GILBERTSON, Justice.
[¶ 1.] The State of South Dakota and the Office of the Commissioner of School and Public Lands (State) appeal from a trial court’s order denying the State’s claim of escheat. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶2.] Robert G. Jetter (Jetter) and his brother Martin farmed and ranched together in Haakon County near Milesville, South Dakota. Neither brother ever married nor had children. They spent their entire fives solely devoted to their ranching pursuits and through decades of diligent hard work, they were successful at it.
[¶3.] In 1981, Jetter contacted attorney Russell C. Molstad and executed a will which devised all of his property to his brother Martin in the second provision to the will. Viewed in isolation, the will’s third provision purported to disinherit all of Jetter’s other relatives:
I have intentionally omitted all of my heirs and all other persons whomsoever, who are not specifically mentioned herein, and I hereby generally and specifically disinherit each and all persons whomsoever claiming to be my heirs-at-law and each and all persons whomsoever who, if I died intestate, would be entitled to any part of my estate except those herein provided for.
The following year, Martin contacted attorney Molstad and executed a nearly identical will, leaving all of his property to Jetter and including a provision purporting to disinherit all of Martin’s other relatives. '
[¶ 4.] Martin died in December 1990. Jet-ter inherited all of Martin’s property under his will. At the time of Martin’s ■ death, Jetter was-incompetent and remained so up until his death. He was living in a nursing home and did not attend his brother’s funeral. He was unaware his brother had died and was likewise unaware of any of his relatives or of the nature and extent of any property he owned. A guardianship was established for Jetter approximately one month after Martin died.
[¶ 5.] Jetter died six years later on- October 2,1996. At the time of his death, he was still residing in a nursing home in Philip, South Dakota. He had amassed an estate estimated to be worth 3.2 million dollars in real and personal property. The will he executed in 1981 was admitted into probate and declared valid.
[¶ 6.] The personal representative petitioned for determination of heirship. A hearing on this petition was held December 5, 1996. Following that hearing, the trial court ruled the disinheriting clause in Jetter’s will was not applicable and that his estate was to pass to his heirs by intestate succession unrestricted by the disputed “disinheritance” clause. The court concluded “[t]he plain language of Robert G. Jetter’s Will indicates that he wanted to disinherit his other heirs if Martin was [sic] alive, but there is no indication that he intended to disinherit them if Martin Jetter predeceased him.” From this, the trial court concluded the will made an ineffective disposition and that Jetter’s property would be distributed pursuant to the law of intestacy.
[¶ 7.] The trial court denied the State’s escheat claim. The State motioned for reconsideration of the court’s decision. Following a hearing, this motion was denied. The State now appeals raising the following issues:
1) Whether SDCL 29A-2-101 mandates that words of disinheritance in Jetter’s will apply to the testator’s property?
2) Whether the disinheriting clause in Jet-ter’s will is ambiguous?
[28]*283) Whether the trial court erred in holding that Jetter’s estate passes by intestate succession to his heirs?
[¶ 8.] Appellees are heirs of Frances Schwab Jetter, Jetter’s mother, and heirs of John Carl Jetter, Jetter’s alleged half-blood brother. Heirs of John Carl Jetter filed a notice of review but waived consideration of any issues raised therein by failing to brief them. SDCL 15-26A-60(6); Peterson v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 400 N.W.2d 909, 912 (S.D.1987).
DECISION
[¶ 9.] 1. Whether SDCL 29A-2-101 mandates that words of disinheritance in Jetter’s will apply to the testator’s property?
[¶ 10.] SDCL 29A-2-101 is part of the newly-enacted South Dakota Uniform Probate Code and this Court has not, until now, had the opportunity to interpret this statute.1 The question presented is one of first impression. This Court interprets statutes under a de novo standard of review without deference to the decision of the trial court. City of Brookings v. Winker, 1996 SD 129, ¶ 4, 554 N.W.2d 827, 828; In re Estate of Steed, 521 N.W.2d 675, 680 (S.D.1994).
