[17]*17UHLENHOPP, Justice.
Ronald L. Parsons was killed on October 3,1973. He was survived by his widow and his two adopted children from a prior marriage. The probate court appointed Parsons’ widow as administrator of his estate. At that time § 633.336 of the 1973 Code provided:
When a wrongful act produces death, damages recovered therefor shall be disposed of as personal property belonging to the estate of the deceased, but if the deceased leaves a spouse, child, or parent, it shall not be liable for the payment of debts of the estate, except debts and charges of the first, second, third and fifth classes.
On September 30,1975, Parsons’ administrator commenced an action for wrongful death. Effective July 1, 1976, the legislature amended § 633.336 of the Code to provide:
When a wrongful act produces death, damages recovered therefor shall be disposed of as personal property belonging to the estate of the deceased, however, if the damages include damages for loss of services and support of a deceased spouse and parent, such damages shall be apportioned by the court among the surviving spouse and children of the decedent in such manner as the court may deem equitable consistent with the loss of services and support sustained by the surviving spouse and children respectively. If the decedent leaves a spouse, child or parent, damages for wrongful death shall not be subject to debts and charges of the decedent’s estate. 66 G.A. ch. 1227, § 4.
On April 19, 1977, the probate court authorized the administrator to settle the litigation regarding Parsons’ death. The settlement netted Parsons’ estate about $75,-000 for distribution. The administrator thereupon applied for an order of distribution, contending that amended § 633.336 applied. The children claimed that § 633.-336 applied as it read when Parsons was killed. The probate court adopted the administrator’s position and awarded the widow approximately $70,000 and the children together $5000. The children appealed.
If the settlement and distribution had occurred before the statutory amendment in 1976, the widow would have received approximately $41,667 and the children together approximately $33,333 under then § 633.336 and our regular descent and distribution law. Code 1973, §§ 633.211(4), 633.219(1). Did the amendment to § 633.-336 reach back and increase the widow’s share and reduce the children’s shares, as the probate court held?
The general principles on the prospectivity-retrospectivity of statutory amendments are well established; the problem arises in their application. The principles are stated thus in 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 414 at 981:
As a general rule, statutes are construed to operate prospectively unless the legislative intent that they be given retrospective or retroactive operation clearly appears from the express language of the acts, or by necessary or unavoidable implication.
And in 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 421 at 996-997:
A difference is recognized between statutes affecting substantial rights and those affecting only procedure, and the courts are more liberal in the interpretation relative to retrospective operation in the latter than in the former case. Although the general rule that statutes will be construed to be prospective only and not retrospective or retroactive . has been held to apply to statutes relating to remedies and procedure, in most jurisdictions the rule does not apply to such statutes. As is otherwise stated, such general rule is subject to an exception in the case of a statute relating to remedies or procedure, such as a statute creating an additional remedy, although such exception does not apply where there was no remedy whatever before the statute was enacted, and even procedural statutes may be regarded as prospective and not retrospective where they tend to destroy existing rights or to create new rights. While it may be said that statutes relating to remedies or procedure may be given a retroactive operation, a [18]*18statement of the rule perhaps more accurate is that statutes merely affecting the remedy or law of procedure apply to actions begun after their passage, whether the right of action accrued before or after the change in the law, at least in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary.
Similar statements are made in 73 Am. Jur.2d Statutes § 350 at 487 (“courts observe a strict rule of construction against a retrospective operation, and indulge in the presumption that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments thereof, enacted by it, to operate prospectively only, and not retroactively”), and § 354 at 489 (“remedial statutes, or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, do not normally come within the legal conception of a retrospective law”).
The question here is whether the children had a substantive right under the original statute on distribution of the wrongful death proceeds, or whether the statutory amendment relates only to the procedure or remedy and thus controls.
The 1976 amendment to § 633.336 does not state that it operates retrospectively. Under such circumstances, the courts hold that distributees such as these children have a right to their shares under the original statute which a subsequent amendment changing the mode of distribution does not take away. Thus the Illinois Appellate Court had an issue almost identical to the present one in the case of In re Dance’s Estate, 16 Ill.App.2d 122, 130, 147 N.E.2d 385, 390. The statute in effect at time of death distributed wrongful death damages as personal property; a 1955 amendment distributed the damages in proportion to the claimants’ dependency. The defendants-claimants were siblings of the minor decedents. The court held, “We are of the opinion that in the instant case the rights of the defendants became vested upon the deaths of the minor decedents and that the 1955 amendment should not be retroactively applied.” The court held similarly in Berg v. Berg’s Administrator, 105 Ky. 80, 83, 48 S.W. 432, 433. The statute in force at time of death distributed wrongful death damages as personal property; a subsequent amendment gave the damages to a parent. The court stated:
It is unnecessary to decide the question as to whether the General Assembly could enact a law which would have had the effect of giving the entire amount of the judgment to the mother, as, in our opinion, the act is, and was intended to be, prospective in its operation, and does not affect the rights acquired under the law in force at the time of the intestate’s death.
