Matter of Dallas X. v. Belinda Y.
This text of Matter of Dallas X. v. Belinda Y. (Matter of Dallas X. v. Belinda Y.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Family Court, Tompkins County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
| Matter of Dallas X. v Belinda Y. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50347(U) [88 Misc 3d 1235(A)] |
| Decided on February 18, 2026 |
| Family Court, Tompkins County |
| Miller, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on February 18, 2026
In the Matter of a
Custody Proceeding Under
Article 6 of the Family Court Act Dallas X., Petitioner, against Belinda Y., Respondent. |
Docket No. XXXX
Petitioner father was represented by Attorney Robert Baska, Esq.
Respondent mother was represented by Attorney Todd Livingston, Esq.
Citizens Concerned for Children, Inc. (Attorney Elizabeth McGrath, Esq.) represented the child
Scott A. Miller, J.
On July 22, 2025, Dallas X. (hereinafter "the father") filed a modification petition seeking increased contact with the parties' child (date of birth: XX/XX/19) (hereinafter "the child"). On October 20, 2025, Belinda Y. (hereinafter "the mother") filed an answer and counter-petition for modification seeking suspension of the father's contact and communication with the child. The prior Article 6 order, entered March 4, 2021, granted the mother sole legal custody and placement of the child with the father to have one hour of supervised visitation with the child per week, plus additional supervised parenting time as mutually agreed. The order provides that the father may re-petition for modification upon "proof of compliance with [*2]probation and any recommended services for a consistent period of six months without otherwise alleging a change in circumstances."
The fact-finding hearing was scheduled for February 2, 2026. The father appeared with counsel, Attorney Robert Baska, Esq. Counsel for the mother, Attorney Todd Livingston, Esq., appeared. The Attorney for the Child, Elizabeth McGrath, Esq., Citizens Concerned for Children, Inc., appeared. The mother did not appear. The Court dismissed the mother's petition without prejudice for failure to prosecute and held an inquest on the father's petition. Attorney Livingston remained for the hearing but did not participate. The father called his wife as his only witness. She testified on direct examination and was cross-examined by Attorney McGrath. The father then rested his case. Attorney McGrath then called the father as her only witness. He was questioned by both Attorney McGrath and Attorney Baska.
At the hearing, the Court took judicial notice of a final order of protection issued in the Integrated Domestic Violence Part of the Supreme Court by Judge John C. Rowley against the father in favor of the mother and child on November 12, 2021 — just eight months after entry of the prior Article 6 order set forth above. The order of protection prohibits the father from engaging in all contact and communication with the mother and child except for any contact, communication, and access permitted by subsequent order issued by a family or supreme court in a custody, visitation, or child abuse or neglect proceeding. The order of protection was issued upon the father's conviction for Attempted Burglary in the Second Degree. The order is in effect until November 11, 2031. At the hearing, the Court also took judicial notice of the fact that the father was in prison prior to the filing of the within petitions. At the conclusion of the fact-finding, a Lincoln hearing was scheduled.
On February 6, 2026, Attorney Livingston filed a motion to vacate the default. Per the AFC's request, the Court adjourned the Lincoln hearing pending determination of this motion. On February 8, 2026, Attorney Baska filed an affirmation in opposition to the mother's motion to vacate. On February 10, 2026, AFC McGrath filed an affirmation in support of the mother's motion to vacate. On February 17, 2026, Attorney Baska filed a second affirmation in opposition. The Court has reviewed all filings.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
"In order to vacate a default judgment, the moving party is 'required to demonstrate both that there was a reasonable excuse for his or her failure to appear and that [he or she] had a meritorious defense against the allegations addressed at the hearing' [internal citations omitted]." Matter of Shannon NN. V. Tarrin OO.. 194 AD3d 1138 (3rd Dept. 2021). "Further, whether to vacate a default judgment is a determination that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, 'subject to reversal only where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion' [internal citations omitted]." 135 Bowery, LLC v. 10717, LLC, 145 AD3d 1225, 1227 (3rd Dept. 2016). In custody proceedings pursuant to Article 6 of the Family Court Act, courts have adopted a liberal policy in favor of vacating defaults. See Matter of Lemon v. Faison, 150 AD3d 1003, 1005 (2nd Dept. 2017). The Third Department has held that, "'[a]lthough it is true that a motion to vacate a default judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, it is also true that disposition on the merits is favored' [internal citations omitted]." Matter of Brown v. Eley, 107 AD3d 1334, 1335 (3rd Dept. 2013). Further, "the lack of a full hearing to determine the best interests of the [child], a determination in which Family Court 'is bound to assess numerous factors,' constitutes a meritorious defense [internal citations omitted]." Id. at 1336.
In Menditto v. Collier, the Third Department held that the family court abused its [*3]discretion when it denied a father's motion to vacate a default judgment in a custody case. Menditto v. Collier, 101 AD3d 1409, 1410 (3rd Dept. 2012). In that case, the father appeared at the court hours after his scheduled appearance and wrote a letter to the court citing car trouble as the reason for his failure to appear. The Third Department found this to be a "reasonable excuse." Id. The Court noted that "no prejudice accrued to the mother, as she was on notice that he intended to oppose the violation petition." Id. The Third Department held that, "[m]oreover, and of paramount importance in this custody case, Family Court failed to make any findings relative to the best interests of the child, which it was required to do prior to changing an established custody arrangement [internal citations omitted]." Id.
Here, as in Menditto, the Court finds that the mother has established both a reasonable excuse for her failure to appear and a meritorious defense or claim, and that the Court must hear from both parties before making any findings relative to the best interests of the child as it is required to do. The mother cites that there was a misunderstanding with the person who was to provide her transportation to the courthouse on the date of the scheduled hearing. The Court is sensitive to the transportation issues facing its litigants, many of whom cannot afford to own or lease their own vehicle. The Court further notes that the mother has routinely appeared in court before this judge, both on the within petitions and in prior litigation between these same parties, dating back to June of 2020.
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