[¶ 11.] In addition, this Court has previously noted:
Statutes are to be construed to give effect to each statute and so as to have them exist in harmony. State v. Woods, 361 N.W.2d 620, 622 (S.D.1985); Matter of Exploration Permit Renewal, 323 N.W.2d 858, 860 (S.D.1982). It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the intention of the law is to be primarily ascertained from the language expressed in the statute. Petition of Famous Brands, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 882, 884 (S.D.1984). In addition, we are statutorily mandated to interpret uniform laws such as the [UPC] ‘to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.’ SDCL 2-14-13.
Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, 424 N.W.2d 649, 653 (S.D.1988).
[¶ 12.] SDCL 29A-2-101 provides that:
(a) Any part of a decedent’s estate not effectively disposed of by will or otherwise passes by intestate succession to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed in this code, except as modified by the decedent’s will.
(b) A decedent by will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession. If that individual or a member of that class survives the decedent, the share of the decedent’s intestate estate to which that individual or class would have succeeded passes as if that individual or all members of that class had disclaimed their intestate shares.
(emphasis added). This statute was adopted from the Uniform Probate Code § 2-101, 1990 version, and is nearly identical to UPC § 2-101.2 As such, it is appropriate to examine the Official Comment to the 1990 revision of UPC § 2-101(b):
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GILBERTSON, Justice.
[¶ 1.] The State of South Dakota and the Office of the Commissioner of School and Public Lands (State) appeal from a trial court’s order denying the State’s claim of escheat. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶2.] Robert G. Jetter (Jetter) and his brother Martin farmed and ranched together in Haakon County near Milesville, South Dakota. Neither brother ever married nor had children. They spent their entire fives solely devoted to their ranching pursuits and through decades of diligent hard work, they were successful at it.
[¶3.] In 1981, Jetter contacted attorney Russell C. Molstad and executed a will which devised all of his property to his brother Martin in the second provision to the will. Viewed in isolation, the will’s third provision purported to disinherit all of Jetter’s other relatives:
I have intentionally omitted all of my heirs and all other persons whomsoever, who are not specifically mentioned herein, and I hereby generally and specifically disinherit each and all persons whomsoever claiming to be my heirs-at-law and each and all persons whomsoever who, if I died intestate, would be entitled to any part of my estate except those herein provided for.
The following year, Martin contacted attorney Molstad and executed a nearly identical will, leaving all of his property to Jetter and including a provision purporting to disinherit all of Martin’s other relatives. '
[¶ 4.] Martin died in December 1990. Jet-ter inherited all of Martin’s property under his will. At the time of Martin’s ■ death, Jetter was-incompetent and remained so up until his death. He was living in a nursing home and did not attend his brother’s funeral. He was unaware his brother had died and was likewise unaware of any of his relatives or of the nature and extent of any property he owned. A guardianship was established for Jetter approximately one month after Martin died.
[¶ 5.] Jetter died six years later on- October 2,1996. At the time of his death, he was still residing in a nursing home in Philip, South Dakota. He had amassed an estate estimated to be worth 3.2 million dollars in real and personal property. The will he executed in 1981 was admitted into probate and declared valid.
[¶ 6.] The personal representative petitioned for determination of heirship. A hearing on this petition was held December 5, 1996. Following that hearing, the trial court ruled the disinheriting clause in Jetter’s will was not applicable and that his estate was to pass to his heirs by intestate succession unrestricted by the disputed “disinheritance” clause. The court concluded “[t]he plain language of Robert G. Jetter’s Will indicates that he wanted to disinherit his other heirs if Martin was [sic] alive, but there is no indication that he intended to disinherit them if Martin Jetter predeceased him.” From this, the trial court concluded the will made an ineffective disposition and that Jetter’s property would be distributed pursuant to the law of intestacy.
[¶ 7.] The trial court denied the State’s escheat claim. The State motioned for reconsideration of the court’s decision. Following a hearing, this motion was denied. The State now appeals raising the following issues:
1) Whether SDCL 29A-2-101 mandates that words of disinheritance in Jetter’s will apply to the testator’s property?
