one of the proponents or one of their children.
Payments due under the contracts for deed between decedent and the proponents’ children were forgiven by decedent for the year 1974. In 1975, Mary Tesch recorded a similar forgiveness of the amount due for that year without discussing the matter with decedent.
The proponents did not inform any other members of the family about the transfers of property and monies that decedent had made to them and their children.
Jerry Miller, trust officer of the bank in which decedent maintained a safety deposit box, testified concerning the April 4, 1973, transaction in which Alma Zech’s name was deleted and Mary Tesch’s name was added to the $60,000 worth of savings bonds. Mr. Miller explained to decedent the effect of having Mary’s name added to the bond. He further testified that decedent was “adamant” about wanting Mary’s name placed on the bonds. The trial court found that the acts whereby decedent transferred much of his property to the proponents following execution of the will indicated decedent’s intention to carry out a disposition of his property in accordance with the disposition made in the will of June 16, 1970.
In June, 1975, the proponents moved decedent into a nursing home in Aberdeen, South Dakota. They apparently did not notify the other relatives that decedent had been moved to Aberdeen. It would, however, seem purposeless to have done so since no relatives had shown an interest in decedent for many years. On February 9, 1976, decedent was deemed no longer competent to manage his affairs and the bank in Watertown, South Dakota, was named financial conservator for decedent. Decedent remained in the Aberdeen nursing home until his death. The proponents frequently visited decedent during this period of time.
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TICE, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment admitting a last will and testament dated June 16, 1970, executed by Paul Zech (deceased) into probate and the issuance of letters testamentary to Charles Tesch. The judgment appealed from was entered following a lengthy trial in which collateral heirs of decedent attempted to block entry of the will into probate on the basis of undue influence. We affirm.
FACTS
Decedent passed away at Aberdeen, South Dakota, on April 15,1977. He was at that time eighty-three years of age. Decedent had never been married and at the time of his death his four sisters and nine brothers were all deceased. Of the fourteen children in the Zech family only two married and left children. These children constitute the sole heirs at law of decedent. Charles Tesch, a child of decedent’s predeceased sister Emma Tesch, together with his wife, are the proponents of the disputed last will and testament of decedent (referred to jointly as proponents). Emma’s remaining children, brothers and sisters of Charles Tesch, namely, Albert Tesch, Arthur Tesch, John Tesch, and Lorraine Tesch (referred to jointly as contestants) objected to the admission of the June 16, 1970, instrument into probate as the last will and testament of Paul Zech. They contended that the will was the product of undue influence exerted by the proponents over decedent and that deceased was not competent to make a will on the date of execution.
[237]*237For many years decedent resided with his sister, Alma Zech, at the ancestral home near Watertown, South Dakota. As Alma began to slip into senility the living conditions on the farm became intolerable. Accordingly, in September of 1966 decedent became a resident of Jenkins Memorial Home in Watertown, South Dakota. Following a brief stay at the State Hospital in Yankton, South Dakota, Alma joined decedent in the Jenkins Home.
Decedent and his sister were not happy about living in the Jenkins Home. In the spring of 1967, decedent offered to purchase a house in Watertown, South Dakota, for the proponents if Charles and his wife would agree to care for decedent and his sister throughout the remaining years of their lives. In addition, decedent offered to pay to the proponents an amount equal to what it was costing them to live at the Jenkins Memorial Home.
In May of 1967, decedent and his sister left the Jenkins Home and moved in with the proponents. Title to the property was conveyed by decedent to the proponents; however, decedent continued to pay taxes and insurance on the property. In addition, decedent paid the proponents $3,000 to $3,500 a year for his care. Decedent also purchased an automobile and a pickup for the proponents.
On July 17,1967, Alma Zech passed away. Decedent continued to reside with the proponents. By all accounts this arrangement was an amicable one. Decedent received certain real property in lieu of a legacy from Alma’s estate.
During August and September of 1968, two contracts for deed, covering the property decedent received from Alma, were made between decedent and the children of the proponents. These contracts were prepared by an attorney and were executed out of the presence of the proponents.
Mary Tesch testified that when decedent moved into the home of the proponents he indicated that he did not wish to make a will because he did not believe that wills were of any value. She further testified that while she did not speak to decedent specifically about his will they did have conversations about wills in general. At some point decedent apparently changed his mind concerning the efficacy of a will, and on November 9, 1968, Mary Tesch typed up a will for decedent according to his instructions. This document is very brief and was, if valid in the first place, revoked by the instrument now at issue. The general outlines of the 1968 instrument are similar to decedent’s last will and testament at least insofar as the will results in the proponents receiving the bulk of decedent’s worldly goods.
