BROWN, Justice.
Appellant, widow of decedent, offered the will of Alfred Waters for probate. Ap-pellees, decedent’s daughters, contested the will contending that the testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time he executed the will and that he was acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. The jury found against appellees on the issue of testamentary capacity, but found that the testator was acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence at the time he executed the will. We affirm.
The issues on appeal are:
1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict that the testator acted under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence.
2. Were the trial court’s instructions correct and complete.
Alfred Waters was married on March 20, 1935, to the appellees’ mother, Evelyn. Alfred and Evelyn Waters were divorced in 1940, but in that same year Evelyn Waters returned to the family home where they lived together until June 1965.
A second marriage by Alfred Waters took place in 1965, which resulted in divorce in 1969. By this time, drinking had become a problem for Mr. Waters and was first noticed by his daughter, Janet Holkan, in 1961.
Alfred Waters married a third time in 1970 and was divorced in 1974. By this time drinking had become a major problem for Mr. Waters and hospitalization was required on numerous occasions. Between 1969 and the time of his death on October 15, 1978, Water’s drinking problem had become serious, possibly even the cause of death.
When Alfred Waters was committed to the Wyoming State Hospital in February 1974, Janet Holkan, his daughter, was appointed guardian of his estate. Upon his release in August 1974 the medical records indicated that if Mr. Waters were to continue drinking, his chances to recover, to become functional, and to manage his life, were very poor. Mr. Waters, however, resumed drinking the day he was released from the hospital.
Mr. Waters became acquainted with appellant, Valda Waters in June 1975 when he was going to the Mental Health Center in Wheatland, Wyoming. In November 1975 Mr. Waters began proceedings to terminate the guardianship. Valda Waters was an active participant and, in fact paid for a major part of the expenses in the proceedings to terminate the guardianship. Mr. [472]*472Waters was hospitalized in January 1976 just prior to the hearing for terminating the guardianship so that he would be “dried out” before the hearing.
Appellant and proponent of the will, Val-da Waters, married Alfred B. Waters, on February 4, 1976, about a week after the termination of the guardianship. On March 18, 1976, about six weeks later, Alfred Waters signed his will, leaving all of his property to his wife and disinheriting his two daughters.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the jury’s finding of undue influence in three respects: 1) the verdict is inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial; 2) the verdict is not supported by the evidence presented at trial; and 3) the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. We cannot agree.
The standard of review when considering the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict is well established. We must begin by assuming that the evidence supporting the prevailing party is true leaving out of consideration the conflicting evidence. This evidence must also be given every favorable inference that may be fairly drawn. Furthermore, we do not evaluate the evidence but rather determine if there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could have based its decision. Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979).
In re Draper’s Estate, Wyo., 374 P.2d 425, 431 (1962), this Court stated that:
“ * * * [t]he elements of undue influence are opportunity to control; a condition permitting subversion; and activity on the part of the person charged. * * * ”
The proof necessary to support a finding of undue influence has also been discussed by this court. In In re Conroy’s Estate, 29 Wyo. 62, 211 P. 96, 99 (1922), we stated:
“It is not necessary to cite authorities to sustain the proposition that undue influence, seldom susceptible of direct proof, may be established by proof of facts from which it may be fairly and reasonably inferred.” Cited with approval in In re Merrill’s Estate, 80 Wyo. 276, 341 P.2d 506, 509 (1959).
Additionally, in 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 479, p. 614, the burden of proof necessary for a finding of undue influence has been set forth as follows:
“Direct evidence is not essential to the proof of fraud or undue influence invalidating a will, and a contest on the ground of fraud or undue influence may be weighed successfully on circumstantial evidence, the contestant being entitled to the benefit of all inferences which may be reasonably and legitimately derived from established facts. * * ⅜.”
“ * * * A combination of weakened mentality and unnatural bequests will warrant the submission of the issue of undue influence to the jury. * * *.” 79 Am. Jur.2d, Wills, § 487, p. 619.
“The burden of proof on the issue of undue influence, which burden most courts say rests upon the contestant, is carried, in general, by a preponderance of the evidence. * * * ” 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 480, p. 614.