2) Whether the disinheriting clause in Jet-ter’s will is ambiguous?
[28]*283) Whether the trial court erred in holding that Jetter’s estate passes by intestate succession to his heirs?
[¶ 8.] Appellees are heirs of Frances Schwab Jetter, Jetter’s mother, and heirs of John Carl Jetter, Jetter’s alleged half-blood brother. Heirs of John Carl Jetter filed a notice of review but waived consideration of any issues raised therein by failing to brief them. SDCL 15-26A-60(6); Peterson v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 400 N.W.2d 909, 912 (S.D.1987).
DECISION
[¶ 9.] 1. Whether SDCL 29A-2-101 mandates that words of disinheritance in Jetter’s will apply to the testator’s property?
[¶ 10.] SDCL 29A-2-101 is part of the newly-enacted South Dakota Uniform Probate Code and this Court has not, until now, had the opportunity to interpret this statute.1 The question presented is one of first impression. This Court interprets statutes under a de novo standard of review without deference to the decision of the trial court. City of Brookings v. Winker, 1996 SD 129, ¶ 4, 554 N.W.2d 827, 828; In re Estate of Steed, 521 N.W.2d 675, 680 (S.D.1994).
[¶ 11.] In addition, this Court has previously noted:
Statutes are to be construed to give effect to each statute and so as to have them exist in harmony. State v. Woods, 361 N.W.2d 620, 622 (S.D.1985); Matter of Exploration Permit Renewal, 323 N.W.2d 858, 860 (S.D.1982). It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the intention of the law is to be primarily ascertained from the language expressed in the statute. Petition of Famous Brands, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 882, 884 (S.D.1984). In addition, we are statutorily mandated to interpret uniform laws such as the [UPC] ‘to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.’ SDCL 2-14-13.
Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, 424 N.W.2d 649, 653 (S.D.1988).
[¶ 12.] SDCL 29A-2-101 provides that:
(a) Any part of a decedent’s estate not effectively disposed of by will or otherwise passes by intestate succession to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed in this code, except as modified by the decedent’s will.
(b) A decedent by will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession. If that individual or a member of that class survives the decedent, the share of the decedent’s intestate estate to which that individual or class would have succeeded passes as if that individual or all members of that class had disclaimed their intestate shares.
(emphasis added). This statute was adopted from the Uniform Probate Code § 2-101, 1990 version, and is nearly identical to UPC § 2-101.2 As such, it is appropriate to examine the Official Comment to the 1990 revision of UPC § 2-101(b):
New subsection (b) authorizes the decedent, by will, to exclude or limit the right of an individual or class to share in the decedent’s intestate estate, in effect disin[29]*29heriting that individual or class. By specifically authorizing so-called negative wills, subsection (b) reverses the usually accepted common-law rule, which defeats a testator’s intent for no sufficient reason. See Note, “The Intestate Claims of Heirs Excluded by Will: Should ‘Negative Wills’ Be Enforced?,” 52 U.Chi.L.Rev. 177 (1985).
Comment, UPC § 2-101, 8 ULA 105 (Supp. 1997).3 The Comment instructs that a “principal feature” of the 1990 revision is that “[s]o-called negative wills are authorized, under which the decedent who dies intestate, in whole or in part, can by will disinherit a particular heir.” Id. at 104.4 The Comment further states:
Whether or not in an individual case the decedent’s will has excluded or limited the right of an individual or class to take a share of the decedent’s intestate estate is a question of construction. A clear case would be one in which the decedent’s will expressly states that an individual [or class] is to receive none of the decedent’s estate....
An individual need not be identified by name to be excluded.... A group or class of relatives (such as ‘my brothers and sisters’) can also be excluded under this provision.
Id. at 105.
[¶ 13.] Thus, we are called upon to determine what constitutes a “class” within the confines of SDCL 29A-2-101. Is it limited to certain finite groups such as “my brothers and sisters,” or is it so expansive as to constitute all those who would take as intestate heirs under a will thus allowing the State to argue that an escheat now exists?