A few days prior to execution of the June 16, 1970, will Mary Tesch called O. E. Beardsley, formerly of Watertown, South Dakota, and asked Mr. Beardsley to come to the house to see decedent. Attorney Beardsley met alone with decedent. Decedent then told Mr. Beardsley that he wished to make a will and discussed with the attorney the extent and nature of his property, who his relatives were, and how he wished to dispose of his property. Mr. Beardsley then returned to his office and prepared the will. On June 16, 1970, Mr. Beardsley, accompanied by his law partner, returned to the residence for execution of the will. After decedent had read the document and Mr. Beardsley had discussed its provisions with him, decedent signed the will in the presence of Mr. Beardsley and his law partner, both of whom signed the document as witnesses. The attorneys testified that no one else was in the room when the will was executed, and they also testified that each of them believed the instrument to be an expression of decedent’s free will and that decedent was competent to make a will at the time of execution.
During the next several years much of decedent’s property was transferred to the Teschs. On July 19, 1971, a savings certificate registered to decedent was transferred to the proponents and was increased to $10,000. On April 4, 1973, the name of Alma Zech, (decedent’s deceased sister), was removed from approximately $60,000 worth of decedent’s Series H savings bonds, and Mary Tesch’s name was added. Certificates [238]*238of deposit totaling approximately $13,500 were purchased between April 4, 1970, and July 29, 1974. These certificates were registered in joint-ownership between decedent and one of the proponents or one of their children.
Payments due under the contracts for deed between decedent and the proponents’ children were forgiven by decedent for the year 1974. In 1975, Mary Tesch recorded a similar forgiveness of the amount due for that year without discussing the matter with decedent.
The proponents did not inform any other members of the family about the transfers of property and monies that decedent had made to them and their children.
Jerry Miller, trust officer of the bank in which decedent maintained a safety deposit box, testified concerning the April 4, 1973, transaction in which Alma Zech’s name was deleted and Mary Tesch’s name was added to the $60,000 worth of savings bonds. Mr. Miller explained to decedent the effect of having Mary’s name added to the bond. He further testified that decedent was “adamant” about wanting Mary’s name placed on the bonds. The trial court found that the acts whereby decedent transferred much of his property to the proponents following execution of the will indicated decedent’s intention to carry out a disposition of his property in accordance with the disposition made in the will of June 16, 1970.
In June, 1975, the proponents moved decedent into a nursing home in Aberdeen, South Dakota. They apparently did not notify the other relatives that decedent had been moved to Aberdeen. It would, however, seem purposeless to have done so since no relatives had shown an interest in decedent for many years. On February 9, 1976, decedent was deemed no longer competent to manage his affairs and the bank in Watertown, South Dakota, was named financial conservator for decedent. Decedent remained in the Aberdeen nursing home until his death. The proponents frequently visited decedent during this period of time. It does not appear that any of the other relatives made any effort to locate or visit or even inquire about decedent during the final years of his life.
BASIS OF REVIEW
In reviewing this matter we are mindful of the fact that findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. SDCL 15-6-15(a); In Re Estate of Hobelsberger, 85 S.D. 282, 181 N.W.2d 455 (1970). In addition we must review the facts “in a light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and all conflicts in the evidence [must be] resolved in its favor.” In Re Metz’ Estate, 78 S.D. 212, 214, 100 N.W.2d 393, 394 (1960). The function of this court is not to determine the weight of the testimony nor to decide whether any Justice of this court would have made a similar fact determination. This court can only ascertain whether there is evidence from which the trial court could properly have drawn its conclusion. Estate of Podgursky, 271 N.W.2d 52 (S.D.1978). As we said in In Re Estate of Hobelsberger, supra: “It was for the trial judge to select from the conflicting evidence that which he would believe. He, not this court, is the trier of the facts.” 85 S.D. at 288, 181 N.W.2d at 458 (1970). In sum, then, it is not the function of this court to second-guess the trial court, but rather to insure that clear error occurring in the heat of trial is not allowed to deny justice to the parties bringing their causes before the court.
ISSUE
The sole issue we must consider is whether the proponents exercised undue influence upon decedent in the making of his will. In reaching this determination, five factors must be evaluated:
(1) Were the proponents in a confidential relationship with decedent?
(2) Was decedent susceptible to undue influence?
(3) Did proponents have an opportunity to exert undue influence?
[239]*239(4) Did the proponents have a disposition to exert undue influence?
(5) Does the will clearly show the effect of such influence?