“Most of the authorities support the view that a presumption of undue influence arises upon a showing that one who drew the will, or was otherwise active directly in preparing it or procuring its execution, obtains under the will a substantial benefit, to which he has no natural claim, or a benefit which, in amount, is out of proportion to the amounts received by other persons having an equal claim to participate in the bounty of the testator. * * ” 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 429, p. 579.
“ * * * But the circumstance that the condition of the mind or the body of the testator was such as to make it probable that he was not able to resist the influence of others has been held sufficient to warrant a presumption that the will was obtained by undue influence * * 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 434, p. 584.
“The fact that a will is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust in its provisions is a circumstance to be considered in connee[473]*473tion with other evidence bearing on the question whether the will is the result of undue influence. * * * ” 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 437, p. 585.
In addition, as noted by the court in Welch’s Administrator v. Clifton, 294 Ky. 514, 172 S.W.2d 221, 148 A.L.R. 1220 (1943):
“Undue influence may be proved by circumstances leading up to and attendant upon the execution of a will, which, when taken together, are convincing, notwithstanding the fact that each circumstance standing alone might be inconclusive. [Citation.]”
A review of the evidence here indicates that Mr.
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BROWN, Justice.
Appellant, widow of decedent, offered the will of Alfred Waters for probate. Ap-pellees, decedent’s daughters, contested the will contending that the testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time he executed the will and that he was acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. The jury found against appellees on the issue of testamentary capacity, but found that the testator was acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence at the time he executed the will. We affirm.
The issues on appeal are:
1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict that the testator acted under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence.
2. Were the trial court’s instructions correct and complete.
Alfred Waters was married on March 20, 1935, to the appellees’ mother, Evelyn. Alfred and Evelyn Waters were divorced in 1940, but in that same year Evelyn Waters returned to the family home where they lived together until June 1965.
A second marriage by Alfred Waters took place in 1965, which resulted in divorce in 1969. By this time, drinking had become a problem for Mr. Waters and was first noticed by his daughter, Janet Holkan, in 1961.
Alfred Waters married a third time in 1970 and was divorced in 1974. By this time drinking had become a major problem for Mr. Waters and hospitalization was required on numerous occasions. Between 1969 and the time of his death on October 15, 1978, Water’s drinking problem had become serious, possibly even the cause of death.
When Alfred Waters was committed to the Wyoming State Hospital in February 1974, Janet Holkan, his daughter, was appointed guardian of his estate. Upon his release in August 1974 the medical records indicated that if Mr. Waters were to continue drinking, his chances to recover, to become functional, and to manage his life, were very poor. Mr. Waters, however, resumed drinking the day he was released from the hospital.
Mr. Waters became acquainted with appellant, Valda Waters in June 1975 when he was going to the Mental Health Center in Wheatland, Wyoming. In November 1975 Mr. Waters began proceedings to terminate the guardianship. Valda Waters was an active participant and, in fact paid for a major part of the expenses in the proceedings to terminate the guardianship. Mr. [472]*472Waters was hospitalized in January 1976 just prior to the hearing for terminating the guardianship so that he would be “dried out” before the hearing.
Appellant and proponent of the will, Val-da Waters, married Alfred B. Waters, on February 4, 1976, about a week after the termination of the guardianship. On March 18, 1976, about six weeks later, Alfred Waters signed his will, leaving all of his property to his wife and disinheriting his two daughters.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the jury’s finding of undue influence in three respects: 1) the verdict is inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial; 2) the verdict is not supported by the evidence presented at trial; and 3) the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. We cannot agree.
The standard of review when considering the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict is well established. We must begin by assuming that the evidence supporting the prevailing party is true leaving out of consideration the conflicting evidence. This evidence must also be given every favorable inference that may be fairly drawn. Furthermore, we do not evaluate the evidence but rather determine if there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could have based its decision. Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979).
In re Draper’s Estate, Wyo., 374 P.2d 425, 431 (1962), this Court stated that:
“ * * * [t]he elements of undue influence are opportunity to control; a condition permitting subversion; and activity on the part of the person charged. * * * ”
The proof necessary to support a finding of undue influence has also been discussed by this court. In In re Conroy’s Estate, 29 Wyo. 62, 211 P. 96, 99 (1922), we stated:
“It is not necessary to cite authorities to sustain the proposition that undue influence, seldom susceptible of direct proof, may be established by proof of facts from which it may be fairly and reasonably inferred.” Cited with approval in In re Merrill’s Estate, 80 Wyo. 276, 341 P.2d 506, 509 (1959).