[¶ 14.] Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code, a majority of states held that attempting to exclude an intestate heir from his or her share of intestate property was ineffective. This was referred to as the “American Rule.” Other states followed what was known as the “English Rule,” under which a testator could deprive an intestate heir of his or her intestate share if there were other heirs of the testator to take such property. See generally, “The Intestate Claims of Heirs Excluded by Will: Should ‘Negative Wills’ be Enforced?,” 52 U.Chi. L.Rev. 177 (1985). South Dakota never had cause to adopt either of these rules.
[¶ 15.] We were informed by the Jetter heirs that they can locate no case in the past three hundred years either in England or the United States whereby heirs were known to exist and yet an escheat was still allowed in favor of the crown or state. The State of South Dakota concedes this to be correct. However, the State argues that the South Dakota Legislature, in adopting the Uniform Probate Code, in essence rejected both the traditional American and English rules- and opted for a new rule which would authorize an escheat even where heirs are known to exist. The Jetter heirs counter that the UPC adopted the English rule.
[¶ 16.] As an overall view, we would note that the UPC does not appear to be a revolutionary departure from past probate procedure. SDCL 29A-1-103 provides that: “[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this code, the principles of law and equity supplement its provisions.”5
[30]*30[¶ 17.] Although “class” is not defined by SDCL 29A-2-101(b), we would note 29A-2-603(c)(l) provides that a “class gift” excludes a devise to “‘heirs,’ ‘next of kin,’ ‘relatives,’ ‘family’ or a class described by language of similar import.” Further, SDCL 29A-3-914 provides that:
[i]f an heir, devisee, or claimant cannot be found, the personal representative shall distribute the share of the missing person to the person’s conservator, if any, otherwise the court shall enter an order directing that the share vest in the state of South Dakota for the support of the common schools.
(emphasis added). The other statute which deals with escheat is SDCL 29A-2-105. It provides “[i]f there is no taker under the provisions of this chapter, the intestate estate passes to the State of South Dakota as provided in § 29A-S-9U” (emphasis added). Both statutes by their express terms limit escheat to the State to situations where the heirs “cannot be found,” but not where they were disinherited by a will.6
[¶ 18.] Thus, a review of all the pertinent statutes convinces us that the enactment of the UPC in South Dakota intended to adopt the English rule and that an escheat can exist only where no heirs can be found. Here heirs have been found. As such the State’s claim for escheat fails under the above statutes.7
[¶ 19.] 2. Whether the disinheriting clause in Jetter’s will is ambiguous?
[¶ 20.] “ ‘Language is ambiguous when it is reasonably capable of being under[31]*31stood in more than one sense.’ ” In re Estate of Olson, 332 N.W.2d 711, 713 (S.D.1983) (quoting Newton v. Erickson, 73 S.D. 228, 236, 41 N.W.2d 545, 549 (1950)). “ ‘[A]n ambiguity is not of itself created simply because the parties differ as to the interpretation of the [will],’ ” City of Watertown v. Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern RR Co., 1996 SD 82, ¶ 21, 551 N.W.2d 571, 576 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 291 N.W.2d 776, 778-79 (S.D.1980)). This Court reviews a will de novo, with no deference given to the trial court’s interpretation. In re Estate of Bol, 429 N.W.2d 467, 470 (S.D.1988). “[A]ll the words and provisions appearing in [a] will must be given effect as far as possible, and none should be cast aside as meaningless.” In re Estate of Bock, 85 S.D. 113, 115, 177 N.W.2d 734, 735 (1970).
[¶ 21.] The trial court prefaced its decision in this regard at the December 1996 hearing with the acknowledgment that the law abhors an escheat.8 This doctrine has been long recognized in this State as it has in numerous other jurisdictions.
The sovereign state, however, has neither desire nor moral right to escheat property, if there are in fact heirs, even though they may be negligent or dilatory in establishing their heirship.
Nelson v. State, 59 S.D. 410, 414, 240 N.W. 345, 347 (1932).