DECISION
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
It is beyond argument that the proponents were in a confidential relationship with decedent. Mary Tesch assisted decedent with his business affairs during the time he lived with the proponents, although he made all decisions concerning his property. She prepared checks for his signature, wrote letters for him under her signature, made deposits and withdrawals from his savings accounts, had access to his safety deposit box, and discussed with him the price he would receive from her sons for his land. In addition, decedent relied entirely upon proponents for transportation and the daily necessities of life. As we said in In Re Metz’ Estate, supra: “When a confidential relationship is established the burden of ‘going forward with the evidence’ shifts to the beneficiary to show that he took no unfair advantage of his dominant position.” 78 S.D. at 222, 100 N.W.2d at 398. The burden of going forward with a reasonable explanation must be distinguished from the burden of proof. As we said in Estate of Anders, 88 S.D. 631, 637-638, 226 N.W.2d 170, 174 (1975):
Where a confidential relationship is established, only the burden of going forward with the evidence showing that he took no unfair advantage of the decedent shifts to the beneficiary. .
The burden of proof with respect to establishing the fact of undue influence is ordinarily placed on the contestants . . (emphasis supplied)
In the present case the proponents went forward with evidence showing that there was a rational explanation for the disposition of decedent’s property. Proponents initially established that the terms of the will were discussed with Attorney O. E. Beardsley out of their presence and without any participation on their part whatsoever, and that the will was ultimately signed a few days later, also outside their presence and without their participation. In rebuttal it was shown that when decedent’s situation on the farm and later in the Jenkins Memorial Home had become undesirable to decedent, they agreed to provide care and companionship for decedent and his sister for the remaining years of their lives. The record clearly shows that the proponents undertook no small burden when they agreed to do this. Decedent’s sister, Alma, was a very difficult person to deal with. While living on the farm prior to her commitment to Yankton, she had developed many bizarre habits, including wearing many layers of clothing, refusing to eat, refusing to use a bathroom, scattering her feces about the house, setting fires, and refusing to eat nourishing food. While it is true that Alma lived with the proponents for only a short time, there was no way that the proponents could have known this when they made the commitment to care for the elderly pair. Decedent was deeply devoted to his sister and it is not unreasonable that he would show much gratitude to the persons who agreed to make it possible for him and his sister to live in a homelike atmosphere that cannot be found in an old people’s home. The proponents took care of decedent in this environment for ten years. During this period of time the contestants and the other relatives of decedent had only minimal contact with decedent. Indeed, the only visit set out in any detail in the record by any of the contestants was an occasion in which one of the contestants attempted to get decedent to give away some of his property.
The proponents took decedent to an intensive care nursing home in Aberdeen in 1975. They continued to see decedent frequently, driving many miles to do so, even after he was judicially declared incompetent and there was no way in which they would be able to profit from this contact monetarily, which negates the suggestion that they were only after his money. The record also shows that decedent fell and broke his hip in 1974 and that subsequently he required more care than the proponents [240]*240were able to give him. There was no evidence that decedent objected to living in the Aberdeen nursing home. In fact, the record shows that none of the contestants or the other relatives attempted to visit decedent during this time. In view of the foregoing it is clear that the proponents met their burden of going forward with the evidence to show that they took no unfair advantage of decedent. In Re Estate of Anders, supra; Estate of Podgursky, supra.
We now turn our attention to the elements of undue influence that contestants were required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, unaided by any effect of the confidential relationship. In In Re Metz’ Estate, supra, this court said:
Influence, to be undue, must be of such character as to destroy the free agency of the testator and substitute the will of another person for his own. In re Armstrong’s Estate, 65 S.D. 233, 272 N.W. 799 [1937]. Its essential elements are (1) a person susceptible to such influence, (2) opportunity to exert such influence and effect the wrongful purpose, (3) a disposition to do so for an improper purpose, and (4) a result clearly showing the effect of such influence. In re Rowland’s Estate, 70 S.D. 419, 18 N.W.2d 290 [1945].
78 S.D. at 214-215, 100 N.W.2d at 394.
SUSCEPTIBILITY TO INFLUENCE
First, contestants failed to establish that decedent was a person susceptible to such influence. To the contrary, the record shows that during the time period in which the will was executed decedent was, according to a next-door neighbor who spoke to decedent nearly every day, a man aware of what was going on about him, with definite opinions about farming, politics, and farm markets. Another witness, for whom Mary Tesch babysat, testified that she was aware that her infant was sometimes left in decedent’s care. She was not bothered about this because she found decedent to be “a fine and friendly and relatively alert old man.” It was testified by Carl Tesch that decedent was very sharp at and assisted him with algebra and geometry. The attorneys who witnessed the execution of the will testified that decedent met all of the legal requirements for a testator, including not acting under menace, duress, undue influence, or misrepresentation. In addition, the banker who assisted decedent in changing the title to his government bonds testified on cross-examination that decedent was “adamant” about the disposition of his property and was specific about which bonds he wished changed and which he did not. This evidence does not present a dark picture of coercion, threat, and intimidation such as is found in the Metz case, supra.