Additionally, in 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 479, p. 614, the burden of proof necessary for a finding of undue influence has been set forth as follows:
“Direct evidence is not essential to the proof of fraud or undue influence invalidating a will, and a contest on the ground of fraud or undue influence may be weighed successfully on circumstantial evidence, the contestant being entitled to the benefit of all inferences which may be reasonably and legitimately derived from established facts. * * ⅜.”
“ * * * A combination of weakened mentality and unnatural bequests will warrant the submission of the issue of undue influence to the jury. * * *.” 79 Am. Jur.2d, Wills, § 487, p. 619.
“The burden of proof on the issue of undue influence, which burden most courts say rests upon the contestant, is carried, in general, by a preponderance of the evidence. * * * ” 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 480, p. 614.
“Most of the authorities support the view that a presumption of undue influence arises upon a showing that one who drew the will, or was otherwise active directly in preparing it or procuring its execution, obtains under the will a substantial benefit, to which he has no natural claim, or a benefit which, in amount, is out of proportion to the amounts received by other persons having an equal claim to participate in the bounty of the testator. * * ” 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 429, p. 579.
“ * * * But the circumstance that the condition of the mind or the body of the testator was such as to make it probable that he was not able to resist the influence of others has been held sufficient to warrant a presumption that the will was obtained by undue influence * * 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 434, p. 584.
“The fact that a will is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust in its provisions is a circumstance to be considered in connee[473]*473tion with other evidence bearing on the question whether the will is the result of undue influence. * * * ” 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 437, p. 585.
In addition, as noted by the court in Welch’s Administrator v. Clifton, 294 Ky. 514, 172 S.W.2d 221, 148 A.L.R. 1220 (1943):
“Undue influence may be proved by circumstances leading up to and attendant upon the execution of a will, which, when taken together, are convincing, notwithstanding the fact that each circumstance standing alone might be inconclusive. [Citation.]”
A review of the evidence here indicates that Mr. Waters was suffering from the ravages of alcohol; he was confused and in a weakened condition, and had been in that condition some time prior to the execution of the will. Appellant furnished the testator with a place to live, provided for some of his living expenses and gave other financial assistance. Appellant also furnished the decedent with alcohol even though she knew of the dangers involved if Mr. Waters continued to consume alcohol. In addition, throughout this period, Mr. Waters continued to require frequent hospitalization.
The jury heard considerable testimony with respect to Mr. Water’s lack of testamentary capacity. The jury, however, did not think this testimony sufficient to find that Mr. Waters lacked testamentary capacity. The jury, nevertheless, could properly consider this testimony insofar as it showed a weakened mentality, and thus rendered testator susceptible to undue influence. 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, § 480, p. 619, supra.
The attorney who prepared the testator’s will was first contacted by the appellant, Valda Waters. Appellant also accompanied Mr. Waters to the attorney’s office to have the will drawn. Apparently the attorney who drew the will never talked to Mr. Waters except in the presence of appellant. It would be fair to say, therefore, that the testator was completely dependent upon Valda Waters and that he was completely under her domination at the time of the execution of the will.
We wish to make it clear that we are not holding that any one of the circumstances leading up to and attendant upon the execution of the will, standing alone, was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. We do find that a combination of these circumstances, together with permittable inferences, is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict that the testator acted under due influence at the time he executed his will. Welch’s Administrator v. Clifton, supra.
Instructions
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to give her offered instruction Number 4.1 This instruction required clear and convincing evidence to support a finding of undue influence. Once again we cannot agree.
This Court has previously determined the quantum of proof necessary in will contest cases. The burden of proof is upon the contestant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator was so influenced by others that he was not a free agent in making the will. Wood v. Wood, 25 Wyo. 26, 164 P. 844 (1917).
A standard of proof higher than preponderance of the evidence is not required of a deed or will contestant for every claim the contestant makes. Once certain circumstances are established, the contestant is no longer saddled with a “clear proof” standard under remaining issues. Brug v. Case, Wyo., 600 P.2d 710 (1979).