To the same effect is Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. Ry., 87 Mich. 374, 390, 49 N.W. 621, 625. Against the contention that the later law applied to distribution of death damages, the court stated in Richmond that “the distribution of the personal property of Sherwood’s estate would, we think, be governed by the law in reference thereto existing at the time of his death, which provided that the property in such a case as this should descend, one-half to his mother, and the remainder in equal shares to his brothers and sisters.” Accord: In re Brennan, 160 App.Div. 401, 145 N.Y.S. 440 (statute at death governed distribution); City of Cincinnati v. Bachmann, 51 Ohio App. 108, 199 N.E. 853. See also
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[17]*17UHLENHOPP, Justice.
Ronald L. Parsons was killed on October 3,1973. He was survived by his widow and his two adopted children from a prior marriage. The probate court appointed Parsons’ widow as administrator of his estate. At that time § 633.336 of the 1973 Code provided:
When a wrongful act produces death, damages recovered therefor shall be disposed of as personal property belonging to the estate of the deceased, but if the deceased leaves a spouse, child, or parent, it shall not be liable for the payment of debts of the estate, except debts and charges of the first, second, third and fifth classes.
On September 30,1975, Parsons’ administrator commenced an action for wrongful death. Effective July 1, 1976, the legislature amended § 633.336 of the Code to provide:
When a wrongful act produces death, damages recovered therefor shall be disposed of as personal property belonging to the estate of the deceased, however, if the damages include damages for loss of services and support of a deceased spouse and parent, such damages shall be apportioned by the court among the surviving spouse and children of the decedent in such manner as the court may deem equitable consistent with the loss of services and support sustained by the surviving spouse and children respectively. If the decedent leaves a spouse, child or parent, damages for wrongful death shall not be subject to debts and charges of the decedent’s estate. 66 G.A. ch. 1227, § 4.
On April 19, 1977, the probate court authorized the administrator to settle the litigation regarding Parsons’ death. The settlement netted Parsons’ estate about $75,-000 for distribution. The administrator thereupon applied for an order of distribution, contending that amended § 633.336 applied. The children claimed that § 633.-336 applied as it read when Parsons was killed. The probate court adopted the administrator’s position and awarded the widow approximately $70,000 and the children together $5000. The children appealed.
If the settlement and distribution had occurred before the statutory amendment in 1976, the widow would have received approximately $41,667 and the children together approximately $33,333 under then § 633.336 and our regular descent and distribution law. Code 1973, §§ 633.211(4), 633.219(1). Did the amendment to § 633.-336 reach back and increase the widow’s share and reduce the children’s shares, as the probate court held?
The general principles on the prospectivity-retrospectivity of statutory amendments are well established; the problem arises in their application. The principles are stated thus in 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 414 at 981:
As a general rule, statutes are construed to operate prospectively unless the legislative intent that they be given retrospective or retroactive operation clearly appears from the express language of the acts, or by necessary or unavoidable implication.
And in 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 421 at 996-997:
A difference is recognized between statutes affecting substantial rights and those affecting only procedure, and the courts are more liberal in the interpretation relative to retrospective operation in the latter than in the former case. Although the general rule that statutes will be construed to be prospective only and not retrospective or retroactive . has been held to apply to statutes relating to remedies and procedure, in most jurisdictions the rule does not apply to such statutes. As is otherwise stated, such general rule is subject to an exception in the case of a statute relating to remedies or procedure, such as a statute creating an additional remedy, although such exception does not apply where there was no remedy whatever before the statute was enacted, and even procedural statutes may be regarded as prospective and not retrospective where they tend to destroy existing rights or to create new rights. While it may be said that statutes relating to remedies or procedure may be given a retroactive operation, a [18]*18statement of the rule perhaps more accurate is that statutes merely affecting the remedy or law of procedure apply to actions begun after their passage, whether the right of action accrued before or after the change in the law, at least in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary.
Similar statements are made in 73 Am. Jur.2d Statutes § 350 at 487 (“courts observe a strict rule of construction against a retrospective operation, and indulge in the presumption that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments thereof, enacted by it, to operate prospectively only, and not retroactively”), and § 354 at 489 (“remedial statutes, or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, do not normally come within the legal conception of a retrospective law”).
The question here is whether the children had a substantive right under the original statute on distribution of the wrongful death proceeds, or whether the statutory amendment relates only to the procedure or remedy and thus controls.
The 1976 amendment to § 633.336 does not state that it operates retrospectively. Under such circumstances, the courts hold that distributees such as these children have a right to their shares under the original statute which a subsequent amendment changing the mode of distribution does not take away. Thus the Illinois Appellate Court had an issue almost identical to the present one in the case of In re Dance’s Estate, 16 Ill.App.2d 122, 130, 147 N.E.2d 385, 390. The statute in effect at time of death distributed wrongful death damages as personal property; a 1955 amendment distributed the damages in proportion to the claimants’ dependency. The defendants-claimants were siblings of the minor decedents. The court held, “We are of the opinion that in the instant case the rights of the defendants became vested upon the deaths of the minor decedents and that the 1955 amendment should not be retroactively applied.” The court held similarly in Berg v. Berg’s Administrator, 105 Ky. 80, 83, 48 S.W. 432, 433. The statute in force at time of death distributed wrongful death damages as personal property; a subsequent amendment gave the damages to a parent. The court stated:
It is unnecessary to decide the question as to whether the General Assembly could enact a law which would have had the effect of giving the entire amount of the judgment to the mother, as, in our opinion, the act is, and was intended to be, prospective in its operation, and does not affect the rights acquired under the law in force at the time of the intestate’s death.