OPPORTUNITY TO EXERT INFLUENCE
It is clear that the proponents had a very close relationship with decedent, and spent much time with him, however, they were never present during, nor in any way a party to, the discussions with the decedent and his counsel in the preparation or execution of the will. While their relationship with decedent created a certain opportunity to exert influence over him, we have held that “opportunity alone is not sufficient to warrant an inference of undue influence.” Peterson v. Imbsen, 46 S.D. 540, 543, 194 N.W. 842, 843 (1923). In a similar vein this court said in In Re Hosmer’s Estate, 47 S.D. 147, 150, 196 N.W. 545, 546 (1924):
The [trier of fact] may have understood that [it] might infer undue influence from the fact that [proponent] had an opportunity to influence the testatrix, that he was made a beneficiary of the will, and that he showed a disposition to retain the benefits of the will. These facts do not amount to proof of undue influence. If they did nearly every will could be set aside on this ground .
The fact that proponents were the only relatives of decedent who showed an interest in him in his later years and provided for him on a daily basis obviously establishes the opportunity to exert influence, but it does not establish the exertion of undue influence, and indeed such conduct is to be commended rather than used as a basis to deny decedent’s expressed desire to reward such human concern.
[241]*241DISPOSITION TO EXERT INFLUENCE
Contestants did not establish that proponents were of a disposition to exert undue influence for an improper purpose. In their briefs and in argument before this court the contestants repeatedly emphasized the transfers of money and property made by decedent to the proponents and members of their family. Nearly all of these transactions occurred subsequent to execution of the will and would indicate a concerted purpose to carry out the intent of that will inter vivos. The trial court found that decedent intended by these independent acts to grant the bounty he intended to bestow upon his death to the proponents while he was living. As stated earlier, we are to take the inferences in a manner that tends to support the determination made by the trial court.
While the contracts for deed executed by decedent and the sons of the proponents were made prior to the execution of the will, the price recited in these contracts was virtually the same price decedent had paid for the land less than one year prior to execution of the contract when he took the property as his share of his sister Alma’s estate. That valuation had been placed on the land by disinterested appraisers appointed by the executor of Alma’s estate. There is no evidence of any cold and calculating plot on the part of the proponents to cajole, coerce, or subtly acquire decedent’s estate. Indeed, Phyllis Jacobson testified that Mary Tesch had tears in her eyes when she showed Mrs. Jacobson the savings certificate that decedent had signed over to her. Accordingly, we hold that the contestants failed to establish the element of disposition on the part of the proponents to unduly influence decedent for an improper purpose.
WILL SHOWING THE EFFECT OF INFLUENCE.
The final element to be considered is whether the will clearly shows the effect of undue influence. It can not be disputed that the proponents stand to benefit handsomely under the terms of decedent’s will. Had contestants successfully established the other elements of undue influence, this final element would be the capstone necessary to establish a successful challenge to the will. In the present case, the contestants have failed to establish the necessary prerequisites that would cast the disposition of decedent’s property in an unfavorable light. In view of that failure we must conclude that decedent was appreciative of the many acts of kindness shown to him by the proponents and that he wished to reward them for this behavior. This appropriate motivation of decedent, coupled with contestants’ total disregard of decedent in the final years of his life, does not substantiate the evil intent ascribed to this disposition by the contestants. As we said in In Re Blake’s Estate, 81 S.D. 391, 398, 136 N.W.2d 242, 246 (1965):
A testator has the privilege and right to dispose of his property as he chooses within limits and in the manner fixed by statute. The law does not require that he recognize his relatives equally or at all.
The language used by this court in In Re Swanson’s Estate, 54 S.D. 42, 45, 222 N.W. 491, 492 (1928), is appropriate here:
To hold that the will involved in this case was procured by undue influence amounts to a holding that a son or a daughter [or other relative] who is given preference in a will has exerted undue influence by the mere act of remaining with aged parents, and, at a cost of self-sacrifice, aiding them and caring for them until their infirmities end in death. To that extent neither this court nor courts generally have seen fit to go.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.
WOLLMAN, C. J., and MORGAN, J., concur.
DUNN and HENDERSON, JJ., dissent.
TICE, Circuit Judge, sitting for FOS-HEIM, J., disqualified.