In Brug v. Case, supra, this court affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of the contestant. In the case at bar the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will were such that the contestants were, as we said in the Brug case, “No longer saddled with a ‘clear proof’ standard under remaining issues.” A simple prepon[474]*474derance of the evidence is sufficient for the finding of undue influence.
We further said:
“*** [O]nee there is clear proof of suspicious circumstances, * * * a simple preponderance of the evidence will support a finding of undue influence. [Citations.]” Brag v. Case, supra, at p. 715.
A preponderance of the evidence under the circumstances supports the finding of undue influence and the trial court properly refused to give appellant’s Instruction 4.
Appellant further contends that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to give her proposed Instructions l,2 2,3 and 3.4 This court has previously held that it is not error to refuse to give a party’s offered instructions that are legally correct if these legal principles are adequately covered by the instructions that were given by the court. As this Court stated in Jeffers v. Offe, Wyo., 598 P.2d 450, 451 (1979):
“ * * * [I]t is a well-recognized rule of law that no reversible error is committed by a court’s refusal to give an instruction even where it is legally correct and applicable to the issues in the case, where other instructions given embody substantially the same propositions as requested in the refused instruction. [Citations.]”
“ * * * [W]e think that the court was justified in rejecting the instructions since the matters with which they dealt were adequately covered by other instructions. * * * It is well settled that a party is not prejudiced by refusal of instructions when the matter is covered by ones which are given. [Citations.]” Zanetti Bus Lines, Inc. v. Logan, Wyo., 400 P.2d 482, 487 (1965).
“ * * * Counsel for contestee assumes that merely because a requested instruction is correct as an abstract proposition of law it is prejudicial not to give it. That is not the law. [Citation.] The court should, of course, instruct the jury on the basic fundamental rules applicable to the facts in issue, particularly if requested to do so. [Citation.] But requests for instructions which go beyond that point stand on a different footing. Unless the refusal to comply therewith is prejudicial and affects the substantial rights of the complaining party, it cannot be held to be reversible error. * * * ” Branson v. Roelofz, 52 Wyo. 101, 70 P.2d 589, 597 (1937).
Review of Instructions 7 and 11 that were given by the trial court shows that appellant’s offered Instructions 1, 2, and 3 were adequately covered. Instruction No. 7 provided:
“You are instructed that a person possessing the requisites of testamentary capacity at the time of executing his Will is not incapacitated from making a Will by old age or illness, although these are proper matters or factors to be considered in determining whether testamentary capacity existed. The courts guard jealously the right of all persons of sound and disposing mind and memory to make Wills. This includes the right to change the Will by making new Wills at any time and from time to time, and the last Will made by any person which revokes all former Wills, if made while possessing testamentary capacity, is the Will which is valid.”
Instruction No. 11 provided:
[475]*475“You are instructed that a Will which is procured by undue influence may not be admitted to probate.
“Undue influence consists of acts or conduct by which the mind of the testator is overcome by the will of another person. “Mere general influence, not brought to bear on the testamentary act, Is not undue influence. In order to constitute undue influence, it must be used directly to procure the Will. It must amount to coercion destroying free agency of the testator, substituting for his own another person’s will and compelling the testator to make a disposition he would not otherwise have made.”
These instructions adequately explained the applicable law; and therefore, the trial judge did not err in refusing to give appellant’s offered instructions.
Furthermore, we cannot agree with appellant that the failure to give these proposed instructions leads to juror confusion. Appellant’s attorney filed an affidavit with the district court in connection with a motion for a new trial and other relief, claiming that two jurors had approached him and expressed some confusion in answering the second special verdict. The second special verdict concerned the issue of undue influence. This verdict form was apparently drafted by appellant’s counsel, and in any event, appellant’s counsel did not object to the form of the verdict. Confusion, if any, as to the verdict form cannot be directly related to failure to properly instruct the jury as to the applicable law. In addition, we do not believe this voluntary communication was significant because it did not concern “extraneous prejudicial information [that] was improperly brought to the jury’s attention,” or the fact that “outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.” Rule 606(b), W.R.E.5
Affirmed.