[¶ 22.] The State argues that the disinheriting clause does not state its effectiveness is contingent upon Martin’s surviving Jetter, nor does it imply the same. Furthermore, the State claims that if Martin had survived Jetter, there would be no need for the disinheriting language as Martin would have taken all of Jetter’s property under the second provision to the will; there would no be one to disinherit. The State argues that the disinheriting clause is only effective in the present situation — where Martin predeceases Jetter. “[A]ll words and provisions appearing in [a] will must be given effect as far as possible_” Bock, 85 S.D. at 115, 177 N.W.2d at 735. “To hold otherwise would be to convict a testator of performing useless acts.” Id.
[¶ 23.] The trial court based its determination that the will was ambiguous on the following facts. The State of South Dakota was not expressly named as an heir under any circumstances in the will conveying an estate worth over three million dollars at the date of Jetter’s death. The devise to Martin failed whether it be a general devise or a residuary clause as Martin predeceased Jetter leaving no descendants to take under an anti-lapse statute.9 See SDCL 29A-2-603(a)(ii); 29A-2-604. The plain language of the will indicates that Jetter wanted to disinherit his other heirs if Martin was alive, but there is no indication Jetter intended to disinherit them if Martin predeceased Jetter. The will is silent on that point. As the heirs argue, “can it honestly be said, after resolving all doubts against the State, that Robert Jetter intended the State to have his property if his brother Martin did not survive him? If he had had such a bizarre intent, would he have left any doubt?” Clearly if that had been Jetter’s intent, a single simple sentence so indicating in his will would have sufficed. However such direction cannot be found in that document.
[¶ 24.] In this type of a factual setting we find the analysis of the Supreme Court of Oregon in Bruner v. First National Bank, 250 Or. 590, 443 P.2d 645, 646 (1968) persuasive:
As we construe the will the provision disinheriting the named persons was designed simply to prevent any of them from claiming as pretermitted heirs under ORS 114.250. If testatrix had intended to preclude Raymond Mack from taking under any circumstances, it would seem that she would have made provisions to effectuate her purpose. This could have been accomplished by a .simple provision disposing of [32]*32the estate to others in the event that her daughter predeceased her.10
[¶ 25.] Attorney Molstad in drafting Jet-ter’s will may well have had similar concerns. John Carl Jetter, Jetter’s alleged half-blood brother would be treated the same under the then-existing South Dakota law, SDCL 29-1-13, repealed 1995 S.D.Sess.L. ch. 167, § 96,11 as whole-blood brother, Martin. As such, under our intestate statutes, John stood as an equal with Martin for inheritance purposes. SDCL 29-1-7, repealed 1995 S.D.Sess.L. ch 167, § 96. If John were deceased, his children had the right of representation to advance a claim. SDCL 29-1-14, repealed 1995 S.D.Sess.L. ch. 167, § 96. The fact that John and his descendants were aliens did not preclude his intestate rights. SDCL 29-1-17, repealed 1995 S.D.Sess.L. ch. 167, § 96.
[¶ 26.] The language of the third paragraph is supportive of this interpretation as Robert “specifically disinherits ... all persons whomsoever who, if I died intestate, would be entitled to any part of my estate except those herein provided for.”12 In addition, there is the reference to disinheriting those “claiming to be heirs at law,” the exact disputed status of John and his heirs upon Jetter’s death.
[¶27] There is evidentiary support for this view. Craig Hanrahan, a witness to the discussions between Jetter and Molstad and the signing of the will, testified that Molstad emphasized to Jetter that this was only a temporary will that would not constitute a permanent estate plan. Hanrahan quoted Molstad as telling Jetter this would, “just be a temporary will, and you need to get some estate planning set up, and figure out who you want to leave things to and get that down.” In addition Molstad’s notes13 list “John C. Jetter” as a half-blood brother and list one child by John’s first wife and four children by John’s second wife and then states: “disinherit all above.” Hanrahan quoted Jetter at the time of the signing of Jetter’s will that Martin and Jetter were “getting kind of tired of loaning money” to these relatives and that “Barb and her brother and sisters, they think we’re a couple of crazy old bastards living out here and we don’t want them to have a f — k—g thing.” While “Barb and her brother and sisters” had fallen into apparent disfavor with Jetter at this point, the Molstad notes show that other relatives were discussed and were not included in this negative comment by Jetter. Where a will is ambiguous on its face, such extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish the intent of the testator. In re Estate of Nelson, 250 N.W.2d 286, 288 (S.D.1977); In re Estate of King 278 N.W.2d 171, 173 (S.D. 1979).