To the same effect is Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. Ry., 87 Mich. 374, 390, 49 N.W. 621, 625. Against the contention that the later law applied to distribution of death damages, the court stated in Richmond that “the distribution of the personal property of Sherwood’s estate would, we think, be governed by the law in reference thereto existing at the time of his death, which provided that the property in such a case as this should descend, one-half to his mother, and the remainder in equal shares to his brothers and sisters.” Accord: In re Brennan, 160 App.Div. 401, 145 N.Y.S. 440 (statute at death governed distribution); City of Cincinnati v. Bachmann, 51 Ohio App. 108, 199 N.E. 853. See also Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. v. Townsend, 41 Ark. 382; McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48 (Fla.); Biddle v. Moore, 87 Ga.App. 524, 74 S.E.2d 552; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 323 Mass. 671, 84 N.E.2d 32; Fraley v. Muller, 281 App.Div. 1016, 121 N.Y.S.2d 138, rev’d on other grounds, 283 App.Div. 1046, 131 N.Y.S.2d 479; In re Marble, 88 Misc. 339, 151 N.Y.S. 953; In re Weinstein’s Will, 153 Misc. 279, 274 N.Y.S. 826; In re Brody’s Estate, 155 Misc. 819, 281 N.Y.S. 865; In re Weaver’s Estate, 195 Misc. 405, 90 N.Y.S.2d 770; Nohrden v. North Eastern R.R., 54 S.C. 492, 32 S.E. 524; Quinn v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R., 141 Wis. 497, 124 N.W. 653; 22 Am.Jur.2d Death § 7 at 611 (“Statutes which create a cause of action for wrongful death or which change the rights under an existing death [19]*19statute are ordinarily not given a retroactive effect unless the legislature has clearly expressed an intention that such effect should be given.”); Anno. 66 A.L.R.2d 1444, 1445 (“a statute changing the manner and method of distributing the proceeds of a judgment or settlement for wrongful death will not be given a retroactive effect”). A case involving a later statute which was construed to be retrospective by its terms is De Long v. Green, 229 Ark. 100, 106, 313 S.W.2d 370, 374 (“we point out that Act 115 was repealed by Act 255 of 1957, which by its language is applicable to all actions for wrongful death, whether arising before or after the effective date of the 1957 statute”).
These cited cases are in line with the principle that the rules of distribution at the time of the decedent’s death control the devolution of personalty generally, rather than later amendments which are not expressly retrospective. Blackman v. Baxter, Reed & Co., 125 Iowa 118, 100 N.W. 75; Lorieux v. Keller, 5 Iowa 196; 23 Am.Jur. Descent & Distribution § 17 at 764 (“As a general rule, a statute of descent and distribution will not be given retroactive effect unless this is the manifest intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute.”), and § 21 at 768 (“an estate must be distributed among heirs and distributees according to the law as it exists at the time of the death of the ancestor”). The cited cases on amendments regarding death damages are also in harmony with an Iowa legislative enactment in 1971 entitled “An Act relating to rules of statutory construction.” 64 G.A. ch. 77. That Act provides in § 3 (now § 4.5 of the Code):
A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective.
And in § 11(1) and (2) (now § 4.13(1) and (2) of the Code):
The reenactment, revision, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not affect:
1. The prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken thereunder;
2. Any validation, cure, right, privilege, obligation, or liability previously acquired, accrued, accorded, or incurred thereunder; .
Our prior decisions are not in conflict with the cited cases holding that amendments like the present one do not operate retrospectively. None of our decisions deal with such an amendment. One of them held that a statute creating a remedy for an existing wrong in the consumer fraud context operates retrospectively. State ex rel. Turner v. Limbrecht, 246 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa). This is in line with the rule already stated regarding retrospectivity of a statute “creating an additional remedy”. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 421 at 997. The same is true of Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 260 Iowa 556, 149 N.W.2d 789. The statute there did not reduce or eliminate a right a person had; it provided a remedy for a loss already existing — loss of services and support. Another case dealt with “remedy” in the strict sense of that term. Jones v. Bowers, 256 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa). Another dealt with the burden of proof as a procedural matter (although the quantum of proof was held to be substantive). Schultz v. Gosselink, 260 Iowa 115, 148 N.W.2d 434. Still another case dealt with a procedural matter — application of a rule of civil procedure. Walker State Bank v. Chipokas, 228 N.W.2d 49 (Iowa).
We conclude that we should adopt the position of the courts which have considered the question elsewhere, and hold that the statutory amendment before us does not apply retrospectively. The wrongful death damages are to be distributed under the statute as it stood when Parsons was killed.
REVERSED.
All Justices concur except ALLBEE, J., REYNOLDSON, C. J., and HARRIS, J., who dissent.