[¶ 28.] People do not go to a lawyer to have a will drawn with the idea that their estate will pass under the intestate succession laws. That is the whole purpose of a will, to avoid the State’s estate plan by creating your own. Thus, it seems eminently more logical that Jetter had Molstad draft the disinheritance language of the third paragraph to preclude [33]*33claims from would-be known and unknown relatives, that they were unintentionally omitted, rather than the conclusion that this clause was Robert’s intention of leaving all his property to the State of South Dakota. See Kimley v. Whittaker, 63 N.J. 235, 306 A.2d 443 (1973) (the court arriving at a similar analysis in a case involving a nearly identical fact pattern).
[¶ 29.] Ordinarily in an escheat issue, there is no will and thus the escheat arises by force of law. Here however, intent is a crucial issue. The record is absolutely void of any hint that Jetter wished to leave the substantial fruits of his life-long labors to the State. There is no evidence of inter vivos gifts to the State and not one statement attributed to either of the Jetter brothers that they wanted their assets to go to the State. Based on this, can it be concluded that Jetter elected to leave nothing to his relatives, leave nothing to his friends, leave nothing to the local charities and churches, or leave nothing to the local schools so that all his worldly possessions could go to the State of South Dakota?
[¶ 30.] We conclude the will is ambiguous and affirm the trial court on this issue.
[¶ 31.] 3. Whether the trial court erred in holding that Jetter’s estate passes by intestate succession to his heirs?
[¶ 32,] As has been determined, the will of Jetter is ambiguous and under the South Dakota Uniform Probate Code the State is not entitled to an escheat. This final issue then addresses what is the proper disposition of Jetter’s estate. The question calls for a construction of SDCL 29A-2-604. This statute provides:
(a) A devise, other than a residuary devise, that fails for any reason becomes a part of the residue.
(b) A residuary devise that fails for any reason passes to the testator’s heirs unless the residue is devised to two or more persons, in which event the failed devise passes to the other residuary devisee, or to other residuary devisees in proportion to the interest of each in the remaining part of the residue.
(emphasis added).
[¶ 33.] As noted previously in paragraph 23, the devise to Martin, which is for Jetter’s entire estate, cannot be preserved by South Dakota’s anti-lapse statute, SDCL 29A-2-603(a)(ii), as Martin left no descendants surviving Jetter. Thus, this devise lapses and becomes part of the residue under SDCL 29A-2-604(a). Since Jetter made no provision for the distribution of the residue, SDCL 29A-604(b) provides the estate passes to Jetter’s heirs.14
[¶ 34.] In accord is SDCL 29A-2-101(a) which states that: “[a]ny part of a decedent’s estate not effectively disposed of by will or otherwise passes by intestate succession to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed in this code, except as modified by the decedent’s will.” We agree with the rationale of the trial court that the term “except as modified by the decedent’s will” can only be interpreted as meaning that the modifications in the will must effectively dispose of the estate and if the modifications in the will do not do so, then the estate “passes by intestate succession to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed in this code.” As there is no modification plainly indicated, the statutes control and the estate passes to the intestate heirs. Schalk v. Dickinson, 89 S.D. 263, 272, 232 N.W.2d 140, 145 (1975).15
CONCLUSION
[¶35.] We affirm the trial court for the above reasons. We remand to the trial court for completion of the probate proceedings.
[34]*34[¶ 36.] AMUNDSON and KONENKAMP, JJ., concur.
[¶ 37.] SABERS, J., and DeVINE, Circuit Judge, dissent.
[¶ 38.] DeVINE, Circuit Judge, sitting for MILLER, Chief Justice, disqualified.